

States to refuse financial aid to any country furnishing or selling arms or other war materials to Red China; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Also, memorial of the Legislature of the State of Massachusetts, memorializing the President and the Congress of the United States to restore certain postal services; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

Also, memorial of the Legislature of the State of New York, concerning interstate civil defense and ratifying on behalf of the State of New York a compact therefor; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

Also, memorial of the Legislature of the State of Vermont, memorializing the President and the Congress of the United States to support the agricultural conservation program; to the Committee on Agriculture.

PRIVATE BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 1 of rule XXII, private bills and resolutions were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. ASPINALL:

H. R. 3810. A bill for the relief of Aldo Valessa; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. DEANE:

H. R. 3811. A bill with respect to the national service life insurance in the case of the late Guy P. Harris; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H. R. 3812. A bill for the relief of the estate of Staff Sgt. Harry M. Manson; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. DENTON:

H. R. 3813. A bill for the relief of Kenneth Cecil; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. FARRINGTON:

H. R. 3814. A bill for the relief of Yoshiko Tokeshi; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H. R. 3815. A bill for the relief of Kakutaro and Chiyo Horio Okumura; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H. R. 3816. A bill for the relief of Otome Goto; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H. R. 3817. A bill for the relief of Wa Ja Shin; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H. R. 3818. A bill for the relief of Yutaka Nakaeda; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. FISHER:

H. R. 3819. A bill for the relief of Ann Elisabeth (Diana Elizabeth) Reingruber; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. HARRIS:

H. R. 3820. A bill for the relief of Houston Hodges; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mr. HEDRICK:

H. R. 3821. A bill for the relief of Hildegard Mintz; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. HELLER:

H. R. 3822. A bill for the relief of Roy S. Moore; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. HOEVEN:

H. R. 3823. A bill for the relief of Shozo Ichiwawa; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. KLEIN:

H. R. 3824. A bill for the relief of Chee-on Wong, Chee-leong Wong, Qew-yuen Wong, and Mee-yuen Wong; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. McGRATH:

H. R. 3825. A bill for the relief of Marlene Bruckner; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. MASON:

H. R. 3826. A bill for the relief of Giuseppe Panzarino; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. ROGERS of Colorado:

H. R. 3827. A bill for the relief of Setsuko Ogawa Tapper; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

PETITIONS, ETC.

Under clause 1 of rule XXII, petitions and papers were laid on the Clerk's desk and referred as follows:

238. By Mr. GOODWIN: Resolution of Metropolitan Pomona Grange, No. 30, Winter Hill, Mass., opposing H. R. 1652 relating to an increase in automobile taxes; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

239. By Mr. GRAHAM: Petition of 21 residents of Beaver County, Pa., opposing any universal military training bill that does not prohibit the sale of alcoholic beverages to servicemen; to the Committee on Armed Services.

240. By Mr. HESELTON: Resolution of the General Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts memorializing Congress to refuse financial aid to any country furnishing or selling arms or other war materials to Red China; to the Committee on Appropriations.

241. Also, resolution of the General Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts memorializing the Congress of the United States to protest Communist rule in Poland; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

242. Also, resolution of the General Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts requesting the Congress of the United States to enlist the aid of the State Department to bring about the return of certain Greek children kidnaped by the Communists; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

243. Also, resolution of the General Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts memorializing the Congress of the United States to publish the names of all persons, firms, and corporations who are doing business with Communist countries and to bar them from doing business with the United States Government or with any agency thereof; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

244. Also, resolution of the General Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts memorializing the Congress of the United States to restore certain postal services; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

245. By Mr. SMITH of Wisconsin: Resolution of the Women's Auxiliary to the Wisconsin State Dental Society, Racine, Wis., opposing any form of compulsory health insurance legislation as being detrimental to the national welfare; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

246. Also, resolution of the Kenosha Retail Druggists Association, Kenosha, Wis., reaffirming faith in the American, voluntary way to safeguard the Nation's health and insure against the costs of illness and unequivocally oppose any form of national compulsory health insurance as a dangerous step toward complete acceptance of a planned, socialistic economy; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

247. Also, resolution of the Newville Mother's Club, Edgerton, Wis., reaffirming faith in the American, voluntary way to safeguard the Nation's health and insure against the costs of illness and unequivocally oppose any form of national compulsory health insurance as a dangerous step toward complete acceptance of a planned, socialistic economy; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

248. Also, resolution of the Kenosha Druggists' Auxiliary, Kenosha, Wis., to reaffirm faith in the American, voluntary way to safeguard the Nation's health and insure against the costs of illness and unequivocally oppose any form of national compulsory health insurance as a dangerous step toward complete acceptance of a planned, socialistic economy; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

249. Also, resolution of the James Knutson Post, No. 322, Wisconsin Department of the American Legion, Babcock, Wis., urging the

Congress of the United States to reexamine the present policies of our Nation relative to Communist aggression and to proceed forthwith with action which will (a) end the Korean War, if that is possible, by military victory, and (b) proceed to the war with Soviet Russia with all available weapons if the decision of the Kremlin is to back Communist China in an all-out war; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

250. By the SPEAKER: Petition of Lester Washburn, chairman, Waukesha County Democratic Organizing Committee of Wisconsin, Madison, Wis., commending the President of the United States for his action in relieving Gen. Douglas MacArthur of his commands in the Far East; to the Committee on Armed Services.

251. Also, petition of R. Roy Keaton, director-general, Lions International, Chicago, Ill., petitioning consideration of their resolution with reference to endorsement of statehood for Hawaii; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

252. Also, petition of Amerigo D'Agostino, chairman, congressional trends committee, Association of Immigration and Nationality Lawyers, New York, N. Y., urging the passage of H. R. 400; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

SENATE

TUESDAY, APRIL 24, 1951

(Legislative day of Tuesday, April 17, 1951)

The Senate met at 12 o'clock meridian, on the expiration of the recess.

The Chaplain, Rev. Frederick Brown Harris, D. D., offered the following prayer:

Our Father God, author of liberty, grant us the lowly heart which is the only temple that can contain the infinite. Facing grave questions and perplexing problems so vitally affecting national welfare and world concord, we would begin the day by bowing in reverence, acknowledging Thee in whom we live and move and have our being. We come conscious of those lofty and eternal verities that outlast the strident noises of any day.

Strengthen us to make our utmost contribution to the healing of the tangled tragedy of our troubled world. To our stricken generation may there come peace with honor, with human dignity vindicated, and social justice the canopy of all the nations of the earth: For Thine is the kingdom to which the future belongs, and the power and the glory. Amen.

THE JOURNAL

On request of Mr. McFARLAND, and by unanimous consent, the reading of the Journal of the proceedings of Monday, April 23, 1951, was dispensed with.

MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT

A message in writing from the President of the United States submitting nominations was communicated to the Senate by Mr. Miller, one of his secretaries.

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Maurer, one of its

reading clerks, announced that the House had passed the following bills, in which it requested the concurrence of the Senate:

H. R. 3096. An act relating to the acquisition and disposition of land and interests in land by the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Federal Civil Defense Administration; and

H. R. 3464. An act to authorize the Secretary of the Navy to proceed with the construction of certain naval installations, and for other purposes.

ENROLLED JOINT RESOLUTION SIGNED

The message also announced that the Speaker had affixed his signature to the enrolled joint resolution (H. J. Res. 238) making an emergency appropriation for the fiscal year 1951, and for other purposes, and it was signed by the Vice President.

COMMITTEE MEETINGS DURING SENATE SESSIONS

On request of Mr. McCARRAN, and by unanimous consent, the State, Justice, Commerce, and Judiciary Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations was authorized to meet this afternoon during the session of the Senate, and each day hereafter until the hearings are concluded.

TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE BUSINESS

Mr. McFARLAND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senators be permitted to transact routine business, without debate.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered.

THE LATE SENATOR ARTHUR H. VANDENBERG

The VICE PRESIDENT laid before the Senate a telegram from Henri Bonnet, French Ambassador, which was ordered to lie on the table and to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

APRIL 19, 1951.

The VICE PRESIDENT,
United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.:

The great loss which the United States Senate has sustained at the passing away of Senator Vandenberg will be profoundly felt in France where the prominent part which he played in the forming of the Atlantic policy had gained him confidence and admiration. His devotion and authority in helping to carry out and develop that policy of security through close cooperation of democratic nations in every field will never be forgotten. Please accept and convey to the Members of the Senate the expression of my heartfelt condolences.

HENRI BONNET,
French Ambassador.

EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

The VICE PRESIDENT laid before the Senate the following letters, which were referred as indicated:

REPORT OF FEDERAL MARITIME BOARD AND MARITIME ADMINISTRATION

A letter from the Secretary of Commerce, transmitting, pursuant to law, a report of the Federal Maritime Board and Maritime Administration, for the year 1950 (with an accompanying report); to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

SUSPENSION OF DEPORTATION OF ALIENS—WITHDRAWAL OF NAMES

Two letters from the Attorney General, withdrawing the names of Charles William

Fohlinger, Armando Galatolo, and Vincenzo Maggiore from a report relating to aliens whose deportation he suspended more than 6 months ago, transmitted to the Senate on January 16, 1950; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

TEMPORARY ADMISSION INTO THE UNITED STATES OF CERTAIN ALIEN SEAMEN

A letter from the Attorney General, transmitting, pursuant to law, a copy of an order of the Acting Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization, dated October 20, 1950, authorizing the temporary admission into the United States, for shore-leave purposes only, of alien seamen found to be excluded as persons within one of the classes enumerated in section 1 (2) of the act of October 16, 1918 (with accompanying papers); to the Committee on the Judiciary.

REPORT OF FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION

A letter from the Administrator, Housing and Home Finance Agency, transmitting, pursuant to law, a report of the Federal National Mortgage Association, for the 6 months ended December 31, 1950 (with an accompanying report); to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

PETITIONS AND MEMORIALS

Petitions, etc., were laid before the Senate, or presented, and referred as indicated:

By the VICE PRESIDENT:

A concurrent resolution of the Legislature of the State of Minnesota; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs:

"Resolution 8

"Concurrent resolution memorializing Congress to establish a national cemetery at Birch Coulee Battlefield in Renville County, Minn.

"Whereas, on September 2 and 3, 1862, there was fought at Birch Coulee, in Renville County, a battle with the Indians of great historic importance, at which soldiers and pioneer citizens, heroically fighting against overwhelming odds, laid down their lives; and

"Whereas said battlefield has been set apart and designated as a State park and cemetery of the State of Minnesota by laws 1929, chapter 75; and

"Whereas said battlefield, by reason of its unsurpassed natural beauty and advantageous location, is eminently suitable for a national cemetery for soldier and sailor dead, and there is urgent need for such cemetery in this section of the country: Now, therefore, be it

"Resolved by the House of Representatives of the State of Minnesota (the senate concurring therein), That the Congress of the United States of America be, and hereby are, requested to establish a national cemetery upon said battlefield, and to provide for the acquisition by the United States of the necessary ground therefor, including the ground already set apart as a State park and cemetery, or so much thereof as may be required; be it further

"Resolved, That it is the sense of this legislature that in case the Congress shall establish a national cemetery upon said battlefield the State of Minnesota will cede to the United States that part of said battlefield which has already been set apart as a State park and cemetery and will consent to the acquisition by the United States of such further ground as may be desired for a national cemetery; be it further

"Resolved, That the secretary of state transmit a copy of this resolution, properly attested, by the proper officers of both houses, be sent to the President of the United States, the Secretary of War, the Presiding Officers of the Senate and House of Representatives,

and to each United States Senator and Member of Congress from the State of Minnesota.

"JOHN A. HARTLE,

"Speaker of the House of Representatives.

"C. ELMER ANDERSON,
"President of the Senate.

"Passed the house of representatives the 7th day of March 1951.

"G. H. LEAHY,

"Chief Clerk, House of Representatives.

"Passed the senate the 6th day of April 1951.

"H. Y. TORREY,

"Secretary of the Senate.

"Approved April 12, 1951.

"LUTHER W. YOUNGDAHL,

"Governor of the State of Minnesota."

A resolution of the Senate of the State of California; to the Committee on Foreign Relations:

"Senate Resolution 114

"Resolution relative to the use of Chinese Nationalist troops in combat against Chinese Communists

"Whereas during the past few days California's National Guard, Fortieth Division, arrived in Japan; and

"Whereas President Harry S. Truman has seen fit to relieve General of the Army Douglas MacArthur of all authority as commander of United Nations Forces in Korea, commander of United States Military Forces, Far East Theater, for alleged noncooperation; and

"Whereas General MacArthur has advocated the use of Chinese Nationalist military troops in combat against Chinese Communist military forces; and

"Whereas such dismissal indicates an opinion of the President of the United States to refuse to allow Chinese Nationalist troops to aid and assist United States military forces presently engaged in combat against Communist military units in Korea; and

"Whereas the Senate of the State of California recognizes that the military action in Korea is but a battle in the war against communism; and

"Whereas the Chinese Nationalist army leaders have indicated their desire to aid and assist United States forces in engaging in combat for the purposes of defeating and destroying the Chinese Communist military forces; and

"Whereas all governments of nations desirous of joining in a crusade to destroy communistic aggressors should be encouraged and utilized to the end that the majority of lives sacrificed in the present conflict against the Chinese Communist troops should not be drawn in vast measure from American military personnel, and in particular the anticipated use of the California Fortieth National Guard Division: Therefore

"The Senate of the State of California respectfully memorializes the President of the United States to seriously reexamine the desirability of permitting the use of Chinese Nationalist military forces in the common cause of destroying Chinese Communist aggression in Asia, and the utilization of Chinese Nationalist troops prior to, or in conjunction with, utilization of California Fortieth National Guard Division in combat.

"J. A. BEEK,

"Secretary of the Senate."

A joint resolution of the Legislature of the State of California; to the Committee on Public Works:

"Senate Joint Resolution 25

"Joint resolution relative to memorializing Congress to enact H. R. 3110

"Whereas it has come to the attention of the Legislature of the State of California that on March 7, 1951, H. R. 3110 was intro-

duced in the House of Representatives of the Congress of the United States; and

"Whereas H. R. 3110 is entitled 'A bill to permit the allocation of funds under the Federal Highway Act for the construction, reconstruction, or maintenance of highway approaches to certain toll bridges which are part of the strategic network of highways'; and

"Whereas H. R. 3110 is of vital importance to the United States, the State of California, and the San Francisco Bay region because its enactment would permit the Commissioner of Public Roads to extend Federal aid in accordance with the Federal Highway Act, for the construction and improvement of much-needed highway approaches to the Golden Gate Bridge and the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge; and

"Whereas the construction and improvement of approaches to the Golden Gate Bridge and the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge are urgently needed at the present time because the ever-increasing tempo of our national defense efforts and consequent mushrooming of military traffic places an unduly heavy burden on the existing approach facilities of these bridges while the free flow of military and civilian traffic in the San Francisco Bay region is a prime requisite to the National and State emergency defense programs: Now, therefore, be it

"Resolved by the Senate and Assembly of the State of California (jointly), That the Legislature of the State of California, in the interests of the welfare and safety of the people of the State of California, hereby respectfully memorializes and urgently requests the Congress of the United States of America to enact H. R. 3110 without delay; and be it further

"Resolved, That the secretary of the senate is hereby requested to transmit copies of this resolution to the President and Vice President of the United States, to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the chairman of the House Committee on Public Works, and to each Senator and Representative from California in the Congress of the United States."

A joint resolution of the Legislature of the State of California; to the Committee on Foreign Relations:

"Assembly Joint Resolution 27

"Joint resolution relative to Gen. Douglas MacArthur

"Whereas Gen. Douglas MacArthur has countless admirers throughout our Nation and the world because of his outstanding ability as a military leader; and

"Whereas it is impossible to enumerate General MacArthur's achievements, which range from becoming brigadier general at the early age of 38, Superintendent of West Point at 39, Chief of Staff of the United States Army, Supreme Commander of Allied Land, Air, and Sea Forces in the South Pacific during World War II, and Allied Supreme Commander accepting the surrender of Japan, where he remained as Supreme Commander; and

"Whereas General MacArthur has further distinguished himself by conducting the Korean war as Supreme Commander for the United Nations under extraordinary conditions: Now, therefore, be it

"Resolved by the Assembly and Senate of the State of California (jointly), That the members of the legislature express their admiration for Gen. Douglas MacArthur's distinguished military record; and be it further

"Resolved, That the chief clerk of the assembly is directed to send copies of this resolution to the President and Vice President of the United States, to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and to each Senator and Representative from California in the Congress of the United States, and to Gen. Douglas MacArthur."

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A concurrent resolution of the Legislature of the State of Florida; to the Committee on the Judiciary:

"Senate Concurrent Resolution 2

"Concurrent resolution ratifying the proposed amendment to the Constitution of the United States relating to the terms of office of the President of the United States

"Whereas the Eightieth Congress of the United States of America in both Houses by a constitutional majority of two-thirds thereof has made the following proposition to amend the Constitution of the United States of America, in the following words, to wit:

"Joint resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States relating to the terms of office of the President

"Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled (two-thirds of each House concurring therein), That the following article is hereby proposed as an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part of the Constitution when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States:

"ARTICLE —

"SECTION 1. No person shall be elected to the office of the President more than twice, and no person who has held the office of President, or acted as President, for more than 2 years of a term to which some other person was elected President shall be elected to the office of the President more than once. But this article shall not apply to any person holding the office of President when this article was proposed by the Congress, and shall not prevent any person who may be holding the office of President, or acting as President, during the term within which this article becomes operative from holding the office of President or acting as President during the remainder of such term.

"SEC. 2. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States within 7 years from the date of its submission to the States by the Congress": Therefore be it

"Resolved by the Senate of the State of Florida (the house of representatives concurring), That the said proposed amendment to the Constitution of the United States be, and the same is hereby, ratified by the Legislature of the State of Florida; be it further

"Resolved, That certified copies of the foregoing preamble and resolution be immediately forwarded by the secretary of state of the State of Florida, under the great seal, to the President of the United States, the Secretary of State of the United States, the President of the Senate of the United States, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives of the United States."

A resolution of the House of Representatives of the Territory of Alaska; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs:

"House Memorial 36

"To the President of the United States, to the Congress of the United States, to the Secretary of the Interior, and to the Delegate from Alaska:

"Your memorialist, the House of Representatives of the Territory of Alaska, in twentieth session assembled, respectfully represents that—

"Whereas the people of the Territory of Alaska desiring the fullest measure of self-government are requesting Congress to grant them statehood at the earliest opportunity; and

"Whereas a bill providing for admission of Alaska as a State of the Union failed to

become law in the Eighty-first Congress; and has again been introduced in the first session of the Eighty-second Congress; and

"Whereas this bill provides for an appointive secretary of Alaska, which is not the usual process; and

"Whereas all States have an elective lieutenant governor, it is desirable that the bill be amended so as to provide for an elective lieutenant governor for Alaska; and

"Whereas the acquisition of an additional measure of self-government through provision for the election, by the people of the Territory, of their own Governor, will constitute an important and decisive step toward the achievement of the ultimate goal of statehood for Alaska; and will aid and not detract from the statehood cause; and

"Whereas the people of Alaska deem themselves fully qualified and capable at the present time to exercise all the duties and prerogatives of full citizens:

"Now, therefore, your memorialist, the House of Representatives of the Territory of Alaska, respectfully urges the Congress of the United States to make provision by appropriate action for the election, by the people of the Territory, of the Governor of that Territory.

"And your memorialist will ever pray.

"Passed by the house March 20, 1951.

"WM. A. EGAN,

"Speaker of the House.

"Attest:

"MARGARET O. GRISHAM,

"Chief Clerk of the House.

"Approved by the Governor March 27, 1951.

"ERNEST GRUENING,

"Governor of Alaska."

A concurrent resolution of the Legislature of the State of Michigan, relating to the recall of Gen. Douglas MacArthur; to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

(See concurrent resolution printed in full when presented by Mr. FERGUSON on April 23, 1951, p. 4135, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.)

A resolution adopted by the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the United States of America, New York, relating to segregation and discrimination in the utilization of manpower for the armed services; to the Committee on Armed Services.

An act of the Legislature of the State of New York, relating to interstate civil defense and ratifying on behalf of the State of New York a compact therefor; to the Committee on Armed Services.

A resolution adopted by the Chevy Chase Citizens' Association of the District of Columbia, extending its greetings to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur on his return to this country; to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

A resolution adopted by the National Council of the Jewish Young Fraternalists, New York, N. Y., relating to the renazification and remilitarization of Western Germany (with an accompanying paper); to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

A resolution adopted at the National General Assembly of the Daughters of the American Colonists, in Washington, D. C., protesting against the recall of Gen. Douglas MacArthur; to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

A letter in the nature of a memorial from the Spokane (Wash.) Women's Republican Club, signed by Florence Marks, president, and Margaret L. Calland, corresponding secretary, enclosing copies of telegrams which they sent to the President of the United States and General MacArthur, relating to the recall of General MacArthur; to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

A resolution adopted by the Board of Directors of Lions International, at Honolulu, T. H., favoring the enactment of legislation providing statehood for Hawaii; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

A resolution adopted by the Pittsburgh (Pa.) Umpires' Association, favoring the enactment of legislation providing a 17 percent increase in compensation for postal employees; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

A telegram in the nature of a petition from Harry Darby, of Kansas City, Kans., relating to the death of the late Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg; ordered to lie on the table.

By Mr. SALTONSTALL (for himself and Mr. LODGE):

Two resolutions of the General Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts; to the Committee on Foreign Relations:

"Resolution requesting the Congress of the United States to enlist the aid of the State Department to bring about the return of certain Greek children kidnaped by the Communists

"Resolved, That the General Court of Massachusetts hereby urges the Congress of the United States to enlist the efforts of the State Department to bring about the return to their homes of 28,000 Greek children kidnaped in Greece by the Communists; and be it further

"Resolved, That copies of this resolution be sent forthwith by the secretary of the Commonwealth to the President of the United States, to the presiding officer of each branch of Congress, and to the Members thereof from this Commonwealth.

"In house of representatives, adopted April 5, 1951.

"LAWRENCE R. GROVE, Clerk.

"In senate, adopted, in concurrence, April 10, 1951.

"IRVING N. HAYDEN, Clerk.

"A true copy.

"Attest:

"EDWARD J. CRONIN,

"Secretary of the Commonwealth."

"Resolution memorializing Congress to refuse financial aid to any country furnishing or selling arms or other war materials to Red China

"Resolved, That the General Court of Massachusetts hereby petitions the Congress of the United States to pass legislation refusing financial aid to any country furnishing or selling arms or other war materials to Red China; and be it further

"Resolved, That copies of this resolution be sent forthwith by the Secretary of the Commonwealth to the President of the United States, to the presiding officer of each branch of Congress, and to the Members thereof from this Commonwealth.

"In house of representatives, adopted, April 5, 1951.

"LAWRENCE R. GROVE, Clerk.

"In senate, adopted, in concurrence, April 10, 1951.

"IRVING N. HAYDEN, Clerk.

"A true copy.

"Attest:

"EDWARD J. CRONIN,

"Secretary of the Commonwealth."

Resolutions of the General Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce:

"Resolution memorializing the Congress of the United States to publish the names of all persons, firms, and corporations who are doing business with Communist countries and to bar them from doing business with the United States Government or with any agency thereof

"Whereas, the Government of the United States is in the process of preparing itself against aggression by Communist countries; and

"Whereas there are certain persons, firms, and corporations which continue to do busi-

ness with such Communist countries and to provide them with essential materials of war: Therefore be it

"Resolved, That the General Court of Massachusetts hereby urges the Congress of the United States to take such action as may be necessary to publish the names of all persons, firms, and corporations which are doing business with Communist countries and to enact legislation barring such persons, firms, and corporations from doing business with or entering into contracts with the United States Government or with any agency thereof; and be it further

"Resolved, That the Secretary of the Commonwealth send forthwith copies of this resolution to the President of the United States, to the presiding officer of each branch of Congress, and to the Members thereof from this Commonwealth.

"In house of representatives, adopted April 5, 1951.

"LAWRENCE R. GROVE, Clerk.

"In senate, adopted, in concurrence, April 10, 1951.

"IRVING N. HAYDEN, Clerk.

"A true copy.

"Attest:

"EDWARD J. CRONIN,

"Secretary of the Commonwealth."

Resolution of the General Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service:

"Resolution memorializing the Congress of the United States to restore certain postal services

"Whereas by reason of recent curtailments effected by the United States Post Office Department relative to the opening and closing hours of post-office stations, and the frequency of pick-ups and local deliveries, the orderly procedures of general business routine have been retarded: Therefore be it

"Resolved, That the General Court of Massachusetts recommends that the Congress of the United States take such action as will restore the postal service to its former efficiency; and be it further

"Resolved, That copies of this resolution be sent forthwith by the secretary of the Commonwealth to the President of the United States, to the presiding officer of each branch of Congress, and to the Members thereof from this Commonwealth.

"In house of representatives, adopted, April 5, 1951.

"LAWRENCE R. GROVE, Clerk.

"In senate, adopted, in concurrence, April 10, 1951.

"IRVING N. HAYDEN, Clerk.

"A true copy.

"Attest:

"EDWARD J. CRONIN,

"Secretary of the Commonwealth."

Resolution of the General Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts; to the Committee on Foreign Relations:

"Resolution memorializing the Congress of the United States to protest Communist rule in Poland

"Whereas the people of Poland are being deprived of religious and political freedom and are being subjected to indirect coercive methods of government and are the victims of Communist subjugation by an outside power, namely, Soviet Russia; and

"Whereas these people in the vast majority are thoroughly imbued with democratic ideals and are opposed to totalitarianism: Therefore be it

"Resolved, That the General Court of Massachusetts urges the Congress of the United States to protest the present communistic rule in Poland and the subjugation of the Polish people by an outside power, namely, Soviet Russia; and be it further

"Resolved, That copies of this resolution be sent forthwith by the secretary of the

commonwealth to the President of the United States, to the presiding officer of each branch of Congress and to the Members thereof from this Commonwealth.

"In house of representatives, adopted, April 5, 1951.

"LAWRENCE R. GROVE, Clerk.

"In senate, adopted, in concurrence, April 10, 1951.

"IRVING N. HAYDEN, Clerk.

"A true copy.

"Attest:

"EDWARD J. CRONIN,

"Secretary of the Commonwealth."

(The VICE PRESIDENT laid before the Senate resolutions of the General Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, identical with the foregoing, which were referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.)

REORGANIZATION OF EXECUTIVE BRANCH—RESOLUTION OF MILWAUKEE (WIS.) JUNIOR CHAMBER OF COMMERCE

Mr. WILEY. Mr. President, I present for appropriate reference a resolution adopted by the Milwaukee Junior Chamber of Commerce on the issue of the application of those remaining Hoover Commission bills which have not as yet been enacted into public law. I believe that this resolution will be of interest to my colleagues, particularly those who serve on the Senate Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments.

I believe that the resolution reflects the tremendous interest throughout my State on this over-all issue of Federal reorganization and economy.

I ask unanimous consent that the resolution be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the resolution was referred to the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, and ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

RESOLUTION ON REORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT—HOOVER REPORT

Whereas Congress clearly recognized the necessity for Government reorganization when it unanimously created the bipartisan Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government in July, 1947; and

Whereas Chairman Herbert Hoover and the members of the bipartisan Commission admirably and efficiently performed their duties of investigation and made specific recommendations to the President and the Congress, and went out of existence in June 1949; and

Whereas the Citizens Committee for the Hoover Report was organized on a National, State, and local level for the purpose of educating the citizens of the country and getting them to back up the action of their Representatives in Congress in putting through the recommendations of the Commission; and

Whereas as a result of the Commission's report and the work of the Citizens Committee, Congress and the President have enacted 50 percent of the recommendations with a consequent annual saving of over \$2,000,000,000; and

Whereas 19 bills covering the remaining recommendations of the Hoover Commission were presented on March 15 to the Senate in a program of bipartisan cosponsorship led by Senators McCLELLAN, AIKEN, BYRD, TAFT, DOUGLAS, LODGE and 14 other prominent Senators from both sides of the aisle; and

Whereas these bills together with some 40 reorganization plans being introduced by

the White House, will complete the most definite and comprehensive single legislative program ever set forth to install efficiency and economy in our Federal Government; and

Whereas the adoption of the balance of the Commission's recommendations promises lasting benefits to all citizens not only in terms of economy and efficiency, but also in terms of the effective use of our resources, human and material, in the cause of world peace and progress; and

Whereas the adoption of the balance of these recommendations will complete the reorganization of the executive branch of the Federal Government and result in a further economy and annual saving of about \$6,000,000,000 a year, and help put the brakes on inflation: Therefore be it

Resolved, That the Milwaukee Junior Chamber of Commerce at its board of directors meeting on the 12th day of April 1951, approves the recommendations of the Hoover Commission and the work being done by the Citizens Committee for the Reorganization of the Executive Branch of the Government; and be it further

Resolved, That the Milwaukee Junior Chamber of Commerce, records itself in favor of Congress adopting the 19 bills covering the remaining recommendations of the Hoover Commission at this session of Congress; and be it further

Resolved, That copies of this resolution be sent to the President of the United States, all Representatives in the Congress and to all State and local affiliated organizations, and to the Citizens Committee for Reorganization of the Executive Branch of the Government, 1421 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia 2, Pa.

REPORT OF A COMMITTEE

The following report of a committee was submitted:

By Mr. O'CONOR, from the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce:

S. 241. A bill to amend the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, as amended, to further promote the development and maintenance of the American merchant marine, and for other purposes; without amendment (Rept. No. 295).

BILLS INTRODUCED

Bills were introduced, read the first time, and, by unanimous consent, the second time, and referred as follows:

By Mr. NIXON:

S. 1372. A bill for the relief of Mrs. Madeline Viale Moore; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. MURRAY:

S. 1373. A bill authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to convey certain lands in the State of Montana to Nick Langager; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

By Mr. MURRAY (for himself and Mr. MORSE):

S. 1374. A bill providing equal pay for equal work for women, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.

By Mr. DWORSHAK:

S. 1375. A bill to authorize the decentralization of certain Government personnel, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Public Works.

By Mr. BYRD (for himself, Mr. BRICKER, Mr. KEM, Mr. ROBERTSON, Mr. WILLIAMS, and Mr. FERGUSON):

S. 1376. A bill providing for the dissolution of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and the transfer of certain functions related to national defense heretofore vested in the Reconstruction Finance Corporation; to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

By Mr. LEHMAN:

S. 1377. A bill for the relief of Irene Kramer; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. JOHNSON of Colorado:

S. 1378. A bill to transfer to the Federal Communications Commission authority to assign frequencies for use of Government-owned radio stations; and

S. 1379 (by request). A bill to clarify the provisions of section 315 of the Communications Act of 1934, relating to the use of broadcasting facilities by candidates for public office; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

AMENDMENT OF AGRICULTURAL ACT OF 1949—AMENDMENTS

Mr. HUMPHREY submitted amendments intended to be proposed by him to the bill (S. 984) to amend the Agricultural Act of 1949, which were ordered to lie on the table and to be printed.

HOUSE BILL REFERRED

The bill (H. R. 3464) to authorize the Secretary of the Navy to proceed with the construction of certain naval installations, and for other purposes, was read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on Armed Services.

EXECUTIVE REPORTS OF A COMMITTEE

As in executive session,

The following favorable reports of nominations were submitted:

By Mr. JOHNSTON of South Carolina, from the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service:

Nine postmasters.

ADDRESSES, EDITORIALS, ARTICLES, ETC., PRINTED IN THE APPENDIX

On request, and by unanimous consent, addresses, editorials, articles, etc., were ordered to be printed in the Appendix, as follows:

By Mr. NEELY:

Address by Senator MURRAY before the National Conference of the Muscular Dystrophy Association, at the Statler Hotel, New York City, April 14, 1951.

By Mr. ELLENDER (for Mr. EASTLAND):

An article entitled "Sees MacArthur's 'Greatest Hours,'" written by Edgar Poe and published in the New Orleans Times-Picayune of April 20, 1951.

By Mr. LANGER:

Comments by German newspapers on the subject of the proposed sale of the former German Embassy in Washington, D. C.

By Mr. MUNDT:

Article entitled "On Academic Freedom" written by James Marshall, and published in *Strengthening Democracy*, referring to opposition to communism by the New York City Board of Education.

By Mr. MUNDT:

Excerpts from two newsgrams appearing in *United States News and World Report*, one from the issue of April 20, 1951, and the other from the issue of April 27, 1951, with reference to the Asiatic problem and the replacement of General MacArthur.

By Mr. HENNING:

Editorial entitled "As India Starves," from the *St. Louis Globe-Democrat* of April 11, 1951, with reference to the proposed assistance to India.

By Mr. NIXON:

A letter from the board of directors of the Screen Actors Guild to Miss Gale Sondergaard, in reply to her appeal for support of her attack on the House Committee on Un-American Activities, published in the *Hollywood Reporter* of March 21, 1951.

TELEGRAM FROM EXECUTIVE COUNCIL OF INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS ENDORSING CONTINUATION OF SENATE CRIME COMMITTEE

Mr. WILEY. Mr. President, I have received from Mr. Albert J. Hayes, president of the International Association of Machinists, a fine telegram which respectfully urges the Senate to extend the life of the Senate Crime Investigating Committee.

I am delighted to have this telegram, particularly because in the past I have not always seen eye to eye with the officers of the IAM on some domestic issues. However, such differences fade into complete insignificance on an issue such as the committing of crime—an issue which is above partisan politics, above personalities, but which goes to the heart of the public interest.

Mr. Hayes did not refer in his telegram to Senate Concurrent Resolution 28, which, of course, was submitted only yesterday, and so I do not wish to infer that the telegram endorses my approach as contrasted to the approach by the Senator from Maryland [Mr. O'CONOR] who favors a joint committee.

I believe the telegram does, however, convey very clearly the deep interest of the officers of this important union organization in our crusade against crime.

Mr. Hayes suggests a permanent body for a continuing surveillance of the effectiveness of laws against crime. I personally feel that such a permanent body could well be in the form of an independent citizens crime commission at the national level. So while there may be somewhat of a difference, at least on that point, I think that Mr. Hayes is to be congratulated for placing the ranks of his considerable portion of organized labor squarely behind our fight to extend the crusade against crime.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of Mr. Hayes' telegram be printed at this point in the body of the RECORD.

There being no objection, the telegram was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

WASHINGTON, D. C., April 23, 1951.

HON. ALEXANDER WILEY,
United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.:

The executive council of the International Association of Machinists respectfully urges Members of the United States Senate to approve by unanimous consent Tuesday Senate Resolution 129, providing for continuation of the Special Senate Crime Investigating Committee to January 15, 1952, with an appropriation of \$150,000. Our council believes that the work of exposing the influence of interstate criminal syndicates on public officials at all levels of government must go on. Public opinion everywhere, not simply in a few major cities, must be so aroused that conscientious public officials and determined civic bodies may have the overwhelming support necessary to drive criminal influence out of our Nation's political affairs. No sanctuaries must be left to harbor criminal syndicates driven from other sections of the country. We believe that much of the alarming indifference of a large bloc of our citizens to political affairs can be traced to the sinister relations between criminals and some public officials. Many people are disillusioned and frustrated with government because organized crime is granted privileges

denied to ordinary citizens. In order to reestablish the respect and confidence of the general public in the various levels of government it is absolutely necessary that all of our public officials, especially our representatives serving at the national level, do everything possible to find ways and means to eliminate crime within our borders. For these reasons our executive council urges that you vote to continue the special committee during the interim which will elapse before Congress can (1) establish a permanent body for continuing surveillance of the effectiveness and enforcement of laws governing interstate criminal activity, and (2) enact adequate Federal legislation to stamp out crime.

Respectfully,

A. J. HAYES,
International President.

DAYLIGHT-SAVING TIME IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (H. R. 2612) to authorize the Board of Commissioners of the District of Columbia to establish daylight-saving time in the District of Columbia.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The bill is open to amendment.

Mr. BUTLER of Maryland. Mr. President, I should like very much to urge the immediate passage of the pending bill. It is a very vital piece of legislation to the people of my State, especially those who must commute between the Capital City and Baltimore City, and the counties adjacent to the Capital City. For instance, many persons who live in Baltimore and who desire to attend to business in Washington, would have to take a 10 o'clock train in order to arrive in Washington at 10 o'clock. Likewise, on leaving here in the evening, after conducting business in the Capital, it would be necessary, if the pending bill were not passed, that they lose an additional hour in going home in the evening. Many thousands of persons would suffer if the bill failed of passage. I cannot too strenuously urge upon Members of the Senate that the bill be enacted.

Last year I was not a Member of this body, but I understand that for a time the daylight-saving bill then proposed was held up in committee and did not pass so as to become effective on the last day of April. The confusion which resulted was untold. It was a real detriment to the business interests of the District of Columbia and caused great inconvenience to thousands of people in the States of Maryland and Virginia. For instance, in my case I would have to arise in time to take my children to school at 9 o'clock, which would be really 8 o'clock, and then I would have to take a 10 o'clock train in order to come to Washington to attend the sessions of the Senate, which would constitute the clear loss of an hour. When I left Washington, after attending to my duties in the Senate, I would lose another hour in going home. I most heartily recommend that the bill be considered and passed at this time.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The bill is open to amendment. If there be no amendment to be offered, the question is on the third reading and passage of the bill.

The bill was ordered to a third reading, read the third time, and passed.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, the Senate bill on the same subject (S. 944) will be indefinitely postponed.

Mr. LANGER subsequently said: Mr. President, the daylight saving bill was considered and passed a few moments ago. I had objected to it for the reason that in my State various commercial clubs have asked me to vote against the bill because they are very much interested in having a law passed by which we shall have the same time all over the United States. It has been a source of great embarrassment and great inconvenience to them, for example, to have the time so arranged that when it is 9 o'clock in the morning in New York, it is 8 o'clock at Bismarck, N. Dak., 7 o'clock at Mandan, N. Dak., and farther west 6 o'clock and 5 o'clock. The commercial clubs are very much interested in devising some way, if it is possible to do so, by which, when it is 9 o'clock in any part of the country it will be 9 o'clock all over the country.

The sole reason for my objecting to the bill was to bring the attitude of the commercial clubs to the attention of the Senate. I wish to say that I intend to bring the subject to the attention of the appropriate committee so that it may consider whether or not some action along that line may be feasible. I ask the distinguished majority leader to which committee such a bill would be appropriately referred.

Mr. McFARLAND. The bill which we have passed referred only to the District of Columbia. I should think that a bill of the type referred to by the Senator from North Dakota would probably be considered by the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

Mr. LANGER. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator will state it.

Mr. LANGER. The inquiry is to what committee a bill dealing with the subject would be appropriately referred.

The VICE PRESIDENT. General bills dealing with the subject throughout the country would be referred to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

Mr. LANGER. I thank the Chair. It would be impossible to amend in the manner I suggest the bill which has just passed the Senate, because I understand it refers only to the District of Columbia.

The VICE PRESIDENT. That is correct.

SUSPENSION OF CERTAIN IMPORT TAXES ON COPPER

Mr. McFARLAND. Mr. President, I move that the Senate proceed to the consideration of Calendar 202, House bill 3336.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Secretary will state the bill by title.

The CHIEF CLERK. A bill (H. R. 3336) to suspend certain import taxes on copper.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from Arizona.

The motion was agreed to; and the Senate proceeded to consider the bill (H. R. 3336) to suspend certain import taxes on copper which had been reported from the Committee on Finance with an amendment on page 2, line 2, after the numerals "1953", to insert "or the termination of the national emergency proclaimed by the President on December 16, 1950, whichever is earlier."

SCHOOL CONSTRUCTION ASSISTANCE

Mr. LEHMAN obtained the floor.

Mr. MAYBANK. Mr. President, will the Senator from New York yield for an insertion in the RECORD?

Mr. LEHMAN. I shall be glad to yield to the Senator from South Carolina, provided I do not lose the floor.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MAYBANK. Mr. President, I received a letter from United States Commissioner of Education Earl J. McGrath in the Office of Education, Federal Security Agency. I shall read only the first paragraph of it:

We have had many inquiries on applications for school construction assistance under Public Law 815.

I read in this morning's newspaper that a large number of applications had been granted in Maryland and Virginia.

Naturally, the newspaper coverage in this area would be limited, in all probability, to applications from nearby States. However, in view of the fact that the subject was mentioned in the press this morning, and in view of the fact that I have received the letter to which I have referred, I ask unanimous consent that there be printed in the RECORD at this point as a part of my remarks the letter, together with a statement from the Federal Security Agency, which was presented to the Appropriations Committee. The hearings have not yet been printed. The reason why I place it in the RECORD at this point is that information has been made available by the Federal Security Agency showing 697 applications filed as of March 12, 1951, totaling \$322,027,077. There are wide variations in the amounts of Federal funds to which States are entitled under Public Law 815, Eighty-first Congress, approved September 23, 1950. I am advised this occurs because of the specific formulas and special provisions contained in that statute. Other variations occur among States in the amount of Federal funds requested for proposed financing of school facilities construction on the basis of applications filed as of March 12, 1951.

There being no objection, the letter and statement were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

FEDERAL SECURITY AGENCY,
OFFICE OF EDUCATION,
Washington, D. C., April 23, 1951.
HON. BURNET R. MAYBANK,
United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR MAYBANK: We have had many inquiries on applications for school

construction assistance under Public Law 815. Accordingly, we are enclosing for your information a list of all school districts in your State which have submitted applications for school construction assistance under this act. The list also indicates those projects, if any, which are sufficiently high on the priority list so that funds can be reserved for the project from the appro-

priation currently available. Reservation of funds for other projects will be made if and when additional funds are made available.

Enclosed also is a brief statement of information concerning the over-all cost of financing all applications presently on file in the Office of Education, and describing the basis for determining the relative urgency of need of each project.

We want you to have this information prior to its national release. An identical letter to each member of your State delegation was delivered today to the congressional post offices.

Sincerely yours,
EARL J. McGRATH,
United States Commissioner of
Education.

Summary of information regarding applications for assistance for construction of school facilities under Public Law 815 as of Mar. 12, 1951

State	Number of entitlement applications	Amount of entitlement	Number of construction projects	Proposed financing			State	Number of entitlement applications	Amount of entitlement	Number of construction projects	Proposed financing		
				Federal funds	Local funds	Total					Federal funds	Local funds	Total
Alabama.....	27	\$11,110,050	61	\$8,380,780	\$1,826,377	\$10,207,157	Nevada.....	5	\$2,319,370	3	\$1,063,239	\$255,917	\$1,319,156
Arizona.....	19	8,041,376	31	6,049,905	3,370,911	9,420,816	New Hampshire..	4	179,609	3	155,000	680,146	835,146
Arkansas.....	18	6,204,148	45	5,100,614	888,380	5,988,994	New Jersey.....	6	1,186,785	1	225,080	19,640	245,720
California.....	58	55,500,342	59	21,616,325	14,189,253	35,805,578	New Mexico.....	12	3,963,960	21	3,869,137	1,006,393	4,875,530
Colorado.....	12	3,447,256	17	3,335,626	968,405	4,304,031	New York.....	8	1,696,702	7	3,284,494	817,190	4,101,884
Connecticut.....	10	4,930,363	0	0	0	0	North Carolina..	8	3,999,571	25	3,304,905	605,285	3,910,190
Florida.....	8	7,047,790	25	3,080,726	2,046,206	5,126,932	North Dakota....	6	259,186	5	234,201	205,859	440,060
Georgia.....	24	18,637,550	51	8,943,429	3,373,132	12,316,561	Ohio.....	25	9,116,952	20	6,800,563	3,692,836	10,493,399
Idaho.....	7	1,765,008	6	1,369,909	1,540,959	2,910,868	Oklahoma.....	22	6,578,120	22	4,019,001	1,229,718	5,248,719
Illinois.....	22	5,627,874	24	5,152,062	1,888,789	7,040,851	Oregon.....	21	2,016,342	15	1,335,566	1,978,461	3,314,027
Indiana.....	4	1,176,833	3	1,052,171	305,527	1,357,698	Pennsylvania....	9	3,149,468	12	2,627,101	2,573,295	5,200,396
Iowa.....	9	852,755	9	759,763	976,831	1,736,594	Rhode Island....	3	858,794	3	0	137,960	137,960
Kansas.....	14	7,531,245	27	4,758,275	4,858,198	9,616,473	South Carolina..	5	4,246,344	5	425,797	285,442	711,239
Kentucky.....	10	2,160,429	21	1,773,164	946,362	2,719,526	South Dakota....	3	441,049	3	441,040	364,470	805,510
Louisiana.....	13	1,664,250	15	1,664,162	1,277,722	2,941,884	Tennessee.....	17	7,129,678	28	5,335,985	4,949,191	10,285,176
Maine.....	11	1,280,751	9	457,597	571,321	1,028,918	Texas.....	72	24,118,814	121	17,654,554	4,659,405	32,313,959
Maryland.....	8	22,351,052	14	4,095,903	2,941,932	7,037,835	Utah.....	6	4,700,592	12	3,373,871	1,243,108	4,616,979
Massachusetts..	3	351,842	3	32,760	1,976,290	2,009,050	Vermont.....	1	207,760	1	0	42,277	42,277
Michigan.....	34	12,396,028	30	7,713,034	3,445,598	11,158,632	Virginia.....	17	29,720,825	46	17,604,083	10,416,670	28,020,753
Minnesota.....	12	518,416	12	229,771	1,896,632	2,126,403	Washington.....	64	33,190,631	58	18,804,009	10,143,809	28,947,818
Mississippi.....	8	2,571,639	8	1,496,425	399,588	1,896,013	Wisconsin.....	2	305,305	2	315,100	0	315,100
Missouri.....	21	3,693,966	23	2,624,372	1,324,398	3,948,770	Wyoming.....	2	1,061,340	1	76,375	157,000	233,375
Montana.....	16	1,564,608	1	613,994	0	613,994	Total.....	697	322,027,077	915	182,293,742	98,834,034	281,127,776
Nebraska.....	11	1,254,309	7	1,042,874	2,357,151	3,400,025							

Mr. MAYBANK. Mr. President, there will undoubtedly be many more applications filed under Public Law 815. My information is that many States have not applied for the full amount they might get under the statute, and some had not yet submitted any applications as of March 12. Under these circumstances it is difficult to determine how much in Federal funds the Federal Government is going to be requested to appropriate for disbursement under Public Law 815. It would be possible to evaluate the effect of this program better if more applications were on hand showing over-all requests to be made for Federal funds for reimbursement of construction costs of school facilities and for proposed construction of new school facilities. I thought it would be of interest to Senators to know the amounts of money for which various States have applied under Public Law 815, as of March 12, 1951. This is the first year in which there could be any considerable activity in the field of Federal aid in construction of school facilities under Public Law 815, which was enacted last year.

CALL OF THE ROLL

Mr. McFARLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a unanimous-consent request?

Mr. LEHMAN. I yield, provided I do not lose the floor.

Mr. McFARLAND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senator may yield for the purpose of a quorum call, without losing his right to the floor.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. McFARLAND. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Secretary will call the roll.

The roll was called, and the following Senators answered to their names:

Alken	Hendrickson	Millikin
Anderson	Hennings	Monroney
Bennett	Hickenlooper	Morse
Brewster	Hill	Mundt
Bricker	Hoey	Murray
Bridges	Holland	Neely
Butler, Md.	Humphrey	Nixon
Butler, Nebr.	Hunt	O'Connor
Byrd	Ives	O'Mahoney
Cain	Johnson, Colo.	Pastore
Capehart	Johnson, Tex.	Robertson
Carlson	Johnston, S. C.	Russell
Case	Kefauver	Saltonstall
Chavez	Kem	Schoeppel
Clements	Kerr	Smith, Maine
Connally	Kilgore	Smith, N. J.
Cordon	Knowland	Smith, N. C.
Dirksen	Langer	Sparkman
Duff	Lehman	Stennis
Dworshak	Lodge	Taft
Eastland	Long	Thye
Eaton	McCarran	Underwood
Ellender	McCarthy	Watkins
Ferguson	McClellan	Welker
Frear	McFarland	Wherry
Fulbright	McKellar	Wiley
George	McMahon	Williams
Gillette	Malone	Young
Green	Martin	
Hayden	Maybank	

Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. I announce that the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. BENTON] is necessarily absent.

The Senator from Illinois [Mr. DOUGLAS], and the Senator from Florida [Mr. SMATHERS] are absent on public business.

The Senator from Washington [Mr. MAGNUSON] is absent by leave of the Senate on official committee business.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I announce that the Senator from Vermont [Mr. FLANDERS] and the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. TOBEY] are absent on official business.

The Senator from Indiana [Mr. JENNER] is necessarily absent.

The VICE PRESIDENT. A quorum is present.

THE POLICIES ADVOCATED BY GENERAL MACARTHUR

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. President, since I wish to maintain the continuity of my argument, I do not intend to yield until the conclusion of my remarks. Of course, I shall then be very glad, indeed, to yield for questions.

The crisis of our times has deepened in recent days. To our grave external dangers has been added the danger of internal discord. The differences among us on foreign and military policy have become dramatically enlarged, not by a sudden change in the policies or programs of our Government, but by a collateral incident—the recall of General MacArthur from his far-eastern commands.

This action by the President is not, however, the basic issue. Of course, there have been many attacks in this body and elsewhere against the President's wisdom in relieving General MacArthur. But the real attacks, the real questions concern the policies which General MacArthur has openly advocated as against the policies which have been laid down and enunciated by the President and the Government of the United States.

There can no longer be doubt that an unbridgeable gulf has stretched between General MacArthur's view on military and political strategy and those of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Commander in Chief. There can be no doubt that General MacArthur sought with all his

great powers as a public figure to reverse the policies of his Government. The questions before us, then are, first, whether the President acted wisely in relieving General MacArthur on the basis of the General's refusal to accede to the policies of his Government, and, secondly, whether those policies are, in fact, sound ones, designed to meet the Nation's needs and serve the national purposes.

As for the first question, the President had no alternative. No military commander has the right to try to secure, by public appeals, approval of his own policies as against the declared policies of his Government. In this way lies utter confusion and impotence. In this way lies danger to our form of government as deadly as any which we face from abroad. Let us recall and bear in mind the traditions of our country.

Our Declaration of Independence lists as one of the prime charges against the King of England, that "He has affected to render the military independent of and superior to the civilian power."

The second resolve and declaration of the Continental Congress, on June 12, 1776 proclaimed that "in all cases the military should be under strict subordination to and governed by the civil power." And this resolve was written into the Bill of Rights and the constitutions of many States.

President Andrew Jackson, himself a military man, in his first inaugural address, on March 4, 1829, pledged that he would never disregard that salutary lesson which teaches that the military shall be held subordinate to the civil power.

This same theme has run through our entire history and has dominated our traditions in war as in peace. This undeviating insistence on the supremacy of the civil power has preserved our country and its institutions against the unhappy history of other lands. We have known no Caesar, no Napoleon, no Cromwell. In the present days, more than in any other, we need to cling to this primary and essential tradition.

President James K. Polk had his troubles with Gen. Winfield Scott. President Abraham Lincoln had his, with Gen. George McClellan. President William Howard Taft went through his crisis with General Ainsworth. In every case the civil authority emerged supreme.

In the case of General MacArthur, the civil authority was again challenged. That challenge could be met in only one way. The maintenance of the authority of the United States demanded General MacArthur's recall. The President would have dishonored his oath of office had he failed to act as he did.

I need not cite, at any length, the specific words and acts which justified the President's decision in this matter. They are all part of the public record. General MacArthur's message to the Veterans of Foreign Wars in September 1950, his communique of March 25, 1951, his letter of March 20, 1951, to the minority leader of the House of Representatives—all these specific instances have already been referred to, but above and beyond these several instances was the certain knowledge—known throughout

this country and throughout the world—that one of our generals, appointed by the President to command the forces of the United Nations, was not only a bitter and outspoken critic of the policies of the United States Government, but of the United Nations as well.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks an excellent and sober editorial from the Catholic weekly, America, on the subject of this dispute.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit A.)

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. President, I also ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD following my remarks an editorial from The Christian Century on the same subject.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit B.)

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. President, I should like to refer, at this point, to the brief announcement of last Saturday by the Department of Defense on the subject of General MacArthur's differences with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Those differences will soon be made clear to the public. The announcement said:

Operations in the Far East are being carried out in accordance with the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These views will be fully explained to the appropriate congressional committees. An analysis of the basic differences which exist between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and General MacArthur will be presented at that time.

In concluding my discussion of this phase of the matter, Mr. President, I should like to quote a statement on this subject made by an eminent Chief of Staff of the United States Army. That statement is as follows:

The national strategy of any war—that is, the selection of national objectives and the determination of the general means and methods to be applied in attaining them, as well as the development of the broad policies applicable to the prosecution of war—are decisions that must be made by the head of the state, acting in conformity with the expressed will of the Congress. No single departmental head, no matter what his particular function or title, could or should be responsible for the formulation of such decisions. For example, in every war the United States has waged, the national objective to be attained has involved the Army in land attacks against areas held by the enemy. In every instance missions have been prescribed for the Navy that had in view the assisting and facilitating of the Army's efforts. Yet in no case could these missions and objectives have been properly prescribed by the Secretaries of War and Navy acting in unison or by a single super-secretary acting for both. The issues involved were so far-reaching in their effects, and so vital to the life of the Nation, that this phase of coordinating Army and Navy effort could not be delegated by the Commander in Chief to any subordinate authority. Any such attempt would not constitute delegation, but, rather, abdication.

Who was the Chief of Staff who made that statement? It was Gen. Douglas MacArthur, in his annual report as Chief of Staff in the year 1932.

Now I should like to turn to the broader issues—the issues we have had before us,

in one form or another, since December 1949, when the last organized forces of Nationalist China suffered overwhelming defeat and were driven off the Chinese mainland.

Mr. President, ever since that time we have heard the same charges we hear today, the same accusations that the United States Government is appeasing communism in Asia while opposing communism in Europe. This charge was false in 1949. It was false in 1950. It is equally false today.

What is the fighting in Korea if it is not an effort to halt Communist aggression? We are engaged in bitter and violent hostilities in Korea. American soldiers, and Korean soldiers, too, and British, Australian, French, Filipino, Greek, and Turkish soldiers are fighting against Chinese forces and against the North Korean Communists. We are trying, with the support and under the banner of the United Nations, to halt Communist aggression in Asia. A conflict is going on in Korea, but we are not involved in an all-out war with China. There is a difference as wide as eternity.

Chinese troops are committing aggression in Korea. They have been branded as aggressors by the United Nations. Our forces and those of our allies today are fighting the Chinese—in Korea. But as bloody and costly as that struggle is, it is not a general all-out war. It is a struggle limited in geographic extent and in the size of the forces engaged. It is limited in objective, too. It is limited to repelling the aggression against the South Korean Republic.

True, Mr. President, the United Nations declared that the goal in Korea should be a unified Korea. But the United Nations did not declare that Korean unification should be achieved by all-out war with Communist China. Obviously, the vast majority of the United Nations do not desire such a war with China.

Mr. President, our allies are alive to the enormous and varied risks attendant on the proposal to bomb Manchuria and the ports of China. They realize only too well that the transportation of Chiang's troops and the support of those troops in an offensive effort against the China mainland may enmesh us in a fruitless and exhausting land campaign on the mainland against a China united against an invader. That is the grave consideration this Government, too, has considered.

Were we foolish enough to involve ourselves in all-out war with China on our own initiative—by our own overt actions—we would split the free world as cleanly as with a knife, and would isolate ourselves and would isolate the rest of the free world. In so doing, we would be doing the Kremlin's work.

Mr. President, I do not pretend to know what is in the mind of the Kremlin. I do not pretend to know what is in the mind of the Communist regime of China. They may be determined to involve us in all-out war in China; and, perhaps—although I pray not—we shall be forced into it. But let us not spare them the effort. Let us not take the initiative and stick our head into the tiger's mouth.

Let us review for a moment exactly what General MacArthur and those who share his views urge this country to do. They urge that, among other things, we bomb Manchuria and the port cities of China; that we try to establish a naval blockade of the vast coast line of China; that we enable the troops of Chiang Kai-shek in Formosa, with our logistic support, to attack the mainland of China across the Formosan Straits.

Mr. President, all this sounds very simple and easy. But let us look at these proposals a little more closely.

General MacArthur and others have referred bitterly to the existence of a privileged sanctuary for Chinese troops in China. But do not we have a privileged sanctuary, in Japan, just across the Korean Straits?

What if China retaliated for our bombing of China with an air attack on Japan? What if Chinese Communist troops launched an invasion of Formosa and the Ryukyu Islands and the Bonins? What then, Mr. President?

What if China asked Russia for so-called volunteer air units to bomb Alaska? What would be the end of it? And after we had bombed China's cities, what if China, as she undoubtedly would, asked Russia to come fully to her aid, under the terms of the Russo-Chinese defense assistance pact?

We know that such a pact exists, and we believe that the terms of that pact call for mutual aid in the event of attack against the territory of either. If we attacked China without further provocation, and if Russia came to the aid of China, would not we then be in a world war? Would the other free nations of the world judge us to be the aggressors? I do not know. I would not take the risk. To do so would be what Mr. Walter Lippmann called, the other day, a "policy of strategic lunacy." Let us await further events before calling for such an extreme and dangerous policy.

Let us look at General MacArthur's proposals from another angle—from the angle of simple and practical common sense, from the angle of simple arithmetic.

If we bombed Manchuria, Mr. President, without further provocation, we would be foolish if we did not anticipate retaliation. We would need planes and anti-aircraft equipment to guard our own installations in Japan and elsewhere against such retaliation.

If we bombed the port cities of China, or the cities inside China, we would need to assign planes for that particular purpose. Planes which are now engaged in bombing the enemy in North Korea would need to be diverted for that purpose.

Then, if we decided to arm and equip Chiang Kai-shek's troops for a landing on the mainland of China—beyond the arms we have been and are giving these forces for the defense of Formosa—we would need, in the first instance, many hundreds of millions of dollars worth of military equipment of all categories—tanks, artillery, machine guns, bazookas, and other similar types of armament. If we supplied such additional equipment to Chiang Kai-shek, it would have to be taken away from our own forces, or from

the supplies we are sending to our Allies in Europe. Obviously our supplies are still limited. We are straining every sinew here at home to produce more, but we still have far from enough to supply our own forces and those of our European Allies, as well as our anti-Communist friends in Greece, Turkey, Iran, Indochina, Malaya, Siam, and the Philippines.

If we had enough arms, we could put more South Korean troops into the field, we could outfit and equip Filipinos who have volunteered to fight in Korea. There is no end to what we could do with the supplies at the present time if we had them in unlimited quantities.

I have thus far been talking only about the initial equipment needed for a landing by Chiang Kai-shek's troops. After the Chinese Nationalist troops landed, if they landed, they would need equipment and supplies in vast and ever-increasing amounts, if they really engaged in battle against the enemy.

Still more important, we would need to transport the Chinese Nationalist troops and support their landing with naval ships, guns, and planes. For it would not be enough to set the Chinese forces down at the beach. It would be necessary to see that they got onto the beach, and that they were not wiped out. It would be necessary to assure, as far as we were able, that they were not annihilated, or driven out, or encircled. It would take vast amounts of air power and seapower and, finally, land power. It is as inevitable as the progression from A to B to C. Where would we get all this logistic and air and naval and, finally, land support? It would have to be drawn away from Korea, from the Mediterranean, and from Europe. That would be fatal to us and to the forces of freedom throughout the world.

Moreover, I presume to ask if the Chinese Nationalist troops became involved on the mainland of China, who would defend Formosa against a Chinese invasion?

Finally, what leads us to hope that Chiang Kai-shek's troops would be more successful in invading the mainland of China now than these troops were in holding the mainland of China 2 years ago? Might they not throw down their arms, surrender, and melt away into the hills as Chiang's troops did so insistently and so consistently during the months of the long retreat in the face of the Communist forces, from 1946 to 1949? And if they did not surrender, but chose to fight, would we permit them to be chewed up by superior forces, or would we feel impelled to send ground troops to give support to the Nationalists?

What would we gain through the military program advocated by General MacArthur? I do not pretend to be an expert in military strategy, but certain basic facts are obvious to me. General MacArthur himself says the object is to gain a complete victory in Korea.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. LEHMAN. I decline to yield at this time. Before the distinguished Senator from California came to the floor, I announced that, in order to maintain the

continuity of my argument, I would not yield during the delivery of my speech. At the conclusion of my speech, I shall be very glad indeed to yield.

Mr. President, General MacArthur, himself, says the object is to gain a complete victory in Korea. What does he mean by a complete victory? Even if it were true—which is dubious—that if we bombed Manchuria, our forces might be able to proceed up to the Yalu River and chase the Chinese out of Korea, would that be a complete victory? Would China then solemnly promise that since her troops had been driven out of Korea, they would never return? Of course, that is ridiculous. After we reached the Yalu River, if we did, could we stop? Well, if we did, we would have, at best, another stalemate. If we stopped, Chinese forces could seize the initiative and recross the Yalu River. But, of course, sound military practice would require that we press on, beyond the Yalu River, into China; beyond the Yalu River to the Liao Ho River; beyond the Liao Ho to the Hwang River, and then to the Yangtze. Why? Because, as General MacArthur said, the object of war is victory. And if we were engaged in a war with China, the only end would be the defeat of China, the willingness of China to admit defeat, to surrender. Does anyone think that China would grant us total victory and surrender just because we had chased the Chinese forces out of Korea and had bombed some of China's cities and blockaded her ports?

The only possible course would be to press on until we had conquered all of China or had subdued all her armies. How many American troops would that require? A million, 2,000,000, 10,000,000? How many casualties would result and what would be the prize? What would Russia be doing while we were thus engaged, thus involved, thus wholly bogged down in a vast country of mud, jungle, desert, mountain, and ravine?

So, Mr. President, it is one thing to say that we must press forward until victory is achieved. It is quite another to follow this statement through to its logical conclusions and implications. The eventualities I have outlined promise nothing but tragic disaster for the United States and all the free world. Yet this is the inevitable course of all-out general war with China.

General Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in a brilliant speech in Chicago on April 17, warned:

Any recommended course of action which would enlarge the present war is contrary to our best interests and by jeopardizing world peace ultimately would threaten our security.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to insert the text of General Bradley's Chicago speech in the RECORD at the end of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HOEY in the chair). Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit C).

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. President, we must at this time, as General Bradley indicates, avoid violating Chinese territory. Confining the hostilities to Korea is to our interest.

We went into Korea to show that aggression must not go unopposed. We did that—and the other nations supported us—to forestall world war. If we allow ourselves to be drawn into a world war, because of Korea, we shall have truly failed in our mission in Korea. But as long as we keep the Korean action within bounds, while we strengthen the resolve and unity and spirit of the free world, and hold in check the aggressive designs of the Kremlin, we are gaining time, we are gaining strength, we are winning the truly significant victory.

To achieve this kind of settlement, this kind of victory, we must have patience. We must remember that the Chinese and even the Russian people are traditionally long on patience. We must develop a similar fortitude. We have something positive to fight for—freedom. They have only the patience of the long-suffering and long-enduring.

Of course, what I say here is based on the realities of the immediate past and the immediate moment. We must, as General Bradley so finely said, adjust our policies to our military capabilities. We must adjust our policies to realities—the realities of our military strength, and the realities of the attitudes of our allies. When those realities change, our policies may be modified to take the new realities into account. This applies to China and the Far East, as it applies to Europe and the Atlantic.

We are becoming stronger by the month and by the day. We and our friends and allies have the resources. We have the tools and the industrial might. But we need the strength and cooperation of all the rest of the freedom-loving world. We cannot possibly do it alone. We need the help of all the rest of the free areas and free peoples. We need them. They need us.

We need to drive a wedge, if and when possible, between Soviet Russia and her satellites. If it is possible, we must look forward, on a long-range basis, to freeing China from the domination of the Kremlin. How and when this will come about, I do not know. But it is to our vital interest to have it happen. It is against our vital interest, and that of the entire free world, to prevent its happening. Air attacks against Chinese cities would consolidate all the Chinese people against us, and behind the Communist regime. Transporting Chiang Kai-shek's troops to China under today's conditions, with all our help, assistance, and support, would handicap and not help efforts to free China from the Kremlin's rule or even from the rule of Peiping.

No, Mr. President, the policies advocated by General MacArthur sound simple on the surface, but they fall of their own weight. They would lead us from our present difficult but still tenable position into the trackless waste of isolation, involvement, and disaster.

Mr. President, you know, and all of us know the real lure of the views presented by General MacArthur. That lure is the hope of an early victory in Korea, and of an early end to all our struggles, sacrifices, and losses. Behind all the fine words being spoken, that is the hope which is being held out.

Oh, Mr. President, let us not delude our people with so false a hope. Many of those who hold out this false hope believe that we can and should attain mastery by ourselves in the Pacific, and let our allies shift for themselves in Europe. This is a false and dangerous doctrine. It is impossible, in the first place, and suicidal, in the second.

We are urged to follow a course that would involve us in a big war in order to bring a speedy end to a small one. Mr. President, let us not play falsely on the hopes of the American people. Let us not promise what cannot be delivered. Let us speak the truth, however hard, and prepare our people for the long, hard struggle ahead. The hot fighting in Korea is inseparable from the cold war in Europe. It is part of the same action—an action designed to prevent world war rather than to precipitate it.

We do have a positive policy of opposition to Communist aggression in Asia and all the world, but it is a policy geared to our resources and capabilities, and to our desire for lasting world peace and justice. It must be a dominant and controlling sentiment and influence to every right-thinking man, woman, and child in this country.

Our policy, as I said, is to prove to Communist aggressors that their aggression cannot succeed. That is why we are in Korea. That is why we are helping to build up the economies and the armed forces of all the countries in Asia as well as in Europe which still remain free.

That is why we are negotiating a peace treaty with Japan. That is why we are trying to help India establish a stable economy. What we must not do is to initiate a general war in Asia, an all-out war against the 400,000,000 people of China—a country one-third larger in geographic area than all of the United States.

In our policy, we cling to the basic and unassailable assumption that we must not do anything which will split the unity of the free world. That unity must be maintained and strengthened. That is our most important and most difficult task.

We hear much criticism of our allies. Much of that criticism is careless and misinformed. Some of it is downright irresponsible. I saw in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD a recent statement describing the British Government as Communist-dominated. We must all regret such misstatements, such violent libels of one of our best friends, one of our closest allies, without whose comfort and cooperation our cause would be, in my judgment, hopeless. It is a matter of general knowledge that the British Labor Government is vigorously and persistently anti-Communist. But beyond this is the fact that all British parties, including the Conservative Party—Winston Churchill's party—are united in opposition to the policies advocated by General MacArthur.

I should like to insert, at this point in my remarks, a New York Times report of an interview on the subject of General MacArthur with Lady Nancy Astor, a former member of the British Parliament, born in Virginia, whose views are

known to be highly conservative and pro-American.

There being no objection, the report was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

LADY ASTOR WARNS ON MACARTHUR FIGHT—SAYS POLITICAL BATTLE WHEN UNITED STATES SHOULD BE STRONG AND UNITED WOULD BE TRAGIC

Lady Astor, the American-born former member of the British Parliament, said yesterday that it was "of such vast importance" that the United States be united and strong at this time that it would be tragic and "very bad for the country" if a political fight developed over President Truman's dismissal of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur.

Speaking as a politician, she said that she thought it would be a great mistake for the Republicans to make a political issue of the ouster. And as one who felt it was unhealthy for the same party to remain in power too long, she said she believed the Republicans would never get in if they took that step.

Her ideas were expressed in an interview at the Ritz-Carlton Hotel as she prepared to return home on the *Queen Elizabeth* Friday night after a 2½-month visit to her native land. She said that she had had a wonderful time and as always had found her visit stimulating and exciting.

The trim visitor described General MacArthur as a military genius who had done a wonderful job in the east and said she was glad he was receiving such a welcome. But she added that she could not imagine him permitting a divisive political fight over the President's action.

Unity in this country now is vitally important because of its world leadership, Lady Astor asserted. She said that if the United States and the British Commonwealth remained united and strong, the rest of the world would be safe.

PRaises OUR MILITARY LEADERS

She also declared that she had a terrific sense of faith in the American military men who were running the war and she mentioned specifically Generals of the Army George C. Marshall, Dwight D. Eisenhower, and Omar N. Bradley, and Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Air Force Chief of Staff, and Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations.

"Let the politicians run the political wars," she added.

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. President, it is absolutely necessary that we retain our ties with our allies. It is necessary that we keep a solid and united front with them. This takes patience. It requires some compromise on our part as well as on theirs. On some things we will not compromise nor give an inch. On some we must yield, as must they. Our interests are common—our interest in the peace and security of the world and in the survival of the values of freedom and western civilization. We will not appease, but we must arrive at common policies and common decisions.

And what of the charge that our allies are shirking and are content to let us do the fighting for them? That charge, Mr. President, is not true. Many of the countries of Western Europe have relatively as many men under arms as we do. They will furnish the bulk of the forces in Western Europe—that most vital of all sectors in the world today. Their troops, in small numbers, have been fighting in Korea. But in large

numbers they have been fighting and dying in Malaya and Indochina against the same enemy—the forces directed and dominated by Moscow.

There are 154,000 troops under the French flag engaged in combat against the Communists in Indochina. There are 120,000 British Commonwealth troops similarly engaged in Malaya. The French have been fighting for 5 years. They have suffered 80,000 casualties. Of these nearly 30,000 have been killed. These are heavy and tragic casualties. They include some of the finest of France's officers and men. They must be taken into account in reckoning the sacrifices our allies have made and are making in fighting Communist aggression on fronts other than Korea.

We must never forget that Europe is the home of our civilization. Europe is the only continent besides our own which possesses any considerable economic power. This is the prize Stalin is after. The fall of any further part of Asia under Communist domination would be a casualty. The fall of any further part of Europe would be a calamity.

The Atlantic Pact is the Magna Carta of the forces for world peace and security. It must not be prejudiced or endangered by commitments in Asia which we cannot meet. Asia must be defended by all possible means. No one can question that. But it cannot be defended by forfeit in Europe.

The real enemy is in the Kremlin. Let us not lose sight of that fact. If we let the aggression of China and our tragic losses in Korea blind us to the realities in Europe, the struggle will be lost. Our sons die in Korea so that millions of their brothers may not need to die on many other battlefields. It would be the rank-est folly to turn Korea, by our own initiative, into a trap where the forces of freedom would be ambushed and ensnared, while Russia would be free to pursue her designs where she wished and when she wished.

Mr. President, the burdens we bear are very heavy ones. They will grow heavier with the passing months. There is no magic formula that will turn these stones into feathers. There is no cheap, quick, or easy way to victory. We cannot with a single blow bring back peace and quiet and comfort into our lives. We cannot make complex matters into simple ones by wishing them so.

We need, for these tasks, the utmost national as well as world unity. I implore my colleagues, as I implore my countrymen to lay bitterness aside, to abandon thought of partisan advantage, to dispense with senseless dispute over the past, and to turn with sober mind and impartial judgment to the problems of the present.

In the words of Speaker RAYBURN:

We must have unity at home and unity among the democracies of the world if democracy and civilization are to survive.

Mr. President, and my colleagues, the future of the struggle in which we are engaged is still in doubt. The time of its ending is certainly obscure. But if we have faith, and if we have humility, and courage, and understanding, we can pre-

vail and can succeed in our struggle to help bring to the world justice and lasting peace instead of all-destroying war. May God guide us on our course.

EXHIBIT A

(From the magazine America)

THE GREAT DEBATE

If anything were needed to prove beyond all question that the discussion of public issues has reached a low ebb in the United States, it is the furor over the removal of General MacArthur. Emotion, half-truths, unsubstantiated reports and extremely fragmentary information have been fused in the fire of smoldering resentments and frustrations into a strange alloy that passes for public opinion.

In the first place, it is hard to see how the President of the United States can allow a military commander in one theater to preempt executive control over our foreign policy. As Cardinal Newman wrote nearly a century ago, military policy must remain subservient to political control. Political control must remain in the hands of civilians elected through established procedures of popular control of our Government. The President of the United States, in conjunction with Congress, is responsible to the people of this country for our foreign policy. When a military commander, no matter how skillful or successful, attempts to usurp the authority of the President and of Congress, the only possible course for the President is to remove him. Otherwise we would have anarchy.

General MacArthur, after all, is not the only military figure who might exploit his popularity to try to wrest from the President control of our foreign policy in its military aspects. General Eisenhower, for one, has just as much right to try to assume the driver's seat. On hearing of MacArthur's removal, Ike said that a man accepts certain inhibitions when he dons a uniform. General MacArthur apparently found it impossible to accept such inhibitions. In that case he should have resigned instead of precipitating the present confusion. After resigning he could have had his say.

All informed observers readily admit that the President certainly acted within his constitutional authority in removing General MacArthur, and acted with good reason. They add, however, that the question of the wisdom or unwisdom of MacArthur's policy, as contrasted with the one we have adopted, is still debatable. This is true. But the reasons for sticking to our present policy, instead of making substantial changes in it, have not been sufficiently set forth.

Foreign policy demands continuity. No policy will work if we spend several years laying its ground work, spend billions and billions of dollars to put it, so to speak, within scoring distance, and then drop it for a new policy—a new policy for which no similar ground work has been laid and for which, quite possibly, no similar ground work could be laid.

We have a foreign policy, one which was summarized in these pages ("U. S. foreign policy: 1945-50," Am. Jan. 27, 1951). This policy was set by our elected officials. It embraces the United Nations, the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall plan, and the North Atlantic Pact. The United Nations is important chiefly because the charter enunciates principles accepted by almost the whole world (at least verbally) and accepted in reality by the vast preponderance of the peoples of the world. A United States foreign policy based on the charter has the maximum support from other nations which any United States foreign policy can have.

The Truman doctrine, the Marshall plan, and the North Atlantic Pact are, generally speaking, United States-sponsored policies originated to make up for the incapacity of

the UN to achieve international security. They were all adopted and implemented, over a period of 4 years, after our political, economic, and military authorities had decided that our national security depended on keeping the nations of Western Europe free and strong.

This we have done. Militarily, Europe is only beginning to produce the divisions needed to ward off a Russian attack. But the economic and political strength necessary for a military build-up has been achieved. It has been achieved in accordance with a well-thought-out plan, and at heavy expense to the United States.

Let's stop a moment to consider what we have in Europe. First of all, some 200,000,000 people—people whose traditions of political freedom and culture are similar to our own. Secondly, an industrial capacity so great that if we can keep it on our side we can outmatch Russia's capacity to produce the armaments essential to military victory. Thirdly, an enormous military potential, now being activated, plus air bases from which we can strike to stem a Soviet attack.

Contrast this situation with Asia. For one reason or another, we have built up next to nothing out there. It is extremely doubtful whether we could ever have built up much. Despite its teeming populations, Asia lacks effective political organization. It lacks industrial development. Its primitive and sprawling economies and political societies—with the exception, perhaps, of Japan—defy any attempt on our part to make reliable allies of its peoples. No nation in the Orient today can be built into a formidable military power within the next few years. From no terrain in Asia can we knock out Russia, if it comes to that. We could knock out the cities of Red China, but this would not destroy Red China. It would leave a mass of rural Chinese able to carry on guerrilla warfare endlessly.

Our present military armament is limited. We cannot pour much more of it into the Far East without weakening our ability to operate effectively in Europe. If we conquered the cities of Red China, where would that leave us? Russia would still be intact. It could probably move into Western Europe with ease. We would have lost allies who can play an extremely important part in the eventual defeat of Russia, and we would have gained practically nothing of value in the Far East. We are already punishing the Red Chinese in Korea so severely that they are shooting their seriously wounded. All available buildings are being requisitioned in the cities of China to care for the thousands of other casualties. The chances of our causing dissension and perhaps revolution on the mainland are improving daily.

We have nothing to fear from Red China. Soviet Russia is the foe we have to fear. Russia would probably like nothing better than to see us divert our at present limited power into an all-out war with China. It may be true that we could bomb Manchurian bases without getting into an all-out war with either Red China or Soviet Russia, but the odds are against it. The time may come when we shall have to take the chance. But the longer this decision can be postponed, the better.

We have nothing to lose by building up our military power and that of our allies so that we can use it where we, and not our enemies, think it ought to be expended. The impatience of a commander to be allowed to destroy the enemy facing him in the field is understandable. But the over-all decisions have to be made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Hearst and other lion-baiting press can scream as loudly as they want. If we are careful not to alienate our European allies, the reason is that our military leaders, as well as our political leaders, are convinced that a quick victory in Korea can come too high.

EXHIBIT B
(From the Christian Century)
MACARTHUR

How long the uproar over the dismissal of General MacArthur will last no one can do more than guess. Republican party strategists hope it will keep up, and even increase, until November 1952. We doubt it. At this moment the Nation is filled with wild words and wilder counsel. As the weeks pass into months, however, we believe that the American public will come to have a more general understanding of the fundamental issues which had become involved in the MacArthur case. As this understanding spreads, we expect the excited talk to die down. Eighteen months from now—it is that long to election day—MacArthur will still be a controversial figure. But by that time, we think, the effort to turn him into a partisan martyr whose wrongs are enough to swing a national election, will have collapsed.

For what were the fundamental issues which finally led President Truman to relieve MacArthur? There were two, and we believe that before long most Americans will see that there were just these two. The first was the issue of military subordination to civilian authority. With it MacArthur managed, before the end, to mix the question whether he would obey the orders of his military superiors. (It is worthy of note that the ample documentation released by the White House to justify the dismissal contains as many attempts by the Pentagon to impose discipline on MacArthur as by the President.) The basic question, however, was that of civilian control over the military. Does the Republican Party want to fight a presidential campaign on MacArthur's side of that issue?

The second basic issue was MacArthur's effort to extend the fighting in Korea to a full-scale war against China. The general believed that unless this was done the present conflict will end in a military stalemate. But he was not content to press this military judgment on his superiors by the regular channels which were open to him. With the Martin letter he tried to launch a partisan drive in Congress to force such an extension of the war. President Truman showed his keen sense of the political factors which, given time, are effective with the general electorate, when, in his radio speech on the night after his summary action, he rested his whole case for MacArthur's dismissal on the general's demand to push the fighting beyond Korea into China. Do the Republicans want to fight a presidential campaign a year and a half from now on that issue?

Now that General MacArthur has quickly accepted the Republican invitation to come back to this country and address Congress and numbers of public meetings, these two basic issues will grow larger and larger in the minds of the American people. Already Maj. Gen. Courtney Whitney, MacArthur's military secretary and closest adviser, has started a defensive action on the first issue by asserting that his chief had complied meticulously with all directives. How even MacArthur's staff can claim this in the light of the now disclosed directive of December 6, or how that claim can be maintained after the public becomes familiar with the text of that directive, we cannot conceive. But General Whitney's statement shows that the MacArthur forces know that is one basic issue they will have to meet.

The other issue will bulk larger the more MacArthur speaks because it has such a bearing on the question as to whether the general's proposal meant a general war in China and therefore a far heavier sacrifice of the lives of American soldiers. Mr. Truman, and his military advisers in the Pentagon, believed that it did. So did the other nations which have contributed contingents to the UN forces in Korea. Among them they

can be counted on to pound that thesis home until there will be few Americans who do not know that the weight of opinion, military and political, American and international, was against the MacArthur proposal.

When General MacArthur replies he will have to argue: (1) That Chiang Kai-shek's forces could make an effective invasion of China without large-scale additional help from American troops; (2) that Communist China could be destroyed easily by the means the general outlined in his interview with the London Daily Telegraph; (3) that in an all-out war with China, Russia would allow her Communist neighbor to be destroyed without intervening. All these opinions are highly questionable, just as was MacArthur's assurance given Truman at Wake Island that he could occupy all Korea up to the Manchurian border without Chinese intervention. The more speeches the general makes upholding this line of argument, the more we believe its dubious nature will become clear to the public.

There was still a third important issue involved in General MacArthur's continuation in command. It was a bit more shadowy than these two basic issues of which we have spoken. But it had to be taken into account. It was the question of the nature of a military command under the United Nations. Anyone can see that the issue of MacArthur's subordination, as an American general, to the authority of his American Commander in Chief had come to a showdown. As yet, however, apparently not everyone has seen that the issue of his subordination to the UN had also become seriously involved. And if the UN is to continue "police action" against recalcitrant aggressors, that is an issue of great moment for the future. MacArthur had all but brought the policy of cooperative action by international forces to protect world peace to the verge of collapse and abandonment.

The Christian Century is by no means sure that the idea of a UN armed policing of world peace can be made to work. Alliances are notoriously hard to hold together; Eisenhower's real claim to fame rests on the fact that he succeeded in doing this in World War II to a greater degree and with less friction than in the case of any other major multiple alliance known to history. But questions of theory concerning UN armed forces and their chain of command may be set to one side for the moment. The fact which counted in this instance was that MacArthur was simply not the man to set the first precedents as to how a UN commanding general should operate.

Everyone seems to be vying today to insist on what a great general MacArthur has been. We have no desire now to challenge that judgment, though we will not be surprised if history, 50 years hence, tones down the superlatives. But in his years as "proconsul" in Tokyo, surrounded and isolated by a staff which continually hailed him as the greatest military genius of all time, this spectacular commander came to believe implicitly that his views concerning policy in the Far East were the only sound views, and that any policy he supported should be pushed through in the best interest of mankind without regard to who opposed it.

In the end, he convinced the non-Communist members of the United Nations that he would do everything he could, without regard to higher authority, to extend the war to China in order to avoid the stalemate he saw developing in Korea. He also convinced them that he did not care a snap of his fingers what objections to that policy they might hold. What part these convictions held by other UN participants in the Korean fighting played in bringing President Truman to supplant MacArthur with Ridgway, we do not know. That they played an important part, we are confident. Wash-

ington rumor credits Canada with having been most active in telling the President that there must be a change, so that there might be no question that the UN general was amenable to UN opinion. It is expected that General Ridgway will speedily make this clear.

Well, the action dismissing MacArthur has been taken. It came suddenly, and at a time when it was beginning to look as though even the insubordinate Martin letter and Daily Telegraph interview would not be enough to crack the political immunity of the general. It took courage on President Truman's part, as the almost hysterical abuse which followed has shown. General MacArthur had already shown his readiness—perhaps even eagerness—to cooperate with such partisans as Congressman MARTIN to attack the President and UN policy, just as in 1948 he showed his readiness to cooperate with William Randolph Hearst and Colonel McCormick to gain the Presidency. (The voters of Wisconsin put a quick end to that.) Controversy has always swirled around MacArthur. He is one of those figures who seem to evoke either 100-percent devotion or 100-percent detestation. Now the controversy will rage more fiercely than ever. But in the long run, if MacArthur makes enough speeches, for the reasons already outlined we believe that the President will be the gainer.

Meanwhile, the problem in Korea and the Far East remains. In one way it has been made more difficult because the White House thought it necessary, in justifying its action, to release secret documents which showed that the general commanding in the Far East is under orders not to allow the fighting to extend above the thirty-eighth parallel or outside Korea. Mao Tze-tung's government, thus assured that it need fear no bombing and no invasion, may find in that added reason for indifference to truce talk. Yet on the other hand, the dismissal of General MacArthur has made the purpose of the UN and of the United States of America in Korea so clear that even Communist propaganda will have trouble distorting it. It was surprising, in fact, how few were the conditions of peace laid down by President Truman in his April 10 radio address. Equally worthy of note was what he did not say. If China, if the Communists in the Cominform, want peace in Korea, all that has happened thus suddenly and spectacularly shows them they can have it.

Is this not, therefore, the moment for the UN to go back into action with all its resources to end the fighting in Korea and seek a stabilized peace in eastern Asia. The authority of the UN over the actions taken in its name has been reestablished. The decency of its intentions has been shown. Can it not now make a supreme effort to rally all its members, including Russia, to negotiate a reasonably fair and firm peace?

EXHIBIT C

[From the New York Times of April 18, 1951]
TEXT OF ADDRESS BY GENERAL BRADLEY ON
FOREIGN POLICY OF UNITED STATES

CHICAGO, April 17.—Following is the text of an address today by General of the Army Omar N. Bradley at a meeting of the National Association of Radio and Television Broadcasters:

"It is hard to realize that our relatively small-scale military operations in Korea hold the key to the success or failure of our worldwide strategy.

"In the hands of our United Nations soldiers, sailors and airmen, fighting the unwarranted attacks of twice as many North Korean and Chinese Communist aggressors, rests the possibility for peace. Success in Korea may prevent a new incident, and may prevent World War III. Failure in Korea will only invite another aggression.

"When our forces were in the throes of withdrawal last December, many people, who saw no point to further struggle, were recommending that we give up the fight. Nothing could have been more disastrous for the South Koreans, the United States, the United Nations and the ultimate chances for peace in this world.

"As much as I hate war, if we had abandoned Korea under any less circumstances than being driven out, we would have dealt a tragic blow to the hopes of free men everywhere for peace.

"Adding up the military pros and cons of the situation, there is no early end in sight to the Korean war under present conditions. As far as we can see now there is nothing transitory, nothing temporary about the Communists' determination to drive us out of Korea, and if possible, to destroy our forces completely. We may strive for peace, and a cessation of hostilities, but while so doing we must continue to fight."

ASPECTS OF POLICY CITED

"Foreign policy is the expression of a nation's instinct for survival. Military policy comprises the practices of a people in the organization of their military resources for defense.

"There is little immediate danger of this country being overrun—but our way of life, our freedom, and our Nation have the best chances for survival by keeping peace in the world.

"This is the overriding consideration of our national foreign and military policies. Any recommended course of action which would enlarge the present war is contrary to our best interests, and by jeopardizing world peace, ultimately would threaten our security.

"In Korea our foreign policy and our military policy are united in three basic objectives:

"First, to protect and maintain our form of Government and our way of life against any challenge. On this point we recognize no limitation of expenditures or of exertion.

"Second, to seek peace by every means at our command. We will not provoke a war against anyone. And we will not wage a so-called preventive war even against an arch-enemy, for this certainly destroys peace. But there is one price we will not pay—appeasement.

"Third, to assure peace, not only for ourselves, but for all others. For this reason we support the United Nations, realizing that world peace is an integral part of American security."

"I would like to emphasize that our military action in Korea is closely related to our North Atlantic Treaty efforts in Europe.

"The same guiding principles govern our actions there. We joined in the North Atlantic Treaty as a collective defense effort for mutual security. In collective action we multiply our defensive strength. Bound together in a pact, the individual nations gain strength from their close ties and, individually, are more secure.

"Not only are we trying to contain communism, but we hope to deter all forms of aggression in order to bring peace to the world.

"Through our efforts in connection with the North Atlantic Treaty, and our even more positive action in Korea, we have drawn the line—giving unmistakable evidence that appeasement of communism is not part of American policy.

"In Korea communism went, without warning, one step further than it had ever gone before, and for the first time resorted to open and organized armed aggression to gain its oppressive ends, shedding even its pretense of peaceful intention.

"THREE PEACE FACTORS IN MIND

"The United Nations had to take some quick positive action.

"The decision to support the Republic of Korea, first with air and sea power, and then with ground forces, was heralded in this country as a sound decision and given wholehearted support. Like every other international political decision from time immemorial, there had to be some authority behind it to make it stick, and the task of establishing that authority was assigned to the Armed Forces.

"As we proceed with the assigned military task in Korea, your military advisers and planners are keeping these three important factors in mind:

"Because we are intent upon preventing world war III, we are not making moves that might lead to an enlargement of the present conflict, whenever it is militarily practicable.

"Furthermore, because we seek peace and an end of this war in Korea, our Government is cautious in every decision that might prolong this conflict. I might add that it has been difficult for the men in the field to refrain from attacking the air bases in Manchuria. However, Communist air intervention has not been a factor in the ground action to date; neither has it been any serious threat to our Air Force.

"And, third, every decision we have recommended has supported United Nations unity in the conduct of war. With these principles in mind, we of the United Nations are now doing an outstanding military job.

"Conjecture in military affairs is always risky and often unwarranted, but I would like to give my personal opinion as to some of the accomplishments of the Korean decision that may have escaped public attention. I doubt that even those who supported this move at the time realized how much more was being gained toward world peace.

"I believe that our positive action in support of the United Nations resolution was unexpected by the Kremlin-dominated Communists. I think we scored an advantage and disarranged their plans for Asia.

"I think our positive action in support of the United Nations slowed down the plans for world domination, not only in Asia, but in other areas in the world.

"The Communist action in Korea indicated to me that the people in the Kremlin are willing to risk world war III. I believe the United Nations action in Korea gave them pause for thought.

"I would also estimate that our action in Korea may have prevented, at least temporarily, Chinese Communist aggression toward Indochina. It may have saved Thailand. It may have preserved Formosa. At least it gained time in all of these areas.

"There was no doubt in the minds of free men that we had to draw a line somewhere. Appeasement would have forfeited our chance to stop communism, and encourage them to continue picking off helpless nations one by one. Eventually the international situation would have become intolerable as the Red-dominated areas covered more and more space on the map.

"Today, we are carrying out the military operations to enforce this political decision.

"As we carry out these actions, even though it would possibly result for a time in a military stalemate, we have already achieved an international victory.

"As long as we are able to confine the battles to Korea and continue to destroy the Communist aggressors, we are making progress toward our international objective of preventing world war III. As long as we are keeping Communist forces occupied and off balance and keeping the war confined to Korea, we are minimizing their chances for world domination.

"We are going to be faced with some difficult decisions in Korea in the next few months.

"To solve them, we must realize that Korea is not a brief, acute attack of a new disease; it is a symptom of a chronic ailment which must be cured.

"In outlining my thoughts on this matter, I have no intention of entering the foreign policy field or even urging a particular policy in the conduct of foreign affairs. Conduct of foreign affairs is a civilian responsibility. But a soldier can often see strategic perils that the layman might overlook. However, it is fundamental that our foreign policy must be based upon our military capabilities to back it up.

"We cannot take the chance of trying to anticipate immediate Communist intentions. We can only determine their capabilities, and prepare to meet them. Otherwise we would be in a guessing game without a referee. We would be playing Russian roulette with a gun at our heads."

IMPATIENCE IS NO SOLUTION

"Fundamentally we Americans are apt to become impatient with a situation that has no foreseeable conclusions. We all would like to know when the war in Korea will be over.

"I wish that I might tell you; my job would be less difficult if I knew.

"If we examine the Communist capabilities in Korea, we find indications that the Chinese Communists are building up for another drive. We must prepare to meet it. There is no assurance that even when this attack is dispelled that the war will be over.

"In the case of Korea, those who despair of an early solution are apt to become frustrated and discouraged. There have been recurring and louder whispers in favor of forcing a showdown and delivering an ultimatum to those who encourage such local wars and who continue to obstruct sincere efforts for peaceful negotiation.

"Any such direct, unilateral solution to the problem would be militarily infeasible.

"I wonder if these responsible citizens have pondered the conditions of such an act. Any ultimatum must state clearly the irreducible minimum of what we would regard as satisfactory and it ordinarily, if not always, implies a threat to use force if the demands are not met. These dissatisfied and impatient strategists—and they are not representing the views of responsible Air Force officials—suggest the threat of bombardment as part of the ultimatum.

"Our policy is to avoid war, and to promote peace.

"Our best chance for the survival of our way of life, and our freedom is to continue cooperation in mutual security efforts, and to continue negotiation in this world-wide conflict as long as possible. An ultimatum would either commit us to a so-called preventive war, or gain for us only a temporary respite from war until the enemy feels that conditions for his victory were more favorable.

"Enlarging the battle to a full-scale war is never an economical or morally acceptable solution to a limited conflict. If at all possible, Korea should be settled on the present battleground.

"ROLE OF DIPLOMACY IS SET

"The confinement or extension of the area of combat is in the realm of diplomacy and international politics.

"However, the military consideration is an intrinsic part of this problem. Our armed force will continue to carry out the tasks assigned to them until conditions permit a political decision to be reached.

"I have mentioned the complexity of the United Nations problems only to encourage us in a steadfast course of patience and preparedness.

"The United Nations forces in Korea have done a magnificent job and have exhibited a cooperative spirit that is more effective than anyone could have previously imagined.

"The Air Force and the Navy have performed wonders in supporting the Ground Forces in Korea. They have exercised ingenuity and imagination in carrying out missions that could not have been anticipated. The marines have performed heroically side by side with our soldiers.

"I am especially proud of the United States Army.

"The soldiers entered the war in platoon strength, building up to a force of six divisions which have fought through fierce summer heat and bitter winter, usually against great odds, and with platoons and companies, battalions and regiments which were for a long time under strength.

"The American people can be very proud of their Armed Forces and of the spirit which these men have shown.

"If we here at home can only measure up to their standards of sacrifice and devotion—to their achievements in patience and courage—there is every reason to believe that the war in Korea can ultimately be concluded on honorable terms, contributing to a hoped-for permanent peace in our times."

Mr. KNOWLAND, Mr. WATKINS, Mr. McMAHON, and Mr. CAPEHART addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from New York yield, and, if so, to whom?

Mr. LEHMAN. I yield first to the Senator from California.

Mr. KNOWLAND. I should like to ask the Senator from New York whether he can point to any specific place or any specific time when General MacArthur advocated area bombing of Chinese cities, as distinct from military targets in Manchuria, or when he ever advocated the use of American land forces on the Continent of Asia, aside from Korea?

Mr. LEHMAN. I should like to say to the Senator from California that if he will refer to the speech made by General MacArthur—he may have it before him—certainly he will find General MacArthur recommending an intensification of the blockade and the bombing of Manchuria, as well as the bombing of ports and cities. Certainly that would be bombing and committing overt acts against China.

So far as transportation of, and the landing of, Chiang Kai-shek's troops on the mainland of China is concerned, I am sure that the Senator from California will recall that when General MacArthur advocated that Chiang Kai-shek's troops be sent to the mainland of China he recommended that they be given logistical support by the United States.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, the Senator from New York is not answering my question. I am asking the Senator when General MacArthur ever advocated the landing of American troops in China, or the area bombing of Chinese cities? I am quite familiar with the fact that he advocated a coastal blockade, to keep the British and others from supplying from Hong Kong and other places with strategic materials which aid the enemy who is fighting us in Korea. That is not the same as the landing of United States forces in China. It is not area bombing of Chinese cities.

Mr. LEHMAN. If the Senator from California will refresh his memory I

think he will recall that General MacArthur unequivocally recommended that Chiang Kai-shek's troops be landed on the mainland of China with logistical support. Possibly the interpretation of the senior Senator from California of what is meant by the term "logistical support" differs from the interpretation of the Senator from New York. My understanding of the term is that it would mean transport and air cover. I understand the term to mean also naval support and transporting the Chinese troops from Formosa to the mainland in American ships. Certainly the Chinese troops cannot swim across to the mainland. It would mean not only, as I said in my remarks, putting them in front of the mainland, but it would mean that we would assure their landing on the mainland. It would also mean protecting them when they were attacked by the forces of the Communist Government. There would be no possibility of doing anything else under the circumstances. In view of the fact that I am afraid the Senator from California has not listened attentively to my speech, I should like to read a portion of it again.

Mr. KNOWLAND. I listened very attentively to the speech.

Mr. LEHMAN. I said:

Still more important, we would need to transport the Chinese Nationalist troops and support their landing with naval ships, guns, and planes. For it would not be enough to set the Chinese forces down at the beaches. It would be necessary to see that they got onto the beach, and that they were not wiped out.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, the Senator from New York is not reading from General MacArthur's speech. He is reading from his own speech. It is his interpretation as to what might have to be done. General MacArthur said no such thing. He said that he believed the Nationalist forces on the island of Formosa, numbering more than 500,000, should have some logistical support. I submit that such logistical support could be sent to them on the island of Formosa. They could use the planes and ships and equipment themselves. They have their own pilots. They have their own navy. They could transport their own troops to the mainland of China if they were supplied with certain logistical support. The Senator reads into the statement of the general that United States forces would have to land the Chinese forces on the mainland, or accompany them there. General MacArthur said no such thing.

Mr. LEHMAN. General MacArthur certainly did make a very definite reservation to the effect that Chiang Kai-shek's troops could be landed on the mainland only with logistical support from the United Nations or the United States. Logistical support means what I have said. At least that is what it means to me. I do not think the senior Senator from California will say that my description of what is meant by logistical support differs in any substantial degree from what I have read.

Mr. KNOWLAND. I merely wished to clarify the situation. Will the Senator yield for another question?

Mr. LEHMAN. I yield.

Mr. KNOWLAND. The Senator said that we should take a realistic view of the situation. Is the Senator from New York familiar with the fact that General MacArthur's successor as United Nations commander in Korea, Gen. Matthew Ridgway, today said that the United Nations forces are locked in a decisive battle, which, from all news reports, represents the desire on the part of the Chinese forces to destroy completely the United Nations forces in Korea? Is the Senator familiar with that fact?

Mr. LEHMAN. I have not read the general's statement. Was the statement made today?

Mr. KNOWLAND. Yes; the statement was made today. It is to the effect that we are now locked in a decisive battle in Korea.

Mr. LEHMAN. I realize that. However, I wonder whether the Senator from California would not agree with me that General Ridgway is talking about the immediate situation.

Mr. KNOWLAND. He is talking about the security of 250,000 American soldiers who are fighting for their lives in Korea, at the very moment we are talking about the situation today.

Mr. LEHMAN. The Senator asked me to yield for a question.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Yes.

Mr. LEHMAN. I am glad to yield, but I expect from the Senator from California the courtesy of allowing me to reply to his queries.

General Ridgway is, of course, talking about the immediate situation in Korea. That is not the only front with which we are concerned. I realize that it is an important front; but in my opinion the threat of global war is far more important even than Korea. I can assure the Senator from California that no one deprecates the losses and the sacrifices we have suffered in Korea more deeply than does the Senator from New York.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Is the Senator from New York—

Mr. LEHMAN. Will the Senator permit me to finish?

Just as General MacArthur thought only of the immediate situation in Korea, so I deplore the fact that so many of the American people and so many of my highly respected colleagues in the Senate think of this situation exclusively in terms of the immediate situation in Korea. I am thinking about the situation in Europe. I am thinking about the situation in the rest of Asia; and I am thinking about the situation in our beloved United States. I can say to the Senator from California that in my opinion, if Europe falls, if we lose the support of the 280,000,000 people living in the free countries of Western Europe, and if we lose their productive capacity, we cannot, as Mr. Hoover has suggested, build up a bastion of defense and strength here in America. We would be doomed.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. LEHMAN. Gladly.

Mr. KNOWLAND. First of all, I wish the Senator would not shake his finger at me when he speaks, because it so happens that I supported the North Atlantic

Pact and the arms implementation program. I am just as alert to the problems existing and the dangers of communism in Europe as is the Senator from New York. The only respect in which I have departed from his point of view is that I do not believe we can meet the global menace of communism by closing the door to it in Europe and leaving the door wide open in Asia.

The Senator is speaking to the Senate and to the country today about a realistic policy. Let me read to the Senator an extract from the United States News and World Report of May 5, 1950, on page 30 of that issue. This is from an interview with the distinguished chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations [Mr. CONNALLY]. The interview took place a little more than a month and a half before the outbreak of the Korean fighting.

One of the questions was:

Do you think the suggestion that we abandon South Korea is going to be seriously considered?

The spokesman for the administration on the floor of the Senate, the chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, answered the question in this way:

I am afraid it is going to be seriously considered because I'm afraid it's going to happen, whether we want it to or not. I'm for Korea. We're trying to help her—we're appropriating money now to help her. But South Korea is cut right across by this line—north of it are the Communists, with access to the mainland—and Russia is over there on the mainland. So that whenever she takes a notion, she can just overrun Korea, just like she will probably overrun Formosa when she gets ready to do it. I hope not, of course.

The next question was:

But isn't Korea an essential part of the defense strategy?

The answer of the distinguished Senator from Texas was:

No. Of course, any position like that is of some strategic importance. But I don't think it is very greatly important. It has been testified before us that Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines make the chain of defense which is absolutely necessary. And, of course, any additional territory along in that area would be that much more, but it's not absolutely essential.

Was that a realistic answer to give to the American people on May 5, 1950, indicating, as the Secretary of State had indicated on January 12, that the United States would not be involved in case of aggression? Yet now, very realistically, after that has happened, we have 60,000 casualties—more casualties than we had in the first year of World War II, and more casualties than we had in the War of the Revolution, the War of 1812, the Mexican War, and the Spanish-American War combined.

I think it is time for the administration and for Senators on the other side of the aisle to begin realistically to tell the American people the facts.

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. President, will the Senator remain on his feet for a moment? I wish to address my remarks to him.

I am very glad indeed to yield for questions. I do not believe that the long quotation to which we have listened from the Senator from California is a question. I should be very glad to continue to yield to the Senator from California for questions; but if he wishes to make speeches, I ask that he make them in his own time.

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. LEHMAN. I am not through. I am talking to the Senator from California.

I believe that the Senator from California and my colleagues know me well enough to be assured that on matters which are within my competence I never pussyfoot, and I do not hesitate to express myself if I feel that I am competent to do so.

The Senator from California has read at great length from a statement made by the distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. I wish to tell the Senator from California that the Senator from New York is not familiar with the facts about which the Senator from California has questioned him, and is unable to make deductions with reference to things with which he is not familiar. If the Senator from New York may do so, he would suggest very respectfully that the Senator from California question the Senator from Texas, the distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for another question?

Mr. LEHMAN. I will yield for a question, but not otherwise.

Mr. KNOWLAND. I am asking the Senator questions.

Mr. LEHMAN. The Senator has not been asking me questions.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Yes, I have.

The questions grow out of the Senator's statement on the floor of the Senate that we should take a realistic look at the situation. I asked the Senator most respectfully, whether he felt that the Senate and the country had been realistically dealt with in the past, when statements such as I have read from the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee were made to the American people. Does the Senator think that that is a realistic approach?

Mr. LEHMAN. The Senator from New York replies to the distinguished Senator from California that he has no knowledge of the statement which the Senator from Texas is reported to have made, and that the only way the Senator from California can get an answer is by inquiring from the Senator from Texas. I am not in the habit of answering questions on subjects on which I am not informed, or of speaking for other persons who are very well able to speak for themselves.

However, let me say this: I believe so strongly in a realistic approach that I hope with all my heart that the Armed Service Committee and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate will have before them every man, whether he be General MacArthur, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, or anyone else, who has knowledge of this sit-

uation. I believe that it is time for us to get to the bottom of these things. I believe that it is time to stop rumors, alarms, and reports, and let the American people know just what is involved in the situation. I can assure the Senator from California that I will strongly support any move which will immediately—not in two or three or four weeks, or perhaps months—bring about the appearance of those persons before the committees. They should have testified last week.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator from New York yield for one more statement? Then I shall not interrupt him further.

Mr. LEHMAN. I yield.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Is the Senator familiar with the interview with Lt. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer, commander of the Far Eastern Air Forces, which appeared in the United States News and World Report of this week, dated April 27, 1951? In that interview General Stratemeyer points out the very critical dangers which confront our forces in Korea at the present time, in view of our policy of preventing the attack against the Communist air bases north of the Yalu. Has the Senator read that article?

Mr. LEHMAN. No, I am afraid I have not read the report and hence cannot comment on it.

Mr. KNOWLAND. For the information of the Senator, I ask unanimous consent, Mr. President, to have the article placed in the RECORD at this point in my remarks.

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. President, I raise objection to that. I am glad to have the article inserted in the RECORD, but I ask that it be inserted at the end of this debate.

Mr. KNOWLAND. That is where I assumed it would be placed.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. WHERRY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me?

Mr. LEHMAN. I yield to the Senator from Nebraska.

Mr. WHERRY. The distinguished Senator from New York just stated that he thought the people should become acquainted with these issues.

Mr. LEHMAN. Will the Senator talk a little louder? I am slightly deaf in one ear.

Mr. WHERRY. I shall be glad to speak louder. I usually try to modulate my voice so I will not talk too loud. Most people complain that I shout when I talk. I was attempting to be very careful and modulate my baritone voice, as it should be modulated when singing in the new quartet we have in the United States Senate.

Five and one-half million people turned out to greet, to see, and to commend General MacArthur in New York City. Does the Senator from New York believe they knew what they were doing when they gave that tremendous evidence of their approval to the great general when he visited New York City?

Mr. LEHMAN. I do not really think the Senator—

Mr. WHERRY. Does the Senator from New York think they did not know what they were doing in New York City?

Mr. LEHMAN. One moment. I do not think the Senator is really serious in that question.

Mr. WHERRY. Oh, I never was so serious in all my life.

Mr. LEHMAN. I have been in public life for a long time. I have often told my wife that the only time I feared defeat was when great crowds—

Mr. WHERRY. Will the Senator speak a little louder? I cannot hear him very well.

Mr. LEHMAN. I shall be very glad to. I have often told my wife and others that when I was a candidate for office the only time I feared defeat was when people came out in crowds just to look at me. I may say to the Senator from Nebraska that I do not think the mere turnout of large crowds means that the crowds necessarily support the person who is on exhibition.

Mr. WHERRY. I am not going to comment on the Senator's appearance and how it contributes to his election or his defeat. That is a personal matter.

I should like to ask the distinguished Senator another question. What we are discussing is a very serious matter. In my opinion the people know what the issue is, and turn out to indicate their approval of the stand taken by General MacArthur. I should like to ask the Senator, who is a fair person, and who likes to have the facts brought out, if he will tell the Senate now how much mail he has been receiving from the people of New York?

Mr. LEHMAN. I have been receiving a great deal of mail.

Mr. WHERRY. The Senator has been receiving thousands upon thousands of letters from the people of his great State; has he not?

Mr. LEHMAN. Yes.

Mr. WHERRY. What is the percentage in favor of MacArthur and what is the percentage against him?

Mr. LEHMAN. I do not know what the percentage is; but I can say without any hesitation or reserve, that the majority of the letters, telegrams, and postal cards I have been receiving have favored the MacArthur position. But may I ask the Senator from Nebraska a question?

Mr. WHERRY. I do not have the floor, but I shall be glad to yield so the Senator can ask me a question.

Mr. LEHMAN. I suggest to the Senator from Nebraska that the simple fact that temporarily a large segment of the people believe "A" to be right or believe "B" to be right, or believe "A" to be wrong or "B" to be wrong, should not stop men who have views, as I have views on this subject, from speaking their own minds, from the depths of their own convictions.

Mr. WHERRY. Oh, no.

Mr. LEHMAN. I may go further and answer the question of the distinguished Senator from Nebraska by saying that I do not think the mere receipt of mail for a temporary period is at all significant. I was Governor of my State for 10 years. I received mail in great quantities then; more mail than I am receiv-

ing now as a Senator. I was always affected by letters and telegrams I received from people I thought were serious and sincere, and I studied the situations to which they called my attention. But the mere volume of mail did not influence me then, and the mere volume of mail I am receiving does not influence me today.

Mr. WHERRY. Will the Senator yield further?

Mr. LEHMAN. I yield.

Mr. WHERRY. I shall not at all labor the point. The question I raised was not with respect to volume. I asked the Senator about the percentage of the mail that was in favor of the announced program of General MacArthur. I feel that since the general returned and made his speech to the Congress the issue has been made extremely clear respecting the proposals in connection with Korea. What I was attempting to secure from the Senator was an answer as to why the people are writing so many letters, and why there are such great demonstrations whenever General MacArthur appears.

I will say in passing that I have never heretofore received anything like the volume of mail I am now receiving. My question relates to the mail that has been received by the Senator from New York as well as the mail that has been received at my office and the whole-hearted welcome that has been given to a returning hero by the American people. Why are they turning out in such great numbers? Why are so many letters being written on this subject? That was the question I asked, and that is the question I should like to have the Senator answer. Does not the Senator feel that the issue has been made very clear and that the American people approve the suggestions made by this great general, this great American, who has returned to the United States and so clearly laid the issue before the American people?

Mr. LEHMAN. I may say to the Senator from Nebraska that I do not believe the volume of mail reflects the national decision or the national will. I want to make it very clear to the Senator from Nebraska that I act on the basis of my conscience, not on the basis of the volume of my mail.

Mr. WHERRY. The Senator does not mean to infer that the others of us do not act on our consciences, does he?

Mr. LEHMAN. I cannot speak for anyone's conscience except my own.

Mr. WHERRY. I will take care of my own.

Mr. LEHMAN. I now yield to the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. McMAHON].

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President—

Mr. WHERRY. Will not the Senator permit me to finish? The Senator from New York asked the Senator from California for the courtesy to be extended him to make a reply to the Senator from California. The distinguished Senator from New York when he was Governor received a great deal of mail, and he is receiving a great deal of mail now; in fact, he is receiving so much mail he does not know what to do with it.

I will say to the distinguished Senator, as I said before, that other Senators act on their consciences also. The Sen-

ator's conscience, I am sure, is influenced, is impressed, by the tremendous numbers of letters he is receiving from people of New York, from fathers and mothers, urging that the Nation follow the leadership of a great American such as General MacArthur.

EXHIBIT 1

WARNING OF RED AIR OFFENSIVE

(An interview with Lt. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer, commander, Far East Air Forces)

Question. General Stratemeyer, what is the build-up of Red air power in Korea and in the vicinity?

Answer. We are almost certain that the Reds are building up their air power in Manchuria and Northern China. During recent reconnaissances made along the Korea side of the Yalu River, when we could look over on Antung Airdrome, and from photographs taken from this side of the river, at one time we identified and counted 70 aircraft at the field at Antung. There is a photograph right over there that shows some 58 jets at Antung. Then, of course, there have been press dispatches which say China is getting more aircraft. From our own intelligence reports it appears there are more aircraft in Manchuria and in Northern China today than there have ever been before.

Question. Do you have any idea of Communist air strength in that area?

Answer. I have seen public statements telling of 400 to 700 airplanes now deployed there. Many more could, of course, be flown in overnight. The airdrome capacity is there already.

Question. What about North Korea itself? Are they developing airfields there?

Answer. Since the first of the year we have actually identified some 50 airstrips that have been built in North Korea or are in process of being built. Those that we feel could be used we have bombed, and the Reds have immediately repaired them. We have bombed them again, and the Reds have immediately repaired them again. That, to us, indicates there is a build-up, or there is to be a build-up.

Recently—I won't give you the location—one of their airstrips was increased from 5,000 feet to some 7,000 feet in length. They eliminated part of a village, and you can see in the photos the sharp outline of a runway that is being constructed. In one of the big cities in North Korea they have taken the long, straight main street, cleared debris away and destroyed buildings on both sides. Right now we feel that the Chinese could take off from that strip. We bombed that particular paved runway today.

Question. These fields they are developing—would they be suitable for sustained operational work, or merely for staging purposes?

Answer. My answer to that would be both. At this last field I just spoke of, they could go in and operate. What concerns us are those fields that can be put in usable condition and around which there would be stored gasoline, oil, munitions—where they could stage in about dark and take off at daylight to hit our Ground Forces just north of the thirty-eighth parallel.

If there were only a few it wouldn't be so bad, but there are so many fields—more than 50 potential threats in North Korea. Our job of keeping those airstrips out of commission is a big one and I can assure you that Fifth Air Force, Far East Air Forces Bomber Command, and Far East Air Force Headquarters are alert to it. We are doing everything in our power to put them out of commission and keep them that way.

Question. What is the Communists' capacity of accumulating adequate fuel and other supplies necessary to maintain any effective air force?

Answer. The same as they have been doing for their ground forces. We have sighted thousands of trucks in North Korea—and in the past month—mainly moving from northwest to southeast. We know that China itself doesn't have those munitions of war or the trucks to move them. They are coming from somewhere. If they can do that for their ground, they can do it for their air.

Question. What about their pilots, General? One report is that there is some indication that they might be using volunteer German pilots.

Answer. I have no evidence whatever that there are any German pilots. Some of their pilots are very good. Some of them are particularly poor marksmen. To date, when they get well south of the Yalu River, they have not been too aggressive, but within a radius of some 50 to 70 miles of the Yalu River the MIG pilots are aggressive and are getting more aggressive.

VALOR OF ENEMY PILOTS

Question. How do their pilots compare with ours?

Answer. Well, I'm an American and I don't think there are any pilots in the world as good as American pilots. During our last bombing of Sinuiju Bridge, the MIG pilots were very determined and they flew through their own antiaircraft fire to bore in on the bombers and ignored our fighters. As you know, we lost two B-29's. I think those losses were due to MIG fighters rather than to flak.

Question. In the last war, General, you spent considerable time in China in very close association with the Chinese Air Force. What is your estimate as to the capabilities of the Chinese as pilots? Are they any better or—

Answer. I think I can give you a fair answer to that question. Those pilots we trained back in the United States and put in the composite Chinese-American wing were good. They flew our B-25's and our F-51's just as well as Americans. They were courageous, they thought well in the air, and when they had good leaders they were nearly as good as Americans. They were good pilots, but they do not have the leadership and command ability Americans have. I think, though, that the younger generation—those young pilots the Americans trained—will make good commanders as they grow older.

Question. Aren't some of those pilots flying for the Communists now?

Answer. As I understand, some of them defected from the Nationalists.

Question. With proper training, then, it would seem that they could turn out to be capable air commanders?

Answer. Yes; I think they could.

BOMBERS LOST TO FLAK

Question. You mentioned flak. What are we running into on that score?

Answer. All along the Yalu River there is good and accurate flak, mainly from the Manchurian side. Around certain North Korean cities and their main military installations, they have plenty and accurate flak. As you know, we have lost quite a number of fighter-bombers to ground fire.

Question. How do their jets compare with ours?

Answer. I think the MIG-15—that is the only one we have met—compares favorably with our F-86.

Question. Is there any indication they have any jet bombers comparable in the bomber class to the MIG-15 in the fighter class?

Answer. We have not come in contact with any yet.

Question. What about conventional bombers? Is there an indication of how good they are?

Answer. No. We know that there is a probability that they have a Russian-built B-29 type. We know that they have a twin-engine bomber that is comparable, say, to

our World War II A-20, or to our B-25. We have not come in contact with many of them. We have seen and shot down a few in the early part of the war.

Question. You have indicated very clear evidence of a build-up and that they have good planes and fairly good pilots. Do you believe the Chinese could mount an effective, or rather a sustained, air offensive against our ground forces?

Answer. That is what concerns me right now. Yes, I do. And the reason I am concerned is because our ground forces have had the greatest immunity from air attack that any army has ever had in the history of modern warfare. The first surprise air attack might cause a great many casualties in our front lines. General Ridgway is acutely aware of this threat and both he and General Partridge [Lt. Gen. Earl Partridge, commander of Fifth Air Force] and his own ground forces all are alert to it. But, if it happens, the Eighth Army "can take it and carry on," as General Ridgway told me recently. Of course, we in the Far East Air Forces will do our very best to stop them before the attack.

Question. Do you think that we could meet and stop completely any air offensive against us?

Answer. You can't stop a determined air offensive unless you can get at the facility from which it originates. As you know, going north of the Yalu River is not permissible, and as a consequence our stopping of air attacks can't be airtight. All we can do is to be as alert to it as possible, try to outguess them and catch them in the air if and when they come over.

WHAT AIR ATTACK WOULD DO

Question. Precisely how would any Chinese air offensive against our ground troops affect our present air support?

Answer. It means simply this: The air-ground support that the Eighth Army has been used to, and which we are giving daily, would be cut down proportionately to the strength of the enemy air offensive. If we don't blunt that air offensive, it means our ground forces are going to get hit and our installations in the rear will get hit. I am concerned also about my own air facilities in Korea, which can be attacked from the air.

The enemy can hit me where I am based, but I cannot hit him. However, I am going to hit him in North Korea—any place that I can find him on the ground, and I am going to hit any facility that he can use—that is, in North Korea.

Question. If they throw an effective air offensive in, it would seem that would constitute the greatest threat the United Nations army faces in North Korea, wouldn't it?

Answer. I agree with you 100 percent.

Question. Will you sum up this point?

Answer. We seem at the moment to be on something of a razor's edge. The enemy does have the capability of presenting us with a very serious air threat. He has the capability, fields, facilities, pilots and planes—

Question. It is just a question of whether he wants to gamble on it?

Answer. Well, I am going to take one exception to that statement. He has fields and facilities in Manchuria, north of the Yalu, but I am going to keep him out, if it is physically possible, of any facilities or fields in Korea. If I can do that, I am not too worried about his MIG-15s, because they do not have the range to hit our ground troops where they are at present.

Question. In other words, the Chinese could not have jet fighter escort unless they could use those fields in North Korea?

Answer. That is right. It seems to me that I have a big problem to keep his fighter-bombers away from our ground troops. That is a difficult job to do because, as I said, there are some 50 fields in North Korea available

to Communists. Each field must be kept under surveillance.

DAILY WATCH ON FOE'S FIELDS

Question. How do you keep this watch?

Answer. We have certain areas which are daily, or at least every other day, surveyed from the air by either fighters or bombers. There is not an important airfield that we know of in North Korea that is not looked at at least every day.

Question. With his more than 50 airdromes it seems that it would be quite possible for him to stage aircraft into one of these many fields at last light one evening, and then take off from this same field at first light next morning and strike almost without warning at ground forces. Is that right?

Answer. That is absolutely correct. If I am unable to keep those fields in North Korea in such a state of nonrepair, he could do just what you have said.

Question. Is it physically possible to keep 50 fields in a state of nonrepair, so that the Communists couldn't use them or bring them into usable shape in a matter of a few hours for emergency use?

Answer. It is almost physically an impossibility. There are certain of those fields where jets could be used that we give extra surveillance to all the time. He is a master of camouflage. Don't forget that with his capability of camouflage there might be a jet field there that he could get into at dark and take off from next morning.

Mr. McMAHON obtained the floor.

Mr. CAPEHART. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me for 3 minutes?

Mr. McMAHON. I should like to, but the colloquy has proceeded for some time. I am sure the remarks which the Senator from Connecticut will make will provoke a rejoinder from the Senator from Indiana, and if he will allow me to get started I will let him have at me instead of the Senator from New York.

Mr. President, I, too, receive a great deal of mail. There are about 1,000,000 voters in my State. I have received from people in my State about 5,000 letters regarding the issue referred which is being discussed. I know what to do with them. I answer them. I answer them with the reason the best of my intelligence can afford as to why I believe that the policies the great general has enunciated would plunge us into world war III, and why I do not want that to happen. Nine hundred and ninety-five thousand of the voters of my State have not written me. I know that the position of the administration upon this situation is constantly gaining ground, because it happens to be right.

Mr. NIXON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McMAHON. In a moment I will yield. As I said, the position of the administration is constantly gaining ground because it happens to be right, Mr. President. I have no fear as to what the eventual determination of the American people will be when they have the facts before them, and I am completely in favor of giving the facts to them.

Incidentally, among the facts which I want them to have are these: I want them to have the executive hearings before the Foreign Relations Committee in the spring and winter of 1949 on the China policy. Let us lay them out in the open, and have done with the constant

suggestions which are being made that we have no bipartisan policy in the East.

Now I yield to the Senator from California.

Mr. NIXON. Mr. President, let me say at the outset, in propounding my question to the Senator from Connecticut, that I feel that his comments and the comments of the Senator from New York [Mr. LEHMAN] to the effect that they are following their consciences in this matter are well taken. I also feel that so far as mail is concerned, certainly, as both the Senators have suggested, they must base their decisions on the facts as they see them, rather than on the mail which they may receive from individual constituents, who may not have the facts which are available to the Senators.

However, I wish to revert to the point the Senator from Connecticut made in his opening statement, namely, his concern that the policies advocated by General MacArthur would lead to world war III. General MacArthur set forth his program to the joint meeting of the House and the Senate on last Thursday as his proposal for bringing the war in Korea to an end through victory without appeasement. Of course, the Senator from Connecticut has a right to disagree with that proposal. He has suggested that he thinks that proposal would lead to world war III. What I should like to ask the Senator from Connecticut is this: In his remarks today, in addition to pointing out that General MacArthur's proposal would lead to world war II, and therefore should be rejected, does he propose—and I trust that he proposes to do so—to present his alternative, the State Department's alternative, and the administration's alternative program to end the war in Korea with victory and without appeasement, because that is what the people want at this time.

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, I am going to propose the policy which I believe the President of the United States stands behind, which is one that makes sense to me, and which if vigorously pursued and supported by all Senators on both sides of the aisle and by the House of Representatives and by the American people may well lead to a lasting peace. I invite the Senator to remain in the Chamber until I get through enunciating it.

Mr. NIXON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for one more question at this point?

Mr. McMAHON. I yield.

Mr. NIXON. I think the Senator is aware of General Ridgway's statement, made shortly before he took over as General MacArthur's successor, to the effect that under present conditions in Korea, victory on the battlefield was not possible until certain political decisions were made. So, as I understand the Senator's position today, he proposes to make some suggested additional proposals in regard to what our program in Korea is or should be at the present time. In other words, I understand that the Senator from Connecticut is not satisfied with our program as of today. Is that correct?

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, if the Senator from California will be patient,

there will be an unveiling in a few minutes.

I should like to add—but perhaps we had better not start on another course; perhaps we had better begin on the course which I had in mind following when I obtained the floor.

Mr. President, there are four fundamental strategic facts which passion may obscure but which we will ignore at our peril.

Fact No. 1 is American unpreparedness for all-out war, except in the field of atomic energy. We have not nearly mobilized the air fleets and the naval forces and the ground troops that we would like to possess for major conflict. Our civil defenses are in a state of unreadiness. Incidentally, they were not helped here yesterday by the decision which the Senate made, unfortunately in my opinion, which in all probability deprived the American people of a place from which to carry on a coordinated defense not only of the United States but of the people of the free world. That was done in large part on the plea that it would save \$107,000,000. However, Mr. President, by saving the \$107,000,000, we may, and conceivably we could, surrender our freedom; and then I suppose that money would be redeemed in Russian rubles.

Although American rearmament is moving forward rapidly, we simply do not possess—as yet—the armed power we must have to confront a new world war.

Fact No. 2 is the industrial war potential of Western Europe—the munitions plants and factories that have no remote counterpart in Asia. I challenge any Senator to contradict my statement that Russia and Western Europe, if ever merged together under Communist rule, could in time produce more atomic bombs and more long-range bombers and more armaments of all kinds than could the United States. Here is the basic reason why Europe takes priority over Asia. Lose Europe and you lose the arms race. But whatever happens in China or India or Korea, the Kremlin cannot acquire one extra atomic bomb or one extra atomic bomber from such a far eastern source.

Fact No. 3 is the opposition of our major allies to spreading the Korean war. We may deplore this fact. We may wish that it did not exist. But it is there. Do not forget—as the Senator from New York [Mr. LEHMAN] pointed out a few minutes ago—that British troops are heavily engaging Communists in Malay, and that large French forces are battling Communists in Indochina.

Fact No. 4 is Russia's ability to drop a number of atomic bombs upon American cities, right now—today. At stake in our decisions is not merely a military adventure in a far-off Asiatic land. Also at stake is whether or not this very Capitol building, this very Senate Chamber, may be blown to smithereens next week or the week after. We have had before us the so-called dispersal bill to scatter Federal agencies, yet the attack could come even before that bill could be written into law—although now apparently it never will be—and much less before the agencies themselves could be

dispersed. I wonder how many of my colleagues are fully and acutely aware that if they guess wrong—if they pursue the wrong course—the penalty may be the loss of their own lives.

Against this background, then—with the indisputable knowledge that our country is unprepared, that Europe rates miles ahead of Asia in capacity to produce armaments, that our allies oppose spreading the Korean war, and that Russia could drop atomic bombs on our cities tomorrow—what has been proposed? It is proposed that we bomb bases in Manchuria, that we completely blockade the Chinese coast, that we fly American planes over the interior of China—on a sightseeing expedition, I suppose—and that we arm, equip, and transport Chiang Kai-shek's forces for an invasion of the Chinese mainland.

Mr. KERR. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. FREAR in the chair). Does the Senator from Connecticut yield to the Senator from Oklahoma?

Mr. McMAHON. I yield.

Mr. KERR. Did the specific recommendation which General MacArthur made with reference to the support of the Chinese Nationalists in opening a second front—one on the Chinese mainland—include the expression "logistical support"?

Mr. McMAHON. It most certainly did. Now the claim is made, I may say to the Senator from Oklahoma, that that means we are merely going to furnish the arms; we are not going to drop any bombs or do any shooting, but are going to give them only planes and matériel.

Mr. KERR. Do not the words "logistical support" include the following elements: transportation, supplies, equipment, and the delivery and maintenance of them?

Mr. McMAHON. I believe that is the classic definition.

Mr. KERR. Could that possibly be done other than by maintaining, on our part, the Armed Forces which, first, would open the avenues, to permit it to be done, and, second, would keep the avenues filled with the vehicles and equipment of supply and transportation and maintenance?

Mr. McMAHON. Realistically, I may say to the Senator that I think it means much more than that. Despite the efforts of the Senator from California to paint this adventure of the general's on the mainland of China as a very limited one, it reminds me of a small boy who might get his shirt tail caught in a power wringer, and who might think he could cut it off at any particular time: the entire shirt would go into the wringer.

Mr. KERR. I thank the Senator for his response to the question.

Mr. McMAHON. In other words, it is proposed that, all on our own, without the support of the United Nations, without the support and against the will of our allies, in a secondary theater, and with Russia able to atom-bomb us tomorrow, an unprepared America run the grave risk of starting world war III.

I find it a paradox that, for the most part—and I exempt the Senator from

California from this classification—those who are most eager to run this grave risk have usually been the penny pinchers and the economizers in American rearmament. I find it curious that those most avid for a military adventure in Asia, a theater which has no atomic-bomb plants and no aircraft factories, have been usually the opponents of strong cooperation with Europe, a theater whose atomic plants and aircraft factories could in time, if combined with Russia, outbuild the United States. I deem it puzzling that those who talk most about the strategic importance of the island chain running from the Philippines northward to the Aleutians say little or nothing about Alaska, which is separated from Russia by only a few miles of water and through which a land invasion might be directed toward Seattle and Portland and Los Angeles, to say nothing of assaults from the air; and let us not forget that Hanford is located in the northwestern section of the country. It is surprising that those who favor drastic measures want to act in China, but apparently do not fear the Soviet atomic centers and industrial areas which constitute the very heart of our peril. Most of all is it a paradox, Mr. President, that those who seem least concerned with the dispersal bill and least concerned with the civil defense measures needed to protect their own lives and the lives of American families, that these same individuals are usually the outspoken partisans of a course which might well lead into the third world war.

I do not know whether the masters of the Kremlin would precipitate that tragedy if unprepared America, all on her own and in the teeth of her Allies, were to spread the Korean fighting to China proper. No one can know with certainty. But at least we may all agree that such action would increase the risk of unlimited war. It may be that the Soviets, at this very moment, want war and are only seeking an excuse to attack—an excuse such as the American policy which has been proposed. It may be that this policy, if adopted, would set off a chain of Soviet action and American counteraction leading quickly to the third war, even though neither side desired full-scale hostilities. It may well be that, even if a world war were temporarily avoided, the armed strength of America would be poured down the military rat hole of the Chinese mainland.

This much I recall from recent history: The leading advocate of an American decision to spread the Korean conflict firmly believed and predicted, even against growing evidence and up to the very last moment, that Red China would never intervene in Korea. I also recall that this same advocate discounted the first reports of the original North Korean invasion of South Korea and theorized that the attack was only a "reconnaissance in force." Where such signal errors have been made in past evaluation, how much weight may we now attach to present prophecy?

We hear much talk about privileged sanctuaries in Manchuria. It is already trite to point out that the air bases of South Korea, the waters around the Ko-

rean Peninsula, and the Japanese islands are also privileged sanctuaries and that if we set about bombing somebody else's sanctuary he may feel irresistibly tempted to retaliate in kind.

Mr. KERR. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McMAHON. I yield.

Mr. KERR. In the event that should happen, could it be possible under any circumstances which the Senator from Connecticut can imagine that that, within itself, would not throw us into all-out world war III?

Mr. McMAHON. I believe world war III would then inevitably follow. But I desire to reemphasize—and I invite Senators to pay particular attention to this—that there are still other sanctuaries, American sanctuaries, and that if we set about bombing the sanctuaries of other nations, they, of course, may feel irresistibly tempted to retaliate in kind. I refer to New York and Detroit and Denver and San Francisco. If American planes fly over the Chinese mainland, if American-assisted troops attempt to invade that mainland, if American ships attempt to squeeze it in a total sea blockade, how much time will elapse, Mr. President, before you and I will listen, day and night, for the air-raid sirens here in Washington?

The original American and United Nations decision to act against aggression in Korea was a right decision—I think nearly all of us can agree on this point. Our troops are fighting in as glorious a cause as any for which Americans have ever risked their lives. Our troops are fighting to combat a revolting international crime. They are fighting to hold open the future for a just peace. I think we would not, and could not, keep the faith with them if, driven by passion and in a reckless mood, we took steps which might not only swell their casualties in far-off Asia, but very possibly bring atomic war to their own families here in America.

No one can read the future with certainty. No one could have predicted, for example, that the billion-dollar aid which we once supplied Chiang Kai-shek would not return to us in the arms and shells which Chiang's forces abandoned to the Chinese Communists and which the Chinese Communists now hurl at our men in Korea.

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McMAHON. I yield.

Mr. LEHMAN. I wonder whether the figure, \$3,000,000,000, for the aid we have provided to Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist Government is not more nearly accurate than the \$1,000,000,000 figure which the Senator mentions.

Mr. McMAHON. I was speaking about military aid, I may say to the Senator from New York. We gave them, in economic aid and military aid, a total, as I recall, of approximately \$2,750,000,000.

Mr. FERGUSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McMAHON. I yield.

Mr. FERGUSON. I did not want to interrupt the Senator at the moment, but he spoke a little earlier about a prophecy, and I assume he has discussed the prophecy as to whether China would partici-

pate in the Korean conflict. I should like to ask the Senator whether he is familiar with the broadcast by the Secretary of State regarding our Asiatic foreign policy, which was released to the press on September 10. It was a televised interview with Secretary Acheson, and it is found in the State Department Bulletin on page 463. On that page, it is shown that Mr. Bancroft, of the Columbia Broadcasting System, asked the Secretary of State this question:

Well, Mr. Secretary, what are the chances, do you think, of Communist China getting herself involved in the support of the Korean Communists?

Secretary ACHESON. I should think it would be sheer madness on the part of the Chinese Communists to do that, and I see no advantage to them in doing it.

Let's again look here. We have a map of Asia and I'd like to make a point here by looking at it. The Chinese Communist authority runs throughout this area (indicating on map of Asia) of China proper. It is not completely in control of China proper but that is the general area.

Mr. McMAHON. What is the Senator's question?

Mr. FERGUSON. I think I should read the entire reference, and then ask my question. It is only fair that the Secretary be quoted accurately, in full context. I read further:

The great part of China to the north, which is made up of Sinkiang, Outer Mongolia, and Manchuria, is Chinese at the present moment only nominally. That is where a great cloud from the north, Russian penetration, is operating and it is quite obvious that the plan is to absorb those northern areas of China under Soviet domination.

Now, I give the people in Peiping credit for being intelligent enough to see what is happening to them. Why they should want to further their own dismemberment and destruction by getting at cross-purposes with all the free nations of the world who are inherently their friends and have always been friends of the Chinese as against this imperialism coming down from the Soviet Union I cannot see. And since there is nothing in it for them, I don't see why they should yield to what is undoubtedly pressures from the Communist movement to get into this Korean row.

With all the evidence the Office of the Secretary of State must have had on this question, does the Senator understand how the Secretary of State could have given the answer that he did?

Mr. McMAHON. Let me say to the Senator from Michigan that the Secretary of State apparently made a logical appraisal of what the Chinese should do, and it turned out that his logical appraisal of what would be in their best interests has been disregarded, and, I am sure, to their eventual loss of character and prestige.

I also say to the Senator from Michigan that the Secretary of State was speaking from 9,000 miles away, and not as a theater commander who had in his charge the immediate safety of his troops, and he did not tell the President of the United States as was told him on Wake Island, when the conference was held with General MacArthur, that in his opinion, there was not a chance of Red China entering the Korean picture. He said that if they were coming in, they would have come in when they had us down at the tail end of Korea.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McMAHON. I yield.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Is it not true, from the analysis which the Senator has presented of the opinion of the Secretary of State, that what the Secretary was saying was what he felt the Chinese, in their best interests, should or should not do, but that in the case of General MacArthur, he was saying what they would or would not do. One was a diplomatic analysis; the other was an actual military decision. The Secretary of State did not say that the Chinese Communist forces would not come into the war. He said they ought not, that it was madness on their part. General MacArthur said they would not come into the war. I think that is a very neat difference.

Mr. FERGUSON. Mr. President, will the Senator from Connecticut yield further?

Mr. McMAHON. I yield.

Mr. FERGUSON. Is it not true that the question as to whether the Chinese Reds or Soviets would come into the Korean War was a political question whose answer would emanate from Peking and Moscow, where we had our intelligence agents, or where our allies had agents for the purpose of determining the answers to just such questions? Should it not then have been known by the Secretary of State first, rather than by the military commander in the field, whether the political decision was going to be made to send troops into Korea?

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, I can see that the Senator from Michigan has read the views on that subject, as published this morning, of the very eminent commentator, Mr. Walter Lippmann, who makes that very point; and if the Senator will accept everything else that Lippmann has written in the past 2 weeks—

Mr. FERGUSON. I am trying to get the opinion of the distinguished Senator as to whether this was a political decision, and therefore—

Mr. McMAHON. I understand the Senator's question. Let me answer it in this way: The Senator received a pretty good answer the last time, in the opinion of the Senator from Connecticut; but I will give another one, which is this: Secretary Acheson did not have an opportunity to capture any soldiers of the enemy and to question them about the intentions of their command. It is regrettable that he made his statement on the basis of what he thought were the best interests of the Chinese. I am not going to defend that. Maybe he should have known. But I am saying that the man who now says Russia will not come into the war is the same man who told us that the Chinese would not come into it.

Mr. FERGUSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for another question?

Mr. McMAHON. I yield.

Mr. FERGUSON. On the point the Senator last raised, it has been prophesied here that Russia will come into the war should we bomb the North Korean and Chinese Red munition dumps or supply lines across the Yalu River. The Senator is familiar with the fact that during the Second World War Russia

had a similar treaty with Japan in case Japan were attacked in the Far East. China did attack and have a war with Japan, but Russia did not come in. Does the Senator feel that there is any more reason to believe Russia today will keep her treaty with Red China than she kept the treaty which she had with Japan? Is there any more reason to believe that Russia has now changed and has become a treaty-loving nation, to be controlled exactly by her treaties?

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, I have previously observed that the Soviets rarely keep their promises, but they almost always carry out their threats.

Mr. KERR. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McMAHON. I yield to the Senator from Oklahoma.

Mr. KERR. Did the Senator from Connecticut understand the Senator from Michigan to say that when China attacked Japan and brought about the Chinese-Japanese war—

Mr. FERGUSON. Oh, the Senator is mistaken.

Mr. KERR. Russia failed to come to the defense of Japan in accordance with her treaty with Japan in the event Japan was attacked? That is the way the Senator from Oklahoma understood the Senator. I should like to ask the Senator from Connecticut if it is not a fact, according to the information which we have, that the Japanese-Chinese war to which reference has been made was brought about by the attack by Japan upon China, rather than by an attack by China upon Japan.

Mr. FERGUSON. No; the Senator from Michigan was not confused about that at all.

Mr. KERR. I must say that if he was not, it would be an interlude most delightful to contemplate. But I am awaiting the answer of the Senator from Connecticut.

Mr. McMAHON. The Senator from Connecticut, of course, does not pretend to be a prophet as to what is going to happen. I prefer that the Senator from Oklahoma straighten the matter out with the Senator from Michigan, if he will.

Mr. KERR. I thank the Senator, and I must say that I look forward to it with great pleasure.

Mr. FERGUSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McMAHON. I yield.

Mr. FERGUSON. I do not want the RECORD to show otherwise than that there was a war between China and Japan, and Russia had a treaty but did not intervene at the time, and I wondered whether there was any reason to believe that she would respect her treaty at this time. What we are trying to do is get information.

Mr. McMAHON. I hope to give the Senator much information. I believe, as a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, I can give him a great deal of information. I should like to proceed with my remarks.

Mr. HICKENLOOPER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McMAHON. I yield to my friend from Iowa.

Mr. HICKENLOOPER. I thank the Senator. I should like to have his comment, in the light of the speech he is making to the effect that we are in danger of bringing on a third world war if we bomb the arsenals at Mukden, or if we give aid to Chiang Kai-shek by way of munitions.

First, I should like to invite the Senator's attention to the fact that in a situation which the Senator from Connecticut and I supported, namely, the sending of four divisions to Europe, we were put on notice by the Kremlin that the furnishing of four divisions to the North Atlantic Pact army in Europe would be considered an unfriendly act. In the face of that open declaration by the Kremlin, the administration and Congress went forward and supported the sending of four divisions to Europe.

I know of no declaration by the Kremlin or by Mr. Stalin to the effect that if we bombed the Chinese arsenals at Mukden and Harbin, or if we gave small arms and munitions to the Chinese Nationalists, our action would be considered an unfriendly act by the Russians. Therefore in one case we have supported a movement which had been formally declared by the Russians to be an unfriendly act. Now we are asked not to support a proposal because of the danger that, if we acted in accordance with it, such action might be considered an unfriendly act, even though no notice has been served on us to that effect. I merely call the facts to the attention of the Senator, and I hope he will comment on the compatibility or incompatibility of the two situations.

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, my whole address is predicated on the point that we must at all costs save Europe. I point out to the Senator from Iowa that he can summon to his aid all the logic he can command, but if by what we do we contribute to the danger of the breaking out of the third world war in the Far East, it would not be to the best interests of the United States of America.

Mr. HICKENLOOPER. Will the Senator yield for one more question?

Mr. McMAHON. I am sorry; I should like to yield the floor. However, Mr. President, I dislike very much to say "No," so I will say "Yes." I yield to the Senator.

Mr. HICKENLOOPER. Again I thank the Senator. I shall try not to bother him again.

Mr. McMAHON. I really welcome debate. I may say to the Senator that I always like to yield for questions during my speeches. I like to have the questions come as I deliver the speech. We should not get too far afield, however.

Mr. HICKENLOOPER. The Senator from Connecticut desires to avoid a third world war, and I am sure all of us share that desire. Why does the Senator support vigorously a program which contains a great threat of world war III, according to announcement from Moscow, to the effect that sending four divisions to Europe or implementing the North Atlantic Pact army would be considered an unfriendly act by Moscow, and would be considered an open threat of the possibility of starting a third world war, but does not support the suppress-

sion of Communist aggression in Asia by Chiang Kai-shek, or destroying the sources of supply for the Communist armies, when no such warning or threat of the possibility of such action being considered an unfriendly act has been forthcoming from Moscow? I supported the sending of four divisions to Europe. The Senator and I find ourselves on the same side generally in that respect. I believe in taking a similar stand in Asia.

Mr. McMAHON. Every day we have threats from the Kremlin, which are hurled like thunderbolts in all directions. I favor giving aid to Europe. I support our taking certain calculated risks in Europe from the standpoint of military strategy, because if we lose Europe we will lose the world, and possibly ourselves. I am not willing to precipitate a war in the Far East, because strategically it would be wrong to do so. There are no atom bomb factories in China. We are not preparing our civilian defense to withstand an attack from Mao Tse-tung's troops.

Mr. NIXON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McMAHON. I shall be glad to yield in a few moments.

No one can be sure that the Korean fighting, regardless of our own action, will not spread to engulf the world. But I want the onus and the awful responsibility of spreading the Korean War to be upon the Communist enemy and not upon peace-loving and peace-seeking America. I do not want voluntarily to shatter our hopes for a just peace through American recklessness. If those hopes are to be destroyed, let the enemy be the destroyer and let him be branded as such before all the world.

You may say: Yes, but when will this Korean attrition of our treasure and our far more precious blood be terminated? I answer that it will be terminated when the free world is stronger, both physically and spiritually. It will be terminated when our freedom of action has been increased through increased strength. It will be terminated when we seize the strategic initiative by firing billions of silver bullets at all the enslaved peoples behind the iron curtain.

I think Senators know what I mean by silver bullets. I mean a great campaign of truth—a great campaign of friendship, without appeasement, directed toward the regimented millions under communism. If we have but the will and the boldness and the imagination, we can indeed bring a kind of war to the Chinese mainland and to Russia herself, the kind of war which the men of the Kremlin most fear, the kind of war which can win the oppressed peoples away from their present masters, and which can make aggression impossible.

Mr. NIXON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McMAHON. There is only one real way to end the threat of aggression. The Senator is particularly interested in the program, I know.

Mr. NIXON. That is why I am asking the Senator from Connecticut to yield at this point.

Mr. McMAHON. There is only one real way to end the threat of aggression,

and that is by creating a world environment in which people—everyday people—will refuse to carry out an aggressor's designs. People, particularly the plain men and women of Russia, represent the heart problem of war and peace. I now yield to the Senator from California.

Mr. NIXON. Mr. President, the Senator will recall that at the outset of my remarks my question was directed to what positive alternative steps the Senator would recommend for ending the war in Korea. Having in mind the fact that General MacArthur has offered such a program, with which the Senator from Connecticut has disagreed, am I to understand that the Senator's proposal for ending the current war in Korea consists of a program of economic aid, to which, incidentally, I subscribe, as the Senator well knows from my record, and a program of ideological warfare, to which I also subscribe? Do I correctly understand that the Senator has no additional proposals, from a political standpoint or military standpoint, which would bring the war to a successful conclusion?

I ask the question because I think the Senator will recognize that a program of spending \$50,000,000,000 for the world under the Marshall plan and a program of ideological warfare are long-range programs. Today, in Korea, we are suffering from 1,400 to 2,000 casualties every week. What does the Senator propose to do to meet that particular problem?

Mr. McMAHON. I say to the Senator that in the meantime we must take advantage of the glorious opportunity our heroes are giving us to mount an offensive and to take the initiative against communism all over the world. That is the safest program I could suggest for concluding the war. I believe the military action in Korea should be viewed as a containment action. I should like to ask the Senator from California, or anyone else, how many thousands of planes, how many hundreds of ships, and how many regiments of men, he thinks would be necessary to join the heroes in Korea in order to terminate the war, as General MacArthur suggested in his speech last Thursday?

Mr. NIXON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McMAHON. I shall be glad to yield in a few moments.

Mr. NIXON. I had a question to ask him on the point he mentioned.

Mr. McMAHON. Very well; I yield for a question.

Mr. NIXON. Is it the Senator's position—

Mr. McMAHON. Did not the Senator from Connecticut make his position clear?

Mr. NIXON. No. I wish to ask another question regarding a point on which the Senator from Connecticut has commented, because I know he wants the debate to be complete with respect to his proposal. Let me say that the Senator's position, as I understand, is that from a long-range standpoint the only way to end aggression is through stepped-up ideological warfare and through a program of economic aid. I

may say that I agree with the Senator on both programs, from a long-range standpoint. However, in addition to the two programs I have mentioned, the Senator offers at this time for bringing an end to the war in Korea—

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President—

Mr. NIXON. Let me complete the question. Therefore, so far as the Senator's position is concerned—and I want him to clarify his position if this is not a true statement of it, until we are able to work out the program of silver bullets and ideological warfare, the 250,000 heroes, as the Senator has well described them, in Korea who are suffering casualties of from 1,400 to 2,000 a week, are expendable. Is that the Senator's position?

Mr. McMAHON. I will say to the Senator from California that I do not accept some of his characterizations of my position, but I pass over that for the moment to point out that the alternative course which has been proposed by General MacArthur and by most of the leaders of the Republican Party is that we should go all out in China. I say that the 250,000 men and the casualties we are suffering there, great though they are, would be but token numbers and casualties compared with the ones we would suffer if we were to become bogged down in the endless wastes of China, to say nothing of the millions of casualties which might result in the cities of America. Such an eventuality I want to prevent at all costs if I can. I am willing to stay with the action in Korea, as I know our soldiers are. They are serving their country as bravely as any soldiers ever served their country, in fighting the kind of war which I hope will not change to the extent that the North Chinese bring into it their Soviet allies and cut up our troops to the point where we shall have to go back and use our planes and submarines, and, God help us, world war III will be on our doorstep.

Mr. CAPEHART. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. McMAHON. I yield.

Mr. CAPEHART. Might it not be a better plan, then, since the Senator has painted such a sad picture of what may happen or may not happen, for us to withdraw troops from Korea?

Mr. McMAHON. No; I am not willing to say that I want to withdraw our troops out of Korea, because if we should do that we would put the rubber stamp of approval on the most brutal kind of aggression. That would be fatal to the morale of the free world. The answer to that question is categorically, no.

Mr. CAPEHART. Mr. President, will the Senator further yield?

Mr. McMAHON. I yield.

Mr. CAPEHART. Why is it, then, that the Senator is opposed to winning against the aggressors in Korea? Are we merely going to sit there for a year, 2 years, or 5 years, and see 2,000 or 3,000 American boys killed every week? What does the Senator propose to do?

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, we should follow the proposals which were

made when we entered the United Nations. That program is to resist aggression, to free Korea, and to bring about an election in Korea under which the Korean people can serve their own destiny.

Mr. FERGUSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McMAHON. I yield.

Mr. FERGUSON. Will the Senator state for the RECORD how far he thinks we can go militarily without bringing Soviet Russia into the picture and/or starting a third world war, in which, of course, Russia would take part, for, as we understand a third world war would certainly involve Russia.

Mr. McMAHON. The Senator from Connecticut cannot say how far we can go. He knows what General MacArthur has proposed, and what his recent record as a prophet is. The Senator from Connecticut feels that if we went that far, under their mutual-assistance pact, the Russians would come in, and then we would be in for it.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McMAHON. I yield.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Let us assume for a moment that Russia does not come into the war. I think the Senator from Connecticut pointed out that he did not have any way of knowing what the intentions of the Soviets were. I wonder if the Senator can give us a little more documentation from his point of view as to what he thinks would be the total number of troops we would have to commit in China, as well as the total number of planes and the amount of ammunition and supplies.

Then I should like to seek answers from all my colleagues to this question: When do they think the war would be over, once we went into China, with the 600,000 troops which Chiang Kai-shek has and which were driven out of China? When would the war be over? Since we want victory, and I am for victory, I should like to get some sort of idea about the date when the war would be over? Would it be 2 years from now? 3 years from now, or 5 years from now? Would it require 5,000,000 men or 2,000,000? Has anyone any idea? I am speaking now of a war in China, without Russia. What is the evidence which would lead us to believe that we could ever win a war in China? Who ever did win a war in China?

Mr. McMAHON. I do not know, because I am not a military tactician. I do not know what would be required to do, in China, the job which the Senator has described. The whole point of my remarks is that when we undertake to take action in China we should not do so under any sham or pretense that we are going to give the Chinese Nationalists a mysterious thing called logistical support. We are going to be in all the way. The Japanese can give valuable testimony about making war in China. They wallowed around in China for 10 years, but did not accomplish success.

In other words, what the Senator from Connecticut is pointing out is that we have some unhappy alternatives. I recognize that the alternative of fighting

what I call a containing military operation—if we are permitted to carry on such an operation—is not the ideal state of affairs. Of course it is not. I am talking about the alternatives to all-out world war III, which some seem to want to bring about, with a careless and reckless disregard of the consequences, not alone to the future manpower which would be sent into Asia, not alone to the cities of America, but also to the very troops themselves who are on Korea.

Mr. CAPEHART. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McMAHON. I yield.

Mr. CAPEHART. The able Senator from Connecticut has just about convinced me of the hopelessness of the whole program in Asia. I am about ready to introduce a resolution directing the withdrawal of our troops from Korea, because the picture which the Senator from Connecticut and his colleagues have painted is absolutely hopeless. We are sacrificing from 1,500 to 2,000 American boys every week for absolutely nothing. That is not merely my opinion. It is the opinion of the Senator from Connecticut and his colleagues. They have told us that there is no possible chance, in their opinion, of winning in China or against China. If that be true, let us get our boys out of Korea.

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, the interpretation which has been made by the Senator from Indiana may satisfy a certain partisan sense which he undoubtedly possesses in a very tiny measure, but I do not think it will make sense to those who read this RECORD.

Now, Mr. President—

Mr. LEHMAN and Mr. FERGUSON addressed the Chair.

Mr. McMAHON. I shall yield, and then I wish to proceed with my speech. I enjoy debate. I think it is most useful. When I finish my speech, I shall be glad to yield. I will stand here until some other Senator moves an adjournment or recess.

Mr. President, I think the Senator from New York [Mr. LEHMAN] was well advised. He declined to yield, and thus preserved the continuity of his speech. There are some ideas in my speech which I wish to present in proper continuity. I am afraid they may be lost sight of in the debate back and forth.

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. President, I think I was so well advised in taking the position which I did that I withdraw my request of the Senator from Connecticut that he yield to me.

Mr. FERGUSON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McMAHON. Not at this time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut declines to yield.

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, the people, and particularly the plain men and women of Russia, represent the heart of the problem of war and peace. If Stalin enjoyed the loyal support of his people, he would not have isolated them so completely from the outside world, from contact with the ideas of western civilization.

Incidentally, Mr. President, perhaps what I propose will be called impracti-

cal; maybe it is too idealistic; but I have failed to hear from anyone who has taken part in the debate on the other side of the aisle any definite suggestions as to how or through what means we have a chance of avoiding world war III, and that is what I am interested in.

I said that if Stalin enjoyed the loyal support of his people he would not have isolated them so completely from the outside world, from contact with the ideas of western civilization. His weakness in this respect is a source of strength to us. We must and can find the ways and means of speaking directly to the peoples of Russia. We must tell them that they are not isolated, that they are not alone, that they are not forgotten. We must raise a banner and light a torch, just as our forefathers did when they conceived this Nation of free men, which will shine over all barriers, penetrate any iron curtain, and bring a message of hope to the enslaved and imprisoned millions under the hammer and sickle.

America has always stood for peace and freedom. This is the message we must get across to the suffering peoples of Russia. They yearn for the end of a system which sends millions to penal labor camps, which denies the farmers their own land, persecutes religion, tolerates no free trade-unions, maintains a tremendous spy system and a huge police army, stifles science and art, and prevents free intercourse with the free nations of the world. Each day brings new evidence from behind the iron curtain of this fervent longing of the Russian people for liberty.

In recent years, we have learned from the many thousands of Soviet citizens who have fled to the West that this longing for freedom exists not only in the mass of the Russian people, but among the officers and soldiers of the Soviet Army and in the Russian Communist Party itself. The continuing postwar purges and the virulent campaign against western and American influences are further proof of how much the present Soviet rulers fear this deep-rooted longing for freedom and friendship with other peoples.

That is why a few weeks ago, together with Representative RUBINOFF, of Connecticut, and 24 distinguished Senators of both parties, I asked the Congress to begin a moral crusade for peace by adopting a resolution which lets the world know of our desire to live in friendship with all the peoples of the world, including the ordinary people of Russia. This resolution of friendship says that we are unalterably resolved to defend our freedom, we rearm only with reluctance, and we would far prefer to devote our resources to a war against want. It points out that only the iron curtain keeps the Russian people from knowing of our true intentions.

The resolution finally requests the President to challenge Stalin to make these sentiments known to the Russian people. The Foreign Relations Committee unanimously reported the resolution to the Senate.

Senators will not mistake my meaning. The resolution in no sense con-

done the frightful practices of the Kremlin—as men of conscience we cannot. But I am convinced that the Russian people want war no more than we do. I am convinced that we can convert them into potential or actual allies. The 14,000,000 Russians now in slave labor camps are grim witnesses to the struggle for liberty which goes on unrelentingly within the Soviet Union.

All decent men want a halt to the onrushing armaments race. They want freedom from the fear of annihilation, they want relief from the crushing burden of military spending. All men want also a better material existence—their deepest desire is that the moneys and resources now being expended on armaments be diverted to the conquest of poverty and disease.

We must therefore stand for the kind of peace program that confronts squarely the one issue that supremely matters—the issue of bread or bombs, peace or war, life or death.

A year ago February, when many of my senatorial colleagues aspired toward the altogether desirable goal of balancing the Federal budget, I ventured to predict that the accelerating arms race would force our budget up and up and up. I pointed out that if a safe system of weapons control went into effect and if our military expenses were therefore reduced two-thirds, we would save some fifty billion dollars over a period of 5 years. I suggested then that we offer to take such a sum as this \$50,000,000,000—once the control system were proven to be airtight—and use it for universal improvement of living standards.

Last October, in one of the greatest addresses known to our history, President Truman stood before the United Nations and defined the basic goals of our foreign policy.

He laid down what I like to call the two imperatives of peace—first, foolproof disarmament and, second, use of the money thus saved for human betterment.

If real disarmament were achieved, Mr. Truman said:

The nations of the world, acting through the United Nations could join in a greatly enlarged program of mutual aid. As the cost of maintaining armaments decreased, every nation could greatly increase its contributions to advancing human welfare. All of them could then pool even greater resources to support the United Nations in its war against want. In this way, our armaments would be transformed into foods, medicines, tools for use in underdeveloped areas, and into other aids for human advancement. . . . Thus we could give real meaning to the old promise that swords shall be beaten into plowshares, and that the nations shall not learn war any more.

It is high time that we Americans, regardless of our party affiliations, put ourselves four-square behind these ultimate foreign-policy objectives of the President of the United States. It is high time that we tell the world "Here is our defense money—join us in a secure system to regulate all weapons, and the money you save, along with the money we save, can be pooled through a common United Nations fund to buy bread and tractors."

Here is a program which the Frenchman, the Egyptian, the Indian, the Russian, and the Chinese can understand. Here is a program which—if supported by the American people and proclaimed with all the vigor at our command—can lift the hopes and strengthen the will to resist of all decent men throughout Europe and Asia.

I am convinced that if we can approach the Russian people with a peace program so in harmony with the natural desires of all men, we can drive a wedge between the Kremlin and the ordinary Russians, and convert the peoples of the Soviet Union into Stalin's greatest liability.

I foresee the time—and not a distant time—when the aggressive leaders of Moscow and Peiping will feel the effects of our silver bullets, when they will be absolutely forced to draw back and lick their wounds, when the Communist regimes will totter under their own rotten weight. Here is the path to real peace—peace with justice. Here is the positive action which our peril decrees.

Stalin can have all the guns and tanks and planes he desires, and, yes, atomic bombs themselves; but if he does not have the support of other peoples, he cannot make war upon us. I say it is high time that we evolve the kind of a program that will take the peoples of the world away from the Communists and give us a chance for peace, a chance for victory, without the destructiveness of world war III, into which we would be plunged, in my opinion, if we were to take the advice which has been handed out to us by a military commander.

I yield the floor.

Mr. CAPEHART and Mr. NIXON addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Connecticut yield for a question; and if so, to whom?

Mr. McMAHON. No, Mr. President; I yielded the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Indiana [Mr. CAPEHART].

Mr. NIXON. Mr. President, will the Senator from Indiana yield to me so I may ask the Senator from Connecticut a question?

Mr. CAPEHART. I yield for that purpose, if it is agreeable to the Senator from Connecticut.

Mr. McMAHON. May I ask the Senator from California to make his question brief? I had a short breakfast, and I have not yet had any lunch.

Mr. NIXON. I can understand how the Senator feels, because I, too, have been in such circumstances.

I should like to say, first, that I was impressed, as I am sure the other Members of the Senate were, by the persuasiveness and the eloquence of the Senator from Connecticut in speaking in support of the position he has taken, insofar as it concerns his advocacy of a truth campaign, an ideological campaign, a campaign in addition to economic aid to certain areas of the world. I may say that I could subscribe to and could agree with the positions the Senator has taken in that regard. However, I return to the basic question, which

I am sure the Senator from Connecticut will appreciate I am asking him in all sincerity, because I know he is as concerned as I am about the current casualties in Korea: Is it the Senator's position that until his proposed campaigns in the ideological field and in the economic field reach fruition—and I mean by that until the peoples behind the iron curtain become convinced by means of those campaigns that they are embarking upon a course which they should give up, whether in Korea or in other parts of the world—until that time comes, we have no other alternative but to continue the so-called holding or containment action which now is going on in Korea?

It seems to me that is an untenable position, because while we can call it a containment action or a holding action, yet it is an action which cost 60,000 casualties in 1 year, as my colleague from California has pointed out. It seems to me that the Senator from Connecticut should go further, and in addition to his very fine proposals in the ideological and economic fields, should suggest what concrete military steps he would advocate, while admitting that he disagrees with General MacArthur's proposals.

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, I should like to make this answer to the Senator from California: As I pointed out, we have the choice of alternatives. As between the two alternatives, I would prefer to continue to hold on in Korea while we gained the time to mount the kind of intellectual invasion which, as soon as it is mounted and is properly serviced, will serve to weaken the determination of the Kremlin to bring about the kind of conflict which they might now be willing to undertake if we precipitate an all-out war on the mainland of Asia.

The Senator from California criticizes the military position I take when I say that I prefer to continue a holding operation rather than to make it possible to precipitate world war III. I say I would far prefer to do that than to do what General MacArthur has recommended, which, in my opinion, would immediately plunge us into all-out world war III, and therefore we would have no time to mount the kind of intellectual invasion, if we wish to call it that, which would do more to weaken the Kremlin than any other thing we could possibly do in the military field.

Mr. NIXON. Then the position of the Senator from Connecticut, as I understand it, is that he does not have any alternative proposals in the military or political field in dealing with the immediate military problem in Korea. He rejects the proposals of General MacArthur; but the Senator from Connecticut, as I understand him, has no other proposals; and so far as his program is concerned, what he proposes is a continuation of the Korean war until we win on the ideological and economic fronts.

Mr. McMAHON. If we can continue that war, I say to the Senator from California, and can push the Communists back, and if it does not become enlarged and develop into world war III, the

American boys now in Korea will have served their country and, I repeat, will have served the security of America as truly and as forthrightly as have any troops who have ever served and died for their flag.

Again I say to the Senator that I want him to consider the alternatives. If we precipitate a war in China, the troops about which the Senator is now directly concerned, would in all probability be placed in such a situation that they would be subjected to the kind of raids and attacks from the air we have mentioned, but which up to the moment, so far as we know, have not occurred in Korea. They may have occurred there while I have been speaking; but, at least, up until this moment, our forces in Korea have been free from them.

Mr. NIXON. The Senator from Connecticut, as a spokesman, as I assume he is—

Mr. McMAHON. I ask the Senator to wait a moment, please. I have endeavored to make my position clear. If I have not been able to make it clear in the course of speaking for 1 hour and 10 minutes, then I certainly am unable to do so. I do not wish to be rude, for I have tried to be liberal in yielding. However, if the Senator from California does not yet understand my position, nothing that I can say now would make my position clear to him.

Mr. NIXON. I merely do not wish the Senator from Connecticut to leave his remarks in the RECORD subject to an implication which I am sure he does not wish to have made from them. As I understand—and I say this so there will be no misunderstanding on my part or on the part of others who have heard the remarks of the Senator from Connecticut today—the Senator from Connecticut does not offer any military or political program to end the war in Korea.

Mr. McMAHON. I may add that I realize that the Senator from Connecticut does not agree with that for a moment; but, of course, I would point out that General MacArthur offered no program to end it, either. General MacArthur offered a program to bring on world war III, and that is what I am protesting against.

I say again that when we mount our strength, when we become better prepared—and we did not become better prepared yesterday by means of the vote we took in this Chamber—we shall have more latitude of action in deciding what our final military policy in Korea will be. Until that time, I say we are there as a member of the United Nations, and we must subscribe to the policy under which we went there, and we must act in accordance with the agreed-upon objectives which were set forth when we went there.

Mr. KNOWLAND, Mr. CAIN, and other Senators addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana [Mr. CAPEHART] has the floor. Does he yield; and if so, to whom?

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator from Indiana yield at this point, in order to permit me to ask a

question of the Senator from Connecticut, for in view of his last statement, I think the Senate and the country are entitled to have some clarification made.

Mr. CAPEHART. I yield on that basis, provided I may do so without losing the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Do I correctly understand that in part the position the Senator from Connecticut takes is that we are not prepared from a military or defense point of view to take the risk—or, at least, what he feels is the risk—of following the MacArthur proposals? Am I correct in that understanding?

Mr. McMAHON. It is my position that today we are not ready militarily, to say nothing of the moral question, to precipitate world war III.

Mr. KNOWLAND. I should like to ask the Senator from Connecticut if he is familiar with the fact that the Congress of the United States appropriated for the national defense the following sums: In the fiscal year 1946, \$44,900,000,000; in the fiscal year 1947, \$11,400,000,000; in the fiscal year 1948, \$9,700,000,000; in the fiscal year 1949, \$10,513,000,000; in the fiscal year 1950, \$13,000,000,000; and that it is proposed that the Congress appropriate for the next fiscal year approximately \$41,000,000,000 for the national defense? Does not the Senator from Connecticut think it is a sad commentary if, after providing more than \$100,000,000,000 for that purpose, the American people are not prepared to stand up against the forces of aggression, either in Asia or in Europe?

Mr. McMAHON. I say to the Senator from California, first, that, of course, I believe, as I know he does, that if a third world war conflict should be precipitated, those responsible for it would end up by wishing they had not been, and terrible destruction would be wrought upon them. Let there be no mistake about that, Mr. President. I said that in the opening paragraph of my speech.

The figures the Senator from California has read simply demonstrate that providing a global defense against communism is extremely serious and expensive. Of course, at various points along the road, we lost some \$6,000,000,000 which we might have put into the defense of the United States; but that takes us into other fields and we had better not go into them.

The Senator from California is a very diligent member of the Armed Services Committee, and a fine representative of his State. I know that, because he serves with me on the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. I know that the Senator from California carefully examines every crack and cranny; and if he finds any crooks or thieves in the Pentagon who have been spending defense money improperly, I want him to tell the Armed Services Committee and the Senate of the United States itself about it.

I think the figures he has cited only prove that the effort to resist communism and contain it and being ready to fight it is far more expensive than even those of us who have voted for those appropriations realized.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CAPEHART. I decline to yield any further. I am sorry, but I have been standing for a long time awaiting an opportunity to speak.

Mr. President, for the past 2½ hours I have been listening to speeches by Senators. The first thing I wish to say is that I think it a most serious charge to make that one of our great Americans and one of our great generals is interested in starting world war III. That is exactly what we have heard here this afternoon, and it is what we have been hearing over the radio. It is what we have been reading in the press, in reports of what various persons have said.

It is serious to charge that a great American, a great soldier, and a great general, is desirous of starting world war III. The reason assigned for making the charge is that he advocates winning the so-called Korean war and advocates permitting the Nationalist Chinese to join the United Nations forces in fighting that war.

I listened this morning to a speech by an able Senator, who dwelt almost entirely upon the theme that the general advocates permitting the Chinese Nationalists to join the United Nations forces. Who are the Nationalist Chinese? They were among the founders of the United Nations organization, and they are still members of it. Yet there are those who stand on the floor of the Senate of the United States to advocate that a member nation of the United Nations does not have a right to participate in a war which is being conducted by the United Nations. How can anyone make sense out of such a statement as that?

We are now told that permitting the Chinese Nationalists, who are members of the United Nations, to fight in the Korean war, or to take part in it, would result in starting world war III. My understanding of what General MacArthur has been trying to do since the war in Korea began is that he favors permitting the Chinese Nationalists to furnish troops for his army in Korea; yet there are those who say we cannot and should not permit it. I ask them to answer this question: Why is it permissible for Americans, the British, the French, the Turks, the Greeks, and others to furnish troops, when that right is denied to the Chinese Nationalists?

I should like them to answer one other question: Why would we be any more likely to provoke world war III by permitting the Chinese Nationalists, as members of the United Nations, to participate, than by permitting the Turkish Army to participate, by permitting the British Army to participate, and by permitting the United States Army to participate? Why is it proper to allow one nation or a half dozen nations to participate in this fight, when it is improper to permit the Chinese Nationalists to participate? Why should they be denied that right?

As I have said, the Chinese Nationalists are members of the United Nations. Not only that, but they are also citizens

of China. All they have been demanding is the right to fight against the Communists who have taken over their country. Why do we deny them that right? The answer which is advanced is, of course, that to grant the permission would result in precipitating world war III, that for some unknown reason Russia would rush in to start world war III if we were to permit the Chinese Nationalists, as members of the United Nations, to participate in this war.

I have heard it said that the Chinese Nationalists do not have 600,000 men, that they have but 200,000 or 300,000. Even if they have but half a dozen why, as members of the United Nations, are they denied the right to fight for the United Nations, and why are they denied the right to fight against the Communists who have taken over their country?

I have heard it argued, "Oh, no, we cannot do that, because if we were to permit Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalist troops to take part, it would be necessary to provide them with transportation; it would be necessary to convey them from Formosa to the mainland." Of course it would be necessary to transport them if they were unable to reach the mainland themselves. But I ask, how did our troops get to Korea? How did the Turkish troops get to Korea? How did the small number of Greeks get to Korea? Of course, if the Chinese Nationalists on Formosa were without means of transportation, it would be necessary to supply it. So what? What difference does it make whether we do or do not transport them?

Why are Senators opposed to using Chinese Nationalist troops? I want them to tell the world why. I should like to have the American people know the truth. Why are two standards set up for members of the United Nations? Why is it said to certain member nations, "You may fight in this war in Korea," while to another member nation it is said, "You dare not take part in it"? Why not be honest and state the reason? The reason, of course, is that the British object to it, the French object to it; and the Chinese Communists would not like it, either. The Chinese Communists do not want the Chinese Nationalists fighting against them.

Someone may say that Russia would object to it. I believe that is correct. And that brings me to the question, Who is running the war? Who is running the United States? Are we more interested in what the Chinese Communists think about it and what the Russian Communists think about it than we are in what we think about it, or in what we think ought to be done? Do we have more sympathy for the Chinese Communists than for the Chinese Nationalists? Are we more interested in helping the Chinese Communists, and is that why we say to the Chinese Nationalists, "You dare not fight the Communists"? That is what we have been doing.

On the outbreak of the Korean war, the President of the United States sent the Seventh Fleet to Formosa with instructions not to permit a single Nationalist Chinese soldier to cross over

into China. I presume the thought was that the Chinese Nationalists might wish to join forces with the United Nations in Korea. He also gave instructions, of course, to prevent Chinese Communists from crossing to Formosa. What right had the President of the United States to do that? If the Russians are as friendly to the Chinese Communists as many people say they are—and I agree with them—why did they not object to that? Why did they not start world war III? I do not remember that they made any objection to it. But what right has the President of the United States to say to a sovereign nation, a fellow member of the United Nations, a nation which is recognized by us today, that we are going to put our fleet between Formosa and the mainland, to keep the Chinese Nationalists from getting back to their own country, and that we are going to prohibit them from taking part in the Korean war? What right did he have to do that? Why did he do it?

Why do we seem to be more friendly with the Chinese Communists than we are with the Chinese Nationalists? Why are we more interested in defending the Chinese Communists than we are in defending the Chinese Nationalists, who are our friends, and who are members of the United Nations? Why did we go into Korea to stop the North Korean Communists from overrunning the South Koreans, when we refused to go into China and refused to help Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist troops when the Communists were taking over their country? Those are some of the questions which I think the American people would like to have answered.

Mr. WATKINS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CAPEHART. I yield.

Mr. WATKINS. Has the Senator from Indiana ever considered how many peoples in the world are not permitted to help fight in their own defense against the Communists? I invite his attention to the fact that there are probably 10,000,000 Chinese, including those on the mainland, and on the island of Formosa, who are not permitted to fight. There are approximately 80,000,000 Japanese who, by their own constitution, are not permitted to defend themselves. There must be 40,000,000 Italians who are prohibited by the Italian treaty from engaging in the war, and there are more than 60,000,000 Germans in the same situation. It seems to me we are very choosy as to those who can help to defend themselves. Can it be that we want to have exclusive control of the whole defense of the free world? Moreover, we find that there are many neutrals in Great Britain, in France, and in other nations who were our allies in the great war. So that those who should be in the fight are not in it, and we are excluding as many as we can.

Mr. CAPEHART. I gather from listening to able Senators this afternoon that they are opposed to quitting in Korea; they are opposed to fighting; they are opposed to winning; they are opposed to receiving help from Chiang Kai-shek; they are opposed to General MacArthur, and they are opposed to the Republicans.

That is all I got out of listening to the arguments and debate in the past 3 hours. They are opposed to winning; they are opposed to fighting; they are opposed to General MacArthur; and are opposed to the Chinese Nationalists. What is their program? What do they want to do?

General MacArthur came back with a program which he said, in his best judgment, was what should be followed. He said that in his best judgment such a course would avoid world war III. That is his opinion. He may well be wrong. But I say, Mr. President, what right has any Senator to say that the able general is advocating world war III?

Talk about playing politics; talk about being partisan. What right has a Senator to say the Republican Party is the party of war, and then to listen to the able Senator from New York [Mr. LEHMAN] and hear him ask for unity in this country? We have heard the views of an able general who has been in Korea fighting the war, who gives us his best judgment as to what we should do. As I have said, he could be wrong; but why does anyone seek to assassinate his character by calling him a warmonger and saying he wants to start world war III? It is a lot of poppycock, so far as I am concerned.

Mr. CAIN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CAPEHART. I yield.

Mr. CAIN. Did the Senator from Indiana read in this morning's press, as I did, that in the area between the thirty-eighth parallel and the Yalu River in Korea approximately 700,000 of the enemy forces are arrayed against our free forces?

Mr. CAPEHART. Yes, I read that in the newspaper this morning.

Mr. CAIN. With reference to what the Senator has recently been saying, I wonder if he thinks that the American and allied forces would now be faced with approximately 700,000 of the enemy if the Chinese troops on Formosa were hitting the Chinese Communists on their flank, which is on the mainland?

Mr. CAPEHART. Of course, in that event, there could not possibly be that many opposing us. I think the Chinese Nationalists should be given the right to fight. They are citizens of China, and they belong to the United Nations. How can we keep them out if they want to participate? For whose benefit are we keeping them out, whom are we helping when we keep them out? We are helping the Communists.

Mr. CAIN. It happens that the Senator from Washington supports the view just expressed by the Senator from Indiana, but aside from that consideration it seems to me the Senator is saying that our forces would not now be in such trouble if some of the force opposing them were compelled to withdraw from the present Korean front because of the need of the Chinese Reds to protect themselves against an assault on the mainland, not by Americans, but by National Chinese troops.

Mr. CAPEHART. The Senator is correct. I do not know that General MacArthur ever advocated that, and if we

do not want to do it, we certainly should permit the Chinese Nationalists, who are members of the United Nations, to send 50,000, 100,000, or 200,000 soldiers into Korea under the command of General Ridgway. We should have done it a year ago, under the command of General MacArthur, to relieve some of the American boys from fighting in the Korean war. I challenge anyone to give me one sound reason why that should not have been permitted and why it should not now be permitted.

Mr. CAIN. I take it that the Senator from Indiana is speaking with such conviction because of his great hope that a national program and policy will soon be adopted which will win the war in Korea. As I conceive it, the Senator from Indiana has no other reason for speaking.

Mr. CAPEHART. Of course I have no other reason. I want to see the war won and our boys returned to their homes.

Mr. CAIN. The Senator from Indiana feels that the Senator from Connecticut a few minutes ago used words which were beautiful but meaningless in that they did not begin to recommend a positive course of action which would conclude victoriously the war in Korea. I think the Senator from Washington and the Senator from Indiana are in agreement on that.

Mr. CAPEHART. We certainly are. I listened this afternoon to speeches in which Senators almost convinced me—indeed, I think they did convince me—that the situation in Asia is absolutely hopeless. We were told that we never can win. It is impossible to win against Asia, they said. They used adjectives to describe the terrible situation existing.

I say, Mr. President, that if they feel that way about it, then they have a right to demand, not tomorrow, but today, that every American boy be brought out of Korea. They have no right to consent to its sacrifice of another American soldier in a situation which is so hopeless as they have described it to be today.

Talk about speaking out of both sides of one's mouth. At one time we are told that we are liable to be bombed tomorrow. I heard one able Senator say that this building might be bombed even today. Yet it is perfectly all right to appease the Communists in China.

Mr. BUTLER of Maryland. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CAPEHART. I yield.

Mr. BUTLER of Maryland. I should like to ask the able Senator from Indiana if he was present during the address of the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. McMAHON].

Mr. CAPEHART. Yes; I was.

Mr. BUTLER of Maryland. Did the Senator understand the theme of the Senator from Connecticut to be that we are now buying time in Korea with the lives of our boys?

Mr. CAPEHART. That is the way I understood it. I think he said that any lives lost there would be lost in as great a cause as any cause in which any American had lost his life.

Mr. BUTLER of Maryland. After we have spent more than a hundred billion dollars getting ready for such an emer-

gency as that now upon us. Is not that correct?

Mr. CAPEHART. That is the way I understood it. I am sorry the Senator from Connecticut is not present to answer for himself, but I am certain that that is what he said.

Mr. CAIN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. CAPEHART. I yield for a question.

Mr. CAIN. Did the Senator not read in this morning's press, as did the Senator from Washington, that the allied estimate is that some 20,000 of the enemy have been killed in the past 2 days?

Mr. CAPEHART. I read it in the newspaper this morning; yes.

Mr. CAIN. The Senator saw no reference in the newspaper to allied or American casualties during the same 2-day period, did he?

Mr. CAPEHART. That is correct; there was none published.

Mr. CAIN. Is the Senator aware of the rule of thumb which is employed, or at least it has been so stated to be employed by one administration advocate after another, that for every American who dies at least 10 of the enemy die?

Mr. CAPEHART. Yes; I understood that to be the rule of thumb.

Mr. CAIN. Should we not be very mindful, therefore, as we talk in the Senate in the hope that we can move aggressively forward in adopting some program which will result in victory, that in the last 2 days probably 2,000 of the finest young American men who have ever trod this earth have been killed in Korea? On my own responsibility I want to talk about death all the time in the hope that we can get somewhere. Unfortunately, we do not have in Korea, nor shall we have for a long time to come, the silver bullets, in the way of ideological advantages, to which the Senator from Connecticut made such a beautiful but meaningless reference this morning.

Mr. CAPEHART. Let me say that no one can argue with the able Senator from Connecticut that if we could get world peace by spending money and by being helpful and doing all the things he so ably described that that would not be the thing for us to do. That would be the thing I would be for. That would be the thing that every other American would be for. However, I wish to remind Senators that I doubt whether any nation was ever as helpful to Russia as the United States was at a time when they had their backs to the wall in Stalingrad. The American people gave them hundreds of millions of dollars. They gave them tanks. They gave them guns. They gave them everything they had. They gave them everything they could possibly spare. Able Senators stood on the floor of the Senate and voted for it. I am looking at the able Senator from Georgia [Mr. GEORGE]. He was a Member of the Senate at the time. The American people poured out their souls and hearts to the Russians. They gave them all the physical help they could possibly give them. If it had not been for such help the Nazis would have overrun their country. Yet, within 5 years, Mr. President, they have turned on us. Today we listen to able Senators

on the floor say that we might be bombed in the Capitol, and that everyone in the building could be killed. Then other able Senators tell us what would happen in China as a result of communism. I would subscribe to what the able Senator from Connecticut read to us if I thought it was humanly possible to achieve the objective in that way. It is not possible, it has never been, and it never will be, so long as we are dealing with Communistic Russia and with the Communistic philosophy. Why do we fool ourselves? Talk about being realistic, Mr. President. I heard something about being realistic this afternoon. Let us be realistic, Mr. President.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CAPEHART. I am glad to yield to the Senator from South Dakota.

Mr. MUNDT. I was impressed by the colloquy between the junior Senator from Maryland and the Senator from Indiana concerning the statement made by the Senator from Connecticut to the effect that we are buying time with the lives of the American boys who are now being expended in Korea, in order to get prepared, and that even though 1,400 American casualties every week may be a fearful price to pay he proposes to pay it in order to buy additional time.

I wonder whether the Senator from Indiana recalls how long it has been that we have had a Democratic administration in charge of the Defense Establishment of the country.

Mr. CAPEHART. They have been running the country for 20 years.

Mr. MUNDT. In that time they have had complete control of the Defense Establishment of the country.

Mr. CAPEHART. They have been in 100 percent control.

Mr. MUNDT. There has been no time during the past 18½ years to be exact when the Republican Party has named a Secretary of State or Secretary of Defense, or any of the Chiefs of Staff; is that not correct?

Mr. CAPEHART. That is correct.

Mr. MUNDT. Therefore, whatever defense we have or do not have is the sole responsibility, first of the New Deal, and then of the Fair Deal; is that correct?

Mr. CAPEHART. That is correct.

Mr. MUNDT. Therefore, if we can judge, as the Senator from Connecticut has suggested we can, the future by the past, and assuming therefore, that it might take another 18½ years for this administration to get the country prepared for such an emergency as we are now confronted with in Korea, I wonder whether the Senator from Indiana is fast enough with arithmetic to say how many boys would have to be expended at the rate of 1,400 a week for that period of time?

Mr. CAPEHART. I am not fast enough at figures to give the answer. It might run into millions.

Mr. MUNDT. It is certainly a fearful spectacle to contemplate, when an administration which has had the sole control of the Defense Establishment of the country for 18½ years says it has not had time to get ready to meet the menace of communism. Mr. President,

it says it did not even have time to get ready to wage a conflict against a country like Red Korea which has no modern military establishment or factories for fabricating a modern weapon.

Mr. CAPEHART. Of course, I am one who does not subscribe to the position that we are not well prepared today. I think we are. However, even if we are not, according to the policy of the President of the United States, he would not use even the material that he has.

Mr. MUNDT. Because he has argued, and his lieutenants have argued in and out of Congress, that we are not prepared enough to defend ourselves against communism or to battle for the free world. It seems to me a pretty sordid spectacle to contemplate that we must continuously and endlessly spend 1,400 or more American casualties every week while we hesitate and fumble and fool around with the defense establishments, spending billions of dollars for other things besides defense, and at the same time not being able to defend and support the boys who are already fighting communism on the bloody front at Korea.

I wonder whether the Senator from Indiana has had occasion to examine the very significant and highly illuminating report of David Lawrence in yesterday's Evening Star, in which he pointed out category by category errors in the position which is today being broadcast by those who, for one reason or another, are supporting the White House line. Has the Senator read the article?

Mr. CAPEHART. No; I have not.

Mr. MUNDT. Let me invite the Senator's attention to a statement in the column written by Mr. Lawrence on yesterday.

Mr. CAPEHART. I would suggest that the Senator read as much as he cares to read, and then place the whole article in the RECORD.

Mr. MUNDT. I wish to take it up point by point. Then I shall put the whole article in the RECORD. He is discussing the smear campaign, which the country now knows has been inspired by White House sources, and which is being launched throughout America by every individual in and out of public life who can be induced to participate in the disgraceful smears against one of the greatest Americans in the history of our Republic. Mr. Lawrence suggests that we get back to the facts before anyone tries to smear a great American like Douglas MacArthur, whether we agree with his policy or not. It is apparent that they are very definitely attempting to smear him as they smeared Herbert Hoover in 1931 and 1932.

First, Mr. Lawrence says:

For the White House declaration that the Joint Chiefs had unanimously recommended the President's action is a half-truth.

He does not call it a lie. He calls it a half-truth.

He says:

The facts are these:

1. There was no meeting of the Joint Chiefs and no action of a formal nature taken by the Joint Chiefs.

David Lawrence is one of the most highly respected and able newspapermen in America. He makes that as a categorical statement. If he is right, the White House has falsified its statement, David Lawrence says it told a "half truth."

Certainly in this debate the American public has the right to know whether we can rely upon statements coming from the White House even though they be politically inspired and are a part of an organized smear campaign against MacArthur.

If I may, I should like to have permission to insert in the RECORD the entire article by David Lawrence at the conclusion of the Senator's remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit A.)

Mr. MUNDT. I now quote paragraph numbered 5 from the article by David Lawrence:

5. Not a single recommendation of a formal nature is in the record to show that the Joint Chiefs took cognizance of any military insubordination or preferred any such charge against General MacArthur. Yet Members of Congress have been saying so in a chorus for several days just as if General MacArthur, after 52 years of military service, did not know what was and was not a military order or instruction.

Has the Senator from Indiana any recollection of hearing persons in high places accuse General MacArthur during the past 2 weeks of military insubordination?

Mr. CAPEHART. Oh, yes. That has been one of the hues and cries.

Mr. MUNDT. Does the Senator from Indiana share with the Senator from South Dakota grave concern that a respectable newspaperman like David Lawrence should say on his own responsibility that there is no such record of any such insubordination?

Mr. CAPEHART. I do not think there is any.

Mr. MUNDT. Does not the Senator from Indiana agree that certainly the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the Senate Committee on Armed Services, when they talk with Douglas MacArthur, will have a responsibility as Senators, in open and public, recorded hearings, to get at the truth in that kind of disgusting controversy, and ascertain wherein lie the facts?

Mr. CAPEHART. Certainly.

Mr. MUNDT. I quote another paragraph from the article by David Lawrence:

6. General MacArthur's summary dismissal was not recommended by any military man since it meant he was instantly relieved and not only could not say farewell to his troops but had no opportunity to turn over the complicated affairs of his command to a successor.

Does not the Senator from Indiana agree, therefore, that our duly appointed committees have a responsibility, in public, open, and recorded hearings, to find out whether it was President Truman or Dean Acheson who insisted that General MacArthur should go, or whether the lame excuse they now offer is indeed the fact—that they were acting upon recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Mr. CAPEHART. There is no question about it.

Mr. MUNDT. In my opinion the Joint Chiefs of Staff have some responsibility too. They are important men. They are distinguished Americans. They too stand before the bar of history. They have been dragged in by the heels by politicians, as a part of this debate. I would be proud of any member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who had the courage and patriotism to stand up on his responsibility and tell America the truth, whatever it is. If his head must roll, because the king can do no wrong, the American people will praise any member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who will tell us wherein lies the truth in this labyrinth of fiction and falsehood by which it is attempted to deceive and delude the American people.

I read the next paragraph from the article by David Lawrence.

7. Not a single piece of evidence exists that General MacArthur failed to carry out the policies of the President and the Department of State in his post as Supreme Allied Commander in Japan.

That is important. If we are to expend lives so freely in Korea, as a very small handful of articulate Democratic Senators have suggested, at least the mothers and fathers of the boys, and their relatives, as well as the parents of boys yet to be shipped overseas to be expended, have a right to know who is lying at the top in America. And what is the purpose of the bloody sacrifice?

I read that statement again, because someone is not telling the truth—

Mr. CAPEHART. Mr. President, I have only about five minutes more, before I must leave the Chamber.

Mr. MUNDT. If I may, I should like to read one further paragraph.

Mr. CAPEHART. Very well.

Mr. MUNDT. David Lawrence continues:

7. Not a single piece of evidence exists that General MacArthur failed to carry out the policies of the President and the Department of State in his post as supreme allied commander in Japan. Though it wasn't necessary to relieve him of his command when General Ridgway was given command of UN operations in Korea, the President swept General MacArthur from all three of his posts and gave the impression that this action was based on the "unanimous recommendation" of the Joint Chiefs.

Small wonder that America is disunited, for, when military men are compelled to become scapegoats in petty political blunders, respect for institutions of military importance can hardly be enhanced.

I hope the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be permitted, in a public hearing, to remove themselves from the indictment of being scapegoats for the politicians in the White House.

Mr. CAPEHART. Mr. President, I know that I shall be repeating a little, but I must do so, and then I shall take my seat.

Why did the President of the United States do what he did in respect to the Nationalist troops on Formosa when the war in Korea broke out? What was the purpose? When the war in Korea began the President sent the Seventh Fleet and said in substance to the Chinese Nationalists, "You dare not leave Formosa." I

think he also said to the Chinese Communists, "If you make any effort to cross over to Formosa, you will have trouble with our fleet."

Why did he do that? Did he do it because he did not want the Chinese Nationalists, who are members of the United Nations, to take part in the Korean War? Did he do it, as some tell us, in order to protect Formosa against the Chinese Nationalists? Did he do it because he was fearful that if the Chinese Nationalists invaded the mainland of China or entered the Korean War the Chinese Communists would be brought into the Korean War? Just why did he do it? The war has been in progress for nearly a year. Why have the Chinese Nationalists been denied the opportunity of participating in the war in Korea? I do not know whether Chiang Kai-shek has 600,000 troops, 6,000,000, 60,000, or only 60. The number must be somewhere between zero and 600,000 because I have heard both those figures used.

I should like to know the answers to these questions. The American people want to know. I am sure that the American boys fighting in Korea want to know. I know that the families of the boys who have lost their lives in Korea want to know why 100,000 Chinese Nationalists, who are members of the United Nations, are not allowed to participate in the war in Korea.

How could Russia or the Chinese Communists take offense at the Chinese Nationalists fighting in this war, any more than they would take offense at the Turks, the Greeks, the British, the French, or the Americans fighting in the war? I want to know why the Chinese Nationalists have been kept out. I want to know who has been helping whom.

No one can ever make me believe, and I think no one can ever make any fair-minded person believe, that denying the Chinese Nationalists the right to send 50,000 men to Korea to join what was General MacArthur's army, and is now General Ridgway's army is in the best interests of the United States. It could not have been anything but in the best interests of the United Nations. What kind of a United Nations have we, Mr. President, if we say to 50 or more members of that organization, "You may fight in this war," and then to one of them, "You do not dare to take part in this war. We are going to put our Navy in there to see that you do not leave Formosa and fight in this war." I ask again, What kind of a United Nations do we have?

We are furnishing more than 90 percent of the troops engaged in combat in Korea. We are furnishing more than 90 percent of the materials and the money to conduct the campaign, and 90 percent of the casualties are American soldiers. The Chinese Nationalist Government is the one member of the United Nations that really want to get into the fight. Why? Because the Chinese on Formosa are citizens of China, were residents of China, and want to return to China and regain control of their country. They want to oust the Red Chinese Government which has driven them out, and regain control of their country.

They are patriots. They have said and continue to say, "We want to get into this fight." Yet here in America, 9,000 miles away, our Government says, "No, you stay out of this fight. We are not going to let you get into it. We are going to send American boys to fight; boys from Indiana, Ohio, Texas, Washington, California, and all the other States. They are going to Korea to do the fighting. We do not want you Nationalist Chinese in this fight." That is what the position taken by our Government amounts to. Perhaps I am exaggerating it a little bit. It is my intention to exaggerate it, only so as to show how ridiculous our position appears to me to be.

I return to the question I have repeatedly asked: "You, who are opposed to the Chinese Nationalists taking part in the war, who have you been protecting? Whose best interests have you been working for? Have you been working for the best interests of the United Nations, the best interests of America, or have you been working for the best interests of our enemies?"

Mr. WATKINS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for one question?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Indiana yield to the Senator from Utah?

Mr. CAPEHART. I yield.

Mr. WATKINS. Is it not a fact that when the United Nations issued its recommendations that the free nations of the world help defend the South Koreans, that was a general invitation to all other members of the United Nations to take part?

Mr. CAPEHART. Of course it was. If it was not, I think we ought to resign from the United Nations. But of course it was, Mr. President. Who sent troops? The United States sent more than 90 percent. Other nations have sent some troops, some very few troops and other nations no troops. Yet, a great American, General MacArthur, who had been in the Far East for many years, who was in charge of the war in Korea, saw 60,000 American boys become casualties, an average of 1,400 or 1,500 a week. The Americans fighting there needed help. They needed additional troops. On Formosa there were 600,000 men who could help fight. Perhaps that number is exaggerated. Maybe there were not that many. I do not care about the exact figures, but many Chinese troops were on Formosa, ready to fight. They were there and they wanted to help our soldiers fight. But they were told by our Government, "You can not come over and help us. We do not want any help from you." And this great General, MacArthur, saw the casualty lists coming in of American soldiers, at the rate of 1,500 or more a week.

Mr. President, what would you have done had you been in his place? Our soldiers in Korea were told "You can fight only in this little area, on this little peninsula. You can build up all the manpower you can; you can have a pool of men, and a pool of supplies and bases, but all must be outside an imaginary line. You dare not even fly a plane over that line to take a look at what the

enemy is building up in the way of forces to fight against you. Let them continue to build up their forces beyond that imaginary line. You can fight them only if you fight them in a given area."

Mr. President, what would you have done had you been over in Korea conducting that campaign? I ask, Mr. President, what would you have done when the policy seemed to be one of waiting, one of delay, a policy of sacrificing American boys, with the enemy killing them as they found them like sitting ducks, our boys not being given a chance to maneuver or properly to defend themselves until something would happen in the very dim future.

What would you have done, Mr. President? The great general in command in Korea had a plan, and he tried to give it to the heads of our Government, but they would not listen to him. They kept sniping at him, sniping at him, and finally fired him. He then came back and told the Congress, in the joint meeting, what his policies were, what his thoughts, his ideas, and his feelings were. Yet, from that day until now there are those who will stand on the floor of the United States Senate and say, "That man is interested only in one thing, and that is starting world war III."

Mr. BUTLER of Maryland. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CAPEHART. I yield.

Mr. BUTLER of Maryland. Have we not heard it said repeatedly that the administration favored the suppression of aggression wherever it reared its ugly head?

Mr. CAPEHART. Yes. I made a note of what was said on the floor of the Senate today. It was either the able Senator from New York [Mr. LEHMAN] or the able Senator from Connecticut [Mr. MCMAHON] who stated on the floor today, "We stand ready to fight communism all over the world."

Mr. BUTLER of Maryland. Has it reared its ugly head at the fountain source in Red China or has it not?

Mr. CAPEHART. If it has not then I simply do not understand the English language as I read the reports from day to day in the newspapers. Of course it has. But there are those who would make a warmonger out of a great American, a great general, because he advocated the use of Nationalist Chinese troops, troops who represent a member of the United Nations. If troops from a member of the United Nations cannot be used to fight the aggressor in this war, then I ask: What sort of an organization is the United Nations?

General MacArthur also advocated that he be permitted to send airplanes over Manchuria, and to fight the enemy there in the same way that every other general has always been permitted to fight in all wars in which the United States, or for that matter any other nation, has ever been engaged. I doubt if ever in the history of the world one hand of a general has been tied behind him as has been the case with General MacArthur in this war. Yet it is said he wants to start world war III.

General MacArthur wanted to blockade the Chinese coast. Why should we not blockade the Chinese coast? Why

should we permit our enemy, who is killing our boys every day, freely to receive materials of war which will help him win the fight against us? Why should we not try to prevent such materials reaching the enemy? There is nothing new about blockades.

General MacArthur spoke about a blockade, in which we would have the right to discover what cargo ships sailing to the enemy contained, and if ships carried cargoes of materials that would help the Chinese Communists to win the war, materials that would help them kill American boys, such materials could justifiably be prevented from reaching the enemy. That is what the general was talking about, and nothing else can be made out of his statement. For all that he is called a warmonger. I say, God help those who are indulging in any such name calling. Let us pray to God for them because they know not what they are doing.

What is their policy? I said a moment ago that they are opposed to quitting, they are opposed to fighting, they are opposed to winning, they are opposed to receiving help from Chiang Kai-shek, and they are opposed to General MacArthur.

They have convinced me—I have had such a notion for a long time, in fact—that we should do either of two things: either we should go ahead and win the fight in Korea or we should get out of that country. After listening to the Senators on the other side speak in the Senate today and after considering the picture they paint of the hopelessness of the entire situation in Korea, I think we should withdraw from Korea. I should think they would be happy to have us retire from Korea, and that they would be the ones who would be advocating such a course, because they themselves say that we cannot possibly win, but that the only thing for the American boys who are in Korea to do is to stay there like sitting ducks and be killed. At some time in the future—those who advocate that policy do not say at what time in the future it will occur—but they simply say that at some time in the future, somewhere, perhaps we can make an honorable peace. Perhaps they think we can appease the Communists in some way; but we are not told whether that will happen in 30 months or 30 years.

Mr. President, I can understand why the seats on my left in this Chamber are empty and why the Senators whose seats are on the other side of the aisle do not wish to listen now. What is their plan? I listened to it earlier today, as it was presented to us by two Democratic Senators.

Mr. President, much as I dislike to walk away from a fight [laughter], yet because of what I have heard earlier today from Senators on the other side of the aisle, whose remarks at least have helped me to come to this conclusion, after listening to the remarks of other Senators who take the contrary position, after listening to those who call General MacArthur a warmonger, I have come to the conclusion, from their own reasoning, from their own lips, from their own logic, that we had better get out of Korea.

Mr. President, Senators on the other side say that we cannot win the Korean war. Although the seats on the Democratic side are empty at the moment, yet several Senators who sat there earlier this afternoon said we could not win that war. That is their conclusion, not mine. So I ask you, Mr. President, what good does it do us to hold a little corner of Korea that is almost entirely mountainous? What good does it do us to hold it, either from a military standpoint or from any other standpoint?

Mr. President, I have learned much today from what I have heard from Senators on the other side of the aisle, and that is that the policy of the administration—for I suppose that the able Senator from New York [Mr. LEHMAN] and the able Senator from Connecticut [Mr. McMAHON], who have spoken today, were speaking for the administration—is that it is impossible to win the war in Korea, but that we are going to keep our boys there on an imaginary line, with X number of them killed, wounded, crippled, or taken prisoner every day, until some time in the future—and they do not tell us when that time will be—we find some way of bringing about an honorable peace or until we find some way of appeasement or until something happens to put a stop to the Korean War.

Mr. President, after that has been accomplished, if it should be, shall we have prevented what the able Senator from Connecticut said this afternoon is the possibility that the Russians might bomb the Capitol Building in which we now stand—in fact, might bomb it before midnight?

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. LONG in the chair). Does the Senator from Indiana yield to the Senator from South Dakota?

Mr. CAPEHART. I yield.

Mr. MUNDT. I wonder whether the Senator from Indiana would agree with me that perhaps the complete emptiness of the seats on the Democratic side of the Chamber is rather symbolic of the complete emptiness of any hopefulness in the administration's war policy in Korea?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Would the Senator care to suggest the absence of a quorum—and then the clerk will call the roll and more Senators will be present to listen to the Senator from Indiana?

Mr. CAPEHART. I shall suggest that in a moment.

Mr. President, I think I have said about all I care to say.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, is the Senator now yielding the floor?

Mr. CAPEHART. I am not yet yielding the floor.

Mr. WATKINS. Mr. President—

Mr. CAPEHART. Does the Senator from Utah wish to ask a question?

Mr. WATKINS. No; I wish to obtain the floor.

Mr. CAPEHART. Mr. President, again I say, God help us when we have those who would advocate sacrificing the lives of American boys in a war or in a situation in Korea which they themselves say is absolutely hopeless, which they them-

selves say we do not have a single chance of winning. Yet, Mr. President, they would keep your boy and my boy and the boys of other Americans in Korea, fighting and dying in a war which they themselves say those boys can never win. That seems to be the policy of the administration, and evidently it is, because the two Democratic Senators who have spoken today seem to head the list of those who are trying to make the American people believe that General MacArthur is a warmonger. Shame on them. They should be more careful in what they say, if it is not the policy of the administration.

So, Mr. President, I simply say, in closing, God bless America. All of us had better start praying.

EXHIBIT A

JOINT CHIEFS ON A POLITICAL LIMB—WHITE HOUSE STATEMENTS ON GENERAL MACARTHUR'S DISMISSAL ARE IN VARIANCE WITH WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED

(By David Lawrence)

It's a new experience and a very uncomfortable one for the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff to be dragged into the center of a bitter political controversy.

There is, moreover, a serious discrepancy between what the White House has been saying officially—as to the unanimous recommendations of the Joint Chiefs in the MacArthur case—and what actually happened.

The first chapter—the initiative—in the controversy was the administration's sanction of a speech by General Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, last Wednesday in Chicago. This was the day before General MacArthur was due to present his case to a joint meeting of Congress. The big headline in the Wednesday afternoon papers was "General Bradley blasts MacArthur's views." The explanation offered for this advanced rebuttal was that General Bradley had for a long time scheduled the engagement and had to deliver the speech.

The general could as readily have talked about universal military training or something else unrelated to the MacArthur episode.

But once the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs spoke out it was natural that General MacArthur in his Thursday address should reveal that his own military recommendations had been approved in the past by the Joint Chiefs.

Not content with one blunder, the administration then went from the frying pan into the fire with another statement. This one, while issued at the Pentagon, was actually directed by the White House. It came immediately after General MacArthur's speech to Congress on Thursday, and the full text of it reads as follows:

"In response to inquiries from the press concerning General MacArthur's reference to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a Pentagon spokesman said the White House had authorized him to state that the action taken by the President in relieving General MacArthur was based upon the unanimous recommendations of the President's principal civilian and military advisers, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The reasons for General MacArthur's relief have been stated previously by the President."

Now the foregoing gives the impression that General MacArthur's reference to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in his address to Congress had to do with his removal. Not a word of his address had any reference to that point. He merely outlined his own military recommendations about the prosecution of the war in Korea and stated that the Joint Chiefs had supported his proposals.

This latter point, therefore, the White House in its statement did not deny at all, though a local paper headlined its front-page article: *MacArthur Says Joint Chiefs Shared His Views but Pentagon Declares They Favored Ouster*.

This was natural in view of the misleading official statement. For the White House declaration that the Joint Chiefs had unanimously recommended the President's action is a half truth.

The facts are these:

1. There was no meeting of the Joint Chiefs and no action of a formal nature taken by the Joint Chiefs.
 2. There was a meeting in which civilians and military men met with the President who asked their views about the controversy and they generally felt that since Mr. Truman and General MacArthur differed in foreign policy there should be a replacement.
 3. The timing of the replacement and the method of making the replacement was not agreed upon, this being left to the President to decide.
 4. Some of those present at the meeting had their first news of what the President finally decided when they read the newspapers on Wednesday morning, April 11.
 5. Not a single recommendation of a formal nature is in the record to show that the Joint Chiefs took cognizance of any military insubordination or preferred any such charge against General MacArthur. Yet Members of Congress have been saying so in a chorus for several days just as if General MacArthur, after 52 years of military service, did not know what was and was not a military order or instruction.
 6. General MacArthur's summary dismissal was not recommended by any military man since it meant he was instantly relieved and not only could not say farewell to his troops but had no opportunity to turn over the complicated affairs of his command to a successor.
 7. Not a single piece of evidence exists that General MacArthur failed to carry out the policies of the President and the Department of State in his post as supreme allied commander in Japan. Though it was not necessary to relieve him of his command when General Ridgway was given command of UN operations in Korea, the President swept General MacArthur from all three of his posts and gave the impression that this action was based on the "unanimous recommendation" of the Joint Chiefs.
- Small wonder that America is disunited. For, when military men are compelled to become the scapegoats in petty political blunders, respect for institutions of military importance can hardly be enhanced.
- Mr. McCARTHY obtained the floor.
- Mr. BRICKER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
- Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, I am glad to yield to the Senator from Ohio, if it is understood that by doing so, I do not lose my right to the floor.
- The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
- Mr. BRICKER. Mr. President, I have asked the Senator from Wisconsin to yield the floor to me at this time because I have some things which I wish to read into the RECORD—not insert into the RECORD, but actually read into the RECORD—things which are very pertinent to what has been occurring in the Senate Chamber this afternoon.
- I have been listening to the cries of the administration's sponsors for peace in the world; and yet there is no peace. Until the actions of the administration mesh with their words, their proclama-

tions are but hollow-sounding phrases, so far as I am concerned.

Mr. President, I wish to read into the RECORD something which appears in this week's United States News and World Report. It is an editorial by one who has great powers of observation and who has time to think and who has the ability to put into words his sound, courageous, constructive thinking. The article I shall now read is entitled, "A Salute To Courage," and is by David Lawrence. The article is only several columns in length, so it is short enough for me to read it into the RECORD at this time.

Said he:

[From United States News and World Report of April 27, 1951]

A SALUTE TO COURAGE
(By David Lawrence)

Out of the clouds of despair and frustration, out of the months of discouragement and floundering policy has come at last a symbol of hope.

It emerged last week in every city and hamlet, in every home in America. It was the simple, unrestrained American enthusiasm and admiration for and appreciation of human courage.

It came in the form of a demonstration for Douglas MacArthur—the man who fought victoriously at the head of the "Rainbow" Division on the fields of France in World War I, the man who saw the Stars and Stripes hauled down in surrender at Bataan at the start of World War II and, undaunted, led our troops back from Australia, over the mountains of New Guinea, and, by a series of hazardous amphibious landings, came in triumph to liberate the Philippines and finally to receive the Japanese surrender in Tokyo Bay.

The chapter is unparalleled in our history. The record of General MacArthur as a soldier is unmatched in the annals of our country. No man has for so long held positions of high command on active assignment in the field, with continuing responsibilities of such transcendent importance.

But it was not to him as a soldier alone that his countrymen paid him honor. His great achievements as a statesman stand out, too. Only 6 years ago he was marching into a conquered country at the head of victorious armies. Today those same conquered people worship him as a friend, as a statesman who, in civil as well as military affairs—applying rare tact and an extraordinary administrative capacity—implanted the roots of democracy and reform and struck a blow at militarism itself.

In the east General MacArthur stands as a symbol of American idealism, as the very embodiment of American hopes and aspirations for the free world—for an end, as he put it in his eloquent address to Congress, to colonialism and the tyrannies of the exploiting classes, a beginning of better government and higher standards of living for the common man in Asia.

But while these finer points of statesmanship will come to be recognized more fully in time and will live long in history, the American people mingled resentment and enthusiasm in their demonstration last week. They had seen a great soldier dismissed from his command at the hands of a politician. The country by its applause was repudiating petty politics—the deep freezes and the mink coats, the impulsive insults to the Marine Corps, and the whole sickening list of acts which are beneath the dignity and the good taste and the good manners of a President of the United States.

Yes, as Commander in Chief, he can, as in a totalitarian state, purge high military officers.

Yes; he can remove the head of the Navy, as he did in October 1949, for daring to testify under oath before a congressional committee and tell the truth about our naval weaknesses.

Yes; he can summarily dismiss the head of our occupation forces in Japan, where no disregard of orders has even been charged.

And, yes, he can with one blow impose the sentence of death on the military record of a great general and detach him from his command so quickly that he could not have that final privilege so dear to a military man—to say a few words of farewell to his troops.

Yes; he has the legal right to do all this.

But, as President Truman sought to punish General MacArthur, he forgot that ingrained in all of us is a sense of fairness which no official reprimand can tarnish or destroy.

In acclaiming Douglas MacArthur, however, the American people are primarily paying tribute to the American soldier of today—the men who die for us in Korea while an unmoral and weak-kneed administration preaches defeatism even as it seeks, by innuendoes and smears, to persuade the American people that the whole episode is just a disobedience of orders.

The welcome to MacArthur means that the American people are grateful for the valor and sacrifices of their sons on the field of battle. They are not cynical as the bands play and the flag flies. Like the Members of Congress and veteran military officers who stood in tears in the House of Representatives last week and applauded a great man—they are not ashamed to cry.

For this still is America—the America of our forefathers, the America of the illustrious years of past history, the America that will some day see through the guilt of phony liberalism and cynical disdain for patriotism and love of fatherland.

This America that General MacArthur aroused is not an America of petty politics and tricky manipulation of public power. It is not an America of double talk which denounces yet embraces appeasement. It is not an America of cowardice. It is an America of resoluteness and courage and sacrifice. It is an America that applauds the man of honest convictions. It is an America that demands and must have a new leadership.

Mr. President, I read that because it so well voices the sentiments which have been expressed to the Senator from Ohio in about 10,000 letters which he has received from constituents in his own great State. Only 10 of those letters have approved the action of the President, and they were based upon a power which we all recognize, the power of the civilian Commander in Chief over the officers of the Army. The sentiments expressed by correspondents in my State are more unanimous than those which have been expressed in letters received by most Senators, because of the fact that from central Ohio came the One Hundred and Sixty-sixth Regiment in World War I, which fought under General MacArthur in France, and because of the fact that from Ohio came the victorious Thirty-seventh Division, under the leadership of Gen. Robert S. Beightler, who likewise fought under General MacArthur in World War I, which division won so many battles in the Pacific, and, with the First Cavalry, was the first to enter the city of Manila and bring about its downfall.

If the Senator from Wisconsin will permit, I wish to emphasize one more point. It is the fact that in the same magazine there is carried an interview

with General Stratemeyer, commander of the Far East Air Forces. As appears from page 18 of that magazine, he is asked the question:

Do you think that we could meet and stop completely any air offensive against us?

His answer was:

You can't stop a determined air offensive unless you can get at the facility from which it originates. As you know, going north of the Yalu River is not permissible, and as a consequence our stopping of air attacks can't be airtight. All we can do is to be alert to it as possible, try to outguess them, and catch them in the air if and when they come over.

The further question was then asked:

Precisely how would any Chinese air offensive against our ground troops affect our present air support?

General Stratemeyer answered by saying:

It means simply this: The air-ground support that the Eighth Army has been used to, and which we are giving daily, would be cut down proportionately to the strength of the enemy air offensive. If we don't blunt that air offensive, it means our ground forces are going to get hit and our installations in the rear will get hit. I am concerned also about my own air facilities in Korea, which can be attacked from the air.

The enemy can hit me where I am based, but I can't hit him. However, I am going to hit him in North Korea—any place that I can find him on the ground, and I am going to hit any facility that he can use—that is, in North Korea.

He was asked the further question:

If they throw an effective air offensive in, it would seem that would constitute the greatest threat the UN army faces in North Korea, wouldn't it?

He answered:

I agree with you 100 percent.

He then proceeded to say that we can only destroy the fields in North Korea, but it would be a simple and easy task for the Chinese Communist forces, or the Russians, whichever it might be, to come in with airplanes overnight to one of these fields which had been camouflaged, and which their masters had camouflaged, attack on the following day, and then race back to their so-called sanctuary in Manchuria.

Mr. President, it is not fair to our boys who are fighting there to permit them to be bombed from the sky, when we have no possibility of attacking before the bombing takes place, and yet it is admitted by all on the other side—and has been admitted this afternoon—that if enemy planes come over, we shall have to follow them back. Why should we stand by without the power to defend against the attack before it takes place, and be required to sacrifice American lives before we finally make up our minds as to what we are going to do regarding the accruing air attack in Manchuria?

I have but one more paragraph.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for one question?

Mr. BRICKER. I yield.

Mr. McCARTHY. I think the Senator from Ohio has made an excellent point. He participated in World War I. I, myself, was in World War II. I believe we learned the same fundamentals, how-

ever, namely, that in combat either a man must be prepared to kill or to be killed; he kills the other man before that man kills him, or he is killed by the other man. Is not that correct?

Mr. BRICKER. That is exactly correct. That is the rule of war.

Mr. McCARTHY. I believe the Senator will agree that never before in our history have we come to the point where the administration has said to the soldier, "Do not kill the enemy first, because, if you do, you will make him mad." Is that not correct?

Mr. BRICKER. In the whole annals of history I have never heard anything comparable to the situation under which the American boys are fighting in Korea.

Mr. McCARTHY. Another question. I note the argument from the other side of the aisle that, if we fight back, if we allow our men to protect themselves, if they try to fight in order to save their lives, then the war in China will be extended. I received a letter from the son of one of my farmer friends in Wisconsin, in which I think he answered that argument very well. He said, "I have read all about this matter of extending the war in China. I would like to know, where are we in Asia, except in Korea?" He said, "I do not think they can hit us where we ain't."

I should like to have some of my friends on the other side of the aisle tell us how we can answer that farm boy. They talk about extending the war, but how in God's world can it be extended unless we land troops?

Mr. BRICKER. I will say to the Senator that it seems to me that the only ones who can extend the war are the Chinese. In other words, if we are determined not to go in, the only thing we ask on this side of the aisle is to be able to protect the American boys in Korea, and permit them to do the things for which they were sent to Korea.

Mr. McCARTHY. There is no way in which the Chinese can extend the war against us in China, even if we do hit back.

Mr. BRICKER. If we are not in China they cannot. There is no way in which we can incite them to do any more than they are now doing in Korea, because they are there in full strength now. I think they are accumulating air power from Russia, and possibly submarines. I do not know about that, but I do not believe we should wait until they drive us out before we make up our minds what we should do.

Mr. McCARTHY. Will the Senator from Ohio agree with me that, regardless of arguments on either side of the aisle, there is one fact which stands out and which no one can successfully contradict, namely, that so long as we tie the hands of General Stratemeyer and our other generals in that theater, so long as we tell them they cannot fight back, so long as we let Chinese Communist planes come over and kill our American boys—and as we both know, they have knocked down, roughly, 184 American planes already—so long as we follow that type of reasoning, more American boys will die than would die if we followed General MacArthur's advice and destroyed their planes?

Mr. BRICKER. The Senator is absolutely correct. It is as absurd, illogical, and unpatriotic a position the administration has taken as was its position when it said that Korea was not in the perimeter of defense and we should not sacrifice an American boy. When the enemy came down from North Korea the President of the United States reversed his policy, and our Army went into action without being prepared to do so, and without consultation, as we were told in the joint meeting by General MacArthur, who, I think we all agree, knows as much about the far-eastern situation as does any other military man in the world.

Mr. McCARTHY. In connection with the argument that we should not fight China and should not allow our men to protect themselves, because, if we do, the Russians may intervene, does the Senator agree with me that if fighting back and protecting the lives of American boys means that Russia will come into the conflict, then we should realize once and for all that when the time comes—and I hope it has not yet come, even though some of our good friends argue that it has—that this Nation is too cowardly to fight, and is going to whine and whimper and not protect its soldiers, then this country certainly deserves no longer to exist as a nation.

Mr. BRICKER. I do not think it will exist very long as a nation if that kind of an attitude sweeps across it. But, thank God, as the result of the principles of a great man standing against mediocrity in government, General MacArthur has shown us the way, and there is nothing we can do about Russia either coming in or staying out. If Russia thinks it is to her advantage, she will come in, regardless of what we do, and if she does not think it is to her advantage, she will stay out. There is nothing we can do which will affect Russia's moving in. In my judgment, she will not move in, in the Orient, until she is in a strong position at home and in the European sector of Russia.

Mr. President, there is one further thing I desire to read, if the Senator from Wisconsin will permit. It is a letter which I received today from a personal friend of mine who is a civilian adviser in Korea and, as a result of his being a civilian, the administration will not be able to fire him for what he may say. This letter reached my office this morning, and I wish to read from it as follows:

While you doubtless know much more about the Korean problem than I, nevertheless, and at the risk of repetition I would like to give you a run-down on things as they look from here.

This letter was sent from Pusan, Korea, on the 11th day of April 1951. I read further:

In the first place, Korea needs every kind of assistance that she can get. Presently, there is plenty of aid on the military level with one significant exception: The reservoir of some 500,000 Koreans, now in training camps is not being utilized despite the pleas of the Korean Government. Valuable time is being wasted, time in which these men could be properly trained and adequately armed. No matter how the war comes out,

Korean manpower is going to be a key factor and if the UN forces disengage themselves for any reason, the peace of the Orient will be largely dependent on the ability of the present Korean Government to defend its borders no matter where those borders may be. Anything less than an adequate force will insure ultimate Communist domination on this peninsula. The myth that South Koreans can't fight has been pretty well exploded in combat. The North Koreans were better troops initially because the Russians had trained them for 5 years while the Americans sat on their tails in the south. The difference between North and South Koreans as fighting men is about the same as the difference between men from Cleveland and men from Cincinnati. It's all in the training and equipment.

Mr. President, there is one further paragraph which I should like to read, because it refers to the issue which is presently under consideration:

Many of the things that I have said will be challenged by those in high places. The same ones who want to tie MacArthur's hands and secretly long to appease the Communists.

I may say that this letter was written before the dismissal of General MacArthur:

Those are the people who are making world war III inevitable. We don't need to buy time with space here. What we need is a classic, all-out licking of Communist China with the gates of mercy firmly closed. And MacArthur's the lad that can do it.

This Manchurian sanctuary theory goes over like a lead balloon with the Koreans and Chinese Nationalists. All they can see from it is stalemate and continued killing for no purpose. They don't understand a way that has rules which apply only to one side—and, by golly, neither do I.

Mr. President, that comes from a man who was a colonel in the First World War, a civilian in Korea at this time, and who has studied the Korean people, the Korean system of government, and Korean enterprises.

Mr. President, I wish to express a word of appreciation to the Senator from Wisconsin for permitting me to insert these matters in the RECORD at this time.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, I understand there are five or six Senators who want me to yield, which I shall be glad to do, if I do not, by yielding, lose my right to the floor.

I want to give the Senate and the Nation a report on a very expert job which the Federal Bureau of Investigation has done in investigating a complete case under our espionage laws, and I intend to give the Senate a picture of what the Department of Justice is doing in the case, and what part the State Department is trying to play in that espionage case.

SUSPENSION OF CERTAIN IMPORT TAXES ON COPPER

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator from Wisconsin yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from Massachusetts with the understanding that I do not thereby lose the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BUTLER of Maryland in the chair). Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and the Senator may proceed.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, I thank the Senator for his courtesy. I shall not take more than 2 minutes.

On March 1 I introduced Senate Joint Resolution 41, to suspend certain import taxes on copper. The Committee on Finance considered the joint resolution along with the bill which is now the unfinished business of the Senate. The committee has very wisely, I believe, reported H. R. 3336, which would suspend certain import taxes on copper. It is in the same form in which the bill passed the House.

I am interested at this time in seeing the import tax on copper suspended, because I come from an industrial State, and many of the companies which operate in my State need copper in their business. They need it to keep men and women employed.

I should like to quote from a few of the letters which I have received. The first is from the Culver Stearns Manufacturing Co., of Worcester:

Our company is one of the immediate victims of the imposition of the 2 cents per pound duty on imported copper that became effective on July 17, after the same 2-cent duty had been suspended on this critical material for the past several years. * * * This is a matter of vital importance to our company and to literally thousands of other small concerns manufacturing electrical and electronic parts for immediate usage in many military establishments around the country.

From the Bird Machine Co., South Walpole, I quote:

I am writing to ask your support and endorsement of the bill suspending the import tax on copper. I recommend this because we, as large users of copper, recognize the significance and importance of the order and the necessity of providing this particular type of legislation at this time.

I have had similar letters from the United States Bobbin & Shuttle Co. of Lawrence; from the Atlas Tack Corp. of Fairhaven; from the Revere Copper & Brass Co.; from the Merrill & Usher Co. of Worcester; from the New England Council; Millers Falls Co., manufacturers of tools; the General Electric Co.

I know when I was in the Governor's office the General Electric Co. was the largest single employer of labor in Massachusetts and I believe it still is. I mention these companies to show the wide variety of industrial concerns that are dependent in more or less degree upon copper. We all know that the National Production Authority has taken steps to allocate copper. In a letter which I have from the NPA they say:

As you probably know, the copper situation is extremely critical and it is essential that the National Production Authority take all the necessary measures to provide sufficient copper to meet the defense and war-supporting requirements.

The enactment of suspension of the tax on copper is recommended by the Department of Defense, the Department of Interior, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of State, and the Department of Commerce.

The estimated demand for copper is placed at 1,992,000 tons for the current year. Through the allocation orders of

the NPA this was reduced by approximately 300,000 tons, making 1,692,000 tons. Even so, the supply of copper available to meet this demand, as estimated by the NPA, is slightly less than 1,500,000 tons. In 1951, according to informal estimates of the Department of Interior domestic mine production was 950,000 tons. The rest of the copper that we must use must be imported. It is perfectly clear to me that we should encourage in every way bringing copper into this country to meet the urgent demands in this time of emergency. The escape clause of the bill which is before us would in my opinion amply protect the interest of the mines in this country and at the same time tend to be fair to the users of copper wherever they may be located, and I am, of course, particularly thinking of the industries, large and small, in my own State of Massachusetts who must have a continued supply of copper if they are going to continue to operate and employ the men and women who now work in their factories.

I hope the bill will be passed. I thank the Senator from Wisconsin.

Mr. MALONE. Mr. President, will the Senator from Wisconsin yield so that I may ask a question of the Senator from Massachusetts?

Mr. McCARTHY. I shall be glad to yield, with the understanding that I do not thereby lose the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MALONE. Is the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts aware of the fact that everything manufactured by the companies to which he has referred is protected by a 50 to 65 percent duty or import fee?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I do not know the amount of the import fee. I realize that there are some tariffs in effect.

Mr. MALONE. Is it not the old story, that everyone wants free trade in the raw materials he uses—and copper would be the raw material in this case—and a 60 to 80 percent duty on what he sells? Does the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts understand that to be the fact?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I understand the point which the Senator from Nevada is making. I would say that when the domestic supply of copper can fill the needs of the country I shall be very glad to sit down with the Senator and talk to him about the question of the tariff.

Mr. MALONE. If the Senator from Wisconsin will further yield, I should like to ask the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts if he is in favor of free trade in every material of which our country does not produce a sufficient quantity for its own use. If he is for free trade, he would be for free trade on eight or nine minerals in the strategic class. We would be out of them in no time at all if none was mined in this country.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I respectfully say to my colleague from Nevada that I would not commit myself to any such generalities.

Mr. MALONE. Is the Senator aware of the fact that the textile industry and

other industries in Massachusetts could not live 60 days without a tariff?

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I would not agree with that statement in its entirety, but I agree that the tariff helps them.

Mr. MALONE. I thank the Senator.

Mr. MCCARTHY. Mr. President, perhaps I can answer for the Senator from Massachusetts by saying that he is against free trade in textiles and watches.

Mr. MALONE. And in clothespins.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I would say to my distinguished colleague from Wisconsin that I will not bring up those articles unless he also includes something about fur.

Mr. MALONE. And clothespins.

Mr. MCCARTHY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may yield for a brief speech by the distinguished Senator from Utah, without my losing the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

REVISION OF ITALIAN PEACE TREATY

Mr. WATKINS. Mr. President, I wish to report to the Senate on a subject which was considered by the Senate some time ago, and to bring the Senate up to date on what has happened since then.

The Department of State has turned its back on the United States Senate.

It is reported in the press that Italy's Foreign Minister has made representations to the United States, Great Britain, and France urging that they ease up on the military provisions of the Italian Peace Treaty of 1947 and permit Italy to rearm in the interest of self-defense and the defense of Western Europe. It is further reported in the press that the Western powers, including the United States, have refused to move in the direction of relieving Italy of the limitation on Italy's defense forces.

The rejection by the Department of State of Italy's plea for permission to rearm is a direct affront to the United States Senate. It is a deliberate refusal to accede to the wishes of the United States Senate.

On April 2, 1951, the Senate declared its will that the United States Government should seek to eliminate those provisions of the existing treaty with Italy which impose limitations upon the military strength of Italy and prevent the performance by Italy of her military obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty.

No less than 67 Senators voted on April 2, 1951, for an amendment to Senate Resolution 99 which expressed the sense of the Senate that the military provisions of the Italian Peace Treaty be renounced by the United States. Three additional Senators went on record as not voting but in favor of the amendment. Thus, 70 Senators joined in a demand that the Department of State take action to revise the military provisions of the Italian Peace Treaty.

The vote of the Senate for revision of the Italian Peace Treaty was bipartisan. No less than 22 of the 42 Democratic Senators who were present when the matter of revising the Italian Peace Treaty came to a vote cast their votes in favor of re-

vision. Two additional Democratic Senators who were not present and not voting announced that if present they would have voted "yea." That means that 23 of the 49 Democratic Members of the Senate favor denunciation of the military provisions of the Italian Treaty.

No less than 45 of the 47 Republican Members of the Senate voted "yea." The late Republican Senator Vandenberg was absent because of illness and therefore is recorded as "not voting."

The Republican Senator from North Dakota [Mr. Young], who is also recorded as "not voting," was present but did not vote because of a pairing arrangement. He announced, however, that if he were at liberty to vote he would have voted "yea." That means that 46 of the 47 Republican Members of the Senate are on record as in favor of rectification of the military provisions of the Italian Peace Treaty.

In the face of the fact that 70 of the 96 Members of the United States Senate want the military provisions of the treaty denounced, the Department of State has the gall to refuse to take action on Italy's plea for the right to rearm.

When Italy declared war on Great Britain and France on June 10, 1940, she had in the neighborhood of 8,000,000 men in her regular and reserve forces. She had a strong navy and a good air force.

The Italian Peace Treaty puts a limit of 300,000 on the number of men Italy may have under arms. Her navy may not exceed 25,000 officers and men. Her air force may not exceed 25,000 men. Her army, including frontier guards, may not exceed 185,000 combat, service, and overhead personnel. The total of all these is 300,000. The treaty also allows Italy to have 65,000 carabinieri—a kind of internal police force.

Article 64 of the Italian Peace Treaty allows Italy only 200 fighter and reconnaissance planes and 150 transport, training, and other types of planes. The total of all these is 350.

Article 54 allows Italy only 200 tanks.

Article 59 prohibits Italy from constructing, acquiring, or even replacing battleships and prohibits her from even so much as experimenting with aircraft carriers, submarines, motor torpedo boats, or specialized types of assault craft.

Article 51 of the treaty prohibits Italy from possessing, constructing, or even experimenting with atomic weapons, self-propelled or guided missiles, sea mines, torpedoes, and guns with a range of more than 30 kilometers.

While Italy stands disarmed and helpless, the satellite states of Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary are building up their strength and openly violating similar treaty restrictions.

The treaty of peace with Rumania limits the Rumanian Army to 138,000 men. It is reported that Rumania has 300,000 men under arms.

The treaty of peace with Bulgaria limits the Bulgarian Army to 65,500 men. It is reported that Bulgaria has 195,000 men under arms.

The treaty of peace with Hungary limits Hungarian armed strength to 70,-

000 men. It is reported that Hungary has 165,000 men under arms.

Taken together, the three satellite states of Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary have a reported armed strength of 660,000 men—more than double the number of men under arms permitted by the peace treaties of 1947.

In addition to these forces, it is reported that Russia has 60,000 troops in Hungary and Rumania to guard her supply lines to Austria. It is also reported that Russia has no less than 3,000 so-called military advisers in Bulgaria and 35,000 occupation troops in Austria.

There is little doubt that the satellite states of Hungary, Bulgaria, and Rumania are openly flaunting the military restrictions contained in their peace treaties with the allied and associated powers. Italy, on the other hand, is disarmed and helpless. If she continues to adhere to the military provisions of the peace treaty, she can neither defend her own borders nor can she do her part as one of the 12 Atlantic Pact nations.

The failure of the Department of State to proceed promptly for the revision of the military provisions of the Italian peace treaty works a gross injustice on Italy because it keeps Italy militarily weak while her enemies arm and prepare for war. It works a gross injustice on the United States because it forces the United States to send American men and boys to Europe to defend Italy and the other nations of Western Europe while Italy's men and boys are compelled to sit on the sidelines.

Section 6 of the Senate Resolution 99 approved the plans of the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to send four additional divisions of American ground forces to Western Europe. Section 8 of Senate Resolution 99 expressed the sense of the Senate that the United States Government should seek to eliminate all provisions of the existing treaty with Italy which impose limitations on the military strength of Italy and prevent her from performing her obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty to contribute to the full extent of her capacity to the defense of Western Europe. Continued delay in the elimination of the restrictive provisions in the treaty merely makes it more and more likely that the United States will have to send more and more troops to Europe.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to insert in the RECORD, at the conclusion of my remarks, a clipping from the Washington Post of April 15, 1951, entitled "Italy Urging Big 3 To Lift Arms Ceiling"; also a second clipping from the April 15 issue of the Washington Evening Star entitled "Italy Informally Asks for Easing Terms of Peace Treaty"; also a clipping of an article by the noted foreign-affairs columnist Constantine Brown which appeared in the Washington Evening Star and other newspapers throughout the country on April 5, 1951. These articles taken together picture the injustice which is being perpetrated on Italy by the deliberate refusal of the Department of State to take action to right the wrongs contained in the Italian peace treaty of 1947.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington (D. C.) Post of April 15, 1951]

ITALY URGING BIG THREE TO LIFT ARMS CEILING—BUT POWERS WAIT

Italy has urged the United States, Britain, and France practically to renounce the peace treaty which placed a ceiling on its armed forces, it was learned yesterday.

The western powers have agreed informally to take no action on the request pending conclusion of any Big Four Foreign Ministers' talks which may develop out of the deputies' conference in Paris.

But informants said the three western powers would begin active consideration of ways to allow Italy to increase her armed strength about treaty limits if Russia rejects a Big Four check on the inflated Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Rumanian Armies.

The 1947 Italian peace treaty limits Italy's Army, Navy, and Air Force to 300,000 men, and bars bombing planes, tanks, atomic weapons, and major fortifications. Washington, London, and Paris are seeking to discourage talk about treaty revisions now.

The Italian request asked for a three-power declaration announcing the "moral extinction of the peace treaty" and full partnership by Italy with the West in the rearmament program. The request was communicated several weeks ago to French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman by Italian Foreign Minister Count Carlo Sforza.

Action would develop quickly on the Italian request if the Russian satellites continued to threaten Italy's security. The plea lent new importance to the Big Four deputies' talks.

United States Minister to France Charles E. Bohlen left Washington yesterday for Paris to resume his role in the talks.

[From the Washington (D. C.) Evening Star of April 15, 1951]

ITALY INFORMALLY ASKS FOR EASING TERMS OF PEACE TREATY

PARIS, April 14.—Italy has made informal representations to friendly powers in an effort to ease the terms of her peace treaty, Foreign Minister Carlo Sforza said today.

He said he had relayed "some manifestations on my mind on what the feeling is in Italy," without presenting formal documents.

The feeling in Italy, according to informed diplomats here, is that the Allied peace treaty is preventing Italy from contributing her full share to the Atlantic community's European defense against communism.

FORCES LIMITED TO 300,000

The peace treaty was signed and ratified in 1947. It limits Italy's armed forces to just under 300,000 men, including land, sea, and air. It also blueprints the type of armaments, planes, and ships Italy can have and what kind of scientific experiments she can make.

In Paris for completion of the Schuman plan for pooling West European coal and steel Count Sforza refused to elaborate on the text of his representations. Nor would he list precisely the nations which received them.

It was learned, however, that notes have been sent to France, Britain, and the United States, saying the terms of the treaty are hampering Italy's role in the Western World.

ITALIAN LEADER EXPECTED

The Italians are participating in the Atlantic Army headed by General Eisenhower and his Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe. An Italian general is expected to be appointed soon to command the southern sector.

The French Foreign Office said there was no formal document on file from Italy on the matter of the peace treaty, but a spokesman said such a representation as Count Sforza mentioned may have been made directly to Foreign Minister Robert Schuman.

[From the Washington (D. C.) Evening Star of April 5, 1951]

PLEDGES GIVEN TO ITALY BROKEN—SENATE LIKELY TO MAKE GROSS ERRORS IN DECISIONS ON WORLD AFFAIRS MADE UNDER PRESSURE

(By Constantine Brown)

The long debate in the Senate over whether President Truman has the right to send troops to Europe without congressional consent under the provisions of the North Atlantic Pact has brought out one important fact which so far has received little notice.

This is that the Senate is likely to make gross errors when it votes on international matters under pressure from the administration.

An amendment offered last Tuesday by Senator WATKINS, of Utah, was approved by an overwhelming majority. It provided that it was the sense of the Senate that the peace treaty with Italy, which prevents that nation from contributing substantially to Western defense, should be changed.

Its passage has only academic value. It is unlikely that the signatories will do much about the matter. But the large vote favoring such a step indicates that the United States Senate, which voted for its ratification 4 years ago, realizes that it was a bad treaty, which should never have been approved. The affirmative vote was obtained only through intense pressure from the administration.

The spokesmen of the bipartisan policy, Senators CONNALLY and Vandenberg, urged the Democratic and Republican Members to cast a favorable vote, not because the treaty was flawless but for the sake of maintaining a united front with the U. S. S. R.

A large group of Republican Senators supported by a number of Democrats were determined to defeat it. They knew the sordid behind-the-scenes maneuvers which preceded that ratification of the peace treaty by the Italian National Assembly.

Italy's Premier Alcide de Gasperi had visited Washington, where he attempted to obtain some modification of the Paris agreement of 1946. He had received some vague words of encouragement. Upon his return to Rome, he was immediately approached by the British Ambassador, who urged him strongly not to attempt to change anything in the treaty.

The British diplomat informed Mr. de Gasperi that any attempt to interfere with the peace treaty would have adverse consequences for Italy, such as the refusal of the Western powers to permit Italy to join the United Nations and refusal of economic and financial support by the Western nations for Italy's recovery. Our Ambassador in Rome, James C. Dunn, could do nothing but support his British colleague lukewarmly.

Meanwhile, however, a number of Italian-American societies began to talk to members of the Senate, urging them to reject the treaty. Their arguments were not confined to the ill effects on Italy in the future, but its immorality.

All the promises we made to the Italians at the time they decided to break with the Germans were disregarded. All the pledges given them in good faith by General Eisenhower to get them to join the Allies as co-belligerents were thrown in the wastebasket.

Positive proofs, contained in documents and exchanges of letters between the Allies and Marshal Badoglio's government, were given the Senators. Spokesmen for the Italian-American societies spent days in

Washington buttonholing Senators and advising them of the pitfalls of that treaty.

A few days before the matter came to a vote, the representatives of the Italian-Americans disappeared from Washington. The Senators who wanted their support in the final battle on the floor of the Senate could not even contact them.

This mystery eventually was solved. The spokesmen for the administration, fearing defeat approached the Italian-American leaders through local political channels and in some manner or another convinced them to hold their fire and stop the lobby for rejection of the peace treaty signed a year earlier in Paris.

The votes needed for ratification thus were obtained. Senators CONNALLY and Vandenberg convinced their colleagues that while the treaty was not all we may have wanted, it was the best we could get. Four years now have elapsed. Italy is still not a member of the United Nations. Russia has vetoed its repeated attempts to join that organization.

Thanks to America's unilateral efforts, Italy was saved from economic chaos. But this had nothing to do with the treaty itself. But now, when it appears essential that Italy be allowed to develop its national defense in accordance with the North Atlantic Treaty, she is being handicapped by the provisions of the peace treaty, which limit drastically her armament.

The Watkins resolution will not help. But it did prove the harm which can be caused when the Senate votes on international matters under pressure from the executive branch of the Government.

Mr. WATKINS. I thank the distinguished Senator from Wisconsin for giving me this opportunity.

Mr. WELKER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the junior Senator from Wisconsin be permitted to yield to me without his losing the floor.

Mr. LANGER. Mr. President, I cannot hear the distinguished Senator.

Mr. MCCARTHY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to yield to the Senator from Idaho without losing the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

GENERAL MACARTHUR AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

Mr. WELKER. The junior Senator from Idaho rises to answer some points which were made this afternoon by three distinguished Senators on the Democratic side of the aisle who referred to us of the Republican Party as being those of the war party. They might say slanderous things of General MacArthur; they might call him a warmonger, but I point out that the reception given General MacArthur by the American people shows what their reaction to such a statement would be. General MacArthur can very well take care of himself. I would have those distinguished, learned Senators on the other side of the aisle know that when they call the junior Senator from Idaho a member of a war party and a warmonger I shall stand up and say "Nay." Such a charge is ridiculous, it is absurd, and such a statement is on about as low a level as any statement one politician can make with respect to another.

Mr. President, I come from a small State with approximately 600,000 population. I receive the same type of letters

that Democratic Senators receive. Those who write them speak of the dead, the wounded, and the missing. My case may be a little bit different from that of some other Senators, because I know 4 out of 10 boys of my State whose names are referred to in those letters when the casualty list of the dead, missing, and wounded are mentioned. I have known them since their childhood, I know their parents and loved ones who suffer also. The war hits me just as terribly as it does the Members on the Democratic side of the aisle.

Mr. President, let us have an end to this nonsense. Let us have an end to Senators on one side of the aisle standing on the floor, and, like children, making remarks about Members on the other side, saying, "They want war while we want peace."

I say to the Democratic Senators, think a minute. Who sent us to the United States Senate? It was the American people who live and vote in our respective States. When Senators on the other side say we on this side are warmongers they are saying that the people of the States who sent us here are in fact warmongers. Nothing could be more ridiculous.

The spokesmen for the administration had better have a little audition on this subject before they speak. They had better read the letters they receive more carefully for a change, and not try to build up a sham defense for an undefensible act in firing General MacArthur when no defense is possible.

Mr. President, I desire to address myself to a few of the remarks made by my friend the distinguished Senator from Connecticut [Mr. McMAHON]. A few moments ago he advocated the saving of Europe at any price. I, Mr. President, advocate the saving of free peoples all over the world. I do not think any freedom-loving people can be sacrificed.

Not as a military expert, but merely as a fellow American, I want the Senator from Connecticut to go back with me to the time when our situation in Korea was not quite so good, when the Red Chinese came across the line and we began our tragic retreat. It seemed that overnight the morale of the people of Europe dropped away down. The reason it went down was because that retreat seemed to be the best evidence that we of the great and powerful America could not whip the North Koreans.

I am now advised, and I am sure it is a fact, that our situation in Korea is not quite so good this very day. Where now is the morale of England, the England the Senator wants to save? We must have a morale and a strong one in England and Europe if we can save them.

Mr. President, the people of Korea, our boys in Korea, the mothers and the loved ones of our soldiers of Korea, did not have a paid lobbyist who was registered with the Secretary of the Senate, to influence the American people to fight for freedom in Korea. This business of troops for Europe, saving Europe, and saving England, is a bit embarrassing. Do Senators realize that when we were debating the question of troops for Europe there was a paid lobbyist in Washington advocating that we send our

power and strength to Europe? A committee called Committee on the Present Danger had one Tracy Vorhees here to lobby for troops and aid to Europe, while our boys in Korea bled and suffered and tried to fight a war with both hands tied behind their backs.

While all this was going on in America, what was happening in Korea? We found the very disgraceful fact that we could not use one of our allies to fight one of their own battles and help us in our battles in Korea. When the Chinese Nationalists offered to help us fight in Korea we said "nay" to them, although they were a member of the United Nations. On the other hand, we saw our long-time ally, England, send shipload after shipload of provisions to the enemy we were seeking to destroy, and advocate the surrender of Formosa and the seating of Red China in the United Nations.

What kind of unity can we secure in this Nation, Mr. President, if day after day we on this side of the aisle, who are just as red-blooded Americans as any Senator on the other side of the aisle, are accused of being warmongers and members of a war party? There may be some illusions about that matter on the part of some on the other side of the aisle, but I think the American people can take care of that situation come November 1952. The people know who is the war party if my mail can be taken as any indication of their thinking.

That great general, MacArthur, has been maligned, embarrassed, slandered and ridiculed by the hatchet men of the Democratic Party. I desire to read, Mr. President, for the first time a statement which came over the ticker a moment ago. It shows how far the Democratic Senators can be wrong in their defense of the President in the firing of General MacArthur. I read:

Maj. Gen. Courtney Whitney said today Lt. Gen. Matthew Ridgway had proposed to Pentagon that Chinese troops on Formosa be sent into battle. He told reporters Ridgway made the proposal "after analyzing the situation." Apparently soon after his arrival in Korea and while MacArthur was still in supreme command. He said all senior officers in the Far East, including Lt. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer, air commander, and Vice Admiral Charles Turney Joy, in charge of naval operations, also favored use of Chiang Kai-shek's troops.

Further on the ticker:

Joe Short and Pentagon had no comment on this.

Whitney, when asked about the group which opened MacArthur for President office in New York, said, "They could go home."

Now what remains of the case of the Democrats who cry that General MacArthur was fired because he wanted to lead us into world war III?

Mr. President, it is time for us to be fair, it is time for us to have a most searching cross examination as to what is happening in Korea, and what is happening in the Pentagon, and what is happening in the White House and, above all, what is happening in Secretary Acheson's State Department.

Mr. President, I listened with interest to the statement made by the senior Senator from Connecticut [Mr. McMAHON] about "silver bullets" by which

we might be able to buy freedom for our friends throughout the world. I think I would be joined by every Member of the Senate in saying, "How wonderful it would be if that really could be done." But \$100,000,000,000 has been spent in the past 5 years in trying to buy some friends and some allies, and where are they today when we need them most? In little Korea we supply 90 percent of the men and materials while England carries on her trade with the enemy.

Mr. President, does it look very much like we are going to accomplish much with the Russians, the Communists, by trying to buy their friendship? For more than 700 years those people have known no freedom. Even after the French Revolution they had no freedom. What makes the administration feel we can do anything with money that would make them respectful freedom-loving people?

What can we expect to gain by the methods now being pursued? We are losing 1,500 men a week in Korea. Yet those who are pursuing the present policy say they are biding time, they are saving democracy, and that the boys whose lives have been sacrificed will not have lost their lives in vain, while we open our purses again and send out great amounts under the point 4 program in an attempt to get such peoples to be our friends. I cannot follow those who advocate such a policy. It is illogical and not sound. If money will save us, let us bring our boys home and save their lives while we are experimenting with buying the friendship of other nations.

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. WELKER. I yield.

Mr. McMAHON. Will the Senator from Idaho explain to the Senate and for the RECORD, how many ships, how many planes, and how many men he is informed it will take to carry on the operation in China which has been recommended by General MacArthur? Does the Senator care to say how many men, how many planes, and how many ships it will take to carry out the recommendations of General MacArthur?

Mr. WELKER. Of course, I should be glad to give the Senator my advice, but I have no advice on that point. I assume General Bradley and the Joint Chiefs of Staff know something about that. General Bradley made a party line speech in Chicago in an attempt to slander and embarrass the man who should know.

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. WELKER. I wish to continue my answer. I assume, perhaps, we should let our ally in Formosa do a little thinking about the matter. Our ally has 600,000 men which he tells us are ready to help us. I say they will do the answering if they are ready to go into battle.

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Idaho yield to the Senator from Connecticut for a question?

Mr. WELKER. I yield.

Mr. McMAHON. The Senator has referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as knowing what it will take to carry out General MacArthur's recommendations. So I take it the Senator has no opinion as to whether or not it would require 5,000,000 American boys and 5,000 airplanes to carry out General MacArthur's recommendations. But if the Joint Chiefs of Staff should say that it would, then I take it the Senator would join in a strategic decision to carry on that kind of a military operation? Is that what I am to understand?

Mr. WELKER. I am sorry, but my attention was distracted for a moment. Will the Senator repeat the last part of the question?

Mr. McMAHON. I say to the Senator from Idaho that as I understand, he has no information—and I am not blaming the Senator because he has not any information—inasmuch as General MacArthur has yet to tell the American people how many men, how many guns, how many planes, how many ships would be required for the kind of an operation he has proposed, I assume, to the Joint Chiefs, before he proposed it to the American people.

I may say to the Senator from Idaho that I, for one, will be very much interested when General MacArthur finally appears before committees of Congress—for I, too, regret that he has not been able to appear before now—and we can ask those questions of him and can get his answers to them.

I simply wish to point out to the Senator that he is recommending a military course, without any bill of particulars as to the American blood, bone, muscle, and matériel will be required by it.

Mr. WELKER. Mr. President, I shall answer the Senator. The Senator from Connecticut, like the other Senators on his side of the aisle, is attempting to read into this debate the charge that General MacArthur tried to advocate an all-out land war against the Chinese. Nothing could be further from the truth from General MacArthur's own words. I assume that we now have in Korea sufficient forces to bomb the nests of the Red Chinese where they are, and that we do not need any more help in that connection. We do need help from the administration, from the State Department, and from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, rather than to have them attempt to knock off the head of the greatest military leader of our country.

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield further?

Mr. WELKER. I yield.

Mr. McMAHON. I am glad the Senator from Idaho is restrained in his description of General MacArthur, and that he rightfully refers to General MacArthur as a great military leader, and does not refer to him in the terms used by one of the Members of the House of Representatives, who, the other day, declared that we had listened, if you please, to the word of God.

Mr. WELKER. Well, Mr. President, I would be very very glad to take the word of General MacArthur, rather than take the word of Dean Acheson or the word of any of his crew. I think General MacArthur's words were about the most

sacred words I have heard in the 44 years of my young life. Mr. President, the Senators of the opposition who wish to slander and ridicule General MacArthur may keep that up if they will; but the American people are watching what each one of us is doing here and the American people are listening to what each one of us is saying here.

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. WELKER. I yield.

Mr. McMAHON. I do not know whether the Senator from Idaho is referring to what I said or not; but I held the floor for about 1 hour and 15 minutes today, and during that time the debate got rather spirited and rather intense. However, I am not aware that anything I said could be interpreted, even if interpreted unfairly, as a reflection on General MacArthur personally.

Let me say to the Senator from Idaho—

Mr. WELKER. Mr. President, does the Senator from Connecticut wish to ask me a question?

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, I hope the Senator from Idaho will indulge me—and I know he will—for just a moment. Let me say that I believe, with the Senator from Idaho, that personalities, recriminations, accusations, calling Secretary Acheson "General Acheson," slandering the President of the United States, carrying on against our President the worst campaign that has been carried on against a President in the history of the United States, are wrong. I believe we should not carry on a campaign against General MacArthur. On the contrary, what we must do is coolly and dispassionately examine the course which General MacArthur advocates and the course which is advocated by the administration. So long as I take part in this debate, that is the approach I shall intend to make, and it is the approach which I hope I made in my remarks in the Senate earlier today—a purely intellectual approach to one of the gravest problems which ever has been presented to this or any other country and its administration. I want the Senator from Idaho to understand that clearly and correctly.

Mr. WELKER. Mr. President, I hope to have the floor at some time this afternoon.

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, I appreciate the indulgence of the Senator from Idaho. I say to him that we have not come to the point where any one man can make a speech and in it can enunciate a policy which may result in the destruction of 150,000,000 people, without having their representatives who serve in the Senate of the United States rise and comment on those proposals. I wish to make that clear.

I thank the Senator from Idaho very much for yielding to me.

Mr. WELKER. Mr. President, let me say that I have followed the Senator from Connecticut in the speech he made today; and just a few minutes ago the Senator from Connecticut attempted to ridicule General MacArthur, when the Senator referred to a Member of the House of Representatives who compared

General MacArthur's words to the words of God. Mr. President, those of the opposition can "dish it out," but they "can't take it."

Mr. President, at this time I wish to refer to a few facts.

I shall be glad to see this country unite so thoroughly that no one will be criticized again. I do not think it is wholesome to have such criticisms. However, Mr. President, for the past week I have heard Senators on the other side of the aisle say I was a warmonger and that I represented a war party. I say to them that I am just as responsible to the people of my State as they are to the people of their States; and I think it is ridiculous and absurd for any of us to say that any Member of the Senate is not a patriotic American, regardless of the side of the aisle on which he sits in this Chamber. If any Senators who are speaking for the administration desire—I should like them to come to my State and tell my people that I want war. My people know me—I campaigned last fall in a crusade against the stupidity of this "police action" war. My people knew that I felt it was a terrible dictatorial mistake and I promised them that I would work forever to get a peace and get our boys back home again. As I said before, I am willing to leave it to the American people as to who put us in this war. I am willing that the chips fall where they may—you have for too long played the American people as fools.

Mr. President, I differ with the proposal that we can buy lasting peace with silver bullets. Only today I read in the newspapers that the Labor Government of England is about to be destroyed from within. The headline states that Bevan assails the United States policy and says it threatens the English Labor Government. It is charged there, Mr. President, that the United States armament proposal is a greater threat to the world than is the Communist aggression. What kind of cooperation are we going to have from England with such a Government in such a tottering position?

Mr. President, is it not time for a little integration of policy between our allies and ourselves? Is it not time for our allies to join us in these important efforts of war or peace? If they do not join us we must assume they will never want to help us any more than they do in Korea.

This administration and the United Nations want us to conduct a war of containment in Korea, where we are losing 1,500 of our boys a week, yet our allies do not want to help them. Neither do our allies want us to use our ally, Nationalist China, which is ready, willing, and able to help us defeat their and our enemy. What is the sensible objection to rearming Nationalist China and putting her to our aid in Korea. Our allies seem to take the attitude that we forget our Chinese ally and do it mostly alone—why, may I ask, do we accept aid from Turkey but not from Nationalist China?

Mr. President, it seems to me that the best way to let the Communists know that we are prepared is to whip the Communists in the so-called police action in

Korea, and to do it now, without waiting, without dilly-dallying. We can bomb and destroy their bases and we can whip them there, if we obtain the right kind of cooperation; but we can never win if our boys are slaughtered by the Reds, who have a safe haven and marshaling area across the Yalu River.

I am opposed to the proposition that we are going to have our boys fight in Korea for an indefinite period in a so-called holding action, so as to give us time to build stronger allies and to build up our arms throughout our country. If we cannot whip the Communists in China, I say it is time either to bring our boys home or to tell our so-called friends "Either you help us as you should, so that we can go down this road together on a 50-50 basis"—which is what England and the others must do—"or else we must stop that war in Korea now."

For two long months MacArthur has seen the Communists building up across the Yalu River. For two long months he has begged permission to bomb their bases. His requests were met with the most disgraceful firing of an American general in American history.

Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Wisconsin for yielding this much time to me.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin has the floor.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, before I discuss the case which I wish to discuss before the Senate today, I should like to insert several matters in the RECORD.

REMOVAL OF COLLECTORS OF INTERNAL REVENUE AT ST. LOUIS AND NEW YORK

Mr. WILLIAMS. Mr. President, will the Senator from Wisconsin yield to me, to permit me to make an insertion in the RECORD?

Mr. McCARTHY. I am glad to yield.

Mr. WILLIAMS. Mr. President, yesterday I inserted in the RECORD a letter which I addressed to the Secretary of the Treasury, the Honorable John W. Snyder. I should like to read that letter into the RECORD at this time:

APRIL 11, 1951.

HON. JOHN W. SNYDER,
Secretary of the Treasury,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: On April 4, 1951, you relieved Mr. James P. Finnegan of his duties as collector of internal revenue in the St. Louis, Mo., office. While I congratulate you upon this belated action, I am concerned that you did not go further and publicly outline your reasons for this action, at the same time stating what further action you contemplate.

I also believe that you should announce what action you plan to take toward clearing up the deplorable conditions existing in the third district of New York. On at least two occasions the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Mr. George J. Schoeneman, has called the deplorable conditions in that office to your attention, and while he presented no specific charges against Collector Johnson, he did urgently recommend his removal.

Now that you are recommending that Congress place another \$10,000,000,000 tax increase on the already overburdened taxpayer, it is imperative that we convince the American people that no favoritism nor any spe-

cial protection for anyone will be condoned by your Department.

Yours sincerely,

JOHN J. WILLIAMS.

This morning I received a letter in reply to that from Mr. Snyder, which I should like to read to the Senate. This letter, by the way, is dated April 21. It was mailed Sunday. The letter is as follows:

THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY,
Washington, April 21, 1951.

HON. JOHN J. WILLIAMS,
United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR WILLIAMS: Thank you for your letter of April 11, 1951.

The Commissioner of Internal Revenue and his staff have indicated to you in some detail the steps which have already been taken to correct lax administrative conditions in the Third Collection District of New York. While some of the supervisory personnel have been withdrawn, there are still five men from the Washington headquarters group remaining in that office. The effectiveness of the steps taken by this group is reflected by the present much improved condition of that office.

A few months back Commissioner Schoeneman requested Collector Johnson's resignation. As you know, neither the Commissioner nor I has any power of removal over the collector. However, we have been trying for some time to find a strong person we could recommend to replace Collector Johnson—one who would be capable of holding and improving the gains we have made in the work of that office. In our efforts to obtain the proper kind of a replacement a number of persons have been considered. We have found that some did not possess the necessary qualifications, while others amply qualified have declined to accept the position. I hope that our efforts will soon result in obtaining the right person. Due to the presence of the headquarters group, however, the work of the office during this time has not suffered.

I might leave the letter for a moment to comment on that. It seems rather strange that a great city like the city of New York should be confronted with such a situation; where in that great city, this administration has not during the past 12 months, been able to find a single individual who, they feel, is capable and qualified to assume the position of collector of the district in New York. I can hardly follow that line of reasoning, because I do not think the Democratic Party in the State of New York, and particularly in that great city, has deteriorated to this point. Continuing with the letter, I read:

The collector at St. Louis voluntarily resigned earlier this month. You may rest assured that in the event any irregularities are found in that office, appropriate steps will be taken to effect their correction. I am determined that the revenue laws shall be administered without partiality or favor.

Your interest in the effective operation of the Bureau is heartening.

Sincerely,

JOHN W. SNYDER.

I wish to read again the third paragraph of the letter:

The collector at St. Louis voluntarily resigned early this month. You may rest assured that in the event any irregularities are found in that office, appropriate steps will be taken to effect their correction.

From this the assumption may readily be drawn that it was a voluntary resign-

nation, and that there is nothing at all wrong in the St. Louis office. While I do not have time to comment on this now, I do want to read one sentence which can be found in a report now contained in the files of the Secretary of the Treasury. I read from File No. S-1-13134-M, dated February 19, 1951, a report of the Chief Intelligence Unit of the Bureau of Internal Revenue relative to the St. Louis office. I am going to read but one sentence from that file, and I read it, for the information of the Secretary of the Treasury, who apparently has overlooked it:

If the facts which have been developed in this investigation should become published, undoubtedly the public would interpret the entire matter in its worst light, a mild form of "shake-down."

Mr. President, at a later date, I shall discuss the conditions existing both in the New York and St. Louis offices at greater length.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin.

KOREA AND THE REPLACEMENT OF GENERAL MACARTHUR

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to insert in the RECORD an article from Time magazine, entitled "MacArthur Versus Truman."

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

MACARTHUR VERSUS TRUMAN

The drama of MacArthur's removal and homecoming obscures a far more important fact: President Truman has brought his foreign policy into the open.

This policy, new in the sense that it was publicly stated for the first time, denies to the United States the efficient use of its power, guarantees to the enemy the initiative he now has, promises that the United States will always fight on the enemy's terms. The policy invites the enemy, world communism, to involve the United States in scores of futile wars or in messy situations like Iran. Up to now world war III has been prevented by the fact that the United States is stronger than communism. The new policy almost certainly brings world war III closer because it throws away a large part of United States strength.

Truman's speech marked the reversal of a trend: Until April 11 Washington had been veering toward what might be called "the MacArthur view." Not MacArthur, but the pressure of events, was driving many civilian and military policy makers—including Truman—toward a positive, active, hopeful, constructive policy of how to combat Communist aggression. For weeks newsmen have been hearing from the mouths of some of Truman's closest advisers that the passive policy of Dean Acheson—"wait until the dust settles" in Asia—was losing out. George Marshall himself was said to be getting very interested in new countermeasures against the Chinese Communists.

But when Truman needed—or thought he needed—a defense for firing MacArthur he turned to Acheson for a brief. Acheson gave him one, prepared several days before for the purpose of defending Acheson's general viewpoint. Revised for the special situation, this speech was admirably suited to the purpose Truman had in mind—charging MacArthur with trying to extend the war. Apparently it did not occur to Truman or Acheson that the speech could have another—and far greater—effect: Giving communism worldwide possession of the strategic initiative.

The new policy is an attempt to elevate Truman's absence of policy in Korea to the dignity of a principle with world-wide applications.

The public debate swirls around the firing itself. This act, however, is but the symbol of a deep cleavage over American policy.

DID MACARTHUR MEDDLE IN NONMILITARY MATTERS?

Truman's friends say that by firing MacArthur he settled a dispute over civilian against military supremacy. The Nation's founding fathers were rightly concerned over the danger of such a conflict. As it turned out, this issue has rarely arisen in the United States. The most serious instance of military insubordination to governmental authority was Gen. Andrew Jackson's seizure of Florida from the Spaniards. Only a Californian would view this act of Harry Truman's hero as a catastrophe.

In each succeeding generation, the tradition of civilian supremacy has grown stronger. It pervades the whole outlook of men as deeply steeped in American principles as Douglas MacArthur, George Marshall, Dwight Eisenhower, and Omar Bradley.

Then there is the charge that MacArthur meddled in nonmilitary affairs. Many (perhaps most) of the important subjects dealt with by high officers of all armies are partly military and partly political or economic or social or psychological. It is no reflection on George Marshall to say that he is the most successful congressional lobbyist of his time. Reaching agreement with Congressmen on the defense objectives and needs of the United States was a main part of Marshall's wartime job as Chief of Staff. Such a job cannot be performed without reference to nonmilitary matters.

What MacArthur meddled in was defining the strategic objective and general plan of the Korean war. Up until 10:48 on the night of April 11, when Truman finished his fateful speech, neither objective nor plan had yet been clearly defined. Everybody was in on the debate. GI's in Korea were writing: "What the hell are we doing here? How are we going to win this?" Colonels were proclaiming that the long-range strategic situation was "untenable." General Ridgway had said: "I would see no end to the military operations unless there were a political settlement." All the columnists from Walter Lippmann to Walter Winchell were wondering and proposing and punditing over the basic strategy of the Korean war. And Mr. Truman's own administration was hip-deep in plan after plan after plan, trying to answer the great question: Where do we go from here?

MACARTHUR FOUGHT THE WAR THE WAY TRUMAN WANTED

Over the years in Tokyo, MacArthur had formed some conclusions about how to beat the enemy. If he had reached no such conclusions he would not have been fit for his job.

The main issue between Truman and MacArthur is whether the war should be limited to Korea. The record shows that in spite of his opinion, MacArthur, a thorough soldier, fought the war his commander's way, insofar as Truman's views were known. It would have been very easy for MacArthur to let incidents happen that would carry the war beyond the borders of Korea. Such incidents have not happened. By strict military discipline, MacArthur has kept fliers from chasing enemy planes beyond the Yalu River. Chinese shipping, bringing supplies to the enemy, has been at the mercy of ships in MacArthur's command. Yet Chinese ships outside of Korean territorial waters have not been sunk.

Although he was fighting the war Truman's way, MacArthur let the public know

that he did not like Truman's way. This was deliberate on MacArthur's part, and it is the strongest point in the case against him. A subordinate officer has a right and even an obligation to object to any proposed course of action that he considers unreasonable or unwise. He has no such clear right to make his objections public, although in these situations many high officers have done what MacArthur did—and done it more adroitly.

Truman decided that MacArthur's public expression of opinion was hurting the United States. In that situation, Truman had three courses open to him:

1. Fire MacArthur.
2. Agree with MacArthur.
3. Get a clear policy of his own and order MacArthur to conform to it.

MacArthur has great respect for authority. During much of his career, he worked under chiefs with whom he did not wholly agree. He and Roosevelt clashed on global strategy for World War II. The fact that he differed with Roosevelt was well known. MacArthur, however, fought a highly satisfactory war within Roosevelt's over-all strategy, and the disagreement never became a scandal. The MacArthur-Truman scandal grew out of the fact that MacArthur's view on the Korean war was firmly stated and well-known while Truman's view was still a matter of hot debate among the President's advisers.

Every time MacArthur stated his opinion of what the strategy should be, he called attention to the fact that Washington had no idea of how to win the Korean war.

TRUMAN HAD A RIGHT TO FIRE MACARTHUR

Whatever may be thought of Truman's judgment in firing MacArthur, the fact remains that he had a right to fire him. Such an act was clearly within his constitutional authority.

In 1862, President Lincoln removed Gen. George B. McClellan from command of the Army of the Potomac. They had been in disagreement for a long time. Lincoln (like MacArthur) believed that McClellan's mission was to defeat the enemy. McClellan (like Truman) believed that the objective was to defend a piece of ground. McClellan (like MacArthur) had thousands of devoted admirers, and his removal was certain to bring a torrent of political criticism down on Lincoln's head.

Lincoln, however, made no public defense. Harry Truman went on the air with the best defense that Lawyer Acheson could give him.

Truman's argument gets its appeal from the fact that all sane men prefer peace to war and a small war to a big war. Truman's speech was constructed to give the impression that MacArthur was in favor of unlimited war while Truman was for limited war.

In fact, both the Truman policy and the MacArthur policy on the Far East are aimed at a limited war. The differences between them are: (1) Truman's limits are geographical, MacArthur's strategic; (2) Truman invites the enemy to set the limits; MacArthur wants the United States to set them; and (3) Truman thinks that carrying the war to Manchuria and the coast of China would provoke the Russians to come in; MacArthur does not think so.

MacArthur has been fighting the left flank of the Red Chinese army. The center of that army has been shifting north, and may soon be flung against the U. N. forces in Korea. The right flank of the Chinese Reds is still pinned down in south China, fighting guerrillas and guarding against an invasion from Formosa.

The surer the Chinese feel that south China is safe from attack, the more men they can shift to the Korean front. Truman's speech gave them, in effect, a guaranty that south China is safe.

TO ATTACK THE ENEMY? OR TO AWAIT HIS BLOWS?

The side with the initiative and the power to choose the point of concentration has an enormous advantage. In the struggle with communism, the United States starts with the strategic initiative because the United States has the mobility that goes with sea and air power. President Truman tosses aside this enormous advantage when he takes the position that the United States should not go after the enemy except in those geographical areas where the enemy has recently committed aggression. This gives the enemy full freedom to concentrate and then commit aggression wherever the free world is weak. Truman's principle relieves the enemy of all concern for security.

Truman used Greece as a shining example of his policy of geographically limited war. It might be useful to consider the new Truman principle as applied to Greece—if that civil war had turned out the way China's did. In this supposition, General Markos' Greek Reds sweep the mainland. The anti-Communist Greek leader, an unpopular but steadfast fellow called Apericles, retires with an army of several hundred thousand to the island of Crete. The Greek Reds, instead of going after Apericles, attack Turkey. The United States and the U. N. go to Turkey's aid. The war gets difficult and General Legion, the American commander of the U. N. forces in Turkey, proposes to blockade Piraeus, the port of Athens, and to help General Apericles establish a beachhead on the mainland and hit the flank of the Greek Reds.

Under the Truman principle, General Legion should be fired for trying to widen or spread the war. It would be moral for American boys to die on the brown hills of Anatolia but immoral to help anti-Communist Greeks fight the same enemy on the brown plain of Thrace.

Truman did not always have this idea, unique in world history, that it is wrong and dangerous to fight the enemy in any place not of the enemy's choosing. In fact, Truman was proceeding on the opposite (or MacArthur) principle when he issued his great statement of June 27, 1950. The Reds had invaded South Korea and Truman proclaimed to the world that the United States would resist this aggression. He did not, however, limit his action to Korea. In the same brief statement he said that the United States would defend Formosa (this decision reversed an Acheson policy) and give additional aid to anti-Communist forces in the Philippines and Indochina.

To punish the enemy for invading Korea, Truman was willing last June to fight Korean Communists, Filipino Communists, and Vietminh Communists. All that MacArthur suggested was that he be allowed to fight some different Chinese Communists from the ones who were fighting him. No, said the President on April 11, that would be widening the war.

TWO WAYS OF TRYING TO CRUSH AGGRESSION

Yet Harry Truman clearly recognizes the unity of the Communist enemy. In his speech he said: "The Communists in the Kremlin are engaged in a monstrous conspiracy to stamp out freedom all over the world. If they were to succeed, the United States would be numbered among their principal victims. . . . The only question is, When is the best time to meet the threat and how? The best time to meet the threat is in the beginning. It is easier to put out a fire in the beginning when it is small than after it has become a roaring blaze."

MacArthur could not argue with that. The argument is over who makes the rules for fire fighting. The firemen or the arsonists?

To avoid involving MacArthur in further controversy, suppose that the mythical General Legion (who got fired a few paragraphs

back) and Capt. Harry Truman each applied his strategic principles to the aggressions of the 1930's.

Manchuria, 1931. General Legion: Bring the United States, British, and other navies down on the inferior Japanese Navy. Captain Truman: Send United States and other troops to Manchuria. Let the Japanese Navy alone. Do not attack Japanese supply lines to Manchuria.

Ethiopia, 1935. General Legion: Blockade Italy, shutting off oil. Close the Suez Canal to Italian troop ships. If necessary, bombard Genoa, Naples, Leghorn, Palermo. Captain Truman: Send American troops to Ethiopia. No blockade, no closing of the canal.

Rhineland, 1936. General Legion's solution and Captain Truman's coincide here, because the area of aggression is also the place where the enemy should have been attacked.

Czechoslovakia, 1938. General Legion: Tell Hitler to get out of there or else the free world is coming across the Rhine. Captain Truman: Send troops to Czechoslovakia, presumably by parachute, but do not widen the war by crossing the Rhine. Captain Truman's policy might have avoided World War II in the sense that the Axis would have won the world without having to fight the war.

PROVOCATION VERSUS CALCULATION

Through the Truman speech and through much American and U. N. thought runs the fear of provoking the Reds. No man can be absolutely certain that some United States action (such as the Berlin airlift) will not some day anger the Communists into starting world war III. But the evidence—and there is a great deal of it—all runs the other way.

The Red bosses seem to be cool, calculating men. Opportunity, not provocation, is what moves them. Wherever they have been "provoked," they backed down. Wherever they have been appeased, they grabbed for more. The U. N. may negotiate an appeasement in Korea, but it will be merely the prelude to the next aggression.

The Russians may get into the Korean war, but they will get in when and if they think that is the best thing for them to do, not because they are provoked. And no matter what the circumstances when they decide to move, they will claim that they were "intolerably provoked," a Communist phrase meaning "hungry."

Many Britons are among those who think that the danger of war lies in provoking the Communists. British influence was a powerful factor on Truman in both the firing of MacArthur and the speech defending it. Italy's Premier Alcide de Gasperi, when he heard of the firing, called it "the greatest victory of British diplomacy since the war."

In this generation, the predominant British feelings toward Asia are guilt and a sense of failure. The glorious contributions to Asia of British justice and organization are forgotten. Only the seamy side of imperialism is remembered. On many subjects, Truman could profitably use British wisdom and experience. But to take British guidance on Asia is like taking guidance on credit and currency problems from Chiang Kai-shek.

Besides the British, the two other main influences on Truman's Asia policy are Dean Acheson and George Marshall. Both men, highly successful in other fields, failed on China. The failure rankles. They keep looking back. They will not face the future.

MacArthur, on the other hand, was the West's great success in Asia. Faced with communism in Asia, he had what many other western leaders lacked: A will to win. Millions of Japanese, Filipinos, and other Asiatics respected him as liberator and guide. In the night of the long knives when MacArthur was fired, the failures cut down the success.

The one note of hope that emerges from the tragedy is that Harry Truman is too patriotic and sensible a man to pursue for long the policy he laid down on April 11. The great danger is that the Reds will take Truman at his word.

Mr. McCARTHY. I should like to read several paragraphs from the article for the benefit of Senators who are present:

The drama of MacArthur's removal and homecoming obscures a far more important fact: President Truman has brought his foreign policy into the open.

This policy, new in the sense that it was publicly stated for the first time, denies to the United States the efficient use of its power, guarantees to the enemy the initiative he now has, promises that the United States will always fight on the enemy's terms. The policy invites the enemy, world communism, to involve the United States in scores of futile little wars or in messy situations like Iran.

I am only going to read one other paragraph. The article discusses very intelligently the part which Britain has played in the discharge of Douglas MacArthur, and the creation of our foreign policy. I think it is a bit unfair to refer to it as Britain, because I do not believe that the Attlee group in Britain any more represents the people of Britain than does the Acheson crowd represent the people of America, but I think I might say that I heartily agree with Time when it points out that this is a victory for British diplomacy, and, as the Premier of Italy recently said, the discharge of MacArthur was the greatest victory for British diplomacy since the end of World War II.

I am not going to discuss this man Attlee, who temporarily heads the British Government, but I would like to introduce into the Record a photostat of a letter written by Attlee, or part of a letter, in his own handwriting. It is extremely interesting, when we realize that Truman is the President of this country in name only, that the real President who discharged MacArthur is a rather sinister monster of many heads and many tentacles, a monster conceived in the Kremlin, and then given birth to by Acheson, with Attlee and Morrison as the midwives, and then nurtured into Frankenstein proportions by the Hiss crowd, who still run the State Department. They have lost only one of their men, Alger Hiss. When we realize the part that this man Attlee, who, as I say, I do not think represents the British people, any more than Acheson represents the people of this country, because I have a great deal of respect for the British people, but let me read the closing lines of this letter of Attlee's written to a Communist group. He says:

I shall try to tell—

Mr. President, listen to the next words: our comrades—

That is not an English word; it is not an American word. It is a Communist phrase for "member of the party." He says:

I shall try to tell our comrades at home what I have seen.

In the closing line we find the Communist slogan, "Workers of the world unite." Signed, "C. A. Attlee."

I wish I could place in the Record a picture, but unfortunately I cannot. I would introduce a picture of England's Acheson—Mr. Attlee—reviewing a Communist parade. Senators can see it, with the Communist clenched-fist salute. Senators may be interested in some of the other individuals in this picture. One of them is Mr. Anton, who is the leader of the Spanish Communist Party. Another is General Miaja, a Communist general. I mention this matter of Attlee in passing only in connection with the Time magazine article.

Mr. KEM. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. I am glad to yield.

Mr. KEM. I should like to ask the Senator from Wisconsin whether the picture discloses Mr. Attlee giving the Communist salute.

Mr. McCARTHY. It very definitely discloses Mr. Attlee giving the clenched-fist salute. I am going to pass this around so Senators may see it, if they care to. I shall also pass around a photostat of the letter from Attlee.

Mr. WILEY. What is the date, please?

Mr. McCARTHY. It was in late 1937 or early 1938, so there is nothing new about Mr. Attlee's connection. He may have reformed, I do not know. As I say, I am not going to discuss him except to show what his connections were at one time, as evidenced by his own handwriting, with the Communist Party. If he has severed that connection, that is up to the British people to decide, not me. But it is of interest to us when we realize that not Mr. Truman but Mr. Acheson, with advice from Mr. Attlee and Mr. Morrison, and with the aid of the Kremlin, have succeeded in sacking one of the greatest Americans I think that was ever born, and one of the greatest military leaders since long before the days of Genghis Khan.

I also want to introduce for the Record an excerpt from an article appearing in the New Leader, written by Mr. Jonathan Stout, dated April 15, 1950. I should like to read a few paragraphs into the Record. It is headed: "State Department wants to help Communist China build railroads."

Please keep in mind that this article is dated April 15, two and a half months before the beginning of the war in Korea. I now read:

A major conflict is under way between the State Department and the Defense Department over the question whether the United States should help Communist China build up its railroad transportation system.

I may say, Mr. President, that the State Department won out in this conflict.

This conflict has been revealed in a hitherto unpublished exchange of letters between Secretary of State Acheson, Commerce Secretary Sawyer, and Deputy Defense Secretary Stephen T. Early.

The Defense Department believes we should not, the State Department believes we should, help Communist China build up its rail system. The Commerce Department is letting the other two Departments carry the ball in the controversy.

The Defense Department initiated the correspondence. Deputy Secretary Early sent letters to Secretary Acheson and Secretary

Sawyer, with the aim of setting up a world embargo among the democratic nations against the shipment of railroad equipment to Communist China.

Secretary Acheson replied he was strongly opposed to the idea.

It is a rather lengthy article, I may say to any Senators who may care to read it, and it points out in detail that the Army felt that by shipping rail equipment and locomotives to Communist China we would be helping Communist China and Russia in a military fashion, and that we should not do that until some semblance of peace were assured. But, as I say again, we find the State Department winning out.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to place in the RECORD an article from the United States News entitled "Warning of Red Air Offensive," by Lt. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer. This is the article which was referred to a short time ago by the very able Senator from Ohio [Mr. BRICKER]. I ask unanimous consent that the entire article be inserted in the RECORD. It very clearly shows the danger to American lives if General Acheson's Communist sanctuary in Manchuria is allowed to exist.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

WARNING OF RED AIR OFFENSIVE—AN INTERVIEW WITH LT. GEN. GEORGE E. STRATEMEYER, COMMANDER, FAR EAST AIR FORCES

(EDITOR'S NOTE.—Are the Communists in Korea preparing a massive air offensive against our forces? Is our own air strength sufficient to stop it?)

(In the exclusive interview on these pages, Lt. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer, commanding United States Air Forces in the Far East, discusses the signs of a Communist air build-up, and the military problems it poses. Joseph Fromm, regional editor of United States News and World Report, interviewed the general in Tokyo on the basis of questions transmitted by the editors of United States News and World Report. The full text of their conversation, which was sent to the United States by radio, follows.)

(Lt. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer has been the head of United States Air Forces in the Far East since April 1949. From his Tokyo headquarters he has directed the allied air war against the Communists in Korea since the beginning of that conflict last June.)

(General Stratemeyer—a West Point classmate of General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower—commanded United States Air Forces in the China-Burma-India theater during World War II. He was in charge of organizing the air defenses of the United States mainland from the end of the war until his assignment to Tokyo.)

Question. General Stratemeyer, what is the build-up of Red air power in Korea and in the vicinity?

Answer. We are almost certain that the Reds are building up their air power in Manchuria and northern China. During recent reconnaissances made along the Korea side of the Yalu River, when we could look over on Antung airdrome, and from photographs taken from this side of the river, at one time we identified and counted 70 aircraft at the field at Antung. There is a photograph right over there that shows some 58 jets at Antung. Then, of course, there have been press dispatches which say China is getting more aircraft. From our own intelligence reports it appears there are more aircraft in Manchuria and in northern China today than there have ever been before.

Question. Do you have any idea of Communist air strength in that area?

Answer. I have seen public statements telling of 400 to 700 airplanes now deployed there. Many more could, of course, be flown in overnight. The airdrome capacity is there already.

Question. What about in North Korea itself? Are they developing airfields there?

Answer. Since the first of the year we have actually identified some 50 airstrips that have been built in North Korea or are in process of being built. Those that we feel could be used we have bombed, and the Reds have immediately repaired them. We have bombed them again, and the Reds have immediately repaired them again. That, to us, indicates there is a build-up, or there is to be a build-up.

Recently—I won't give you the location—one of their airstrips was increased from 5,000 feet to some 7,000 feet in length. They eliminated part of a village, and you can see in the photos the sharp outline of a runway that is being constructed. In one of the big cities in North Korea they have taken the long, straight main street, cleared debris away and destroyed buildings on both sides. Right now we feel that the Chinese could take off from that strip. We bombed that particular paved runway today.

Question. These fields they are developing—would they be suitable for sustained operational work, or merely for staging purposes?

Answer. My answer to that would be both. At this last field I just spoke of, they could go in and operate. What concerns us are those fields that can be put in usable condition and around which there would be stored gasoline, oil, munitions—where they could stage in about dark and take off at daylight to hit our ground forces just north of the thirty-eighth parallel.

If there were only a few it wouldn't be so bad, but there are so many fields—more than 50 potential threats in North Korea. Our job of keeping those airstrips out of commission is a big one and I can assure you that Fifth Air Force, Far East Air Forces Bomber Command, and Far East Air Force Headquarters are alert to it. We are doing everything in our power to put them out of commission and keep them that way.

Question. What is the Communists' capacity of accumulating adequate fuel and other supplies necessary to maintain any effective air force?

Answer. The same as they have been doing for their ground forces. We have sighted thousands of trucks in North Korea—and in the past month—mainly moving from northwest to southeast. We know that China itself doesn't have those munitions of war or the trucks to move them. They are coming from somewhere. If they can do that for their ground, they can do it for their air.

Question. What about their pilots, General? One report is that there is some indication that they might be using "volunteer" German pilots.

Answer. I have no evidence whatsoever that there are any German pilots. Some of their pilots are very good. Some of them are particularly poor marksmen. To date, when they get well south of the Yalu River, they have not been too aggressive, but within a radius of some 50 to 70 miles of the Yalu River the MIG pilots are aggressive and are getting more aggressive.

VALOR OF ENEMY PILOTS

Question. How do their pilots compare with ours?

Answer. Well, I'm an American and I don't think there are any pilots in the world as good as American pilots. During our last bombing of Sinuiju bridge, the MIG pilots were very determined and they flew through their own antiaircraft fire to bore in on the

bombers and ignored our fighters. As you know, we lost two B-29's; I think those losses were due to MIG fighters rather than to flak.

Question. In the last war, General, you spent considerable time in China in very close association with the Chinese Air Force. What is your estimate as to the capabilities of the Chinese as pilots? Are they any better or—

Answer. I think I can give you a fair answer to that question. Those pilots we trained back in the United States and put in the composite Chinese-American wing were good. They flew our B-25's and our F-51's just as well as Americans. They were courageous, they thought well in the air, and when they had good leaders they were nearly as good as Americans. They were good pilots, but they do not have the leadership and command ability Americans have. I think, though, that the younger generation—those young pilots the Americans trained—will make good commanders as they grow older.

Question. Aren't some of those pilots flying for the Communists now?

Answer. As I understand, some of them defected from the Nationalists.

Question. With proper training, then, it would seem that they could turn out to be capable air commanders?

Answer. Yes, I think they could.

BOMBERS LOST TO FLAK

Question. You mentioned flak. What are we running into on that score?

Answer. All along the Yalu River there is good and accurate flak, mainly from the Manchurian side. Around certain North Korean cities and their main military installations, they have plenty and accurate flak. As you know, we have lost quite a number of fighter bombers to ground fire.

Question. How do their jets compare with ours?

Answer. I think the MIG-15—that is the only one we have met—compares favorably with our F-86.

Question. Is there any indication they have any jet bombers comparable in the bomber class to the MIG-15 in the fighter class?

Answer. We have not come in contact with any yet.

Question. What about conventional bombers? Is there any indication of how good they are?

Answer. No. We know that there is a probability that they have a Russian-built B-29 type. We know that they have a twin-engined bomber that is comparable, say, to our World War II A-20, or to our B-25. We have not come in contact with many of them. We have seen and shot down a few in the early part of the war.

Question. You have indicated very clear evidence of a build-up and that they have good planes and fairly good pilots. Do you believe the Chinese could mount an effective, or rather a sustained, air offensive against our ground forces?

Answer. That is what concerns me right now. Yes, I do. And the reason I am concerned is because our ground forces have had the greatest immunity from air attack that any army has ever had in the history of modern warfare. The first surprise air attack might cause a great many casualties in our front lines. General Ridgway is acutely aware of this threat and both he and General Partridge (Lieut. Gen. Earl Partridge, commander of Fifth Air Force) and his own ground forces all are alert to it. But, if it happens, the Eighth Army "can take it and carry on," as General Ridgway told me recently. Of course, we in the Far East Air Forces will do our very best to stop them before the attack.

Question. Do you think that we could meet and stop completely any air offensive against us?

Answer. You can't stop a determined air offensive unless you can get at the facility from which it originates. As you know, going north of the Yalu River is not permissible, and as a consequence our stopping of air attacks can't be airtight. All we can do is to be as alert to it as possible, try to out-guess them and catch them in the air if and when they come over.

WHAT AIR ATTACK WOULD DO

Question. Precisely how would any Chinese air offensive against our ground troops affect our present air support?

Answer. It means simply this: The air-ground support that the Eighth Army has been used to, and which we are giving daily, would be cut down proportionately to the strength of the enemy air offensive. If we don't blunt that air offensive, it means our ground forces are going to get hit and our installations in the rear will get hit. I am concerned also about my own air facilities in Korea, which can be attacked from the air.

The enemy can hit me where I am based, but I can't hit him. However, I am going to hit him in North Korea—any place that I can find him on the ground, and I am going to hit any facility that he can use—that is, in North Korea.

Question. If they throw an effective air offensive in, it would seem that would constitute the greatest threat the U. N. Army faces in North Korea wouldn't it?

Answer. I agree with you 100 percent.

Question. Will you sum up this point?

Answer. We seem at the moment to be on something of a razor's edge. The enemy does have the capability of presenting us with a very serious air threat. He has the capability, fields, facilities, pilots, and planes—

Question. It is just a question of whether he wants to gamble on it?

Answer. Well, I am going to take one exception to that statement. He has fields and facilities in Manchuria, north of the Yalu, but I am going to keep him out, if it is physically possible, of any facilities or fields in Korea. If I can do that, I am not too worried about his MIG-15's, because they do not have the range to hit our ground troops where they are at present.

Question. In other words, the Chinese could not have jet-fighter escort unless they could use those fields in North Korea?

Answer. That is right. It seems to me that I have a big problem to keep his fighter bombers away from our ground troops. That is a difficult job to do because, as I said, there are some 50 fields in North Korea available to Communists. Each field must be kept under surveillance.

DAILY WATCH ON FOE'S FIELDS

Question. How do you keep this watch?

Answer. We have certain areas which are daily, or at least every other day, surveyed from the air by either fighters or bombers. There is not an important airfield that we know of in North Korea that is not looked at at least every day.

Question. With his more than 50 air-dromes it seems that it would be quite possible for him to stage aircraft into one of these many fields at last light one evening, and then take off from this same field at first light next morning and strike almost without warning at ground forces. Is that right?

Answer. That is absolutely correct. If I am unable to keep those fields in North Korea in such a state of nonrepair, he could do just what you have said.

Question. Is it physically possible to keep 50 fields in a state of nonrepair, so that the Communists couldn't use them or bring them into usable shape in a matter of a few hours for emergency use?

Answer. It is almost physically an impossibility. There are certain of those fields where jets could be used that we give extra surveillance to all the time. He is a master of camouflage. Don't forget that with his capability of camouflage there might be a jet field there that he could get into at dark and take off from next morning.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to insert in the RECORD at this time a report by Henry Hazlitt published in Newsweek on April 11, 1949. It is entitled "Whose Bold New Program?" In this article Mr. Hazlitt points out that the President's bold new program and the many programs to spend billions of dollars throughout the world are not original with the administration, that the program was first set forth in a book 5 years ago entitled "Tehran: Our Path in War and Peace." I invite the attention of the Senate specifically to the fact that the program for fighting the war with silver bullets, the program for the bold new plan, was set forth in detail in the book to which I have referred. Who do Senators think was the author of that book? It was a man who was then the official head of the Communist Party—Earl Browder.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

BUSINESS TIDES

(By Henry Hazlitt)

WHOSE BOLD NEW PROGRAM?

In his inaugural address President Truman announced what has now become the famous fourth point—a bold new program for underdeveloped areas, a program to foster capital investment in areas needing development, to greatly increase the industrial activity in other nations, and to raise substantially their standards of living.

No sooner was this announced than the brains of Washington bureaucrats began to bubble with grandiose schemes for giving away still more of the American taxpayers' money to foreign lands. Our Government representative put the idea before the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, which adopted a resolution approving it. Now the ECA has set up a colonial development division. And Deputy Administrator Bruce says that this new division is intended to carry out point 4.

Before we go farther with this idea it may be instructive to look into its origin. I do not know who sold the idea to Mr. Truman. But at least the record shows clearly where the idea came from in the first place. The following quotations are from a book published in 1944:

"America can underwrite a gigantic program of the industrialization of Africa, to be launched immediately. It must initiate a general and steady rise in the standard of life of the African peoples.

"Closely related socially, economically, and politically with Africa are the near-eastern countries of Arabia, Iraq, Iran, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Transjordan. Here also a broad regional program of economic development is called for.

"What is clearly demanded by the situation is that the United States take the lead in proposing a common program of economic development of the Latin-American countries. For Latin America [such a program] opens the door for an immense leap ahead in progress.

"For the United States especially it contributes a large part of the answer to that all-important question as to whether we

shall be able to keep our national economy in operation.

"The Government can do it, if 'free enterprise' fails to meet the challenge and bogs down on the job.

"Our Government can create a series of giant industrial development corporations, each in partnership with some other government or group of governments, and set them to work upon large-scale plans of railroad and highway building, agricultural and industrial development, and all-round modernization in all the devastated and undeveloped areas of the world. America has the skilled technicians capable of producing the plans for such projects, sufficient to get them under way, within a 6-month period of time after a decision is made.

"On a world scale the combined projects could be self-liquidating in the period of a generation. They would become the best investments the American capitalist class had ever made in its whole history."

The book in which this proposal appeared 5 years ago was "Tehran: Our Path in War and Peace" (International Publishers). And the name of the author was Earl Browder, then still officially head of the American branch of the Communist Party (temporarily calling itself the Communist Political Association).

We need not point out here everything that is wrong with this proposal on political and economic grounds. We need not point out, for example, that every million dollars of capital we send abroad sets back our own capital development by just that much, and this at a time when President Truman himself insists that "at least \$50,000,000,000 should be invested by industry to improve and expand our [own] productive facilities over the next few years," and when he complains that our own steel, oil, and electrical industries are not being expanded fast enough to suit him.

It is enough to point out for the moment that the idea for the "bold new program" comes straight out of the book of the then head of the Communist Party in this country.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to insert in the RECORD an editorial which was published some time ago. It is interesting to take up some of these things and encouraging to find that some of our people have been awake for a long time. The title of the editorial is "Lying to the Public." Among other things, the editorial says:

The State Department has told its attachés in Tokyo that loss of Formosa to the Chinese Communists is to be anticipated and that, to prevent loss of American prestige at home and abroad, the public must now be sold on the idea that Formosa has no strategic value.

The documents sent to our State Department employees in the East were secret, as I recall, until the very able Senator from California [Mr. Knowland] forced the State Department to make them public.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD as follows:

[From the New York World-Telegram and January 4, 1950]

LYING TO THE PUBLIC

The State Department has told its attachés in Tokyo that loss of Formosa to the Chinese Communists is to be anticipated and that, to prevent loss of American prestige at home and abroad, the public must now be sold on the idea that Formosa has no strategic value.

This is a deliberate attempt to deceive the American people about a matter vital to their security. Of course, the State Department's

amazing document was not intended for public consumption. If Ernest Hoberecht, enterprising United Press reporter, had not revealed its contents, much to the Department's consternation, the deception might have been successful.

Nor is it any wonder that the answer of Secretary Acheson's spokesman to all questions concerning it has been "no comment." What else could be said when caught in a deliberate falsehood?

The view that Formosa has no strategic importance is not supported by any Army, Navy, or Air Force officer of any standing now in the Pacific or with any extensive experience there. Congress can ascertain this fact by calling on Gen. Douglas MacArthur, Lt. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer, Admiral A. W. Radford, Admiral Charles M. Cooke, or Admiral Oscar C. Badger.

Scripps-Howard's Clyde Farnsworth in Tokyo just 2 days ago was told by officers in General MacArthur's headquarters and in the headquarters of the Far East Air Force that Formosa was of "prime concern" to them. He also was told that the State Department had not sought General MacArthur's views on the subject.

The individuals responsible for this dishonest propaganda should be exposed and removed from office for betrayal of public trust.

Presumably, they are the same striped pants "strategists" who, when they wanted to write off China to the Communists, told us China was of no strategic importance because our Pacific defenses rest on the Japan-Okinawa-Philippines line. That line will be breached and flanked and become of little value to us if Formosa falls to the Reds.

Any layman can satisfy himself on that point by looking at the map.

The Japs used Formosa as the staging area for their conquests of the Philippines and the East Indies. It could serve the same purpose for the Russians, or their stooges, the Chinese Communists.

This island is 475 miles north of the Philippines and 780 miles southwest of Japan. It is only 400 miles southwest of Okinawa. It has a self-sustaining economy, with substantial food surpluses, oil and gasoline refineries, abundant coal, 70 Jap-built air strips and good harbors which can serve as submarine bases. Yet, according to the State Department document, the American people are to be told that it "is in no way especially distinguished or important."

Congress should intervene in behalf of the American people and fix responsibility for this lying propaganda before the State Department hands over the rest of Asia to Moscow on the excuse that it is "not important." A few persons masked by anonymity should not be permitted to betray the Government and the people.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to insert in the RECORD an article from the New York Times dated March 31, 1951, entitled "South Korea Lets Many Reservists Go." For the benefit of Senators on the floor I will say that this is a story written by George Barrett, special correspondent of the New York Times, to the effect that the Army is unable to feed the Korean reservists, some 400,000 of them, who were gathered together to be used, when they could be armed, to fight the North Koreans and the Chinese Communists. It seems passing strange, Mr. President, that the State Department, which is shedding crocodile tears about the starvation in India, has not given a single thought to feeding the 400,000 would-be soldiers in Korea, and their families. Incidentally it was found

that 30,000 of those released South Koreans were sick, suffering from malnutrition, and their families were starving.

There being no objection, the article was order to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

SOUTH KOREA LETS MANY RESERVISTS GO—ARMY, UNABLE TO FEED STAND-BY POOL, RELEASES 120,000 UNDER ASSEMBLY PRESURE

(By George Barrett)

TAEGU, Korea, March 30.—South Korea is beginning to release some of the men in its army reserve camps because the Government cannot equip them or even feed or clothe them.

Confronted by a dangerously spiraling inflation and with very little funds in the treasury, the Defense Ministry reluctantly put out orders permitting 120,000 men between the ages of 26 and 40 to return to their farms and villages. If the economic crisis worsens the army may be compelled to authorize other more drastic releases from the special reserve pool of manpower it has been keeping in its stand-by camps.

The inability of the army to utilize any of its immediate manpower reserves of 400,000 men, who had been rounded up by the Government to prepare for the fight against the Communist armies, has become one of the top political issues here. It has shaped up into a quarrel that is helping to widen the chasm between the National Assembly and the administration of President Syngman Rhee.

PROPAGANDA PERIL

The propaganda perils inherent in any kind of demobilization program for the South Korean Army, whatever the causes may be that make it necessary, are obvious to all Koreans when they see troop replacements continually coming into the country to fill up the ranks of fighters from 13 foreign nations.

President Rhee has told the United Nations that he is prepared to supply 500,000 men in addition to the 250,000 South Koreans who are now fighting and he has repeatedly asked for guns to arm at least some of the 100,000 members of the national guard, the first echelon of the army reserves. But it is the 400,000 "stand-by reservists" waiting in collection camps for formal induction into the army who have produced the storm in the assembly and forces the Defense Ministry to take steps it would rather not take.

The 400,000 from whose ranks 120,000 are now to be released are officially called volunteers. They were rounded up last November and December when the Chinese began their heavy drive southward and were placed into collection camps to keep them out of the hands of the enemy and provide a central pool of manpower for the South Korean Army.

ARMS WERE NEEDED

The Government was confident that the arms it needed to equip the additional units would be forthcoming without long delay and so the men were kept in camps. But as each week went by, it became increasingly apparent that even the 100,000 uniformed members of the national guard were having trouble getting arms.

With the country itself continuing on the economic downgrade, the volunteers in the camps became a major problem. Complaints began to be aired in the National Assembly that most were suffering from malnutrition and cold and that their families were almost equally hard up because the men were getting no pay.

It was disclosed today officially that at least 30,000 of those being released were sick and a query brought the official reply from the Army that the illness was malnutrition, which the Army declares the men had been

suffering from when they had been picked up and put into the camps. It has been openly charged in the Assembly that some 20,000 of the volunteers died this winter in the camps.

The Defense Ministry, painfully short on money, is already having difficulty in paying the troops of the Regular Army—50 cents a month for a private and \$12 monthly for a lieutenant general—and the additional problem of supplying clothes and food for 400,000 future soldiers is an enormous one.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to insert in connection with the foregoing article a telegram from Henry Hazlitt, who is one of the editors of the Freeman, an excellent magazine, to Gen. Douglas MacArthur, on March 31, 1951.

There being no objection, the telegram was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

MARCH 31, 1951.

Gen. DOUGLAS MACARTHUR,

Tokyo:

Why do we fail or refuse arms to 400,000 South Korean draftees as reported New York Times, March 31, dispatch from Taegu? Previous statements President Rhee reported requests for such arms.

THE FREEMAN,
HENRY HAZLITT, Editor.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to insert in the RECORD at this point the reply from General MacArthur to Mr. Hazlitt.

There being no objection, the reply of General MacArthur was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

APRIL 5.

HENRY HAZLITT,

Editor, the Freeman:

I have delayed reply to your message of the 31st pending receipt here of the referenced New York Times dispatch. There is nothing I can add to the information therein contained. The issue is one determined by the Republic of Korea and the United States Government, and involves basic political decisions beyond my authority.

Cordial personal regards.

MACARTHUR,
CINCFC, Tokyo, Japan.

Mr. McCARTHY. Unless our State Department and our Government were willing to feed those would-be soldiers and arm them, there was nothing General MacArthur could do. During all the time we were refusing to feed and arm them, American boys were dying in Korea and we were talking in this country about drafting 18-year-old boys.

Mr. President, I hold in my hand a picture which, unfortunately, I cannot place in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. It is under the title "Secretary Acheson's Views on Problems in the Far East," and is dated January 13, 1950. I wish Senators would look at it closely. There is a broken line showing where Dean Acheson has placed areas beyond our interests, the areas in which he says the United States will not fight. It excludes Korea from our defense zone. It excludes Formosa from our defense zone. Let me read one paragraph from the article:

Incidentally, Acheson just finished discussing the Communist conquest of China and the fact that Formosa and Korea were not within our defense perimeter. Unfortunately the Communists took him at his word.

So after this survey, what we conclude, I believe, is that there is a new day which has dawned in Asia. It is a day in which the Asian peoples are on their own and know it and intend to continue on their own. It is a day in which the old relationships between East and West are gone, relationships which at their worst were exploitation and which at their best were paternalism.

We here find the Secretary of State only a little more than a year ago notifying the Communist world that they could safely commit aggression in Korea without our interference. He notified the Communists that they could safely commit aggression against Formosa without interference on our part. At the same time the Department of State was sending out dispatches to its personnel in Asia saying to them, "Minimize the importance of Formosa, in order to convince the world that Formosa is not important to the United States." At that time, Mr. President, he had in his possession a very careful study made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with which General MacArthur heartily agreed, to the effect that the loss of Formosa would undoubtedly ultimately mean the loss of Japan, because with Formosa in unfriendly hands it would be possible to cut off traffic between Japan and South Asia.

I am sorry that I cannot insert the picture in the RECORD. It is impossible to do so. If any Senator would care to do so, he may obtain a copy of it. It is published in the New York Herald Tribune of Friday, January 13, 1950.

It is interesting to look back and see what some of the great experts, who now say that they are greater experts than MacArthur, were saying about China at that time. Dean Rusk, the man who was appointed by Acheson to take Alger Hiss' place, spoke in Philadelphia on January 13, according to an Associated Press dispatch. He said:

The Chinese Communist revolution is not Russian in essence and does not aim at dictatorship.

I read from the Associated Press dispatch as published in the New York Telegram and the Sun, of Friday, January 13, 1950:

He likened the revolution in China to the American revolt against the British.

Incredible, Mr. President, incredible. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD at this point, an article entitled "Another MacArthur Canard," published in the November 27, 1950, issue of the Freeman.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

ANOTHER MACARTHUR CANARD

Despite everything that General MacArthur has done in Korea to demonstrate his military brilliance, his common sense, and his sterling patriotism, the potent anti-MacArthur clique in Washington still continues to feed derogatory stuff about the general to the press. The really sad thing is that the gossip is picked up and disseminated to the four winds by those who should know better. The latest story to be put out is that MacArthur told Truman on Wake Island that he understood the Oriental mind and could thus assure the President that the Chinese

Communists would not interfere in Korea. Said the columning Alsops, in the New York Herald Tribune of November 13: " * * * the timing of the Chinese move * * * was supremely illogical—this was one reason why Gen. Douglas MacArthur assured Truman * * * that the danger of intervention had passed." A CBS news commentator repeated the substance of the Alsop statement. Altogether the picture thus created was one of a general who, out of arrogant presumption to superior knowledge of the Chinese mind, was caught way off base.

Since this picture does not jibe with our knowledge of the general, we sent him a wire asking him to confirm or deny the truth of the reports. Said the general in reply: "The statement quoted in your message of the 13th is entirely without foundation in fact. Signed, MacArthur, Tokyo, Japan."

We wouldn't bother with the anti-MacArthur campaign if it were not so virulent, insistent, continuous, and pervasive. Who starts these periodical anti-MacArthur rumors? They seem to come from certain well-established pipelines into both White House and State Department. Yet Truman depends on MacArthur to win our battles in Korea without the expenditure of vast numbers of American lives. Out of gratitude to his able military representative in the Far East, we think Mr. Truman ought to take a look at the pipeline situation in his own Washington balliwick.

Mr. McCARTHY. In that connection I invite the attention of the Senate to an article published in the New York Times of Monday, September 11, 1950, in which Acheson predicts that Communist China will not enter the war. In view of the fact that it is very clear that the decision was a political decision, not a military one, the Acheson smear against General MacArthur because MacArthur did not predict China's entry looks even worse.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an article entitled "The Case Against Acheson," published in the December 11, 1950, issue of the Freeman.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE CASE AGAINST ACHESON

The diplomatic fiction that the war in Korea was a small, local affair has been demolished by open Chinese aggression which threatens disaster to General MacArthur's forces. And Secretary of State Dean Acheson has at last discovered a fact which has been common knowledge outside the never-never land of American diplomacy: that the aggressor behind the Chinese Communists is Soviet Russia.

So now it can be told. We defeated the puppet of a puppet in Korea; we are now fighting the puppet; and in both cases the real enemy has been the puppeteer, who, of course, is Stalin.

"Pardon my firmness," the Secretary of State was saying in effect on November 29, in a broadcast speech which sounded as if it had been written in a second-hand cliché factory. He spoke at a moment when American boys were dying, when the American Army was facing annihilation, and when General MacArthur urgently needed authorization to aid his imperiled forces by bombing installations and troop concentrations behind the Manchurian border. The general could wait; American diplomats at Lake Success would continue to argue with the Chinese Communists over who slapped whom, while Mr. Acheson warned the fathers and mothers of the dying that Communist China's "brazen" act "holds grave danger for the peace of the world." One might think the

Secretary regarded the full-scale war in Korea as just another local skirmish.

Mr. Acheson's speech of November 29, made at a time when swift action to support MacArthur was desperately urgent, was completely silent on this urgency. It sounded like a filibustering speech calculated to divert the attention of the American people and the world from the military paralysis due to UN inaction.

Has there been any basic change in American far eastern policy, all Mr. Acheson's bold clichés notwithstanding? Or are there still between his statements of defiance, hints of further appeasement?

As long ago as the autumn of 1944 the man who now admits that Soviet Russia is out to conquer the world had become the head of the pro-Russian group in the State Department. Former Assistant Secretary Adolf A. Berle testified to this fact before the Committee on Un-American Activities on August 30, 1948, as follows:

"As I think many people know, in the fall of 1944 there was a difference of opinion in the State Department. I felt that the Russians were not going to be sympathetic and cooperative. Victory was then assured, though not complete, and the intelligence reports which were in my charge, among other things indicated a very aggressive policy not at all in line with the kind of cooperation everyone was hoping for; and I was pressing for a pretty clean-cut showdown then when our position was strongest. * * * The opposite group in the State Department was largely * * * Mr. Acheson's group of course, with Mr. Hiss as his principal aid in the matter. I got trimmed in that fight and, as a result, went to Brazil; and that ended my diplomatic career."

The opposite group went on to get many another good and patriotic American in the Department, while Mr. Acheson's principal aid, Alger Hiss, went on from one important post to another until he became the organizer of the San Francisco Conference to set up the United Nations, and one of President Roosevelt's chief advisers at the fatal Yalta Conference.

They got Under Secretary Joseph Grew, who resigned in the summer of 1945 and was immediately succeeded by Dean Acheson. When Patrick Hurley returned from China in November to demand dismissal of the pro-Communist State Department men in China who were turning over his secret messages to Moscow, it was the Ambassador's resignation that was accepted. The pro-Communists stayed. And Dean Acheson sat down with Gen. George Marshall to write the instructions to bring about a Kuomintang-Communist coalition government in China—instructions which Marshall vainly followed for a year.

By October 7 of 1945 the Daily Worker, whose Washington correspondent on June 7 had called Acheson "one of the most forward-looking men in the State Department," chortled in its joy:

"With the assistant to Assistant Secretary of State James C. Dunn, Eugene Dooman, who was chairman of SWINK, the powerful interdepartmental committee representing State, War, and Navy, and former Acting Secretary Joseph Grew out, the forces in the State Department which were relatively anti-imperialist were strengthened."

And the Daily Worker's uptown echo, PM, declared that "What the Government seeks now is to develop a diplomacy based on better appreciation of what the Soviet wants."

That was what the Government developed, and that is what the Government has continued in the Far East down to the present debacle.

When Acheson, after 2 years at his private law practice, returned to the Department as Secretary in January, 1949, he was sold to the American people as representing "continuity" in foreign policy. Precisely because this was true, those who realized that our

foreign policy pointed to disaster were dismayed by the appointment. There was also objection from those who felt that it would be unbecoming, to say the least, for a man whose law firm was registered with the Department as representing several foreign governments to be dealing with those governments as Secretary of State. But the main objections were based on Acheson's previous record in the Department.

Since that time Acheson's completion of the China sellout, his publication of the infamous Government White Paper whitewashing the Department's Red China record, his public denunciations of Chiang Kai-shek, his appointment of Philip Jessup and Dean Rusk as makers of Far East policy, his proposals—after having virtually turned Asia over to communism—that we pour money and arms into any borderland Korea where Stalin might choose to have his puppets attack, his public and official declaration that he would not turn his back on the convicted perjurer Alger Hiss—all these actions had aroused great public uneasiness even before the Korean adventure, and had prompted two Democratic legislatures (Texas and Mississippi), and various other organizations and individuals to call for the Secretary's dismissal.

Some of the charges brought against him are here briefly summarized from congressional speeches and the public prints.

1. He has been the chief architect of the policy which has brought us, in 5 years, from the unconditional victories of 1945, and sole possession of the atom bomb, to the verge of national ruin.

2. Under his guidance, we acquiesced in the corquest of one-third of the world by Communist imperialism.

3. He and his clique encouraged a weak Communist rebellion in China, armed and directed by Russia, to take over the heartland, or key to all Asia; today, in consequence, Americans are dying for a toehold in Korea, a peninsula attached to the China Mr. Acheson's Department helped to push into Russia's arms.

4. On July 31, 1946, Mr. Acheson wrote to Alfred Kohlberg of New York a letter, which was published, in which he said: "General Marshall . . . is exerting every effort to fulfill the American Government's desires by bringing the two major Chinese political factions peacefully together to form a united and representative government."

5. After the legitimate Government of China had been forced to flee to Formosa, Secretary Acheson recommended abandonment of that island. His Department, on December 23, 1949, sent out secret instructions to all diplomatic and consular personnel to promote the view that Formosa was doomed and expendable.

6. Before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, on June 19, 1947, Mr. Acheson said there was no danger of a Communist defeat of Chiang Kai-shek. In his letter to the President of July 30, 1949, prefacing the white book, he says that "no amount of aid could have saved Chiang." These statements are typical of the quality of Acheson's statesmanship.

7. On August 24, 1949, in answer to Congressman WALTER H. JUDT, of Minnesota, Mr. Acheson denied that Vice President Wallace had made a written report to President Roosevelt on his return from China in 1944. Since then, Mr. Wallace has released portions of two such reports.

8. In issuing the white paper on China, on August 5, 1949, Acheson declared that all important documents were included. Twelve cables called for by Ambassador Patrick J. Hurley, when testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1945, were omitted and are still secret.

9. He has approved the Chinese Communists' demands for hostages to guarantee Americans leaving Red China.

10. He paid Communist China to get Consul General Angus Ward out, and then only after a newspaper campaign had aroused public opinion.

11. Under questioning by a Senate committee before his confirmation as Under Secretary of State in 1945, Acheson stated that Russia should have a share in the administration of Japan.

12. He sponsored the Hiss brothers unreservedly to Assistant Secretary of State Adolf Berle, to whom Whittaker Chambers had mentioned them as Soviet agents. In 1946, he used his influence with the FBI to save Alger Hiss; he publicly and officially refused to turn his back on Alger Hiss after 20 jurors had found him guilty of perjury about espionage.

13. He acted as counsel for Lauchlin Currie, former Administrative Assistant to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman, when Currie appeared before a congressional committee, charged by both Whittaker Chambers and Elizabeth Bentley with having aided their espionage network.

14. On April 18, 1947, without investigation, he cleared John Carter Vincent, Chief of the vitally important Far Eastern Division of the State Department, of charges of pro-communism filed by a United States Senator. In his letter he professed complete ignorance of official published Communist programs for world-wide conquest, especially in the Far East.

15. Acheson headed the American delegation in the formation of UNRRA, where he insisted on the veto to please Russia, and according to former Polish Ambassador Jan Ciechanowski, steadily supported all Soviet demands. Thus he rendered the United States impotent to control or investigate UNRRA, although this country supplied the overwhelming bulk of its funds.

16. As head of the State Department unit arranging for the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, Acheson secured the appointment of Alger Hiss as Director of the Division of International Security in charge of American preparations for the UN, as adviser to Secretary Stettinius and President Roosevelt at Yalta, and as first Secretary General of the UN.

17. On July 20, 1946 (CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, vol. 92, pt. 8, p. 9578) Mr. Acheson stated that there were no Communists in the State Department, and that only one had been fired for that reason. The first statement proved to be untrue.

18. In spite of documented charges of softness toward communism against Ambassador Philip Jessup, Mr. Acheson has made him top American foreign-policy adviser both in Europe and Asia.

19. Speaking in welcome to the "Red Dean" of Canterbury at Madison Square Garden, Nov. 14, 1945, Under Secretary of State Acheson said:

"Never in the past has there been any place on the globe where the vital interests of the American and Russian peoples have clashed or even been antagonistic—and there is no objective reason to suppose that there should . . . be such a place. . . . We understand and agree with them that to have friendly governments along her borders is essential both for the security of the Soviet Union and for the peace of the world."

20. Acheson recognized Tito's Communist Government of Yugoslavia on December 22, 1945, without demanding the free elections provided for at Yalta.

21. Against the advice of Ambassador Arthur Bliss Lane in 1946, Mr. Acheson approved a "loan" of \$90,000,000 to Communist Poland, then represented by Donald Hiss, of the Acheson law firm.

22. The Lillienthal Atomic Energy Committee was appointed in October 1946, on Acheson's recommendation, without the knowledge of his superior, Secretary of State

Byrnes, or of Bernard Baruch, who headed our Atomic Commission to the UN.

23. Acheson fronted for the Acheson-Lillienthal atomic energy report, which proposed turning over atomic secrets to Russia on promise of peaceful uses, but without inspection.

24. On May 1, 1946, Acting Secretary of State Acheson announced that invitations to attend the Bikini A-bomb tests on July 1 had been extended to the Soviet Government.

25. On December 16, 1945, Under Secretary Acheson received Juan Negrin, head of the Communist group of Spanish Loyalists. He refused to receive Fernando de los Rios, head of the anti-Communist group. Four days later he received Milton Wolff, commander of the subversive Abraham Lincoln Brigade and Congressman Vito Marcantonio, and promised them, according to the Daily Worker, to intervene with Franco on behalf of two condemned Communists.

26. Everybody except Mr. Acheson has known all along that the Communist forces in China and North Korea were armed and directed by Russia; that American prisoners are executed by order of Russia, exactly as Polish prisoners were executed in the Katyn Forest. Yet Mr. Acheson permitted Chinese Communist delegates to accuse this country of aggression in Formosa while American soldiers were still waiting for permission to fight the enemy with all means at MacArthur's command.

It must be said that President Truman, in approving and defending the policy and behavior of the ruling State Department clique, has made himself ultimately responsible for them, for the policy, and for the debacle to which it has led. It is also true that his responsibility is shared by a majority in Congress, and by a large majority of the newspapers. Those who have not protested against the errors which have resulted in the enslavement of one-third of the world and the terrorization of the rest of it, must share in the responsibility for those errors.

Mr. McCARTHY. I have in my hand an interesting AP dispatch. It is to the effect that General Ridgway, who succeeded General MacArthur in the Far East Command, also believes that we should use the troops on Formosa to do some of the fighting. The report indicates that Lt. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer also agrees, and also Vice Admiral Joy.

Mr. CAIN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCARTHY. Gladly.

Mr. CAIN. Does the Senator know of any qualified military authority who would give any advice contrary to the advice which has been offered to America and the free world by Gen. Douglas MacArthur, Gen. Matthew Bunker Ridgway, Gen. George E. Stratemeyer, and the other gentlemen to whom the Senator has made reference?

Mr. McCARTHY. I know of no competent military man who when talking privately—and the Senator knows that we have talked to many of them—has ever urged a continuation of either one of the following courses which we are now following:

First. The protection of the Communist mainland by our Seventh Fleet. Incidentally this is costing us a great deal of money. Whenever we appropriate money to the Navy, as the Senator knows, part of the money is being appropriated for use by the Seventh Fleet, which is protecting the long exposed

flank of the Communists. I know of no competent military authority—in fact, I do not know of a private, even, in the rear ranks—who would say that it is the sensible thing to do or that it is anything other than an approach to treason. While Communists are killing our American men, why should we be spending time, money and effort to protect the long exposed flank of the Chinese Communists?

Second. I do not know of a single military man who will say that there is any rhyme or reason to our breaking Chiang Kai-shek's blockade of the Chinese coast, so that a vast amount of war material can flow into Communist China. It grieves me, as it does practically everyone who has studied the subject, that out of 10 ships going into Communist ports with war material, 7 ships are sailing under the British flag. That is being done while British boys are dying in Korea. I understand it is something which is also of great interest to the mothers of Great Britain.

Third. I do not know of any military man who will say that there is any rhyme or reason or any sense to a situation in which our men can see the Chinese airports across the Yalu River, knowing that they could knock out those airports in a matter of minutes. They can see the jet planes take off. They know that once the jet planes get off the ground and attain sufficient altitude it is very difficult to fight them. They can see those planes take off, attain an altitude of 30,000 feet, and make one pass at our B-29's and fighters, after which they can skip back across the Yalu River, and we cannot go after them there. I do not think any sane man would say that that should be done. Also, as the Senator knows, there is a fourth point. It is the use of Chiang Kai-shek's troops. A short time ago I sent to the desk an article from the New York Times, together with two telegrams, one to General MacArthur and one from General MacArthur. They deal with our refusal to feed 400,000 young would-be soldiers of South Korea. They are the young men who the South Korean Republic had rounded up in order to train them as soldiers. It is of course a tragedy not to use Chiang Kai-shek's troops, but also for some reason unknown to me, we are saying that we will not use the South Koreans and we will not let them do some of their own fighting.

Mr. CAIN. Mr. President, will the Senator permit me to ask one more question?

Mr. McCARTHY. Gladly.

Mr. CAIN. If I have understood the Senator correctly, he has just said that, for reasons unknown to him and to me and presumably to many others, we are not now feeding some 400,000 South Koreans who, if properly fed, could be made available for the battle front on Korea on the Allied side. Is that correct?

Mr. McCARTHY. Let me correct myself. I said for reasons unknown to me. I correct that statement. I think the reasons are very obvious.

I hold in my hand a paper which I think is the most significant document in this whole sordid traitorous picture. It is the Sunday Compass of July 17,

1949. In this we find set forth the modus operandi of the traitorous group in our State Department, the old Hiss crowd. It sets forth the method which Hiss, with his brilliant mind, helped to work out. Let me read it to the Senate. This is written by the State Department's architect, Owen Lattimore. He says first, talking about China:

The problem was how to allow them to fall without making it look as if the United States had pushed them. Such a policy never succeeds completely, and critics have done their best to make the public believe that the United States did push Chiang and the Koumintang over the cliff.

Listen to this. This is the key to why we are doing what we are doing today. He says:

The thing to do now, therefore, is to let South Korea fall.

The date of this is July 17, 1949, nearly a year before the North Koreans moved into South Korea, and 6 months before Dean Acheson publicly notified the Communists that we had no interest in South Korea.

The thing to do, therefore, is to let South Korea fall but not to let it look as though we pushed it.

Listen to this:

Hence the recommendation of a parting grant of \$150,000,000.

It is not hard to follow the sinister method of operation. The expert says, "Let us let them fall, but in order that the American people may not know that we pushed them, we will give them \$150,000,000, so that when they finally fall we can say, 'We did everything we could possibly do, but they did not have the will to win.'" Of course, the State Department was making certain that no part of the \$150,000,000 was to be military aid.

That is the picture today, except that instead of \$150,000,000 we are giving the blood and lives of American boys. Hiss' pals in the State Department are now determining military strategy, as we know. They are now dictating to the military how they shall fight the war. Hiss' pals, instead of saying, "We will give them \$150,000,000 to deceive the American people," are now saying, "We will give the blood and lives of 6,000 American boys a month."

I retract my statement that I did not know why they were betraying us. I think it is very clear. It is because people who are not for America, but who are for international communism—the pals of Alger Hiss, the espionage agent, the men who drafted the Yalta Agreement—are still running the State Department.

Mr. President, incidentally, we need not take the word of any man from this side of the aisle on this subject. I hold in my hand the testimony of Adolph Berle, given before the House Un-American Activities Committee in 1948. Bear in mind that he was a Democrat, an ardent New Dealer. So he was not trying to embarrass the Democratic Party. There is no question of party politics here. He testified under oath that when he was in the State Department as Assistant Secretary there was the pro-Communist group headed by Dean Acheson and Alger Hiss. He said there was

the anti-Communist group, which, of course, was finally removed from the State Department.

Why the Hisses, Achesons, Lattimores, Jessups, and John Carter Vincents, scheme to betray this Nation? Why the Owen Lattimores say, "The job is to let them fall, but do not let the American people know that we pushed them"? I do not know. There must be an answer somewhere. All we know is that they are doing it, and each day we let them continue, more American boys are dying.

Mr. CAIN. Mr. President, will the Senator permit one further interruption?

Mr. McCARTHY. Certainly.

Mr. CAIN. The Senator has told us that for a number of reasons our Armed Forces are not feeding those in South Korea, who, if they were well fed, could be of great potential service in the war which is going on in Korea.

Against that, I suppose the greatest contradiction I could possibly define lies in the fact that with 700,000 enemy troops now opposed to the limited free forces in Korea, no steps are being taken to prevent the enemy from providing those 700,000 with food sufficient for them to carry on their determination to destroy us to the last man. As often as I relate that obvious fact, I continue to be amazed that it exists.

Mr. McCARTHY. If I correctly understand the Senator's question, he is speaking of our inability to starve out the enemy troops under present orders. Is that it? Or did I miss the Senator's question?

Mr. CAIN. No; I think the Senator has it. The point is that we are taking no steps to destroy the enemy's ability north of the Yalu River to supply, equip, and keep 700,000 enemy troops in the field in North Korea.

Mr. McCARTHY. There is no question about that. I have received letters from men in our Air Force in which they tell the same story time after time. They can see the long enemy supply lines leading toward the Yalu River, lines of supplies not only for guns and ammunition but for food for the enemy soldiers. They see the enemy soldiers coming up to the Yalu River; but they cannot touch them because they are not enemies of ours until after they cross the Yalu River.

I should like to have the Senator take the time to read the article dated March 31, 1951, from the New York Times. The article is written by George Barrett. It points out exactly what we are doing in Korea, so far as the failure to feed the 400,000 friendly troops is concerned.

Mr. CAIN. I thank the Senator.

PROSECUTIONS UNDER ESPIONAGE LAWS

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, I had not planned to spend so much time on the subject of Korea. I had planned only to introduce certain documents into the RECORD. I wish to discuss a matter which I believe is of tremendous importance to the Senate and upon which I should report. I have discussed this subject before.

First, I wish to compliment the Federal Bureau of Investigation for having done an excellent job in this case.

Mr. WILEY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MCCARTHY. I yield.

Mr. WILEY. I wonder if the Senator would yield so that I may ask unanimous consent for the consideration of a resolution which is on the table. There is complete agreement on it, and its consideration will require only a few minutes.

Mr. MCCARTHY. I will yield for the unanimous-consent request if there is to be no discussion of the resolution. I have only about 5 minutes before I must leave the Chamber. I am overdue about an hour now.

Mr. WILEY. Does the Senator mean that he will be through in 5 minutes?

Mr. MCCARTHY. Five minutes or less. I shall be glad to yield. However, if there is to be discussion of the resolution, I do not wish to yield.

Mr. President, in this case the Federal Bureau of Investigation has gathered sufficient facts, and has informally presented them to the Justice Department, to call for prosecution under our espionage laws, laws which provide a maximum of 10 years imprisonment and \$10,000 fine in the offense as found.

The case involves a man who has led the Communist line smear against Gen. Douglas MacArthur. But that is not the offense for which the prosecution has been prepared. In order to make the record complete, I believe I should go back a short time and give the complete picture.

On January 8, 1951, I wrote the Secretary of the Army, Frank Pace, and called his attention to certain secret documents which were appearing in the columns of Drew Pearson. I asked him certain questions about the secret information. For instance, one of the questions I asked him was whether the material was of such a secret nature that it could not be seen by Members of Congress. The Secretary's answer that it was of such a secret nature that Members of Congress could not see it. I was not so much concerned with the particular messages that were published at that time, Mr. President. I was concerned over the fact that Mr. Pearson had complete access to our Pentagon secrets, especially so in view of the fact that he had working for him and on his payroll until several months ago a Mr. David Karr. I have placed Mr. Karr's complete FBI record in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, which shows that he was a top member of the party. Since then I have an affidavit from Mr. Pearson's former employees showing that Mr. Pearson knew all about Mr. Karr's Communist connections, and what is more important, that a top Government official was so concerned with the Karr contact that he offered Mr. Pearson—I say this in affidavit form—offered Mr. Pearson a chance to look at the Government files, showing what an important man to the Communist movement was Mr. Karr.

If Mr. Pearson denies that in the pending trial I will be glad to submit those affidavits to the Department of Justice, so they may also start prosecution for perjury.

But getting back to the case again, I also wrote to the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL], chairman of the Armed Services Committee, a letter on this matter, and I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the body of the RECORD at this point my letter of January 8 to the Secretary of the Army, Mr. Pace, his letter to me of January 11, 1951, and the letter to the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL] of January 11, 1951.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. SCHOEPPLE in the chair). Without objection, it is so ordered.

The letters are as follows:

JANUARY 12, 1951.

HON. RICHARD RUSSELL,
Chairman, Armed Services Committee,
United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Enclosed is a copy of a letter to the Secretary of the Army, dated January 8, and his answer thereto, dated January 11. You will note that my letter called the Secretary's attention to the fact that Columnist Pearson quoted excerpts from secret military messages.

When I first pointed out the aid which Pearson might give to the enemy by publishing decoded secret military messages, Pearson's answer was that he had permission from the Department of the Army. You will note from paragraph 2 of the Secretary of the Army's answer that this statement is false; that Pearson had no such permission to publish any decoded secret military messages. You will also note from paragraphs Nos. 7 and 8 that Pearson published excerpts from decoded military messages of such a high classification of secrecy that none of the Members of the Congress would be allowed to see them.

The answer from the Secretary of the Army indicates that there is a spy in the Pentagon passing out classified information. This follows the sinister pattern of the Hiss case, where a man in the State Department was passing out decoded secret messages.

You will recall the statement of Under Secretary Berle that the most dangerous thing about Hiss handing out secret decoded messages was that it would greatly assist the enemy to break our State Department code.

Some things which, in my opinion, should receive top priority in the investigation being presently conducted by the Department of the Army are:

1. Discover and expose the spy who is stealing those messages and see that he is promptly prosecuted.

2. Find out whether he is on Pearson's payroll.

You will note from the enclosed correspondence that the Army has taken immediate steps to investigate and that they have submitted to the Judge Advocate General the information insofar as it bears upon violations of the Espionage Act.

I thought it appropriate to call this to your attention as chairman of the Armed Services Committee.

Sincerely yours,

JOE MCCARTHY.

JANUARY 8, 1951.

HON. FRANK PACE,
Secretary of the Army,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: On Saturday, December 30, Drew Pearson ran in his syndicated column what purported to be a sizable number of verbatim messages from General MacArthur's intelligence headquarters to the Pentagon.

On January 5, I pointed out that if Pearson was telling the truth and actually was running verbatim decoded messages sent from General MacArthur's intelligence headquarters to Washington, this represented an

extremely dangerous breach of security. Obviously if the enemy could obtain the same messages, both in code and decoded, it would help him materially in breaking our code.

If the enemy were to break our code, it could and undoubtedly would result in the death of a vast number of American young men and military disaster for us.

In Pearson's answer, he stated that he had permission from the Pentagon to publish those decoded secret dispatches on the condition "that he change a few words and the date." I would, therefore, appreciate receiving an answer to the following questions:

1. Even if a "few words and the date" were changed in decoded messages and allowed to fall into the enemy's hands, would this still not be very valuable to him in breaking our code?

2. Did the Pentagon give Pearson permission as he stated to publish those secret military messages on the condition that he change a few words and the date thereof, and if so, who gave this permission?

3. How did those secret military messages fall into Pearson's hands?

4. Was not whoever handed Pearson those messages guilty of a violation of our espionage laws?

5. Were the messages from MacArthur's headquarters given to any other newsmen and, if so, to whom?

6. What other secret decoded messages were given to Mr. Pearson?

7. From Pearson's statement, it appeared that he was to change the date and a few words, meaning that he had a verbatim decoded copy of those secret code messages. Is this correct, or was Pearson again lying?

8. Can I or any other Member of the Congress call at the Pentagon and see the messages from MacArthur's intelligence headquarters?

9. What, if any, investigation has been instituted, or is contemplated, by the Department of the Army to find out who has been giving secret messages to Mr. Pearson?

I realize that you are extremely busy and I would not bother you except that I consider this a matter of the most urgent and gravest importance. If someone is actually stealing secret decoded messages from the Pentagon and handing them to Pearson, the lives of many of our young men and the security of this Nation are in grave danger.

Very sincerely,

JOE MCCARTHY.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY,
Washington, January 11, 1951.

HON. JOE MCCARTHY,
United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR MCCARTHY: This is in reply to your letter of January 8 in which you state that if certain facts are true Mr. Drew Pearson committed a breach of security by publishing classified military information in his syndicated column. I am sure you understand the Army, too, is greatly concerned about any security violation and prior to the receipt of your letter had initiated an investigation in this matter.

I shall therefore answer your questions in the order submitted in your above-referred-to letter:

1. Cryptographic systems vary and a technical discussion of them here is not permissible for security reasons, but in this instance it has been established that cryptographic security has not been violated.

2. The Department of the Army did not give Mr. Pearson permission to publish the secret military messages you referred to nor any other classified information.

3. This matter is being actively investigated.

4. This question has been submitted to the Judge Advocate General of the Army for opinion.

5. No messages from General MacArthur's headquarters were given to any newsmen by the Department of the Army.

6. No secret messages were given to Mr. Pearson by the Department of the Army.

7. Investigation reveals that Mr. Pearson's column of December 30 contained quoted excerpts from classified messages.

8. No.

9. An investigation was instituted by the Department of the Army immediately after the publication of Mr. Pearson's column of December 30, 1950. Your letter of January 8 has been referred to those conducting this investigation.

Your interest in this matter is appreciated and I would welcome information you might be able to furnish us in the investigation that has initiated within the Department of the Army.

Sincerely yours,

FRANK PACE, Jr.,
Secretary of the Army.

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, I also ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD at this point a letter from an Army officer in the intelligence section, dated January 13, 1951, and his letter of January 22, 1951, giving me permission to insert his letter in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

JANUARY 13, 1951.

Senator JOSEPH R. MCCARTHY,
United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR MCCARTHY: This letter is official and confidential. I trust you will treat it as such. However, it contains information which I think should be fully explored.

I am an officer working in the Intelligence Section of the Far Eastern Command. There has been forwarded to us copies of articles by Drew Pearson in which he quotes from secret documents prepared in this intelligence section. One of the documents which concerned us greatly was contained in Mr. Pearson's column of December 30 in which he quotes from, and identifies by date, document 3019, dated December 1950. The quotes are accurate, and the date given by Mr. Pearson was accurate. It proves beyond a doubt that someone has been handing secret documents to Mr. Pearson. Whoever did this knew that he was violating our espionage laws because I have since checked and find that the document from which Mr. Pearson quoted, had stamped upon it in large red letters the warning that if made public, it would be of benefit to the enemy, and that transmitting or revealing this information to any unauthorized person would be a violation of the Espionage Act.

This article properly identified the Chinese Communist units which were arrayed against us. It is of course of tremendous value for the Communists to know just how much information we have about them. Such information is of great value to their counter-intelligence units. For example, if someone would publish for our benefit just exactly what Chinese Intelligence knew about our units, it would save the lives of many of our men. Those of us like myself who have relatively safe jobs in intelligence work, as well as our people who are risking their lives daily behind the enemy lines, feel that Mr. Pearson and whoever stole these secrets for him are guilty of high treason.

We cannot understand the inactivity of the Congress, the Justice Department, and the Army in not starting criminal action against this man. While we are concerned with the publication of this one document, we are a thousand times more concerned with the fact that this means that Mr. Pearson has unlimited access to military

secrets. It means also that there is a spy handling our military secrets, secrets obtained at great hazard and in many cases the expenditure of lives.

Incidentally, we noted that while Mr. Pearson correctly quoted the dispatch listing the six Chinese armies, he then proceeded to do a job of addition and multiplication which should embarrass a child in kindergarten. In order to make the Chinese Communists look braver and better fighters than our men, he stated that the 6 armies contained only 96,000 Communist soldiers.

Hope this information may be of some value to you.

Very sincerely,

JANUARY 22, 1951.

DEAR SENATOR: Your letter of the 16th finally caught up with me. I would have replied, as you requested, by telegram but I am not certain of the integrity of such a communication.

As you are aware, it would be most serious if my letter to you were to become known. I wish to do nothing which will embarrass my fellow officers.

Steps should, and must, be taken to stop such leaks of secret information. It is obvious, to me at least, there is a clique who desire to undermine the prestige and power of General MacArthur. To the troops in the field I know this campaign has had a shattering morale effect. When I see our fighting men being betrayed it sickens me.

You may use my letter in the RECORD if you will do the following things for me: (1) Guarantee my name will never be revealed; (2) return to me by registered mail the original copy of my letter with this letter.

Good luck in your efforts to stop this "leak."

Sincerely,

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, before it was brought to the attention of the Army by me, the Army had initiated an investigation in accordance with Secretary Pace's instructions. At the time the original secret documents appeared in the Pearson column, the Army had a distribution of 15 of these top secret documents. They went to 15 different places. One went to Marine Corps intelligence, one to Navy intelligence, one to Army intelligence, one to Air Corps intelligence, one to the State Department, and so on down the line. After considerable investigation they decided that they could not spot the spy in the Pentagon, or wherever he was, with that type of distribution—a distribution of 15. So they cut the distribution down to 3, and one of those went to the State Department.

The investigation by the Army has convinced them that there was no leak insofar as the two secret military documents going to the military are concerned, but that the leak was after this was sent over to the State Department. As of now they have been unable to find the man who has been stealing the secret documents and passing them on to Pearson.

I am not so much concerned with this, because of the contents of the few documents he has put out. Incidentally, I find in his column today he puts out what purports to be a secret document. I called some of my friends over in the atomic section that has to do with atomic weapons and asked them whether it was a correct description of the new atomic weapons, and they said "No," it was not a completely correct description, but

that it was correct enough so it violated security and it disturbed them very much.

But as I started to say, the thing that disturbed me was not the content of this particular secret document, nor the secret documents he has passed out in the past, but the pattern was so close, and paralleled the case of Amerasia so much, that it begins to look now like another Amerasia case. It will be recalled that in that case they were stealing hundreds of secret documents. Finally they got so careless they published a few, and that is when the FBI moved in on them.

The investigation is to all intents and purposes completed. While they have not been able to spot the spy in the Pentagon, they have produced evidence to make a clear-cut case of violation of the espionage laws by Mr. Pearson. They have found, for example, that he had in his possession this secret document, which had printed thereon—and that shows that he was not operating ignorantly—in large letters the following:

WARNING

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, title 18, U. S. C., secs. 793 and 794.

Section 793 is the section they found was violated. Continuing:

Transmission or revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law; it is intended for eyes only and it is imperative that the material contained in it be treated with the utmost discretion. Under no circumstances shall possession thereof, or the information therein, be given to any person other than those whose duties specifically require knowledge thereof. When not in use, this document is chargeable to the custody of an officer.

It goes on:

This document should be destroyed in 15 days of receipt, and copy of certificate of destruction prescribed by paragraph 33a, AR 380-5, should be furnished AC of S, G-2, GHQ, FEC.

They have also established that Pearson turned this with other secret documents over to David Karr—David Karr, the man whose record I put in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, showing that he was not only a member of the Communist Party, but a top member.

The Mundt-Nixon-McCarran Act, United States Code, title 18, section 793 (e) provides:

Whoever having unauthorized possession of, access to, or control over any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph—

And so forth—

relating to the national defense, or information relating to the national defense which information the possessor has reason to believe could be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation, willfully communicates, delivers, transmits, or causes to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted, or attempts to communicate, deliver, transmit, or cause to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted the same to any person not entitled to receive it—

Which certainly includes Communist Karr—

or willfully retains the same and fails to deliver it to the officer or employee of the

United States entitled to receive it; or * * * shall be fined not more than \$10,000 or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.

Many times before, during World War II, as we know, Pearson has handed out secret military information. This undoubtedly was of great help to the enemy in breaking our code. How much help he gave to them none of us know. There were not sufficient teeth in the espionage laws, however, to catch the Pearsons and Karrs. But now, thanks to the McCarran Act, the wise action of Congress, this man's operations as the Communist Party smear artist can be interrupted for some time.

We have found that to date the State Department has been successful in keeping the Department of Justice from formally receiving the Pearson file. They are saying, "No, we want more investigation done on this." How long they will stall it along, I do not know, Mr. President; but the competent young lawyers in the Department of Justice have gone over the case and have advised the investigators of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who have been working on it, that they have a complete, airtight case of violation of the Espionage Act which calls for a 10-year prison term.

I may say that when this matter was first brought to my attention, all we could do was try to expose this man's activities and pull his teeth and let the American people know whom they were dealing with and, in effect, knock his soapbox from under him. The company which had sponsored him decided for reasons known to them to stop sponsoring him. I should like to congratulate the industry of this Nation for refusing to pay for the soapbox for a man who over the past 8 years has always had the task of doing a job of character assassination upon anyone who stood in the way of international communism. First it was Forrestal whom he smeared; then it was Douglas MacArthur; then it was Chiang Kai-shek; then it was each of the heads of the House Committees on un-American Activities. As we know, each of them was the subject of Pearson's smear attack.

Of course, the cabal who follow him—I think it is unnecessary to name them, for all of us know well who they are—have always followed Pearson all the way.

So I think it is proper to congratulate American industry for not providing another soapbox for him. If Alger Hiss were put on the air, I suppose he could help sell some sort of laxative; or if a Remington were put on the air, I suppose he could succeed in selling something or other. So, Mr. President, in closing I congratulate American industry for refusing to pay for the soapbox for the mouthpiece of the Communist Party, even if an industry could temporarily profit thereby, and I want to inform the Department of Justice that some of us will be looking with a great deal of interest to see how much success the State Department will have in stalling the prosecution of this man, upon whom the Federal Bureau of Investigation now has a complete case.

EXTENSION OF SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE ORGANIZED CRIME IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE

Mr. WILEY. Mr. President, on April 17 I submitted Senate Resolution 129, which now lies at the desk. I wish to inform the President of the Senate and all Members of the Senate that the Special Committee Investigating Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce at that time was in disagreement in regard to how the committee should proceed. However, in view of the tremendous desire for the continuity of the committee, an agreement has now been reached; and I intend to ask unanimous consent that the resolution be considered and amended or modified in accordance with the agreement which has been reached this afternoon among all the members of that committee. The amendment simply makes the following changes: First, instead of extending the life of the committee to January 15, 1952, its life would be extended for approximately 4 months, until September 1, 1951.

Then there would be added at the end of the resolution section 7, reading as follows:

On or before September 1, 1951, the committee established by this resolution shall transfer all of its files, papers, documents, and other pertinent data to the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, which committee shall, under and by virtue of the authority of section 136 of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, continue the study and surveillance of the subject matter of this resolution, and shall be authorized to use for that purpose any unexpended and unobligated balance of the funds authorized to be expended by the committee established by this resolution.

Mr. President, another change is now to be made in the original resolution as submitted on behalf of myself and the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. TOBEY]. The original resolution called for \$150,000, but the resolution as now proposed to be modified calls for \$100,000.

Of course in the meantime the resolutions submitted the other day by the other members of the special committee will be studied, and the appropriate committees considering them will have opportunity to go into the merits of those resolutions.

Mr. President, I have prepared a short statement on this subject. I expected to deliver it today. In it I analyze my views regarding the merits of the three viewpoints which exist. In view of the fact that we now have reached an agreement, I simply ask unanimous consent at this point that the statement which I have prepared be printed in the RECORD, as a part of my remarks.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATEMENT BY SENATOR WILEY WHY I FAVOR CONTINUATION OF SENATE CRIME COMMITTEE

I am shortly going to ask unanimous consent that the Senate immediately proceed to consider Senate Resolution 129 which I introduced last week on behalf of myself and the distinguished junior Senator from New Hampshire, Mr. TOBEY. The purpose of this resolution is to extend the life of the Senate Crime Investigating Committee until January 15, 1952.

At that time, the Senate may also wish to consider Senate Concurrent Resolution 28 which would set up a joint watchdog committee on crime, and which was introduced by the distinguished Senator from Maryland, Mr. O'CONNOR, on behalf of himself and the Senators from Tennessee, Mr. KEFAUVER, and from Wyoming, Mr. HUNT.

I am glad that we will have these two choices before us. I earnestly hope that the Senate will permit us to adopt either one of them.

Regardless of which resolution it adopts, either Senate Resolution 129 or Senate Concurrent Resolution 28, I believe that to some extent the forces of law and order have won a victory.

Why do I say that? Because several weeks ago, when I began this fight to extend the life of the Crime Committee, my colleague from New Hampshire and I were the only Senators to speak up actively and demand that this crusade not be ended. After weeks and weeks of pleading, after pointing out that we still have not touched many types of crimes, after pointing out that we still have numerous legislative recommendations still to formulate, at last, I believe our colleagues have come around to a recognition of the fact that we simply cannot fold up shop as of the end of April.

I have pointed out that to a considerable extent already the forces of organized crime are winning their way back and other results of the crusading Kefauver committee are starting to be dissipated. To be sure, there has been a public awakening; but we have seen reform movements like this in the past wash themselves out, with little permanent accomplishment to show for their effort.

I am not going to take the extended time of the Senate to comment on why I favor Senate Resolution 129. I have previously commented on this issue in the Tuesday, April 17, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, and in the Wednesday, April 18, issue.

Let me point out, however, the following facts:

(1) The basic fact is that it is indisputable that the war against crime in some form must continue. There are hundreds of leads still in the files of the Senate Crime Investigating Committee. There are thousands of unanswered letters, many of them containing constructive tips and suggestions. There are scores of unheard witnesses—both those who had evaded committee subpoenas and those who had evaded committee warrants.

(2) The major question as the Senate confronts Senate Resolution 129 as contrasted with Senate Concurrent Resolution 28 is as to whether or not the Senate Crime Committee as such shall be broken up and replaced by a joint committee. I, for one, see absolutely no reason under the sun why this winning team should be broken up. The Senate Crime Committee has already proved its effectiveness. I had hoped that the distinguished Senator from Tennessee, whose work on this committee has won him well-deserved fame throughout the Nation, could continue as chairman; but if, because of the tremendous pressure of other work, to which he has not been able to adequately attend during this past year—if he feels it necessary for him to no longer serve as chairman, I trust that at the very minimum he will serve as a member of the committee.

I can see little advantage in constituting the committee on a joint Senate-House basis. All we are doing is doubling the number of members of the committee. We all know that in some instances a watchdog committee can be very helpful, as, for example, when an entirely new program is set up by the Federal Government, such as the multibillion dollar ECA program, but I see little point why we need a "watchdog committee" over Federal investigative agencies. I for one have very high confidence

in these agencies, in Mr. J. Edgar Hoover of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, in the Secret Service, in Mr. Anslinger of the Narcotics Bureau. These professional crime busters certainly don't need our intervention.

To be sure, we could benefit from increased voluntary coordination among these agencies; but that is a long way away from harassing them or making them feel as though they have not been doing their job.

If we give them adequate laws, if we give them the jurisdiction, there is no question in my mind but that these investigative agencies will do the job.

We all know how difficult it is to arrange meetings of committees and subcommittees merely among Members of the Senate. When you have to worry about arranging meetings at the mutual convenience of Members of the House also, obviously your problem is tremendously complicated. I do not for one moment underestimate the contributions that could be made by Members of the House. I do not for one moment assume that we in the Senate possess all the wisdom and background to do the job all by ourselves. However, I do feel that we have proved our effectiveness and that the case for a joint committee has certainly not been demonstrated.

Surely Members of the House will look with favor on sound legislation which we write, whether or not they have had members on a joint committee serving with us. Surely they don't have to feel that they are a part of a committee, just in order to sugarcoat some legislative pill which we give them. Let the legislation we submit stand on its merits.

I want to point out that both resolutions contemplate that \$150,000 will be granted to either the extended committee or to the joint committee. The joint committee would go even beyond the life of the extended Senate committee. That is, my proposal was to extend the life of this committee to January 15, 1952, whereas Senator O'Connor's proposal would extend the joint committee until June 30, 1952.

I for one feel that by the end of this year, we can have pretty well completed the job; and then when we return next January, we can write our final report.

I respectfully urge my colleagues, therefore, to take action one way or the other on either resolution. Let us not allow the crime crusade to die by default. There are but four legislative days remaining after today. The country has demanded that the crusade against crime go on. Over 50,000 appeals have come from all over the Nation. The Senate must not break faith with the American people.

WHY I OPPOSE CRIME COMMISSION NOW

I should like just to say a few words in opposition to the third item in this field facing us. I refer to Senate Joint Resolution 65 which would establish a permanent Federal crime commission. I feel particularly strongly that there is no justifiable basis for the establishment of such a commission on either a temporary or a permanent basis.

It should be noted that the three members of the commission would be appointed by the President; and although they would report to the Congress, I for one feel that they could not possibly be completely independent of the wishes of the executive branch. We have long since learned that no branch, no individual, no group can investigate itself, and do an impartial job.

It should be noted that the commission does not have the powers of subpoena. I am glad of at least that fact because I feel that an executive branch unit which possessed such powers would run up the tremendous risk of degenerating into a Federal Gestapo. On the other hand, lacking the subpoena

power, it does not seem to me that there is any particular strength in the crime commission.

I do not feel that we need a supervisor over Mr. J. Edgar Hoover's shoulder and over Mr. Anslinger's shoulder, telling them what to do. As I say, these heads of Federal investigative agencies are sincere, honest men. Men like J. Edgar Hoover are among the greatest public servants we have ever produced. No one has ever questioned their zeal to do the job.

I, for one, feel that the various investigative agencies could work out improved procedures and technics to coordinate their efforts; but I don't think that they need any super-duper crime commission over them.

All in all, it seems to me that we are simply building another superstructure above the Federal investigative level, a superstructure which is not needed.

I, for one, would infinitely prefer a voluntary citizens' crime commission on a national basis. I believe that the great philanthropic foundations of America might contribute funds to such a voluntary citizens' crime commission which would help on a purely voluntary basis to coordinate the work of the independent citizens' crime groups throughout the Nation, such as those in Miami, New York, Chicago, etc. Such a citizens' crime committee could serve as a wholly independent watchdog on the executive branch. It could help educate the American people to the dangers of crime.

Outstanding men could be appointed to it, whose integrity was unimpeachable and who were wholly divorced from politics of the executive branch. Yes, I would infinitely prefer that our free-enterprise system develop such a voluntary body, rather than have Uncle Sam do it.

So I return to the point whence I started. I appeal to the Senate to take action on Senate Resolution 129. I appeal to it to vote down Senate Concurrent Resolution 28. Moreover, when the Senate Interstate Commerce Committee has amply studied the Federal Crime Commission bill, I trust that it will reject that approach.

If a joint "watchdog committee" is set up, I shall be happy to serve on it, even though my time is necessarily limited, as is that of my colleagues. However, I feel that the committee will be more cumbersome than members now imagine; and so I urge that we keep together the winning team by extending the life of the Senate unit.

Mr. WILEY. Mr. President, I also wish to say that I have received from Mr. Albert Hayes, the distinguished president of the International Association of Machinists, a fine telegram in which he indicates that his executive council wholeheartedly endorses Senate Resolution 129 for the continuation of the Special Committee To Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce. Mr. Hayes had sent his telegram before the submission of the concurrent resolution providing for the "watchdog committee" so his reference was solely to the original extension resolution. I congratulate the International Association of Machinists for its sound thinking on this general approach. It shows that the ranks of organized labor, as well as its leadership, recognize, as do American business, American farming, and all other segments of our economy, the importance of the continuation of our crusade against crime.

Mr. President, I now ask unanimous consent that I may modify my resolution in accordance with the provisions I have read into the RECORD.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the present consideration of the resolution?

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the resolution (S. Res. 129), submitted by Mr. WILEY (for himself and Mr. TOBEY) on April 17, 1951, and ordered to lie over, under the rule.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. At this time the Senator from Wisconsin has a right to modify his resolution.

Mr. WILEY. Mr. President, on behalf of myself, the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. TOBEY], the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. KEFAUVER], the Senator from Maryland [Mr. O'CONOR], and the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. HUNT], I submit the modification to which I have referred, and I ask that the resolution as thus modified be read. I point out particularly the modifications which occur in sections 3 and 7.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The resolution as modified will be read.

The CHIEF CLERK. It is proposed to strike out all after the word "Resolved," and insert:

That the committee established by Senate Resolution 202, Eighty-first Congress, agreed to May 3, 1950 (creating a special committee to investigate interstate gambling and racketeering activities), is hereby authorized to expend from the contingent fund of the Senate to carry out the purposes of Senate Resolution 202, Eighty-first Congress, \$100,000 in addition to the amounts heretofore authorized for the same purposes.

Sec. 2. Section 6 of Senate Resolution 202, Eighty-first Congress, is amended to read as follows:

"Sec. 6. The committee shall report to the Senate from time to time, with respect to the results of its study and investigation, together with such recommendations as to necessary legislation as it may deem advisable, and shall make a final report on or before September 1, 1951."

Sec. 3. Such resolution is amended by adding at the end thereof a new section to read as follows:

"Sec. 7. On or before September 1, 1951, the committee established by this resolution shall transfer all of its files, papers, documents, and other pertinent data to the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, which committee shall, under and by virtue of the authority of section 136 of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, continue the study and surveillance of the subject matter of this resolution, and shall be authorized to use for that purpose any unexpended and unobligated balance of the funds authorized to be expended by the committee established by this resolution."

Mr. WILEY. Mr. President, as I stated, the resolution would merely amend sections 3 and 7 of the original resolution in the particulars I have stated. Once more, the committee is unanimous, as we have been throughout the 11 or 12 months we have labored together. We have reached a constructive conclusion, which we feel will meet the desire of the people throughout this broad land that certain other phases of interstate crime be investigated, as we investigated the so-called gambling angle. At this time, I ask that the resolution be agreed to.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair desires to draw the attention of the distinguished Senator to the fact

that under the rules of the Senate governing the Committee on Rules and Administration, there shall be referred to the committee "matters relating to the payment of money out of the contingent fund of the Senate or creating a charge upon the same; except that any resolution relating to substantive matter within the jurisdiction of any other standing committee of the Senate shall first be referred to such committee."

Mr. WILEY. I ask unanimous consent that the rule be waived, and that the Senate proceed with the consideration of the resolution.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered. The question is on agreeing to the resolution, as modified.

The resolution (S. Res. 129), as modified, was agreed to.

Mr. KEFAUVER. Mr. President, as the present chairman of the Special Committee To Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce, I wish to make a few personal observations as to the extension which has been granted this afternoon, and to state something of my reasoning, and that of other members of the committee, in connection with what has been done.

In the beginning, and several times in the course of investigation, I stated that we wanted to complete our work by March 31; that it was my expectation that by that time the committee would have completed its work, and that, if the time were extended, I would be unable to function as chairman, or, I thought also, even as a member of the committee. During the period of 1 year, the committee work has consumed practically all my time. I have not been able to devote time to pending legislation, and I have been able to visit the people of my State for but 2 or 3 days during the past year.

Mr. McFARLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KEFAUVER. I yield.

Mr. McFARLAND. I merely wish to compliment the distinguished Senator from Tennessee upon the splendid work he has done on this special committee. I wish to say that it took a great deal of persuading to get him to agree to remain on the committee. I thank him for his willingness to be of further service to the committee. There were a great number of us who, with all due respect to the distinguished Senator from Maryland, would have liked to see the Senator from Tennessee continue as chairman. We greatly appreciate the fact that he is willing to assist the committee in the continuance of its labors, and I think the Senator from Tennessee is to be congratulated upon being willing to make the sacrifice necessary to help further in the work.

Mr. KEFAUVER. I appreciate the comments of the majority leader, and I appreciate the backing which he and the minority leader, as well as almost every other Member of the Senate, have given to the work of our committee.

I spoke in entire good faith when I said that I expected the work of the committee to terminate on March 31, and that I did not expect to carry on in any manner after that time. It so happened that, a few days prior to March

31, a report had been prepared. We had conducted hearings almost up to that time. That being the original expiration date of all our committee work, we had prepared a report, which the members of the committee did not feel that they had time to consider sufficiently for them to make legislative recommendations, in view of the fact that only 3 days remained before the expiration date of the committee. Our very worthy and able counsel, Mr. Rudolph Halley, and his associates had been working on the questioning of witnesses almost up to the time of the expiration date. By superhuman effort, they were able to draft a tentative report, but in view of the fact that members of the committee did not have time to consider fully the intricate legislative recommendations, we acquiesced in the request for a 30-day extension, for the purpose of enabling us better to prepare our report.

Mr. President, I have always had the feeling that the work of a legislative investigating committee is for the purpose of obtaining facts upon which to make legislative recommendations, and that there is no justification for an investigating committee's continuing forever, unless there are certain facts which it can investigate, and which would be of assistance in proposing legislation.

During the period of the year during which the committee has been in existence, every member of it has worked hard. Many of the members have acted as subcommittees to conduct hearings themselves. We have heard more than 800 witnesses. Day in and day out, for weeks together, we have conducted hearings and held sessions, morning, afternoon, and night. The work of the committee has been tremendous. It has carried a very heavy load.

It is impossible for members of a committee representing a legislative body such as the Senate or the House to continue over an extended period of time upon the basis on which we have been working, and still attend to other legislative duties and to represent properly their constituents within the respective States. For that reason, I had very much hoped that, when our time was up, on March 31, and certainly following the extension, on May 1, we could terminate the committee entirely and get down to the problem of legislation, and get such laws enacted as we could, in order to try to put a stop to interstate operations by big-time racketeers and gamblers, which operations the committee has found, and will report, exist in interstate commerce.

All members of the committee have agreed that there is need of a continuing study and surveillance of this problem, surveillance for the purpose of investigating the new methods and techniques which may be employed by the well-financed racketeers who are constituting such a terrific drain upon the economy of the country, and whose operations are having such an adverse effect upon morals and upon the operation of the Government itself, in many of the communities which we visited.

My personal feeling as to the method of continuing the study and surveillance was to have within the executive de-

partment, but responsible to Congress, an independent commission which would have power to subpoena under certain limited circumstances as, for example, when there was a unanimous vote for the issuance of a subpoena, or when the judge in the district where the hearing was being held, after a proper submission of the matter, felt that a subpoena was necessary; that this independent commission would have the duty of keeping in contact and working with the executive departments which are charged with law enforcement and stopping the operation of criminal activities in interstate commerce; that they would try to correlate the investigative operations of the various departments, some 25 or 26 in number; and that they would make a study and hold hearings when absolutely necessary, when some problem arose which should be gone into in order to make recommendations to a committee of Congress for the purpose of passing new laws or amending laws.

It was my original feeling that on this committee there should be someone representing the Department of Justice, the Attorney General, or his designee, who would probably be Mr. J. Edgar Hoover; and the Secretary of the Treasury, or his designee, who would probably be Under Secretary Foley; because most of these matters are in the Treasury or the Department of Justice, and their full cooperation and coordination are necessary if we are to arrive at the degree of effort which is required to stop organized crime.

The proposal of a commission with subpoena powers and with department agencies represented apparently has not met, so far, with very much support among the Members of the Senate. The departments themselves have opposed it. Mr. McGrath, Mr. Hoover, and Mr. Foley recommended a continuation of the present committee.

My first feeling was that an independent commission should carry on the work. I think it is not a proper legislative function to continue to operate in the capacity of advising local law-enforcement officers as to what they can do, and passing information to them with reference to criminal activities. That gets into the executive function of government. Our only justification is to get the facts and to recommend legislation. I felt that we had the over-all facts on a fairly substantial basis as to the various methods adopted by criminals in using the vehicle of interstate commerce for criminal purposes.

While we have had investigations in some 10 or 11 cities, in the city of Washington witnesses have come from many other places. In other cities in which we have held hearings witnesses have come from many States. So, from the Nation-wide viewpoint, Mr. President, I feel we have the necessary facts on which to base legislation, so that the task of the committee, in my opinion, has been largely completed.

All members of the committee recognized that there was some necessity for a continued study and surveillance of the problem until we overcome all organized crime.

Since the independent commission idea suggested did not receive very much support, and since the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. WILEY] and the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. TOBEY] submitted a resolution to continue the present committee in existence, some of us felt that the various methods which had been suggested should be presented to the Senate so that they could be considered together.

The distinguished Senator from Maryland [Mr. O'CONNOR], with the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. HUNT] and I as co-sponsors, suggested a committee which would have authority to make the necessary investigation, but it would largely be in a watchdog capacity, to keep an eye on what the executive departments are doing and what new methods and activities of organized criminals in interstate commerce are being applied, and to be of any help possible to local representatives who were themselves making efforts to combat crime.

Another reason why we felt that the House should be included was that the House Ways and Means Committee has original jurisdiction of tax questions, and many of our recommendations will have to be considered by that committee. Various Members of the House have been showing a great deal of interest in the problem, and we felt that we would have a better representation as a whole if the House had a part in it.

Many Senators oppose the joint-committee idea and feel that the present committee should be continued. In order that the legislative committees shall have time to consider whether we should have an independent commission or a joint committee, and in view of the fact that the life of the present investigating committee will expire next Tuesday, and so that we shall not have a hiatus in the effort, so far as legislation is concerned, upon the insistence of the majority leader and members of the majority policy committee, I have agreed to go along with the resolution, with the understanding, however, that I shall be relieved as chairman. It is the feeling of all members of the committee that the distinguished Senator from Maryland [Mr. O'CONNOR] should be the new chairman. I think that feeling has been expressed by every member of the majority policy committee. The fact of the matter is that the Senator from Maryland, by his training and the experience he has had as Governor of a great State, and as prosecuting attorney, together with a fine judicial temperament and an interest in this work, is better qualified, in my opinion, than is the present chairman or than is any other Member of the Senate that I can think of. He also has a very unique position in that he is a member of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce and of the Judiciary Committee, the two committees which have the greatest interest in this problem and to which most of the legislative proposals would be referred.

The question as to whether in the long run there will be a joint committee or whether there will be an independent commission in the executive branch will, of course, have to be first presented to

the legislative committees and acted upon on the floor of the Senate. This action does not mean that we are abandoning the work or that those of us who want to push the effort may not do so. It was manifest, however, that the question could not be acted upon by next Tuesday.

The action taken today is upon the urging and recommendation of not only the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. TOBEY] and the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. WILEY], but it represents the unanimous view of the Democratic policy committee, and especially the majority leader. It also coincides with the recommendation of the American Bar Association Commission which met in this city Monday before last, and which is headed by Judge Patterson, a distinguished jurist and attorney of New York, and a former Secretary of War. The opinion of the American Bar Association Commission was that the investigation phase of the work was largely concluded; that some new situation might arise which would require investigation, but that we had the facts and would now make legislative recommendations and get behind them. They recommended a continuation of the committee for a short time for the purpose of cleaning up any loose ends and making any necessary study, but mainly for the purpose of assisting in the preparation and presentation of proposed legislation.

I hope that if the committee is to be continued for a short time there will be no diminution in efforts to consider any proposal which may be submitted. Some persons have thought the full picture has not been submitted, and that was the reason why they thought legislation should not be considered until the next session of Congress.

Mr. President, I hope that that will not be the attitude of the Members of the Senate, but that we can very vigorously present legislative proposals and have them acted upon as soon as possible, because the welfare of the country undoubtedly demands that that be done.

I think it should also be borne in mind that since legislative facts for legislative purposes have been largely gathered it is not the province of a legislative committee, in my opinion, to pile cumulative evidence on cumulative evidence time and time again. I think the byproduct of arousing public opinion is very important, but that alone is no justification for having investigations. I hope the committee can go on during this short period conducting investigations, if some new facts should develop, but that it should largely be in a position of pushing for legislation, and staying in touch with the executive departments, to see if they are carrying forward, as they have given indications they want to, the recommendations which the committee makes, most of which they have agreed to in the past, in the effort against the organized criminals; and that the committee may continue to be of some service in encouraging local people to carry on the fight themselves. Eighty percent of the work must be done by the people in the local communities. It must be done by the local law-enforce-

ment officers. The field of the Federal Government is very limited. We can pass all the laws in the world, but unless they have popular support we will not get anywhere.

I know that all of us have been greatly heartened by the activity which has been undertaken in so many communities, in all of the States of the Union, during recent months, in the formation of crime committees, in the operation of grand juries, in ascertaining the facts, in taking the initiative to clean up bad criminal conditions, and in insistence on public law enforcement. It is true with the exception of a very small minority of persons in public life, who have been doing business with and protecting criminals. It has all been very heartening and, of course, it should be encouraged. However, the public should never be given the impression that they can sit back and not do anything themselves, but depend solely on some Federal agency or some congressional committee to ferret out the facts and do the work for them. I know that the committee in the continuation of its work will not give any part of the public the impression that it can do so.

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KEFAUVER. I yield to the distinguished Senator from Connecticut.

Mr. McMAHON. I should like to ask the Senator if it is not true that when he speaks about crooked public officials he is not talking about officials of the Federal Government, but, rather, about officials of local units of government.

Mr. KEFAUVER. In answer to the question of the distinguished Senator from Connecticut, I think I should say that the percentage of improper or crooked public officials who do business with the underworld in all segments of our Government is very, very small. The great majority of our public officials all the way through are honest and are doing the best they can. They believe in good law enforcement. Of course, they have no part in any transaction with criminals. Largely the politicians throughout the country who give them some protection, as we have found out, are at the local level, because that is where the criminals operate.

In some few police departments, but not in a great percentage of them, in some few sheriffs' offices, in some few prosecutors' offices, and in some few State offices, that is true. I think I should say in fairness that we have found some bad apples in some agencies of the Federal Government. For instance, in the State of California we found that some, but very few, persons in the Internal Revenue Bureau had cast a bad reflection and had hurt the entire agency. They are very few in number. By and large the Bureau is made up of fine, good, and loyal persons who are doing the best they can. They are now more active in the interest of law enforcement.

I think in fairness it should also be pointed out that those we have exposed in California have been dismissed or suspended, and some of them have been indicted. I suppose wherever any great number of people are working together

over a long period of time, particularly if their minds are on something else, and they have not thought especially about criminal activities, that a certain amount of corruption will come about in public office at all levels of Government.

Mr. President, the activity of local people has been most encouraging. I think we are going to have a cleaner and better America. I believe we will be able to help in some small degree by the passage of legislation. However, the great part of the work will have to be done by local people. The committee during the next 4 months will be in a position to be of some assistance in encouraging the local people. I think it is very significant that a large part of my time in the past few months has been taken up with talking with groups who come to Washington. They have asked me what they can do back home; how they should go about forming a crime commission, how they can get a grand jury functioning, and how they can get additional information which they may need. It is a very wholesome thing, and they should be helped. I believe in the long run there must be an additional method in the executive department by which that sort of thing can be taken care of. The FBI gives tremendous assistance in fingerprinting, ballistics, and certain other matters of that sort. However, there is no agency in existence in Government to which local people can turn in order to get information which is correlated or secured from all 25 or 26 investigative agencies who have some part in dealing with interstate crime.

I think I should also point out, Mr. President, that our committee has in the past, in its minority reports, made findings and recommendations which were critical of local and Federal agencies. We have had full support and cooperation from Mr. J. Edgar Hoover in the Department of Justice. The Treasury Department has given us income-tax returns upon the order of the President. Particularly in recent months we have had most relationships with the Treasury Department, and they are going forward with many of the recommendations we have made. I believe that our findings of fact and presentation of the picture have been of assistance to them. Certainly they have been of great assistance to us.

I know that during the 4 months after we make our report the public will not expect the committee, under the chairmanship of the Senator from Maryland, to enter upon as active an investigation as we have conducted in the past. The activities of the committee will be largely for the other purposes which I have described. The committee will function even better under the guidance of the Senator from Maryland than it has under my poor efforts.

I think it is important also that the second amendment be added to this resolution, so that there will be some follow-up and some method provided for a continuing study and surveillance of these problems. I think the public will obtain a great deal of comfort from that fact. They will know that the subject is not going to be entirely dropped by

the United States Senate, and that there will be a continued eye on the activities of the criminal element, and a continual lookout for methods by which Federal laws may be improved to deal with them. The law-enforcement agencies will know that they will be expected to continue to do their part. They will know that they will have some group in Congress to whom they can go for suggestions, to whom they can make their recommendations, and with whom they can work in cooperation.

I look forward to a period of continued good work—even better work under the chairmanship of the Senator from Maryland—and I know that the attitude of the Members of the Senate on both sides of the aisle will not give the racketeers and criminals any comfort. I have a definite conviction that an all-out effort has been started on the part of the Federal Government and the Congress, together with local governments and State governments, to get at the problem of organized and syndicated crime and give the people of the country better law enforcement.

I believe that the facts which our committee has been able to develop to date and bring so vividly to the attention of the public have had some little part in bringing about this condition. If that is true, I feel that our existence and our work so far have been fully justified.

Mr. CAIN obtained the floor.

Mr. FERGUSON. Mr. President—

Mr. O'CONOR. Mr. President, will the Senator from Washington yield to me so that I may make a brief comment in line with the remarks of the Senator from Tennessee?

Mr. CAIN. I had previously agreed to yield to the Senator from Michigan, but I think it is quite proper at this time that I should yield to the Senator from Maryland. I do so with the indulgence of the Senator from Michigan.

Mr. FERGUSON. Certainly.

Mr. O'CONOR. Mr. President, I wish to express gratification that what we have just heard from the very able junior Senator from Tennessee [Mr. KEFAUVER] was not a valedictory, but rather an expression of readiness to carry on this very important work.

I may say, not only for the RECORD, but for every purpose, that the very fine work done by the Senator from Tennessee has been of such a high standard that it would be impossible, in my humble opinion, to excel it in any way. The entire country is indebted to the able Senator from Tennessee for his painstaking, conscientious, and very intelligent efforts, which not only have already resulted in improvement, but I dare say will continue to result in improvement as time goes on.

In addition, I wish to observe that, as has been indicated by the Senator from Tennessee, the amended resolution which has been adopted was submitted at the insistence of the majority policy committee. The able Senator from Arizona [Mr. McFARLAND] our majority leader, not only gave very earnest attention to the matter, but insisted that this work be continued.

While it has been stated by the Senator from Tennessee that his extra duties as chairman could not be continued by him, the fact remains that the committee will consist of the same five Senators, four of whom have done such yeoman service in field, with what humble assistance the senior Senator from Maryland has been able to give.

I think it is also a very happy arrangement that under the terms of the resolution not only will there be a continuity of earnest effort during the next 4 months to continue the work as it has been carried on in the past, but upon the expiration of that period provision is made for subsequent attention to be given to the study and surveillance of the subject matter, as the resolution notes, by the standing Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

As has been stated by the Senator from Tennessee, three of the members of the special committee are members of that committee. I am very confident that the very expert knowledge of the Senator from Tennessee, as well as that of the author of the resolution, the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. WILEY] will be available in the future to the standing Senate committees. So assurance is given that there will be no cessation of effort.

I wish to express appreciation to the Senator from Tennessee and to all who have made possible this very important undertaking, which is directed toward circumventing the activities of the lawless elements of the Nation.

After all, Mr. President, the majesty and dignity of the law must be upheld. I am confident that the Senate has done and will continue to do a very important work in this connection.

I am very grateful to the Senator from Washington for yielding to me.

Mr. CAIN. The Senator from Maryland is most welcome. I now yield to the Senator from Michigan.

RUSSIA'S TREATY OBLIGATIONS TOWARD JAPAN

Mr. FERGUSON. Mr. President, earlier in the afternoon the Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. KERR] interrupted a colloquy between the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. McMAHON] and the Senator from Michigan to correct what was an obvious misstatement by me when I had said that China had attacked Japan and thus brought about the war between those countries.

From his remarks I took it that the Senator from Oklahoma thought I was confused as to who started the Chinese-Japanese war. I was not confused, although I misspoke in saying that China had attacked. The world and everyone knows, of course, that Japan had first attacked.

My misstatement occurred in the course of a discussion of Russia's honoring its treaty obligations and in particular its treaty with Japan which was in effect during the course of World War II. Since the earlier colloquy I have taken occasion to check the provisions of the Russo-Japanese treaty to which I was referring.

The treaty, in the nature of a neutrality pact, was signed April 13, 1941. Its provisions were substantially as follows: First, both parties, in the interests of peaceful and friendly relations, agreed to respect the territorial integrity of the other; second, in the event that either party became the object of hostilities on the part of others, the other party pledged to remain neutral in those hostilities. The pact became effective with its signing and was to run for 5 years with an automatic renewal for 5 years unless either party denounced the pact a year prior to the renewal date.

Under the terms of the pact Russia was not pledged to do anything with respect to the Chinese-Japanese War except to remain neutral.

Likewise, when Japan was engaged in hostilities with the United States—and we all know that Japan attacked the United States first—and its allies during World War II, Russia was pledged by the pact only to remain neutral. This Russia did do, until August 8, 1945, when Russia declared war upon Japan and thus violated the pact which was still in operation.

That violation of the pact by Russia returns me to my original question regarding Russia's observance of her treaty obligations. We have heard about the likelihood of Russia entering the far eastern war in defense of a treaty agreement with Soviet China. I was inquiring when Russia had become so meticulous about its treaty obligations as to demonstrate that possibility to be a certainty. Her breach of the Japanese treaty bears out my point.

In other words, Mr. President, the Senator from Michigan believes that Russia has her own ideas respecting treaties. She has published a textbook on international law for the faculty of law in the Soviet Union, Moscow, 1947, by the Academy of Science of the Soviet Union Institute of Law. It was printed by the Legal Publishing House attached to the Ministry of Justice. It is recommended by the Minister of Higher Education.

On page 406 it deals with the repudiation of treaties. Those who are interested in the text will find that Russia has her own views on the question of the repudiation of treaties. She expressed those views when she sent a note to Finland on November 27, 1939. She gave as a reason for going into Finland and breaching the treaty she had with Finland that Finland had been provocative in the violation of her obligations. In other words, Russia determines whether or not she is going to repudiate a treaty as it affects her interests.

I think it is well that we discuss upon the floor this attitude of Russia in the past in trying to evaluate and determine what Russia might do.

The Senator from Michigan has felt that Russia is going to serve what Russia believes to be her interests, and that she will not make war because she has a treaty, but that she will breach a treaty when she feels like it, as she did with Japan and as she did with Finland. It will be of interest to look at Russia's own textbook to see that Russia has her own

international law rather than giving obedience to international law which is binding upon other nations.

MACARTHUR UNDERMINED—ARTICLE BY HENRY MCLEMORE

Mr. SCHOEPPEL. Mr. President, will the Senator from Washington yield to me so I may make a short statement and insert an article in the RECORD?

Mr. CAIN. I yield to the Senator from Kansas.

Mr. SCHOEPPEL. Since we have had today on the Senate floor some discussion as to the Korean situation and some references have been made to the position taken by General MacArthur and the strategy in Korea, I wish to point out that on Tuesday, April 17, 1951, there appeared in the Evening Star of this city an article entitled "MacArthur Undermined; Troops Were Handcuffed," written by Henry McLeMure. The columnist points out his views concerning General MacArthur. I think he states some things that should be remembered after the last hectic days. I ask unanimous consent that the article may be published in the body of the RECORD as a part of my remarks.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington Evening Star of April 17, 1951]

MACARTHUR UNDERMINED; TROOPS WERE HANDCUFFED

(By Henry McLeMure)

It must have come as a relief to General MacArthur to have been relieved of his command.

The only things he ever was given plenty of in Korea were white crosses with which to mark the final resting places of the men he had been ordered to make play a game which they couldn't possibly win.

No one knew this better than the general, and I am sure no one loathed the situation more. The general was no casual bloodletter, as anyone who cares to search his record will discover.

I remember the luncheon I had with him at his home in Tokyo in 1948. The closest he came to a boast, this supposedly vain, arrogant, egotistical man, concerned how comparatively few lives he had had to sacrifice in the long march from Australia to the deck of the battleship *Missouri* and the Japanese surrender.

He was prouder of the men he had saved than of any other of his multitudinous accomplishments.

He must have spent many a sleepless night in Tokyo, thinking of how this country and the other nations of the United Nations had him and his troops handcuffed. No wonder he lost patience with his superiors who refused to allow him to fight the Chinese Reds on their own grounds, and forced him to allow the murderers of American soldiers to pull behind a line and regird for another blow at his dead-game but weary troops.

Name me a military leader worth the name who did not go into battle to win. Name me a commander before General MacArthur who was told in effect by his superiors that a stalemate would be satisfactory, a draw a happy conclusion.

General MacArthur, who saw what was coming in the Far East, started asking for men and materials years ago. To know what he got one only has to recall the pathetic plight of our troops at the start of the Korean war. A handful of gallant men fighting with weapons of the pea-shooter sort.

History will have the last word to say on the stand the Americans made at Pusan, and on the commander who kept them there.

History will have the last word, too, on the general who has served this country without let-up for upward of 50 years, and who has carried a burden for the past 10 years which would have broken a man of less devotion to his country.

Try to recall a leader of World War II who hasn't had a parade in his honor, a book of his heroics published, or who hasn't strutted about showing his medals. You can name only one, General MacArthur. He could have had all these things, I guess, but he felt time was too fleeting, too much was to be done, to take the time for a ticker-tape shower.

While our staunchest ally, England, was doing traffic with the Chinese Reds in Hong Kong, and shipping tons of rubber to Russia, he was being undermined.

CONSIDERATION OF EXECUTIVE NOMINATIONS

Mr. McFARLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator from Washington yield so that the nominations on the Executive Calendar may be considered?

Mr. CAIN. I yield.

Mr. McFARLAND. Mr. President, as in executive session, I move that the Senate proceed to the consideration of the nominations on the Executive Calendar.

The motion was agreed to, and the Senate proceeded to consider nominations on the Executive Calendar.

EXECUTIVE MESSAGE REFERRED

As in executive session,

The VICE PRESIDENT laid before the Senate a message from the President of the United States submitting sundry nominations, which was referred to the Committee on Armed Services.

(For nominations this day received, see the end of Senate proceedings.)

The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there be no reports of committees the clerk will state the nominations on the calendar.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGES

The legislative clerk read the nomination of William Alvah Stewart, of Pennsylvania, to be United States district judge for the western district of Pennsylvania.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. JOHNSON of Texas in the chair). Without objection, the nomination is confirmed.

The legislative clerk read the nomination of William J. Lindberg, of Washington, to be United States district judge for the eastern and western districts of Washington.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the nomination is confirmed.

Mr. CAIN. Mr. President, may I be permitted to say a word about the appointment of Mr. William J. Lindberg, of Seattle, Wash.? The Senator from Washington knows Mr. Lindberg only in a very casual way. In years gone by I have known him to be both a prominent and a distinguished Democrat. I have known him to be an able practicing attorney in the city of Seattle. I have known him as one who served with distinction on the Washington State Liquor Board of several years ago.

Importantly, however, I know Mr. Lindberg rather well through his friends who are friends of mine, and I want to state that his nomination has been generously and strongly supported by many different and excellent kinds of people from my own State of Washington.

I take this occasion, and am most happy to do it, to wish Mr. William Lindberg, as a judge, the very best of good health and good fortune, for his own benefit and that of all the citizens of the State of Washington whom Judge Lindberg will, I know, serve with credit and fairness in the future.

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY

The legislative clerk read the nomination of Donald C. Miller, of Ohio, to be United States attorney for the northern district of Ohio.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the nomination is confirmed.

UNITED STATES MARSHAL

The legislative clerk read the nomination of Frank Barr, of Alaska, to be United States marshal for division No. 4, district of Alaska.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the nomination is confirmed.

Mr. McFARLAND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the President be immediately notified of all nominations confirmed today.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

THE PRESENT OFFENSIVE IN KOREA

Mr. CAIN. Mr. President, on the evening of Wednesday, April 11, the President of the United States stated that a spring offensive by the enemy forces in Korea could be expected. General MacArthur had expressed the same view some weeks before. The press and radio of yesterday and today have described the action which is presently taking place in Korea and all of us are now convinced that some sort of a new and large-scale offensive has been launched by the enemy.

As best we can judge, about a million men are either engaged or are prepared to be engaged in the action in Korea.

This information leads one to understand that America and her allies are engaged in the largest and bloodiest and most costly undeclared war in the history of mankind. The evidence proves to the satisfaction of every American individual who is capable of thought, that America is at war with a powerful and determined enemy. I take for granted that America, through those in authority in the executive and legislative branches of our Government, is working on the details of some plan which is designed to win the war and to return Korea to the Koreans.

General MacArthur is no longer the Supreme Commander of our forces and the allied forces in Korea. We must, therefore, look to others for advice and information concerning what is taking place in Korea these days.

I am interested in what Lt. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer, commander of the United States Air Forces in the Far East since 1949, said in a recent inter-

view with the United States News and World Report. I am concerned with what he said because the ground offensive which the enemy launched several days ago was not supported by any air strength.

General Stratemeyer stated:

We are almost certain that the Reds are building up their air power in Manchuria and northern China.

The general urged us to think some more when he stated:

You can't stop a determined air offensive unless you can get at the facility from which it originates. As you know, going north of the Yalu River is not permissible, and as a consequence our stopping of air attacks can't be airtight. He can hit me where I am based, but I can't hit him. However, I am going to hit him in North Korea—any place I can find him on the ground, and I am going to hit any facility that he can use; that is, in North Korea.

The magazine correspondent suggested that an effective air offensive by the enemy would constitute the greatest threat that the United Nations Army faces in North Korea. General Stratemeyer replied, "I agree with you 100 percent."

Every Member of this body ought to keep in front of him the knowledge that those now in military authority in Korea or those who have been in military authority over there all say precisely the same thing.

Mr. President, General MacArthur recently was relieved from his command for having raised some questions, one of which General Stratemeyer pointed up the other day. Both these men have only pointed out that the allied forces cannot effectively protect themselves against an enemy who is not molested in his rear areas by the allied fighting forces.

The current enemy offensive is being waged along a 100-mile front which is situated along and on both sides of the thirty-eighth parallel. The latest Associated Press dispatch states that about 700,000 North Koreans and Red Chinese are committed on the line or are in support of the front.

Mr. President, I should say that I have not read the afternoon newspapers, and perhaps they will disclose that either more of the enemy forces have been committed or that at long last the enemy has taken advantage of what has been his opportunity, tactically, for quite some time, and has launched his air strength upon us. Like every other American, as soon as I can do so, I shall get the afternoon newspapers, to find out what is happening so rapidly in Korea.

Mr. President, those who know anything of war can appreciate the logistics problem which is involved in providing the enemy with food, ammunition, and transport. The Thirty-eighth parallel is approximately 175 to 260 miles from the enemy's supply bases north of the Yalu River. There is reason to believe that the enemy could not supply and transport and keep 700,000 men in the field and around the Thirty-eighth parallel unless the enemy was permitted to maintain a secure and unmolested supply and communications system north of the

Yalu River—as the enemy has been permitted to do for 10 full months. The Korean conflict began 10 months ago tomorrow. In this period, the free forces have not attempted to deny any supply build-up to the enemy north of the Yalu River. Perhaps the day will come, and perhaps shortly, when the free forces must attack and destroy the enemy's ability to supply and provision his forces in the field if the allied forces—Americans and their allied friends—are not just to avoid defeat, but are to survive.

It is only proper and reasonable for me to state that some 700,000 men are engaged or are available to be engaged in battle with several hundred thousand troops of the allied forces on and about the thirty-eighth parallel because the allied forces have not made even one attempt to destroy the bases of our enemy.

The press has stated that some eighteen to twenty thousand of the enemy have been destroyed in the first 2 days of this week. There has been no mention of any allied casualties. The rule of thumb which seems generally to be employed by those who publicly discuss casualty rates is that 10 of the enemy lose their lives for every allied soldier who is killed. It will be some time before we learn officially if the usual ratio was an actual fact during the first 2 days of this week.

This brief statement has been offered to the Senate today, Mr. President, because those whom I represent want every bit of information they can get—and this includes General Stratemeyer's most recent advice—and because in speaking publicly, I have my mind and conscience on the war in Korea. Every one of us must continue to think and talk daily about the war if we intend to find a satisfactory answer for its bloodshed, misery, and destruction.

In conclusion, Mr. President, I wish to make this observation: I sense a growing impatience among my colleagues because Gen. Douglas MacArthur has not already testified before the appropriate committees of the Senate. The latest information I have is that General MacArthur will appear before those committees sometime next week. I would urge my colleagues to be patient. I would urge them not to question the general's delay in coming to us. I would remind them that those who are impatient now, and perhaps frightened, took but little interest—and some of them took no interest—in bringing General MacArthur before the Congress and the American people in months gone by. When the general gives his testimony, it will be exceedingly important and helpful to the Nation and to the congressional committees. Had this testimony been available to us weeks ago, when the raging current enemy offensive was merely in the build-up stage, it would have been even more important, and in support of it we might have had a better chance to stop or hinder the offensive before it was launched. That offensive probably has resulted in the death of several hundred Americans just this afternoon.

After keeping General MacArthur waiting for months and months, it would not be proper for us to be impatient

should General MacArthur keep us waiting a few days more.

Mr. President, on the 15th of March I made the following statement to the Senate—and I said it only because it made good, solid, common sense:

I would urge the President of the United States, our Commander in Chief, to bring Douglas MacArthur back to us so that we might have a better idea of how to help, so that we might have a better chance to understand where we are going, and so that we might together agree on a course of action which will achieve our objectives.

Gen. Douglas MacArthur will join with us—those of us in the Senate and those who are not in the Senate—in due time. An unanticipated blessing which has resulted from the sudden and unexpected change in command in Korea is that the advice and experience of General MacArthur are shortly to be made available to America. I shall be as interested as any man alive in what General MacArthur will tell those of us who are in the Senate; but I shall not press him to come to testify before the Congress before he is ready to do so, for I have no right to make such a request. Until he comes to us in the Congress, we can take it for granted that he is moving about among Americans who have a right to his company and who for a long time have been anxiously waiting to listen to, and to shake the hand of Gen. Douglas MacArthur.

PEACE PROGRAMS

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, I shall have consideration for the Chair, and, incidentally, consideration for myself, by speaking for only a few minutes at this time, for the RECORD. I wish to make for the RECORD a few comments which I was not able to make earlier in the day.

Early today I spoke at some length. After speaking and carrying on a running debate for perhaps an hour or an hour and a half, I had to leave the floor because I had some official business to attend to, including the discharge of some very important duties as chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

Before I returned to the floor, I was advised—in fact, that is why I have returned—that the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. McCARTHY] said that the point 4 program had been devised by one Earl Browder, and that the Senator from Wisconsin cited as his authority Mr. Henry Hazlitt, the economist who writes articles under the heading "Business tides," in Newsweek magazine, I believe, and who was a spokesman for the reactionary interests in the United States.

Mr. President, I do not know what Earl Browder said. If he endorsed the point 4 program, perhaps that is why he was kicked out as head of the Communist Party in America, because when the point 4 program was advanced by the President of the United States, it was denounced by the Soviet Union as being an imperialistic program. Until today on this floor, although beginning in February 1950, I had advanced my own program for peace, not a single word of criticism, except constructive criticism, has come from Senators in connection with

the implementation of that plan. But now, today, we have criticism from the Senator from Wisconsin, despite the fact that my proposals were endorsed on the floor by the junior Senator from California [Mr. NIXON], who has been a member of the House of Representatives Committee on Un-American Activities. So under the peculiar doctrine indulged in by the Senator from Wisconsin—who, incidentally, has never been denounced or criticized by the gentlemen of the Kremlin or by their mouthpieces, so far as I have noted—in conformity with his peculiar procedures, it would now seem appropriate that the junior Senator from California also be investigated.

Mr. CAIN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. McMAHON. I decline to yield. Last Saturday night I listened to a debate participated in by the Senator from Ohio, who is commonly called Mr. Republican. In the course of the debate he was asked the question, "Senator, what proposals have you to take the initiative against communism in the world?" I regret that I am unable to quote the answer. I have sent for a transcript of the debate, because I want to put that question and the answer in the RECORD. The Senator from Ohio, Mr. Republican, had no ideas on that question.

Mr. CAIN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McMAHON. I decline to yield. I regret, Mr. President, that the speech I made today caused some uneasiness and unrest on the Republican side of the aisle. I believe that they are beginning to realize that the adoption of General MacArthur's program will stamp their party as a party which is willing to take action which may well lead to world war III. That is why they were rising on the floor of the Senate today. I intend to read the RECORD, to examine what was said, and I intend to be here, day after day, to take part in this debate. I now yield to the Senator from Washington.

Mr. CAIN. I think it is very gracious of the Senator from Connecticut to yield to the Senator from Washington. I was here most of the afternoon, and, although this probably is not important, it is what I think the RECORD will show that the Senator from Connecticut said, in part, when he was speaking earlier today. A Senator on this side, as I recall, asked the Senator from Connecticut to yield. He replied, "No; I would prefer not to yield, for I want an uninterrupted statement to appear in the RECORD, but as soon as that has been accomplished, I shall never ask that we adjourn, for I shall be delighted to stay here for the remainder of the day to answer questions." Immediately after the Senator from Connecticut had concluded, the Senator from California rose to ask a question. The Senator from Connecticut said, "Please, Senator, make it brief, because I had a light breakfast and have had no lunch, and I want to get on with my personal business." Therefore, I think it is proper that the Senator should now make himself available for questions, and, if he will permit—

Mr. McMAHON. Mr. President, I demand the regular order. If the Senator has a question, let him ask it.

Mr. CAIN. The question is this: Because the Senator from Connecticut has brought into this discussion the names of other Senators, I wonder whether he will yield, in order that we may have a quorum call, as a result of which Senators who have been referred to by the Senator from Connecticut will have an opportunity to be present and to speak for themselves, in the event that they, as I, take exception to what the Senator from Connecticut has just said.

Mr. McMAHON. I do not know what the Senator is taking exception to, but I cannot stop him from suggesting the absence of a quorum, as soon as I take my seat. I think that if the Senator wants to go through with it, there is no option on my part but to yield to him for that purpose. I would call his attention to the fact that it is 15 minutes to 7 o'clock. We have tomorrow in which to continue this debate, and I shall be here, let me say to the Senator. I want the RECORD to show the comment of the Senator from Connecticut upon the comment of the Senator from Wisconsin. We can continue it. The Senate is a continuing body. I shall be here, God willing, I may say to the Senator. Now, if the Senator wants to go through with the quorum call, in the face of that, he is perfectly at liberty to do so.

Mr. CAIN. The Senator from Washington thinks that what the Senator from Connecticut has just said is reasonable. The Senator from Connecticut has said that he expects to be on the floor in the early part of tomorrow, and that, if those Senators, not now present, to whom the Senator has recently referred, take exception to any of his comments, those Senators are now on notice that the Senator from Connecticut will be available.

Mr. McMAHON. Exactly. I may say to the Senator from Washington, the record will never disclose that the Senator from Connecticut ever ran away from a fight of any kind or character.

Mr. CAIN. I think that is probably so. The Senator is merely sometimes in a hurry.

Mr. McMAHON. Yes; I was in a hurry after speaking for nearly 2 hours, because I received a notice that there was certain atomic business which needed to be attended to immediately, and I went to take care of it. I have now returned, and the Senate is still in session. It is no more my fault that Senators are not present than it was their fault that I was not present when I was attending business of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. But I shall be here tomorrow. Does that satisfy the Senator from Washington?

Mr. CAIN. That is eminently satisfactory, and the Senator from Washington will enjoy the opportunity to bring together the Senator from Connecticut and those to whom he has made reference.

RECESS

Mr. McMAHON. I move that the Senate take a recess until 12 o'clock noon tomorrow.

The motion was agreed to; and (at 6 o'clock and 46 minutes p. m.) the Senate took a recess until tomorrow, Wednesday, April 25, 1951, at 12 o'clock meridian.

NOMINATIONS

Executive nominations received by the Senate April 24 (legislative day of April 17), 1951:

IN THE MARINE CORPS

The following-named officers of the Marine Corps for permanent appointment to the grade of colonel:

James L. Beam	John P. Condon
Joslyn R. Bailey	Ralph K. Rottet
Ethridge C. Best	Victor H. Krulak
Donald W. Fuller	George C. Tharin, Jr.
William M. Hudson	Harold O. Deakin
Edward L. Hutchinson	Samuel R. Shaw
Reynolds H. Hayden	Henry W. Buse, Jr.
Clyde R. Nelson	Robert E. Hommel
Joseph L. Dickey	Frank C. Tharin
Elmore W. Seeds	Harry W. G. Vadnais
Alexander G. Bunker	John W. Sapp, Jr.
Jack R. Cram	Lawrence B. Clark
Henry C. Lane	George N. Carroll
Hamilton D. South	Clyde T. Mattison
Robert G. Ballance	

The following-named officers of the Marine Corps for permanent appointment to the grade of lieutenant colonel:

Russell D. Rupp	Hensley Williams
Eugene H. Strayhorn	Robert L. Schreier
James "N" "M" Davis	Arthur E. Holdt
John R. Bohnet	Nat M. Pace
John A. Copeland	Claude H. Welch
John L. O'Connell	Vance H. Hudgins
Richard L. Boll	Wilson E. Hunt
Robert D. Kennedy	Earl J. Rowe
Elbert S. Maloney, Jr.	Manual Brilliant
Andrew I. Lyman	Alexander W. Gentleman
Finley T. Clarke, Jr.	William M. Miller
Robert L. Smith	Charles E. McLean, Jr.
Clifton M. Craig, Jr.	Roland J. Spritzen
Alfred L. Owens	Edward S. Dzura
Charles J. Bailey, Jr.	Francis F. Parry
Gordon R. Lockard	William P. Pala
Robert R. Davis	Hubert C. Lattimer
Joe B. Russell	John H. Ellis
Richard S. Johnson	Raymond D. Wright
Nathan C. Kingsbury	Wilbert T. Shafer
Max R. Read	Robert J. J. Picardi
William A. Houston, Jr.	Charles H. Brush, Jr.
Homer W. Sharpenberg	William P. Alston
Thomas J. Cross	Allan L. Feldmeier
Henry M. Wellman, Jr.	Clyde A. Brooks
William G. Tinsley	Arthur C. Lowell
Louis E. Hudgins, Jr.	James M. Johnson
John D. Wiggins	Harry T. Marshall, Jr.
Herman Hansen, Jr.	Donald P. Kennedy
Elmer G. Glidden, Jr.	Regan Fuller
William C. Chamber-Noel	Andrews M. Wilkinson
James M. Watkins, Jr.	Frederick S. Aldridge
James A. Donovan, Jr.	Harold R. Thorpe
Robert C. Walker	John C. Gordon, Jr.
Harold K. Thronson	Robert W. Greeley
Jack A. Witherspoon	
Donald B. Hubbard	
Michael P. Ryan	
Gordon H. West	
Harvey A. Feehan	
Bruce Prosser	
Douglas B. Lenardson	
Harry B. Hooper, Jr.	
Robert W. Greeley	

The following-named officers of the Marine Corps for permanent appointment to the grade of lieutenant colonel, subject to qualification therefor as provided by law:

Loren D. Everton
Armond H. Delallo
William T. Herring

The following-named officers of the Marine Corps for permanent appointment to the grade of major:

David W. Thomson	Howard Dunlap
Harry V. Leasure	Clifford A. Fairbairn
David W. McFarland	Earl W. Dunsmoor
John J. Jarvis, Jr.	Joseph H. Madey
Robert B. Prescott	Alan M. Stewart
John T. Quinn	William A. Oberhoff
Maynard W. Schmidt	Henry L. Knopes
Carl E. Walker	Nicholas P. Lengyel
John L. Tobin	Dewey D. Raynor
Michael Mosteller	Felix T. P. Michaelis
Charles C. Henderson	Wilson D. Hagler
Frank E. Sullivan	Laurence A. Duensing
Robert E. Baldwin	John C. McClelland, Jr.
Paul C. Trammell	William O. Adams
Horace W. Card, Jr.	Bert A. Green
Charles S. Rumbold	

The following-named officers of the Marine Corps for permanent appointment to the grade of major, subject to qualification therefor as provided by law:

Leland M. Swindler	Raymond L. Abel
Henry M. Turner	John R. Stevens
Robert W. Wilson	Frederick W. Barnes
Norman D. Glenn	William Geftman
Henry A. McCartney	Robert W. Lever
Lynn "N" Kelso	Edson W. Card
Clyde H. Davis, Jr.	John A. Bowler
Richard E. French	Clarence L. Zeiger, Jr.
Donald M. Peterson	James Antink
Thomas J. Matthews	Warren H. Simpson
Stanley V. Titterud	Lawrence R. Cloern
Ingram R. Rader	Mackubin T. Owens
William "J" Bedford	Harry "E" Dickinson
George E. Farrell	William J. Kohler
Edmond P. Hartsock	Earl F. Stanley
Howard J. Finn	Donald G. Saunders
William A. Weir	Robert J. Polson
Frank H. Simonds	James A. Appfel, Jr.
Charles R. Metzelaars	James E. Garner
Wilfrid F. Rylander	James R. Stockman
Winfred A. Reid	Carlton E. Betterton
Reinhardt Leu	William J. Sullivan
John F. Bolt, Jr.	Orlando S. Tosdal
John B. Piper	Donald T. Olson
Eugene S. Roane, Jr.	Floyd C. Haxton
Richard B. Elliott	Richard W. Johnson
Grover R. Betzer	George Major
Robert T. Moore, Jr.	James H. Foster
Cary J. Flythe	Franklin C. Thomas, Jr.
John F. Paul	Thomas R. Merritt
William L. Eubank	Richard B. Cropley
Lawrence F. Snoddy, Jr.	George W. Kaseman
Carl T. McLean	Philip H. McArdle
David H. Simmons	Charles S. Robertson
Hildeburn R. Martin	Robert H. Venn
William R. Bennett	James C. Fetter
Hartwell V. Scarborough, Jr.	William E. Lunn
Marshall R. Tutton	Richard H. Mickle
Wiley E. Haverty	John R. Grove
Samuel A. Hannah	Warren F. Lloyd
David E. Wiley	Orville L. Bibb
Andrew M. Zimmer	Howland G. Taft
Alario W. Valentin	Andrew J. Voyles

The following-named officers of the Marine Corps for permanent appointment to the grade of major for limited duty, subject to qualification therefor as provided by law:

George Jones	Joseph R. Foster
Frank G. Paul	Thomas W. McNeely
William A. Searight	Joseph J. Reardon
Richard P. Brezinski	James W. Eldridge
Milligan G. Hereford	Cletus K. Gibson
Theodore R. Cathey	

The following-named officers of the Marine Corps for temporary appointment to the grade of major, subject to qualification therefor as provided by law:

John H. Griffin	George B. McManus
Ernest Bealer	Thomas W. Hyland
Arthur H. Lilly	Robert A. McKeown
John F. Russell	William H. Kapanke
Ralph Martin	Francis L. White
Ollie B. Dawdy	Joe A. Inglish
Robert Colsky	William G. Reeves

James M. Rogers	Fred A. Steele
Albert L. Jensen	Eugene M. Gordeney
Charles T. Lamb	Christopher M. Spurlock
Don E. Linn	James J. Bott
Alfred Skowronek	Louis P. Penney
John C. Duncan	Tillman E. Bishop
John S. Durant	Gilbert N. Powell
Perez W. Pottgether	Elmer L. Starr
Milton B. Rogers	George W. Doney
Porter W. Stark	Andrew J. Strohmen
Patrick H. Thompson	Fletcher R. Wycoff
Charles S. Cummings	Dudley F. McGeehan
Thurman E. Barrier	Hubert J. Hamlin
Lloyd F. Barker	Haldon E. Lindfelt
Rayburn B. Harper	Donald L. Herrick
Edward P. Faulkner	Milton A. Hull
James S. Ammons	Julian Wilcox
Russell S. Kelley	Vernon D. Boyd
Thomas E. Stirewalt	Robert A. Thompson
Maurice C. Pulliam	James K. Linnan
Ira N. Hayes	James C. Norris, Jr.
Walter W. Alford	Ross T. Dwyer, Jr.
Harold J. Thomas	James F. McInteer, Jr.
Eugene Anderson	Samuel Jaskilka
John M. Peterson	John A. Lindsay
Peter J. Wilgus	Franklin L. Smith
Edward F. Taylor	Robert M. Jenkins
Tony Stepanuk	David H. Lewis
Richard M. Stutts	Alido S. Codispoti
James N. Gaut	Paul M. Moriarty
Elbert H. Arndt	Kenneth J. Houghton
Robert Hill	Raymond F. Garraty, Jr.
Herman L. Bailey	Roy I. Wood, Jr.
Charles E. Gardner	Albert B. Atkinson
Wilbur P. Gorsuch	John R. Fields
Vinson A. McNeill	Justin B. Johnson, Jr.
Sloan M. Diaz	Charles D. Garber
Arthur C. Davison, Jr.	"K" "K" Bigelow
Philip W. Sullivan	Warren P. Nichols
Charles E. Yale	Charles E. Call
Richard J. Britten	Patrick Harrison
William G. Leeman	Edward C. Kicklighter
Marcie O. Lindquist	James K. Young
Cecil T. Carraway	Robert A. Morehead
Tracy P. Mizelle	Wendell O. Livesay
George J. Hanft	Stanley N. McLeod
Hans O. Rasmussen	Albert J. Sinuc
Augustus J. Eden	George R. Burke
George E. Allison	Russell Hamlet
John R. Blackett	Raymond L. Valente
John L. Neel	Wesley C. Noren
Stephen K. Pawloski	Lawrence L. Graham
Russell C. White	Donald D. Pomerleau
James E. Lovin, Jr.	Henry W. Stankus
Burt A. Lewis, Jr.	Richard C. Kuhn
Charles W. Boggs, Jr.	Hudson G. Birmingham
Richard F. DeLamar	Glenn E. Ferguson

John B. Bristow	William D. Porter
Martin J. Sexton	Ralph E. June
Coburn Marston	Armand G. Daddazio
Frederick J. Cramer	Lawrence H. Bosshard
William L. Sims	George K. Reid
Ellsworth T. Nobles	Carl L. Sitter
John A. Creamer	Richard E. Roach
Daniel M. Manfull	George C. Westover
Lelon L. Patrow	Keigler E. Flake
Alex H. Sawyer	Richard S. Hooker
George K. Parker	Ralph L. Widner
Richard J. Buckley	Homer S. Coppedge
James P. O'Laughlin	William L. M. Townsend
Robert J. Fairfield	Albert H. Wunderly
Philip N. Pierce	Franklin Carrick
Bernard G. Thobe	Eugene E. Greening
Richard R. Bucher	Laurence A. Ballinger
Augustine B. Reynolds, Jr.	Paul J. Von Tersch
Thomas B. Lenhart	Herman A. Brazke
David Foss, Jr.	Alexis A. Jedenoff
Robert G. Willard	Arnold C. Hofstetter
Charles M. Cable	Edward C. Nelson, Jr.
Clifford J. Robichaud, Jr.	Joseph W. Utz
Harold E. Nelson	Francis J. Rooney
Jake B. Hill	William E. Hemingway
Remmel H. Dudley	Walter R. Miller
James F. Mitchell, Jr.	James C. Musgrove
Albert Wood	Oscar J. Meyer
Clarence F. Zingheim	
Donald L. Mallory	
Thomas J. Branighan	

Russell Piel
Eugene H. Odom
William H. Kay
James N. Hamil
Henry R. Heath
Richard R. Frichette
Edward W. Gallagher
William K. Rudolph
Joseph O. Weist
George Cole
William F. Codner
Louis A. Cortright
Joseph Gordon
Marvin D. Grush
Wilbert F. Morris
Elmer R. Wirta
Roy H. Bley
Cyril D. Jeffcoat
Marion J. Griffin
Herman H. Jones
Walter Smulski
Gerald E. Goss
John H. McGuire
Paul F. McLeilian
Roy H. Roark
David L. Forde
Albert J. Gunther
Joseph A. Petrosky, Jr.
Aaron M. Rottenberg
Thomas B. Wood
Louis H. Steman
Alfred T. Moret, Jr.
Homer L. Daniel
Paul A. Lemarie, Jr.
"H" Leverett Jacobi
William H. Irvin, Jr.
Richard Morton
Harold P. Williamson
Anthony R. Epplin
Tom S. Parker
Maurice E. Flynn
Paul L. Allen
John D. McLaughlin
George J. Kovich, Jr.
Richard M. Remington
Russell S. LaPointe
Hector G. Risigari-Gai,
Jr.
John J. O'Donnell
Michael D. Benda
Bernard M. Boreas
Richard M. Hunt
Robert B. Jeter
Raymond H. Spuhler
George S. Walz
Warren A. Leitner
Lawrence E. Kindred
Junius M. Lowder, Jr.
John F. Mentzer
David W. Schumaker
George E. Jerue
Thomas A. Manion
Don W. Galbreath
Edward E. Hammer-
beck
Mitchell O. Sadler
Raymond J. Fening
Ephraim Kirby-Smith
Paul R. Nugent
John LeMay, Jr.
Thurman L. Perkins
Murray M. Staples
Corbin L. West
Richard C. Peck
Richard F. Dyer
Joseph R. Motelewski
Francis I. Fenton, Jr.
Neil M. Hansen
John V. Huff
Joseph C. Fegan, Jr.
John D. Curd
Julius F. Koetsch
Neely D. Butler, Jr.
Robert "T" Foxworth
Theodore R. Boutwell
Emmett O. Anglin, Jr.
William I. Taylor
Edwin J. Hernan, Jr.
Earle P. Carey

Robert D. Morris
Robert E. Brant
Emmett R. Hiller
Leo B. Shinn
Frederick C. Dodson
Nicholas L. Shields
Werner J. VanBuren
Russell E. Corey
John M. Scarborough
Edward R. Messer
Louis L. Ball
David W. Banks
Richard C. Smith
Edward H. Pesely
Nels E. Anderson
William O. Cain, Jr.
Richard L. Moore
Leslie E. Brown
Jay W. Hubbard
William F. Lane
Wilbur J. Buss
Richard C. Bryson
John M. Barclay
Bruce F. Williams
Walter E. Stuenkel
Charles J. Dyer
William J. Zaro
Rufus B. Thompson,
Jr.
William M. Graham,
Jr.
William P. Nesbit
Roland H. Makowski
Edward H. Greason
James P. Young, Jr.
William H. Clark
Harry L. Givens, Jr.
George E. Zawasky
Frank R. Berran
Frederick W. Baker, Jr.
Charles H. Greene, Jr.
Edward L. Fossum
Gale B. Gibson
Claude R. LaPlant
Richard A. Brenneman
Gilbert D. Bradley
William K. White
Joseph E. LoPrete
Ralph H. Pratt
William P. Vaughan
Benson A. Bowditch
Albert S. Dooley, Jr.
Clyde S. Stewart
Wesley W. Hazlett
Wiley A. Green
Anthony R. Nollet
Marion C. Dalby
Floyd G. Phillips
Harold L. Honnold, Jr.
John E. Cosgriff
Walter A. Petersen
Theodore J. Horner
Charles "E" Cornwell
Robert M. Ervin
Dennis D. Nicholson,
Jr.
Richard N. Aufmann
Peter J. Mulrone
Paul C. Scofield
Francis P. Wilson
Eric R. Haars
Charles E. Walker
Thomas N. Greene
Jack R. Jones
Maximillian N. Brink-
man
Jack M. Daly
Albert L. Williams
Quentin V. Earl
John J. Meek
Leslie F. Fultz
Benjamin G. Lee
Douglas K. Morton
Clyde W. Shealy
Lloyd L. Willis
Gordon Matthew
James R. Turner
Clovis M. Jones
Herbert E. Ing, Jr.

Jerome D. Gordon
Eugene L. Hamon
Thurston B. Stidham
William D. Heier
Phillip C. DeLong
Edwin A. Harper
Robert A. Strieby
Lionel D. Hastings
Zigmund J. Radolinski
William G. MacLean,
Jr.
Ralph H. Lewis
Summerfield M. Tay-
lor, Jr.
Frederick "E" Hughes
John F. Coffey
George E. Kittredge,
Jr.
William F. Fry
John Mesko
Ray H. Bishop
Anthony J. Castagna
James R. Elnum
Gerald P. Averill
Alfred V. Soupios
Russell E. McCreery
William T. Miller
Max D. Smith, Jr.
Arthur L. Sherbondy
Ernest C. Bennett
Eugene H. Haffey
James H. Pope
Lowell T. Keagy
Robert L. Autry
Charles E. Westbrook
Robert R. Sedgwick
Vernon W. Shapiro
Francis A. McMullen
Dale D. Meyers
Rex Z. Michael, Jr.
Kermit H. Shelly
Frank J. Sheppard
Gerard Dethier
Donald J. Gehri
Wesley H. Rodenberger
James J. Larkin
Paul J. Blasko
Joel E. Bonner, Jr.
Robert H. Nuess
William A. Lamont
William L. Phillips
Edwin G. Nelson
Edward L. Barker
Harold G. Schrier
Nathan R. Smith
Harold G. Todd
David M. Johnston
Charles Schultz, Jr.
Virgil D. Olson
Godfrey H. Reed
Raymond E. Knapp,
Jr.
Robert H. Mitchell
Thomas C. Hurst
Michael T. Savino
Lee F. Bennett
Thomas Parran, Jr.
Dwain L. Lengel
Ray B. Wall
Marshall Salvaggio
Robert C. Hilliard
Harold R. Gingham
Ben E. Baker
Oscar B. Johnston
Hubard D. Kuokka
Rofe F. Blanchard
Paul "A" Noel, Jr.
David D. Rickabaugh
Sandy J. DeJohn
Walter F. Jacobs, Jr.
Robert W. Kersey
Henry G. Maeger
Grover C. McClure, Jr.
James E. Warren, Jr.
Marion B. Bowers
John J. Tooley
Edward L. Schnettler

Ovis D. Hunter
William T. O'Neal
John Skorich
Robert M. Butler
Herbert R. Merrick, Jr.
Harry D. Wortman
Everet A. Hedahl
James E. Stauffer
John A. MacNeill
Howard M. Humphrey
Samuel "I" McElhoes,
Jr.
James M. Burris
Clark D. Morrow
William T. Porter
Clarence L. Morrison
Don H. Fisher
James G. G. Taylor
David A. Brewster, Sr.
Harold S. Hill
Ward J. Lytle
Lloyd S. Penn
Bruce J. Matheson
Edwin H. McCaleb III
Alan D. Smith
James M. Walley
John H. Scherer
Albert E. James
Francis P. Rotter
Frank P. Tatum, Jr.
Norman C. Smyle
Paul Fuss
Robert L. Toombs, Jr.
Gerald M. English
James A. P. Binfield
Mauro J. Padalino
Wallace M. Halbert
Hardy E. Foster
Walter Moore
John L. Kelly
John H. Paetow
Robert A. Mills
Emil J. Radics
Edward F. Ganschow
Howard T. Pittman
Haakon B. Rasmussen
Wilbur D. Wilcox
Horace C. Reifel
George W. King
Dean N. McDowell
James D. Jordan
Frank C. Kleager
Dermott H. MacDon-
nell
Edward Cook
Harold N. Mehaffey
George O. Ross
James W. McCall, Jr.
John B. Slingerland
Clarence B. Beasley
Thomas W. Pearson
Fred C. McDaniel, Jr.
Edgar L. Smith
LeRoy T. Frey
James A. Sawyer
Kenneth B. Nelson
William S. Witt
Eugene H. Winchester
Stanley F. Legan
Edwin O. Reed
Jack R. Sloan
Thomas J. Saxon, Jr.
Roy J. Irwin
William R. Rozier
John E. Palmer
Neal "A" Boortz
Elmer W. Rothen-
burger
Mark Jones
Robert R. Pcebles
Lesley V. Strandtman
William B. Holt
John Stepanovich
George C. Schmidt, Jr.
Nicholas Zabitchuck

The following-named officers of the Ma-
rine Corps for temporary appointment to the

grade of major for limited duty, subject to
qualification therefor as provided by law:

Hubert G. Bozarth	Frank C. Sheppard
Paul R. Paquin	William B. Richards
Howard C. Frazer	Robert A. Smith
Ronald J. Nourse	Raymond L. Luckel
Ben Sutts	Harvey W. Gagner
Howard H. Parker	Francis L. Churchville
Harold M. Tupper	Leonard I. Beatty
Frank J. Cermak	James K. Harris

The following-named officers of the Marine
Corps for permanent appointment to the
grade of captain:

Raymond M. Smith	Samuel E. Helm, Jr.
Oliver R. Davis	Marvin L. Berg
Nolan A. Green	Joseph T. Murphy
John P. Kelley	Harvey C. Hinkel
John T. Moore	Emidio Briganti
James P. Bell, Jr.	John McCabe
William Shanks, Jr.	Walter J. Klimek
Dean W. Lindley	Charles R. Leutz, Jr.
James W. Nelson	Allen R. Semb
George J. King	John F. Sutkus
William M. Russ	Wayne E. Wolcott
Willmar M. Bledsoe	Kenneth T. Dykes
Laurence "H." Woods	"W." "C." Hall
Richard H. Kern	Roy J. Leite, Jr.
Norris D. Allen	Samuel G. Beal
Hardy V. Huffstutter,	John S. Bostwick
Jr.	Edgar P. Holt
William C. McGraw,	Edward M. Fleming
Jr.	Alfred F. McCaleb, Jr.
Dee E. Ezell	Walter C. Stewart, Jr.
Floyd K. Fulton, Jr.	Ernest W. Payne
Edward P. Stamford	Robert W. Allen
James S. Ashman	Bennett W. Alford
Charles J. O'Malley	Paul A. Schmuck, Jr.
Kenneth A. Anderson	John H. Thomas
Lewis L. Miller	Goodwin C. Groff
Clayton R. Ingraham,	James W. Bateman
Jr.	William R. Gould
Jack J. Howlett II	Norman C. Wiley
Robert M. Fraser, Jr.	Arthur O. Schmagel
Rex C. Denny, Jr.	Leroy A. Seipo
Arthur E. Phillips	John W. Sullivan
Clyde R. Jarrett	Richard A. Winters, Jr.
John J. Hilburn, Jr.	Charles H. Coppedge
Rockwell M. Rutledge	Samuel J. Griffin
Eugene V. Goldston	Robert F. Marr
John J. Filipo	Edward D. Smith
Frederic T. Watts, Jr.	Harrel K. Jobe
Norman W. Flinn, Jr.	Robert W. Shirley
Robert R. Klingman	Edwin Pendrey
William J. Nichols, Jr.	George S. Mansfield
Jack Lee	William J. Halligan
Edward N. Le Falvre	Richard A. Ward
William C. Parker, Jr.	Charles A. Salser
Gordon R. Reier	Albert Fowler
Austin C. Fitzgerald	Stone W. Quillian
William H. Drewitz	Charles F. Ditzney
George H. Smith	Harold W. Hawkins
Joe M. Prater	Grady W. Ray
Harold L. Sharkey	Nicholas J. Dennis
George Bezbezan	Donald E. Francke
Amil K. Clark	Charles H. Gould
Robert G. Williams	Lynn F. Williams
Daniel H. Linebaugh	Howard Ferguson, Jr.
James A. Hoey, Jr.	Harry B. Hanson
Clifford E. McCollam	Kenneth E. Hunting- ton
Robert A. McMullen	Frank K. Reilly, Jr.
Charles J. Dunkley	Roland S. Helstrom
John A. Hughes	George H. Albers
Roger B. Thompson	Norman R. Reichwald
Neil E. Barber	Jesse R. Crone
William H. Beckett	William A. Danckaert
Mercer R. Smith	Elmer Amundson
Donald J. Hallameyer	John W. Johnson
John S. Perrin	Donald Conroy
Philip J. Keleher	Bertram E. Cook, Jr.
Gerald D. Allen	Jerry B. Smith
Gene M. Badgley	Richard C. Andrews
Richard S. Togerson	Bill E. Horner
George E. Petro	George A. Phillips
Samuel F. Martin	Arthur W. Ecklund
John E. Purvis	Lee R. Miller
Ralph M. Head	Edward H. Walker
Gilbert A. Barrett	Paul W. Seabaugh
Darwin B. Pond, Jr.	

George H. Cearley, Jr. Arthur W. Newendorp
Owen G. Jackson, Jr. John M. Jagoda
Elmer J. Zorn Thomas A. Gribbin II
James D. Johnson, Jr. Albert A. Grasselli
John N. Snapper George J. Collins
Wilbur O. Nelson George E. Mouzakis
Philip A. Davis Charles W. Egan
Daniel G. Murray Charles E. Boswell, Jr.
George W. Parker Ralph P. Ward, Jr.
Charles T. Caldwell Robert L. Smith
William P. Brown, Jr. Leland C. Ritter
Frank J. O'Hara, Jr. Merlin L. Dake
Dale L. Ward Charles R. Howe
Russell A. Andres Eugene W. Meyer
John DeCloud John J. Fischer

The following-named officers of the Marine Corps for permanent appointment to the grade of first lieutenant for limited duty, subject to qualification therefor as provided by law:

Judson J. Swallow	Louis J. Caminiti
Thomas F. Ford	James V. Valentour
Michael M. Marks	Maurice S. Wahrer
Estes N. Ratliffe	Frank L. Howard
Daniel M. Blue, Jr.	Norman Rubin
John T. Bates	Thomas J. Shaw
William H. Shuman	William H. Howard
George E. McKain	Leon C. Riley
Richard C. Laubach	Clyde H. Stamms
Robert B. Dowdy	Stevan Iungerich
Homer King	Albert J. Zlamal
Frank Lisi	Edward S. Stallknecht
Raymond L. Amos	Lawrence W. Keenan
George M. Mathis	Everett L. Anderson
John A. Mitchell	Peter P. Yezlerski
Glenn E. McComas	William A. Flander
Hollis W. Glass	Irving F. Buckland
Louis A. Murphy, Jr.	Richard F. Henderson
Allison G. Folsom, Jr.	Robert D. Leach
Albert L. Protz	

The following-named officers of the Marine Corps for permanent appointment to the grade of first lieutenant, subject to qualification therefor as provided by law:

Walter G. Ackerman	William G. Crocker
Nate L. Adams II	James L. Crutchfield
Hugh S. Aitken	Brian J. Cummings
Harry L. Alderman	Bruce F. Cunliffe
Stanley G. Alexander	Raymond C. Damm
Merle W. Allen	Mayhlon L. Degernes, Jr.
Richard T. F. Ambrogio	
Ralph M. Anderson	Simon I. Degulis
Nicholas A. Arkadis	Paul E. Denny
George L. Armitage	Edwin A. Deptula
Milton S. Ashcraft	Robert R. Dickey III
George T. Balzer	Lucius V. diLorenzo
Harvey W. Baron	Richard M. Doezenia
John R. Bigler	Roy M. DuCharm
Howard G. Blank	Edward F. Duncan
Joseph A. Borowski	Raymond S. Eason
Donald R. Brimmer	Rodger I. Eddy
Dale L. Brown	William S. Edler
Douglas L. Brown	Edward T. Emmelman
Travis D. Brown	Loren T. Erickson
Clayton O. Bush	Tyler D. Evans
Arnold F. Bynum	Richard G. Eykyn
John J. H. Cahill	Paul R. Fields
Lewis H. Cameron	Harry A. Florence, Jr.
Richard E. Carey	Jerry D. Fly
George Caridakis	Joseph P. B. Franklin
Robert R. Carson	Clarence W. Friesen
Ray N. Carter	James R. Gallman, Jr.
Dana B. Cashion	Marvin D. Gardner
John N. Christolos	Philip J. Garm
William R. Clifton	Joseph K. Gastrock III
Harold L. Coffman	John J. Gates
Stuart M. Cohen	Tom L. Gibson
Edward E. Collins	Joseph M. Glasgow
Orville D. Cooney	Raymond J. Glodowski
Alan G. Copp	
John D. Counselman	James J. Gorman
Bert R. Covert, Jr.	Edwin W. Hakala
David R. Cowling	Edward C. Hall, Jr.
Richard J. Coyne	Richard N. Hall II
Lamar G. Crawford	Edmund W. Hanlon
Jr.	James E. Hannan

Dean B. Hansen	Charles B. Quinn
James E. Harrell	John A. Reames
Jack M. Hermes	Robert O. Risinger
John J. Hess	Jack W. Robbins
Lawrence W. Hetrick	Patrick C. Roe
Wallace A. Heyer	Raymond E. Roeder, Jr.
Francis R. Hittinger, Jr.	Paul J. G. Roosen
Frederick W. Hopkins	Edwin M. Rudzisz
Lee R. Howard	Alexander S. Ruggiero
Willis T. Howland	Roy K. Russell
Floyd G. Hudson	Victor A. Salvo, Jr.
John W. Hutchinson	Robert P. Scheunemann
John M. Jackson	Harold G. Schmidt, Jr.
Morris N. Jenkins	Richard D. Schneider
Richard M. Johnson	Hugh C. Schryver, Jr.
Donald R. Jones	Kenneth M. Scott
Nicholas Kavakich	Donald W. Sharon
David D. Kelley, Jr.	George E. Shepherd
Charles J. Kelly	Carl F. Shifflette
Joris F. Kenyon	Michael J. Shinka
Ethmer W. King	Emmett B. Sigmon, Jr.
George J. Kleess	Donald D. Sisson
Donald J. Krabbe	Patrick G. Sivert
Roy E. Krieger	Edward E. Smith
William A. Kronberg	Louie J. Smith
Thomas P. Lennon	Robert J. Smith
Frank J. Mackin	Robert N. Smith
Donald E. Marchette	Edward W. Snelling
Billy C. Marks	Robert H. Starek
William H. Marlowe	James W. Stemple
Ronald A. Mason	Gerald H. Stewart
William J. Masterpool	Charles R. Stiles
George E. McAlee	Wesley E. Strauley
"R" Michael McCarthy	Vaughn R. Stuart
Donald V. McCloskey	Ralph E. Sullivan
Mack R. McClure	John J. Swords
Floyd M. McCurdy, Jr.	Harold A. Thomas
Edmund C. McPoland	Carl B. Thompson, Jr.
Arthur R. Mooney	Robert P. Thomson
Ben A. Moore, Jr.	Francis W. Tief
Joseph Mordente	Robert G. Tobin, Jr.
Edward C. Morris	Nicholas M. Trapnell, Jr.
Richard C. Morrow	William F. Trisler
Francis W. Muetzel	Ralph J. Tuley
Joseph E. Muir	Leon N. Utter
Edward S. Murphy	Roy R. Van Cleve
Bud F. Nelson	Andrew T. Watt
Rollie D. Newsom	Joseph R. Wayerski, Jr.
Minard P. Newton, Jr.	Richard P. Wells
Jack L. Nolan	Robert F. Werner
Merrill L. Norton	William W. Westphal
James P. O'Connell	John O. Williams, Jr.
Philip T. O'Hara	Kenneth C. Williams
Keith O'Keefe	Robert M. Winter
Joseph R. Owen	LeRoy K. Wirth
Orlo C. Paciulli, Jr.	Lyle H. Worster
Eugene J. Paradis	William P. Yerger
John M. Patrick	James R. Young
Frank G. Peterson	Henry S. Zdankowski
Laurence M. Phelps, Jr.	Cullen C. Zimmerman
Edwin A. Pollock, Jr.	
Edward C. Post	
Robert J. Post	
Frederick K. Purdum	

CONFIRMATIONS

Executive nominations confirmed by the Senate April 24 (legislative day of April 17), 1951:

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGES

William Alvah Stewart to be United States district judge for the western district of Pennsylvania.
William J. Lindberg to be United States district judge for the eastern and western districts of Washington.

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY

Donald C. Miller to be United States attorney for the northern district of Ohio.

UNITED STATES MARSHAL

Frank Barr to be United States marshal for division No. 4, district of Alaska.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

TUESDAY, APRIL 24, 1951

The House met at 12 o'clock noon.
The Chaplain, Rev. Bernard Braskamp, D. D., offered the following prayer:

Our Heavenly Father, under whose canopy of grace and goodness we dwell and whose love and care overshadow and surround all our days, grant that daily we may meet our duties with greater clarity of insight and a more vigorous loyalty.

We penitently confess that many noble tasks and causes, which need our allegiance and wholehearted support, often languish and fail of achievement because of our listlessness and complacency and our lack of conviction, consecration, and courage.

Forgive us for being at times so cynical and allowing ourselves to feel that we are the victims of a conspiracy, of fearful and fateful circumstances, and that the lofty aspirations, which we cherish, are hopelessly visionary.

Inspire us with that unity of spirit and understanding which recognizes individual differences but which subordinates them to the supreme and common goal of establishing peace on earth and the building of a finer social order in which there will be, among all the members of the human family, a mutual respect for personal and social rights and obligations.

Hear us in Christ's name. Amen.

The Journal of the proceedings of yesterday was read and approved.

MESSAGE FROM THE SENATE

A message from the Senate, by Mr. Carrell, one of its clerks, announced that the Senate had passed without amendment a bill and joint resolution of the House of the following titles:

H. R. 2612. An act to authorize the Board of Commissioners of the District of Columbia to establish daylight saving time in the District; and

H. J. Res. 238. Joint resolution making an emergency appropriation for the fiscal year 1951, and for other purposes.

The message also announced that the Senate had passed a bill of the following title, in which the concurrence of the House is requested:

S. 285. An act relating to the acquisition and disposition of land and interests in land by the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Federal Civil Defense Administration.

The message also announced that the Senate disagrees to the amendments of the House to the concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 12) entitled "Concurrent resolution favoring the suspension of deportation of certain aliens." Ordered that Mr. McCARRAN, Mr. EASTLAND, and Mr. JENNER be the conferees on the part of the Senate.

The message also announced that the Vice President has appointed Mr. JOHNSTON of South Carolina and Mr. LANGER members of the joint select committee on the part of the Senate, as provided

for in the act of August 5, 1939, entitled "An act to provide for the disposition of certain records of the United States Government," for the disposition of executive papers referred to in the report of the Archivist of the United States numbered 51-19.

SPECIAL ORDERS GRANTED

Mrs. ROGERS of Massachusetts asked and was given permission to address the House for 5 minutes today, following the legislative program and any special orders heretofore entered.

Mr. HOFFMAN of Michigan asked and was given permission to address the House for 10 minutes on tomorrow and on Friday next, following the legislative program and any special orders heretofore entered.

PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION

Mr. POTTER. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to extend my remarks at this point in the Record.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Michigan?

There was no objection.

Mr. POTTER. Mr. Speaker, I have today introduced a joint resolution, which proposes an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, in an effort to simplify the procedure for removing a President from office.

The impeachment proceedings for the removal of a President of the United States under our Constitution are cumbersome and impracticable. One man, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, is able to pigeonhole any motion made to impeach the President. This can be done by appointing a special committee which is stacked with administration supporters.

The joint resolution I am introducing simply makes it mandatory, upon the adoption of a resolution by two-thirds vote of both Houses of Congress, that a special election be held to fill the offices of President, Vice President, Members of the Senate, and Members of the House of Representatives. This election shall be held 12 weeks after such a resolution has been adopted. The terms of the incumbent President, Vice President, and Members of Congress shall terminate 14 days after the special election and the newly elected or reelected officials shall serve for the unexpired terms of their predecessors.

The office of the President of the United States carries with it great responsibilities. The decisions made by the President have immediate and future personal effect, not only upon the citizens of the United States, but upon other peoples of the world. A President must possess many attributes. He must be a master politician in order to get elected, but a master politician without the capacity for statesmanship certainly is dangerous to the country he attempts to lead.

We all know that corrupt political machines and well-disciplined pressure groups seeking special services can be controlling factors in nominating and electing a man for President. A person can have served honorably in one public

office but, due to the political pressures brought to bear upon him, be a failure in the office of Chief Executive.

The citizens of the United States should not be forced to accept weak and inadequate leadership for a period of 4 years when it is realized that the man elected does not have the capacity for the job. My resolution would make the office of President more responsive to the will of the people and the Congress and could force the administration to return to the people in an effort to secure a vote of confidence.

If the Constitution were amended in accordance with my resolution, it would apply to the present occupant of the White House.

CALL OF THE HOUSE

Mr. MORANO. Mr. Speaker, I make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

The SPEAKER. Evidently a quorum is not present.

Mr. PRIEST. Mr. Speaker, I move a call of the House.

A call of the House was ordered.

The Clerk called the roll, and the following Members failed to answer to their names:

[Roll No. 34]

Anfuso	Gossett	Morrison
Armstrong	Hall	Multer
Bakewell	Edwin Arthur	Murphy
Bonner	Harden	Powell
Bramblett	Heffernan	Rains
Brehm	Heller	Reece, Tenn.
Brownson	Hinshaw	Rivers
Buchanan	Hollifield	Rogers, Tex.
Burton	Irving	Roosevelt
Byrne, N. Y.	Javits	Sabath
Cannon	Jenison	Sadlak
Celler	Jonas	St. George
Crosser	Jones	Sasser
Dawson	Hamilton C.	Scrivner
Dingell	Kee	Shafer
Dollinger	Kersten, Wis.	Sheehan
Doyle	Kilburn	Shelley
Engle	Klein	Sutton
Fellows	Lanham	Whitaker
Fine	Larcade	Wolcott
Fisher	Lucas	Woodruff
Forand	McKinnon	Yorty
Gillette	Meador	
Gore	Miller, N. Y.	

The SPEAKER. On this roll call 366 Members have answered to their names, a quorum.

By unanimous consent, further proceedings under the call were dispensed with.

CHARTERS OF VESSELS TO CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES

Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent for the immediate consideration of the joint resolution (H. R. 223) to give the Department of Commerce the authority to extend certain charters of vessels to citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, and for other purposes.

The Clerk read the title of the joint resolution.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Connecticut?

There was no objection.

The Clerk read the joint resolution, as follows:

Resolved, etc., That, notwithstanding any other provisions of existing law, the Secretary of Commerce shall have the authority to extend and continue the present charters of vessels to citizens of the Republic of the

Philippines, which charters were made and entered into under the terms of section 306 (a) of the act of April 30, 1946 (Public Law 370, 79th Cong.). Such charters may be extended for such periods of time and under such terms and conditions as the Secretary may, from time to time, determine to be required in the interest of the economy of the Philippines, but any such charter shall contain a provision requiring that the vessel shall be operated only in the interisland commerce in the Philippines. No such vessel shall be continued under charter beyond the completion of the first voyage terminating after April 30, 1954.

With the following committee amendment:

Page 2, line 6, strike out "1954" and insert "1952."

The committee amendment was agreed to.

The joint resolution was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, was read the third time, and passed, and a motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

MEMORIAL SERVICES

Mr. STANLEY. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent for the immediate consideration of House Resolution 205.

The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

Resolved, That on Wednesday, May 16, 1951, immediately after the approval of the Journal, the House shall stand at recess for the purpose of holding the memorial services as arranged by the Committee on House Administration under the provision of clause (1) (j) (2) (C) of rule XI of the Rules of the House of Representatives. The order of exercises and proceedings of the service shall be printed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, and all Members shall have leave for 60 legislative days to extend their remarks in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, on the life, character, and public service of deceased Members. At the conclusion of the proceedings, the Speaker shall call the House to order and then as a further remark of respect to the memories of the deceased he shall declare the House adjourned. The necessary expenses connected with such memorial services shall be paid out of the contingent fund of the House upon vouchers signed by the chairman of the Committee on House Administration and approved by such committee.

The resolution was agreed to.

CALENDAR WEDNESDAY BUSINESS

Mr. McCORMACK. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the business in order on calendar Wednesday of this week be dispensed with.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Massachusetts?

There was no objection.

INTERIOR DEPARTMENT APPROPRIATION BILL, 1952

Mr. KIRWAN. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the bill (H. R. 3790) making appropriations for the Department of the Interior for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1952, and for other purposes.

The motion was agreed to.

Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the bill H. R. 3790, with Mr. MILLS in the chair.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The CHAIRMAN. When the Committee rose on yesterday the Clerk had read the first paragraph of the bill.

If there are no amendments to this paragraph, the Clerk will read.

The Clerk read as follows:

CONSTRUCTION, SOUTHEASTERN POWER ADMINISTRATION

For construction and acquisition of transmission lines, substations, and appurtenant facilities, and for administrative expenses connected therewith, in carrying out the provisions of section 5 of the Flood Control Act of 1944 (16 U. S. C. 825s), as applied to the southeastern power area, \$3,400,000, to remain available until expended.

Mr. GARY. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. GARY: On page 2, strike out lines 7 through 13, inclusive.

Mr. GARY. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for five additional minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Virginia?

There was no objection.

Mr. GARY. Mr. Chairman, the purpose of this amendment is to prevent the useless expenditure of money, materials and manpower, all of which are now greatly needed for the defense effort. The language which the amendment would strike from the bill appropriates \$3,400,000 to the Southeastern Power Administration for the construction of transmission lines to duplicate existing lines now in operation by private power companies. The amount, however, represents only a portion of the entire expenditure. The complete program of the Southeastern Power Administration calls for the expenditure of \$14,500,000 for the construction of duplicating lines.

In one of the supplemental appropriation bills passed last year, \$1,850,000 was requested. The appropriation was questioned in the Appropriations Committee, but no objection was raised on the floor of the House. When, however, the bill reached the Senate, after a careful study, the Senate Appropriations Committee reached the conclusion that the expenditure of the funds was unnecessary and so reported to the Senate which struck the item from the bill. The House insisted upon its restoration in conference. The Senate finally agreed to the appropriation but with the insistence that no portion of the funds be spent until the Southeastern had made every reasonable effort to reach an agreement with existing companies for the distribution of its power—hearings, page 1456.

The major project involved in this proposal is the construction of transmission lines from Buggs Island Dam to Suffolk, Va., and thence to Langley Field. The Virginia Electric & Power Co. has been furnishing Langley Field with electricity for many years. It is ready, willing, and able to continue to furnish all of the power which the Government needs in that entire area. I understand that my very good friend, the distinguished gentleman from Washington State [Mr.

JACKSON] made a statement on the floor yesterday that the Virginia Electric & Power Co. would not agree to furnish Langley Field 24-hour service. That is a grossly misleading statement, but I hasten to say that I am certain that Mr. JACKSON is not responsible for the statement, but is merely repeating what he has been told. The thing that bothers me is that a Government representative would knowingly furnish the gentleman from Washington [Mr. JACKSON] with misinformation of this kind.

The facts are that the National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics plans to construct a supersonic wind tunnel at Langley Field for experimental purposes. This tunnel when in operation will require a capacity load of 150,000 kilowatts. It would obviously affect the distribution of power within the entire area if this amount of power were used during peak-load hours. The NACA realizes this fact and has always used and will continue to use its experimental equipment only during off-peak hours. They have never requested 24-hour service for the use of this experimental equipment and according to competent engineering surveys the Southeastern could not furnish them a 150,000-kilowatt load more than 20 hours per week.

The Southeastern offered NACA a contract to furnish it with a 150,000-kilowatt load from 12 midnight to 6 p. m., and 70,000 kilowatts at other times. The Virginia Electric & Power Co. has offered to furnish it 150,000 kilowatts from midnight to 6 a. m., 100,000 kilowatts from 10 p. m. to midnight, and 70,000 during peak hours. This is more favorable to NACA than the Southeastern offer and is entirely satisfactory to NACA.

Moreover, the Virginia Electric & Power Co. has offered to supply the NACA with all the electricity it needs for identically the same price that the Southeastern proposes to charge them, and in addition it has offered the NACA three alternate proposals, all of which are more favorable to NACA than the Southeastern proposal.

Moreover, the Virginia Electric & Power Co., in order to supply the Southeastern with an outlet for its Buggs Island power has agreed to transmit or, in the language of the industry, wheel that power over its lines. Negotiations have been in progress for some time over a wheeling and firming contract. All of you are no doubt acquainted with the fact that usually hydroelectric power varies with the available water supply and requires supplemental steam power to even or firm the supply.

The first proposal made by the Southeastern to the Virginia Electric & Power Co. was that the Southeastern would construct with public funds the lines to Suffolk, Petersburg, and certain distribution centers and would then pay the Virginia Electric & Power Co. 1 mill per kilowatt-hour for distributing the power from these centers. The Virginia Electric & Power Co. advised the Southeastern that they preferred to use their own transmission lines from the point at which the power is generated. This would save the Government the \$14,500,000 which the Southeastern proposed to

spend for the construction of these lines. The Southeastern finally agreed to this plan, but will not agree to pay the company any more for wheeling the power from Buggs Island to Langley Field, a distance of 146 miles, than it had previously agreed to pay them for wheeling it from Suffolk to Langley Field, a distance of approximately 30 miles.

The Virginia Electric & Power Co. offered to wheel the power from Buggs Island to Langley Field for exactly the same price carried in both the Colorado and Montana contracts which have been approved by the Government and are now in force.

I understand my friend stated yesterday that they made a proposal of 1 to 4 mills for wheeling these services. They made the same proposal that the Government has already agreed to in other contracts, that they would wheel this power for 1 mill for the first 50 miles, 2 mills for the next 50 miles, and 3 mills for the third 50 miles. That has already been approved by the Government.

Those contracts provide for a 1-mill charge in the first 50-mile zone, 2 mills in the second 50-mile zone, and 3 mills in the third 50-mile zone. In an effort to reach a compromise the Virginia Electric & Power Co. further agreed to a reduction to one-half mill in the first 50-mile zone, which is cheaper than the contracts now in force, and when the Department of the Interior insisted on a flat rate, it agreed to a flat rate of 2 mills over the entire operation. This, the company estimates, is approximately the cost of this wheeling. It is cheaper than the Southeastern can wheel the power itself over Government-constructed lines because if you apply the standard carrying charge figure used by the Federal Power Commission on construction of this character of 5.95 percent, which includes 3-percent interest and depreciation, the carrying charges alone are \$860,000 annually on the \$14,500,000, or roughly 2 mills per kilowatt-hour, and this does not include the operation and servicing of the lines.

The Virginia Electric & Power Co. stands ready to wheel the power at the price in effect on any major wheeling and firming Government contract now in effect. Moreover, when the Southeastern refused to accept these generous offers, the Virginia Electric & Power Co. proposed that the question of rates be submitted to the Federal Power Commission, each party agreeing to abiding by the Commission's decision.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Virginia has expired.

Mr. COOLEY. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman may proceed for five additional minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

Mr. GARY. Nothing could be more reasonable than this, since the Federal Power Commission, under section 5 of the Flood Control Act of 1944, has jurisdiction over rates fixed by the Secretary of the Interior on power from reservoir projects under control of the War Department. In other words, the Federal Power Commission has jurisdiction over the rates which Southeastern charges,

The cost of wheeling the power is a basic factor in the determination of those rates. The Virginia Electric & Power Co. has agreed to submit this charge also to the Federal Power Commission, a Government tribunal. Here we have a dispute between a Government agency and a private enterprise. The private enterprise agrees to submit the dispute to another Government agency, and the Government agency involved will not agree to it.

I submit that nothing could be fairer, and in view of these concessions of the Virginia Electric & Power Co., the construction of the proposed line is absolutely unnecessary. The Government should not spend on this venture money, materials, and manpower, which are in short supply at the present time, and are desperately needed for our national defense in this critical period.

Mr. KIRWAN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment, and ask unanimous consent to proceed for five additional minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Ohio?

There was no objection.

Mr. KIRWAN. Mr. Chairman, less than a year ago in a supplemental appropriation bill Congress provided money for a transmission line from Bugg's Island Dam to Langley Field, Va. The request was for \$1,850,000, and the total estimated cost of the line as about \$7,000,000. Why did this request come to the Congress? Why not find out about this before doing any more talking? Either the Virginia Electric & Power Co. seems to have little understanding of their country's need or they do not know anything about their own company. I may be wrong on one of the charges, but not on both. I still feel that they lack real patriotism or they do not know their own company.

Here is the offer the Virginia Electric & Power extended to the United States Government in the crisis we are in today. The United States Government is going to spend millions of dollars more on Langley Field for an enlargement of wind tunnels: The Virginia company would transport power from their plant at Bugg's Island to Langley Field for a very small portion of the time, one-eighth, I believe. Why do I bring these matters up? Testifying before the committee the secretary of the NACA—not a board of bureaucrats, but a board of scientists from some of the great universities and colleges of this country, said that the Virginia Electric & Power Co. made an offer to the United States Government in a crisis such as we are in today that if the Government would advance it \$4,100,000 the Virginia Electric & Power would build the line. That offer afterward fell through. They required 150,000 kilowatts. The company only offered the Government to deliver that power for 1,000 hours a year, yet there are 8,760 hours in a year. Can you imagine a concern getting this privilege from this great Nation, yet offering to the Nation in its hour of need only 1,000 hours a year? That is the offer that the

Virginia Electric & Power Co. made to the United States Government at a time when our boys are dying in Korea.

Mr. GARY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. KIRWAN. I yield.

Mr. GARY. I just wanted to say that the gentleman from Washington has informed me that he did not make the statement on yesterday about the 24 hours, but that the gentleman from Ohio did. I want to apologize to the gentleman from Washington. I was told that he made the statement, but that was an honest mistake.

Mr. KIRWAN. I made it then and I am making it now, because I am talking from the record.

Mr. GARY. I simply wanted to correct my statement in justice to the gentleman from Washington.

The gentleman, however, does not know how much Southeastern can furnish.

Mr. KIRWAN. They can furnish but 20 hours a week. I am telling the gentleman only what appears from the record. I do not care whether it is Southeastern or Southwestern; I am only talking from the record. That is what they offered this Government. I repeat what I said yesterday, suppose one of these scientists comes up with an idea—then what? Under the Virginia Power & Light proposal, this scientist would have to wait until midnight before he could develop it. He could get the power only at that time. On top of that they only wanted to furnish a limited number of kilowatts. The project might require more power for an experiment than they could get under the company proposal.

What do we have going on in this country today? The biggest thing is stockpiling—whether it is rubber, steel, lead, copper, or whatever it is. All we are doing here is stockpiling our own electricity, not buying it but stockpiling by building a line of our own so that when we want electricity we will have it and have it in our own defense set-up. We will not have to depend upon anybody else. The record shows that a line was out of operation for 5 or 6 hours last fall just before they came to the Congress to ask for this money. That service break was not far from Langley Field. The gentleman who preceded me said it passed the House. It was stated that nine Congressmen from Virginia opposed that line. But when it got on the floor there was not one of the nine Congressmen opposed to that line. It was out in the open then; it is now. There was no opposition in the House to that line.

When it got to the Senate, yes, by a vote of 21 to 4 they kicked it out in committee, but when it got to the floor of the Senate by amendment, on a roll-call vote where they are recorded, they voted to build that transmission line right up to Langley Field.

Let us look at that great power company over in Virginia. There are three such wind tunnels in the United States, one located at Langley Field, Va.; one located at Cleveland, Ohio; and one lo-

cated out at Moffett Field, Calif. Out at Moffett Field, Calif., they have hydroelectricity and mix it with steam power. In Cleveland they have to depend on coal. They have to ship coal 200 miles. Yet, Cleveland, Ohio, the private company that pays for and ships coal 200 miles to generate power furnishes cheaper power to the United States Government than they do in California and over at Langley Field. Virginia gets cheaper coal probably than any place in the United States because it is in the greatest coal center of the country and on two of the greatest coal-carrying railroads, the Virginia and the Chesapeake & Ohio. Yet they charge more money in Virginia for electricity today—not tomorrow, not last year but right today. In Virginia, they charge more money to the United States Government for furnishing power to that wind tunnel than others do in Cleveland, Ohio, and Moffett Field, Calif. That is the record.

That is why the United States Government is asking the Congress today to keep this line in that we put it there last fall. There never was a time in the history of this country when the chips were down more than they are today and the test is the line to Langley Field.

Can you think of any nation in the world that would want to deprive its government, with a war going on, of this privilege. Can you seriously consider tossing out this power line that \$1,850,000 has already been spent on? What kind of saving is that? What kind of legislation is this? They tell you they are going to save a million dollars. Some of the \$1,850,000, according to the Secretary of the Interior, has already been spent on that line, and his letter was mentioned on this floor yesterday.

That is why I am asking every Member of Congress to stop and think about what is at stake before they toss this line out. You know that the Government has many millions invested in Langley Field and another substantial investment to generate this power at Buggs Island when it is finally finished. There will be an investment of many millions when all this is done, yet we do not want to put in a little line that is going to cost a few million dollars to assure the kids in Korea or any part of the world that back on the home front they are doing their part to win the war.

Mr. JACKSON of Washington. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word.

Mr. Chairman, yesterday I tried to explain in general debate the philosophy that the committee has tried to follow in the building of transmission lines from Government dams to the preferred customers as provided by the Flood Control Act of 1944, section 4. The committee has made it clear, and by its action in connection with this appropriation bill made it clear, that we have no desire to build unnecessary transmission lines. Under the basic law the committee has the responsibility of providing funds to carry out the provisions of existing law. If transmission lines can be built by private power companies which will

wheel the Government-owned power from the bus bar to the preferred customers—in this case a Government customer—at a reasonable rate, the Government will make those arrangements with the private power companies. I can only refer you to the action taken by the committee in connection with the bill now before the House. The committee has taken out a number of transmission lines where reasonable wheeling agreements have been entered into with the private utilities.

Now, we hear a lot about economy. By opposing the pending amendment we will save the Federal Government from paying an excessive amount for distributing its own electricity. Do you know the history of this negotiation that has been going on between the Virginia Electric & Power and the Government? Well, the power company started out with the most fantastic proposal that I have ever heard. I refer now to page 98 of the Second Supplemental Appropriation Act for 1951. You will find on page 98 the proposal originally made by the power company on December 15, 1949, when the Southeastern Power Administration was not armed with sufficient bargaining power to talk on a fair and reasonable basis with a private power company. There had been no appropriation for a transmission line. Do you know what they proposed? Well, they proposed that the Government pay a \$4,100,000 connection charge for the purpose of getting power into Langley Field. What does \$4,100,000 represent? It represents the cost of building the entire line. They called that a connection charge. Here is a chance to protect the public interest. I am here interested in protecting Uncle Sam; to give Uncle Sam bargaining power to bring about a contract that will result in a fair and reasonable contract with the Government.

Mr. GARY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. JACKSON of Washington. I yield to the gentleman from Virginia.

Mr. GARY. I know the gentleman wants to be fair.

Mr. JACKSON of Washington. That is right.

Mr. GARY. Is it not true that at the time this proposal was made there was some talk of moving the entire proving grounds or experimental station at Langley Field to the Midwest, and what the Virginia Electric & Power Co. suggested was that the Government build the line and they would deduct the cost of the line from the amount of electricity that was paid each month by the Government? Is that not true?

Mr. JACKSON of Washington. Where would the title to the line be in the meantime?

Mr. GARY. It would be in the Virginia Electric & Power Co. But that was a proposal made months ago, which has long since been canceled and forgotten; it was the first proposal. Now the Virginia Electric & Power Co. agrees to wheel this current, this electricity, at the cheapest charge that the Government is now getting anywhere in the Nation on a similar contract. Now, if they can get

it any fairer than that, I would like to know.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Washington has expired.

Mr. JACKSON of Washington. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for five additional minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Washington?

There was no objection.

Mr. JACKSON of Washington. I will answer my good friend from Virginia in this way. I have mentioned the early history of the negotiations for only one purpose: It proves the validity of the contention that we made right along that you must give the Government sufficient bargaining power to bring about a reasonable contract to protect the public interest. I am reciting this history to prove the point that if it had not been for the fact that we appropriated the money last year we would not have the proposal now that my good friend from Virginia has presented to the House. I understand they are willing to charge the same rates that have been charged in connection with the Montana power contract and the contract in Colorado. But I am further informed that at the present time the proposal has some gimmicks in it.

Mr. GARY. It is the same contract. They have agreed to accept identically the same contract.

Mr. JACKSON of Washington. I am told that the proposed contract as applied to this transaction will result in excessive charges for wheeling.

Mr. GARY. I have stated to the House that the gentleman has been grossly misinformed about this whole thing. That is exactly the point I made when I was making my statement.

Mr. JACKSON of Washington. I do not think I have been grossly misinformed. Imagine a private power company starting out negotiations proposing to make a connection charge which in fact is equal to the cost of building a line. In other words they wanted in the beginning to charge the Government a connection charge of \$4,100,000, giving the power company title to the line.

Mr. COOLEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. JACKSON of Washington. I yield to the gentleman from North Carolina.

Mr. COOLEY. Why would the gentleman call that a connection charge if it is to be repaid over a period of years?

Mr. JACKSON of Washington. This is what the Virginia Electric & Power Co. called it.

Mr. COOLEY. The gentleman referred to it as a connecting charge, yet the contract contemplated repayment by the power company to the Government of the \$4,000,000 involved.

Mr. JACKSON of Washington. Yes, but that is under a lot of reservations. I will read the whole thing, if the gentleman wants me to.

Mr. COOLEY. I do not want to interfere with the gentleman's speech, but

I do not want to be under the wrong impression about it.

Mr. JACKSON of Washington. I am sure no one is under the wrong impression.

Mr. COOLEY. The connecting charge is something that is usually not refunded, is it not?

Mr. JACKSON of Washington. Yes, that is normally true, but if this were a real legitimate proposal, why should not the title to the line be vested in the Federal Government? If they are coming in and asking as a connection charge an amount equal to the cost of building the line, what is the purpose of the Government's not building it? Suppose a person down the street wants to build a building, which has almost happened here, I believe, and he gets a Reconstruction Finance Corporation loan for the full amount of the cost, then turns around and rents the building to the Government? That is what we are doing here.

Mr. HARDY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. JACKSON of Washington. I yield to the gentleman from Virginia.

Mr. HARDY. That seems to be the order of the day, because we are accomplishing the same purpose through the issuance of certificates of necessity. It is done. I do not condone it, nevertheless it is done.

Mr. JACKSON of Washington. I am not condoning it, but two wrongs do not make a right. There is no reason why anything like that should be permitted to happen. What I am trying to get over to the Members of the House is the fact that the Government should be given sufficient bargaining power to bring about a contract that is going to protect the public interest. That is what we are trying to do in connection with this appropriation. It is a strange thing. The Government has entered into a lot of contracts in the Southwest Power area and in the Central Valley power area. They just signed an agreement 2 or 3 weeks ago. They signed one in Montana with the Montana Power Co., with the Bureau of Reclamation. The Bonneville Power Co. has signed a contract. You tie the hands of Uncle Sam in trying to protect the legitimate interests of the United States. That is exactly what is at stake in this amendment.

Mr. WHEELER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. JACKSON of Washington. I yield to the gentleman from Georgia.

Mr. WHEELER. How much is proposed to be spent by the Southeastern Power Administration for the total construction cost of this facility?

Mr. JACKSON of Washington. Of the line?

Mr. WHEELER. Yes.

Mr. JACKSON of Washington. I believe it is about \$7,000,000.

Mr. WHEELER. Did I understand the gentleman a moment ago to say that the total proposed cost on the part of the Virginia Electric & Power Co. was the same as the connection charge, or \$4,100,000?

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Washington has expired.

Mr. JACKSON of Washington. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for two additional minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Washington?

There was no objection.

Mr. JACKSON of Washington. I think the answer to that, I will say to my good friend, the gentleman from Georgia, is this: Deleted from that item of \$4,100,000 are some substations and switching stations. In addition costs have gone up since the original estimate.

Mr. WHEELER. I was just wondering as to the disparity there.

Mr. JACKSON of Washington. There is no dispute as to the actual cost of constructing this line, whether the Government builds it, or whether a private power company builds it.

Mr. WOOD of Georgia. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. JACKSON of Washington. I yield.

Mr. WOOD of Georgia. I understood the gentleman to say that the contract offered by the Virginia Electric & Power Co. had some gimmicks in it. I am anxious to know something about that because we have to pass on it.

Mr. JACKSON of Washington. That is correct. I do not have any of the details. The last offer apparently being made yesterday. I will say this, that since the appropriation was approved authorizing the building of this line in December the company has come in with a proposal which is about twice as favorable to the Government as it was prior to the favorable action taken by the Congress. I think it proves conclusively the necessity of again, if I may repeat, giving the Government sufficient authority to enter into a fair and reasonable contract. I love my good friend from Richmond, Va., and I assure you there is nothing personal about this. I just have a different point of view as have a majority of the committee, as to what should be done in this case.

Mr. GARY. The gentleman said a majority of the committee. Was not the vote 3 to 3 in the subcommittee that heard this matter?

Mr. JACKSON of Washington. Then shall we say an effective majority.

Mr. GOLDEN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. JACKSON of Washington. I yield.

Mr. GOLDEN. Regardless of the past history of the negotiations between the Government and the Virginia Electric Power Co., do you from your study feel that they are now offering a fair proposition?

Mr. JACKSON of Washington. If they can enter into a contract which will be in keeping with the standards set by the Government as to what is a reasonable and fair rate, and which has been agreed to by the other companies—yes—but here we are—we do not have a contract and if it had not been for the appropriation which was made last Decem-

ber we would not be able to enter into any kind of contract with them.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Washington has again expired.

Mr. NORRELL. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. NORRELL: On page 2, line 13, strike out "\$3,400,000" and insert "\$123,000."

Mr. NORRELL. Mr. Chairman, I think in order to understand this we should know that part of this money, or \$3,277,000 is to construct the line from Buggs Island to Langley Field. There is a balance of \$123,000 which has been allowed to construct four small lines in the congressional district of Judge KERR from North Carolina.

What I am going to say will be divided into these areas: If my amendment is adopted you will allow four small lines in the district of Judge KERR. One line, known as Buggs Island-Rocky Mountain, will cost \$60,000. Another line \$15,000, Goldsboro-Wilson; and another line \$24,000, Goldsboro-Kinston. Then there is another line for \$24,000, Goldsboro-Carolina.

Mr. GARY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. NORRELL. I yield.

Mr. GARY. I would like to state to the gentleman that I had intended offering the amendment in the form in which the gentleman now offers it, out of respect to my good friend, Judge KERR, who is a member of our committee. However, when it became known to the members of the North Carolina delegation, and since that line was in North Carolina, I did not feel as a Virginian that I should interfere with it. However, the members from the North Carolina delegation found out that that was my purpose, and the majority of them asked me to offer the amendment to strike out the entire amount, because they said they did not want the Southeastern coming down into North Carolina in competition with their private industry, and duplicate their lines in North Carolina, and I have offered the amendment to strike out the entire amount, purely in response to the request of a majority of the members from North Carolina.

Mr. NORRELL. Now, Mr. Chairman, you have before you those two matters: If my amendment is adopted you strike out the Buggs Island-Langley Field line. You would allow the other small lines.

I understand that these four municipalities in Judge KERR's district own their own power plants. They are not presently being supplied by any private power company. As far as I am concerned, I am willing to go along, since it is in his district alone, and since the lines go to municipalities that now own, control, and operate their own power plants.

Now, regarding the Buggs Island-Langley Field line, I like my chairman, the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. KIRWAN]. I would do anything he would ask me to do. He would not ask me to do anything that was not right. I like HENRY JACK-

SON. But, Mr. Chairman, as a defense matter, as a defense item, this line is no more in the interest of national defense than the purchase of reindeer would be in Alaska. It ought to be knocked out.

When it was allowed last fall there was a subcommittee vote of 3 to 3. Some of us tried to stop this then, but not having a majority we failed. I will say that then they had an effective majority, as the gentleman from Washington [Mr. JACKSON] has said. This is not in the interest of national defense, I repeat, and the line should not be constructed.

Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. NORRELL. I yield to the gentleman from Oklahoma.

Mr. ALBERT. But why should an exception be made to a specifically named congressional district? Why should not the principle rise or fall, and why should one congressional district which is named be excepted from the whole project?

Mr. NORRELL. I tried to explain that. If the gentleman had been listening I think he probably would have heard that the municipalities affected by the \$123,000 own their own power plants. They have not yet gotten any power from the companies at all. There is no reason why, if they want a line to those municipalities under section 5 of the Flood Control Act, they ought not to have it, as I see it.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Arkansas [Mr. NORRELL] has expired.

Mr. NORRELL. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for four additional minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection? There was no objection.

Mr. NORRELL. As to the Buggs Island-Langley Field line, let me say that the entire Virginia delegation last fall indicated that they did not want the line. The line, if constructed, would all be in the State of Virginia. I think the Members of the House from Virginia ought to know what Virginia wants. I am advised on reliable authority that the two United States Senators from Virginia are not in favor of the line. I know it is not in the interest of national defense; I know it is a waste of money. But I want to say that I do not believe that anybody from Arkansas, Oklahoma, Washington, or Ohio need get on this floor and talk about the patriotism of that grand old State of Virginia. Bless your hearts. She was an American State way back yonder in the Thirteen Colonies. I will say that if the national defense needs every kilowatt of power in the great State of Virginia those great patriotic men and women will turn over the last kilowatt they have to the Government. Do not talk to me about the lack of patriotism of Members of the congressional delegation from Virginia or the senatorial delegation from Virginia; they are just as patriotic any time of the year as any Member here, or anybody else.

Mr. COOLEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. NORRELL. I yield.

Mr. COOLEY. Let me say that Rocky Mount, Wilson, and the other two towns in the State of North Carolina have not been able to get power. Actually, Rocky Mount is partly in my district and partly in Mr. KERR's district. Rocky Mount owns a municipal plant which they have operated for many years very successfully and is serving people from my district now. I wish to ask if anybody on behalf of the municipality of Rocky Mount has appeared on behalf of this project? Or has anybody submitted any evidence indicating the necessity for building a line into the city of Rocky Mount?

Mr. MORRELL. No, sir. No one from any of those towns personally appeared before the committee. The only testimony came from the Interior Department.

I yield to the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. SHORT].

Mr. SHORT. Talking about patriotism, does the gentleman think it is patriotic for the Federal Government to force upon any State or congressional district in our Union something that it does not want?

Mr. NORRELL. I do not believe it is the duty of the gentleman from Arkansas to help do that at all, and I am not going to.

Mr. FURCOLO. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word.

Mr. Chairman, I think there can be no question in the mind of anyone concerning the patriotism of any member of the Virginia delegation or of the people of Virginia.

I think the most important thing in this particular matter is this: Apparently for some time there have been discussions going on between the company and the Government with reference to this matter. Now, as the gentleman from Washington, [Mr. JACKSON] pointed out, the position of the subcommittee has been in general that they do not want to spend any money where it is not necessary to spend it, and especially where a private concern can take care of the situation all around.

I do not know how important this matter is as far as defense is concerned but from all the evidence in the hearings and everything I have been able to learn apparently it has quite a bearing; and we can know, regardless of that, that one of the most important things in connection with the defense effort is the entire power situation with all of its ramifications.

The history of this transaction shows very clearly that right from the beginning the company had certain bargaining power and did its best to obtain what it wanted on its own terms. I hold no brief against the company for that; that is well within its rights.

On the other hand, you have to keep that background in mind, in my opinion, to be able to assess what our situation will be if the time comes when we need the facilities the Government wants to furnish. Having in mind this background and the bargaining that went on, I think even the gentleman from

Virginia [Mr. GARY] will admit the fact of the matter is that right up until the very last minute this company did not come forward with a proposal that was equal to what the Government wanted. There was meeting after meeting. It gradually gave little by little by little and it was not until right at the end when it either had to meet the Government's terms or lose completely that it finally came forward in expressing its good faith. There is no harm in that, but you have to bear in mind that at this time the Government did have the bargaining power to be able to drive home its point.

What are you going to do some months from now if suddenly the Government in connection with the defense effort needs to have that power, needs to have those facilities? In view of that bargaining history are you going to have the Government then sit down with the company and ask for its cooperation?

No, Mr. Chairman, this entire situation shows that we cannot rely upon that private company if the chips are down and we need what it has to offer, patriotic as it may be. I do not question its patriotism. But the facts show very clearly it was not until a very short time ago that the company did come forward.

I should like to ask the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. GARY] if it is not true that the present offer of the company was made only a couple of weeks ago?

Mr. GARY. No. I think the gentleman is wrong in that. They have been negotiating constantly since last January. Proposals and counterproposals have been made. I think the last conferences were held within the last week or two. I believe that is correct.

Mr. FURCOLO. Is it not a fact that the final proposition offered by this company to the Government was made not more than 3 weeks ago?

Mr. GARY. Well, I made a proposition right here on the floor that has never been made and that is that the company will accept the cheapest contract that is in existence in the entire United States that has been approved by the United States Government.

Mr. FURCOLO. Is it a fair statement to say that from the time these negotiations started the company at no time took a position meeting the terms that the Government wanted until 2 or 3 weeks ago?

Mr. GARY. I would not say that. I do not think they ever got to an agreement. They have been negotiating and as negotiations go, whenever you reach an agreement that is the end of it. They have not reached an agreement yet.

Mr. JACKSON of Washington. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FURCOLO. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.

Mr. JACKSON of Washington. I think the record will disclose that after the offer was made on December 15, 1949, which was a connection charge proposal of \$4,100,000, there was no further offer until a week before or the day before the committee had under

consideration the appropriation of money for the item, which was in December of last year.

Mr. GARY. Did you not say the Government refused to negotiate?

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Massachusetts has expired.

Mr. FURCOLO. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for two additional minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Massachusetts?

There was no objection.

Mr. FURCOLO. Mr. Chairman, I may say in passing that that was at a time when the company was under the impression that the matter was to be decided, whether they were under that impression rightly or wrongly.

May I say in conclusion that perhaps if there were no emergency, perhaps if there were no war, perhaps if there were not the possibility of great demand being made in the future, we might be satisfied to say: "Go ahead and take a chance." But with this matter being most essential in connection with the entire defense effort—facilities such as those—it is a question whether you want to make an error one way or the other. I think if we are going to make a mistake in being either too easy and lenient or we are going to bear down, I think we should err on the side of the Government being fully prepared and fully ready for whatever eventualities may arise.

This entire transaction, if you follow it through from beginning to end—and I think it is evident from what has been said on the floor—shows that this Government cannot expect full and complete cooperation of this company. The times may change so that we need it so badly and so immediately that we simply cannot afford to get the Government in a position where they are depending upon this company, because practical experience has shown that the company, perhaps acting for the best interests of its stockholders, which is its business, may perhaps make a bargain that the Government cannot meet.

Mr. GARY. Does the gentleman mean to tell this House that the Southeastern Power Administration can furnish all the current that Langley Field needs? Does not the gentleman know that they cannot furnish it and that they have to rely on the Virginia Electric & Power Co. to furnish that current?

Mr. FURCOLO. I do not have any opinion one way or the other. I will take the gentleman's word for it. But, I will say this, that I think this country is entitled to rely on the fact that the facilities are needed and the Government has a duty under its responsibility to see that they are provided. This committee has been very fair in striking out lines where past experience showed that perhaps there was no harm in doing it, but this is a different story.

Mr. KIRWAN. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that all debate on this amendment and all amendments thereto close in 15 minutes.

Mr. BARDEN. I object, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. KIRWAN. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that all debate on this amendment and all amendments thereto close in 40 minutes.

Mr. SMITH of Virginia. I object, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BARDEN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last two words.

Mr. Chairman, I regret the necessity for my opposing something that I understand my good friend from North Carolina, Judge KERR, favors. But, I think Judge KERR will agree that I have gone along pretty well with his Buggs Island project which means much more to him than the little line involved here. I have been rather cooperative with Buggs Island, but that does not mean that I wanted any bugs down in my district. Buggs Island is both a flood-control and electric-generating project. However, that does not mean they should unnecessarily enter the field of power transmission.

Now, there has been a lot of talk about wind tunnels. I am not a wind-tunnel expert but it seems to me that I have been reading in the papers recently where Great Britain has found herself in a wind tunnel, and I imagine she got in it just about the way we are about to legislate here. I like cheap power; everybody likes cheap power. We like cheap everything that we are buying. But what are we going to do for private enterprise, which is the source of our tax income, if, when a matter of this kind comes up, immediately antagonism toward private enterprise pops out? Do we like private enterprise or not?

Let me give you a little history of this. I doubt if there is a man in North Carolina who has given any more time and effort and work for the rural-electrification set-up in North Carolina than I have. It has been a grand thing to North Carolina and especially to the rural people, because the REA lines serve an area where private enterprise, the private companies, either could not or would not furnish the power. They have done a grand job.

With all of my connections with the REA and its power affiliates and with the same folks who are cooperating with this Southeastern Power Authority, not one single one of them has ever parted his lips to me about the proposed lines that they think they are going to run all over my district.

Now they are talking about running a power line to Goldsboro. One of the finest and most modern and most economical steam plants is being finished there at an expense of approximately \$15,000,000. It is probably about half finished now. What is the sense in the Federal Government's taking scarce copper, scarce money, and scarce manpower and duplicating that kind of arrangement there? It just simply does not make sense to me.

Somebody down in my district has to pay some taxes. In the last few days of the last session I called on this House to pass an appropriation of approximately \$72,000,000, for what purpose? To provide schools in areas where the Govern-

ment had gone in and built buildings and built homes and put people there when there was no tax source or any available taxes to educate those children.

If it is a good idea to run these power lines all through the district where power lines exist and where arrangements are being made to make better facilities available than there are now, why is it not a good idea for the Government to take the railroads, for we would like to have better railroads, and run those around? Then when that is done, I hate to pay 4 and 6 percent for money, so the Government can certainly afford to lend it for less than that. Then why not let them take over the banks? Then we will be exactly where Great Britain is, except I doubt if she would endorse our notes as we have been endorsing hers.

I know my people are interested in progress and I am interested in it, too, but you cannot name a single business that somebody down in the departments here cannot prove to you that the Government can operate it cheaper and sell the commodity cheaper and sell the service cheaper, because they come up here and get the money, they do not have to pay any interest on it, and they do not have to pay any taxes. All they have to do is collect the taxes out of you.

That is a simple proposition. Anybody can do business that way. I do not know what kind of a line they are talking about running from Goldsboro to Kinston for, I think, \$16,000. I do not know what kind of a line it would be, but I do not believe it would give as much light as an ordinary lightning bug because it is 29 miles from Kinston to Goldsboro. That is not the only thing they are planning to do. I have obtained this information partly through some of their folks who have just been hinting a little something. There is no doubt in the world but that they have an idea of networking Government lines down there. When they do that, where is our tax income coming from? I will tell you another thing, and we might just as well be practical about it. I can deal with my own people in the State of North Carolina better than I can with the people in any department here in Washington. Who are we—who are we to question either the integrity or the judgment or wisdom of the utility commissions of the various States? If the power rates are too high in North Carolina, whose fault is it? Who passes upon it? The State government agency passes upon it. If a State agency makes a mistake and continues to make a mistake the people of North Carolina can tend to them better than they can to somebody in the remote corners of some of these departmental buildings here in Washington. It is not a question of my resisting any real service. I am resisting a policy here. I do not think this is a good idea. My people have traveled a long way in the development of power and in the development of their small industries, and so forth. And they can go the rest of the way. They have done it with private enterprise capital and cooperative capital. I have never represented a power company in my life, although I

have made some good fees suing them. And so far as that is concerned, if somebody throws me out of Congress I will probably go back to that same business.

But there is no need of us being antagonistic toward private enterprise when we know that that is the one thing that has made America outstanding in this world; and that is our ability to operate as we have under private enterprise.

Yet when these things come up they begin to point the finger at the awful corporations. If the United States Government needed the facilities of the Virginia Electric Power Co., they could take every last bit of it in 12 hours. Of course we know they can do it, and I want that power to remain in the Federal Government. But let those charged with running the various Federal departments realize they are not only the creatures of the people but are their servants and not their bosses.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from North Carolina has expired.

Mr. COOLEY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the pro forma amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I have heard this debate with great interest. I am in favor of more power and cheaper power, and I am in favor of constantly improving service. It is of little importance as to which congressional districts are involved, but I understand that actually about two-thirds of the proposed short lines will be in the district represented by the gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. BARDEN] and in the district which I represent. The important question presented here is whether or not the proposed lines are actually needed and should be built. If the lines are not necessary to the providing of adequate service, then it occurs to me that they should not be built. The city of Rocky Mount is in two congressional districts, part of which is in Judge KERR's district and the other part is in the fourth district which I represent. The city of Rocky Mount owns and has operated for many years a very modern power plant from which the city is served, and not only is the city served but the municipality has built rural lines from which many farm homes are likewise served. My home is about 10 miles west of the city of Rocky Mount, and the municipally owned power line reaches from Rocky Mount almost to the corporate limits of the town of Nashville where I live. The town of Nashville and that entire community have been well and adequately served by the Carolina Power & Light Co. I understand that the city of Rocky Mount has a contract with the Carolina Power & Light Co., under which both contracting parties have maintained a very satisfactory and mutually advantageous relationship. I am not aware of any shortage of electric power either in Rocky Mount or in adjacent communities. No one connected with the municipal government or interested in the welfare of the community has indicated that the present facilities or service is inadequate and that there is need for the building of Government-owned

transmission lines or distribution facilities either into or about Rocky Mount. If there is a lack of facilities or inadequacy of electric power in that community, certainly I would have known about it or would have been advised. I understand that the situation at Wilson, which is only 18 miles from Rocky Mount, is just about the same as it is in Rocky Mount. The city of Wilson also has a contract with the Carolina Power & Light Co., which company has agreed to supplement the power which is generated at the municipally owned power plant in the city of Wilson. If these communities are satisfied, and if the Carolina Power & Light Co. can provide adequate, cheap, and satisfactory service to other similar communities, then why should we spend taxpayers' money and construct duplicating transmission and distribution lines and facilities?

The Carolina Power & Light Co. has a postwar expansion program which contemplates the spending of \$100,000,000. As part of this program, the company is building a plant at or near Goldsboro in Mr. BARDEN'S district which, when finished, will cost about \$15,000,000. Two units are being built, the first of which will be finished within about a month. This one unit will supply firm power amounting to 500,000,000 kilowatt-hours per year. Within another year the second unit will be finished and this unit will also produce another 500,000,000 kilowatt-hours per year. When both units are completed, the Carolina Power & Light Co. will be able to supply, in addition to the power it is now supplying, another 1,000,000,000 kilowatt-hours of firm power which, I understand, is about four times as much firm power as will be produced at Buggs Island when that great project is completed and is in operation. If my information is inaccurate, certainly some member of the committee will be able to prove its inaccuracy. If my information is accurate, then pray tell me why anyone would propose to build duplicating facilities in the Goldsboro area? All of this money which we are now about to appropriate will have to be borrowed by the Government, and certainly such money should not be used in competition with private industry which is now operating successfully and is providing adequate and satisfactory service.

The Carolina Power & Light Co. is now furnishing electric power to many of the important cities of our State, to many small cities, towns, and villages, and to a large agricultural or rural area. The company is now making electric power available to numerous cooperatives at only 7½ mills per kilowatt-hour. I am advised that Army engineers have said that Buggs Island power will cost more than 9 mills per kilowatt-hour. I am, of course, proud of the Buggs Island project. I know that it will be a great blessing to thousands of people and to everyone who lives along the banks of the Roanoke River. But, frankly, I do not want the original purpose of the project to be perverted in such a way as to destroy legitimate private industry either in my district or in the State. I try as best I can to represent all of the people of the Fourth District and I am

anxious for them to have cheap electric lights and power but in passing upon the question before us, I am not unmindful of the fact that approximately 3,500 of my constituents are stockholders in the Carolina Power & Light Co. In addition to these stockholders, hundreds of my constituents are working for that company and their livelihood depends upon its successful operation. The company has embarked upon an expansion program which, as I have said, contemplates the spending of \$100,000,000, and I do not want to do anything that, in the opinion of the stockholders and employees of the Carolina Power & Light Co., will result in the Federal Government's being put into direct competition with that company or that will cause the financial integrity of the company to be either impaired or imperiled. Having listened to the arguments submitted in this debate and upon consideration of all of the information which has been made available to me, I am constrained to support the amendment offered by the gentleman from Virginia. I do not believe that even my good friend, Judge KERR, would want this Congress to appropriate money simply because some of the proposed lines and facilities would be built and some of the money spent in the district which he so ably represents. I am not aware of the fact that any part of Judge KERR'S district is suffering on account of an inadequacy of facilities or on account of a lack of service. The evidence and arguments submitted by the committee, in my opinion, do not warrant or justify the expenditures contemplated. But I shall support the amendment offered by Mr. GARY and I hope that it will be approved.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. COOLEY] has expired.

Mr. HARDY. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the next two words, and I ask unanimous consent to revise and extend my remarks.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection? There was no objection.

Mr. HARDY. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. KIRWAN] referred to the action taken by the members of the Virginia delegation when this matter was under consideration last year. I think that ought to be understood, and I want it understood as far as my own position is concerned.

As one member of our delegation I authorized our member on the Appropriations Committee, the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. GARY], to oppose the construction of this line, before the committee. I did it on this basis: I had the feeling that there were adequate facilities to serve Langley Field. I had the feeling that there was sufficient patriotism on the part of the Virginia Electric & Power Co. to work out with the Government a reasonable basis on which NACA facilities at Langley Field could be served adequately and reasonably.

Subsequent to the request on my part that the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. GARY] represent me before the committee as opposing construction of this line, I had occasion to read some of the testimony which was given before

the Appropriations Committee. I found in that testimony the contention that the Virginia Electric & Power Co. could not serve the needs of Langley Field. I saw the contention, which has been raised here, about the limited number of hours which Langley Field could be served. I also saw the contention that the Virginia Electric & Power Co. had abused its bargaining advantage and wanted a \$4,000,000 Federal contribution to build the line. These and other representations in the testimony were not satisfactorily explained. Allegations on both sides of the issue were left unsubstantiated, and conflicts were left unresolved.

There was not time then to find the correct answers to the wide discrepancies of statements and inferences in the hearings, and I was unwilling to gamble with matters of such importance as research conducted by the NACA. There seemed to be some possible danger to our national defense effort unless that line were built. As a consequence if there had been a record vote, because of the confusion of statements, the conflict of information, if there had been a roll call vote I would have voted opposite to the instructions which I had given to the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. GARY] and I so informed him.

Langley Field is not in my district, neither is Buggs Island, but the greater portion of the line running between Buggs Island and Langley Field would run through my district. I have sought for myself to eliminate some of the confusion which has been raised with respect to this project and to resolve in my own mind some of the conflicts. I do not believe it would be possible for Buggs Island, if it is going to serve any other customers with its power, it would not be possible for Buggs Island to furnish 150,000 kilowatt peak load at Langley Field for any great period of time. It is my understanding that Buggs Island alone cannot furnish the power required at Langley Field. Therefore, in order for the Virginia Electric & Power Co. to wheel power from the Buggs Island station to Langley, it would be necessary to firm up that power to get any satisfactory operation over any extended period.

Another thing that has bothered me in this whole proposition is this: Reference has been made to fantastic proposals submitted by the Virginia Electric & Power Co. As I stated a moment ago when the gentleman from Washington was at the microphone, I do not condone fantastic or arbitrary proposals on the part of anybody, but it seems to be the order of the day. Now, it is just entirely too much to expect that a corporation would not seek to protect the interests of its stockholders, but, of course, capable Government employees must not permit such corporations to secure unjust or unreasonable contracts. I think we also might call attention to the fact that not always have the suggestions and counterproposals advanced by governmental agencies been without some taint of arbitrariness, or been always reasonable. I call attention particularly to the fact that I understand in this controversy SEPA has insisted that a 1-mill wheeling

rate be agreed to by the Virginia Electric & Power Co. According to my information, there is not any area in the United States where a 1-mill rate is in effect over a comparable distance as that expected to be served by the Virginia Electric & Power Co. Now, I ask the Members of this House whether we can in good conscience charge the utility company in this instance as being the only unreasonable party to the negotiations?

Mr. Chairman, under the circumstances, having read this testimony and having made some studies of my own, I have made up my mind that there is no need to build this line, no need to spend this money, no need to utilize these critical materials.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word, and ask unanimous consent to proceed for 10 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Mississippi?

There was no objection.

Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Chairman, the issue involved here goes much deeper than any local quarrel between the Virginia Power Co. and the people living in that immediate area. This is the same old fight that has been carried on by the private power interests ever since I have been in Congress, to get their hands on the Government's power, generated on our navigable streams and their tributaries, at dams built by the Federal Government.

The power in our navigable streams and their tributaries is public power and belongs to the Federal Government. That was decided by the Supreme Court of the United States in both the Ashwander case and the Appalachian Power case. If the private power interests can get their hands on that power and monopolize the power industry, they can wring the lifeblood from the American people for centuries to come. That is the reason they are turning their guns on the Tennessee Valley Authority and the Columbia River development, because those projects have shown the American people what electricity is worth, and have provided yardsticks that have brought the rates down to where the people can afford to pay them.

Not only that, but if it had not been for this public power movement, the average farmer in this country would not have seen an electric light in his home for the next 50 years; and then the chances are that his rates would have been so high he could not have paid them.

The Roanoke River, on which this Buggs Island Dam has been constructed by the Federal Government, is a navigable stream. It has more hydroelectric power running to waste in it than almost any other undeveloped stream in the United States. The Government needs that power to carry on its defense program; the farmers of Virginia and North Carolina, as well as the other consumers in that area, need that power to light their homes and to operate those various appliances necessary for their comforts and conveniences.

If this amendment is adopted, striking out the money for the building of this line down to this air base, which also belongs to the Federal Government, if you adopt either one of these amendments, it will mean the end of the power development on the Roanoke River, at least for the time being, and probably during this generation. The American people are not going to build these dams and then turn the power over to the Power Trust for them to plunder the Government and the people in the surrounding area with exorbitant rates.

As I have said before, the power business is a public business. Electricity has become a necessity of our modern life; and it must be handled by a monopoly. If a half dozen different concerns were furnishing power to one municipality or community, the overhead costs would be so great the people could not pay them. Therefore, it must be handled by a monopoly. Any monopoly of a necessity of life is a public business. Besides, as I said, the water power of the Nation already belongs to the Federal Government, as was decided by the Supreme Court of the United States in the two cases to which I have referred. Here we have a private monopoly trying to get its hands on the power generated on a navigable stream at a dam built by the Federal Government. They emphasize the fact that this project is located in the State of Virginia. That is true; but that does not alter the fact that it is a Federal project on a navigable stream, dealing with Federal power generated at a dam constructed by the Federal Government, and needed as a public air base for national defense.

The Tennessee River flows through Tennessee and Alabama; but that does not alter the fact that it is a navigable stream, and that the water power in it belongs to the Federal Government, which it is now developing and distributing through the Tennessee Valley Authority. When Senator Norris and I were going through the battle for the creation of the Tennessee Valley Authority certain individuals asked why JOHN RANKIN was meddling with a project located in Alabama and Tennessee. My answer was that it was a national proposition—public power in a navigable stream that belonged to the American people. If it had not been for my fight here at that time we would have lost that measure, and today there would be one dam on the Tennessee River, with the private power interests in control of the power produced. If we had lost that fight there would have been no yardstick to show the American people what electricity is worth. Many of you today would be paying five times as much for your electricity as you are now paying; and the chances are that our farmers would be in the dark from one end of this country to the other.

In the great State of North Carolina only 3.2 percent of the farms had electricity in 1934. On June 30, 1950, 88.6 percent of the farmers in North Carolina had electricity in their homes, and by this time I am sure it runs well above 90 percent. Our rural-electrification

program grew out of the Tennessee Valley development. I know, because I led the fight for both of them on this floor and before the country.

In Virginia, where this project is located, only 7.6 percent of the farms were electrified in 1934. On June 30, last year, 91 percent of the farmers in Virginia had electricity in their homes, and I dare say that by this time it is above 95 percent. Those farmers in that area are entitled to the benefit of this cheap electricity; and the Federal Government is entitled to build this line to connect with its air base at Langley Field, in order to have the full and untrammelled use of this public power.

If it had not been for the public power on the Tennessee River and on the Columbia River, I dare say we would not have developed the atomic bomb during the last war.

They talk about the cost of transmitting this power to the air base. The transmission cost of electricity amounts to only from four-tenths to six-tenths of a mill a kilowatt-hour for every hundred miles it is carried. In 1930, which was before the Tennessee Valley Authority was created, the Army engineers made a report in which they showed that—

The sales prices for Wilson Dam power necessary to obtain in order to pay 4 percent on the investment in plant and transmission lines, and to cover the cost of operation and maintenance (indefinitely) should be—

	Mills per kilowatt-hour
At the switchboard.....	1.352
Transmitted 100 miles.....	1.993
Transmitted 200 miles.....	2.310
Transmitted 300 miles.....	2.625
Transmitted 350 miles.....	2.775

When we were struggling for the creation of the Tennessee Valley Authority, the same opposition that we have to these power lines was saying that we did not need any more power, that we had a sufficient amount in that area. They said the same thing when we were developing the power on the Columbia River. Yet today, when we are producing 10 times as much as we were then, we have a shortage of power all over the country, because the American people have learned to use it for so many purposes.

One trouble is that so many Members of Congress are absolutely unaware of what their people pay for electricity in their homes, and what it should cost them.

The year I came to Congress, the American people were using only 37,000,000,000 kilowatt-hours of electricity a year. In 1949, they used 329,000,000,000, or almost 10 times as much. In 1949, California alone used 23,000,000,000 kilowatt-hours.

We still have 394,000,000,000 kilowatt-hours of hydroelectric power going to waste every year in our navigable streams and their tributaries. If it were developed, and firmed up to the peak of the average year with 116,000,000,000 kilowatt-hours of steam power, it would raise that 394,000,000,000 kilowatt-hours

to 510,000,000,000. Add to that the amount we are now using, and it will run almost to a trillion kilowatt-hours a year, or at least to 900,000,000,000.

That would be enough electricity to operate every industry, electrify every business establishment, light and heat every home, including every farm home, and operate all the appliances necessary for the happiness, comfort, convenience, and prosperity of the American people.

Our hydroelectric power in our navigable streams and their tributaries is the greatest wealth in America outside of the soil from which we live. The American people are entitled to its benefits; and I for one do not propose to sit idly by and see it monopolized and the rates raised all out of proportion, in order to enrich the private power interests or to pay dividends on watered stocks.

You Members from the Missouri Valley area, which includes the States drained by the Missouri River and its tributaries, should be the last ones to oppose this public power line.

Your people are being overcharged a hundred percent or more for their electricity now, while about 25,000,000,000 kilowatt-hours a year goes to waste in the Missouri River and its tributaries, and your flood disasters are costing you almost enough to pay for the construction of the necessary dams and transmission lines to generate and deliver this power to the various cities, towns, and cooperative power associations within the distribution radius. Your navigation on that stream is almost paralyzed, and as a result, you people in that area are paying a one-way freight rate that is nothing in God's world but legalized thievery, or highway robbery, which you would not have to pay if you had the navigation of that stream completed.

I hear men complain about what the Tennessee Valley Authority and the Columbia River development are costing the taxpayers of this country. Let me tell you that they will never cost you a dime; they are paying for themselves. These dams will be in use for centuries after the money for the power generated on these streams has paid for all this development, and paid back the interest on the funds invested.

I have said, and I still say, that in 50 years the TVA will pay for all development on that stream for power, navigation, and flood control, and pay back the interest on the money invested.

You people are getting the benefit of this TVA development, because it has provided a yardstick to show the American people what electricity should cost them, and has stimulated interest in rural electrification to where today we have about 90 percent of our farms electrified from one end of the country to the other, whereas 20 years ago less than 10 percent of the farm homes in our Nation had any electricity at all.

I have always regretted that when those 47 locks and dams were built on the Ohio River for navigation alone they did not build high dams, which would have provided the same navigation, controlled the floods, and generated anywhere from

ten to fifteen billion kilowatt-hours of electricity a year.

Besides, if the Ohio and the Missouri Rivers were developed as the Tennessee River is, by the proper use of the facilities provided they could hold back the flood crests on those streams, prevent them from synchronizing with the flood crests on the upper Mississippi, and in that way prevent the overflows on the lower Mississippi, and probably save enough money now spent on flood control on the lower Mississippi to pay for the construction of every dam on the Ohio, the Missouri, and their tributaries.

If you adopt this amendment, then you will have joined hands with an element that is dead bent on paralyzing the water power of this Nation and turning back the tide of progress the American people have made in the use of electricity and electrical appliances during the last 18 years.

This is a very serious proposition. As I said, it is more important than any local controversy, for the simple reason that it not only involves the safety of this Nation during this period of emergency, but it involves the question of whether or not the Federal Government can use its own power for defense purposes without having to pay tribute to a fixed monopoly, and whether or not the people in that area must pay tribute through exorbitant rates before they can use the electricity generated on public streams and their tributaries that drain their own localities.

Before you cast your vote to thus deprive the Government and the people of Virginia and North Carolina of these benefits, go and find out what rates your people are paying for electric lights and power, then find out what rates they should pay, and what rates they would pay if the power in the Roanoke River, and other streams throughout the Nation, were developed and distributed to them at rates based upon the cost of generation, transmission, and distribution.

Electricity is the lifeblood of our advanced civilization. The cheaper the rates, the more freely it flows, and the more freely it flows, the greater the benefits to mankind. If we will develop the water power of this Nation, firm it up to the peak of an average year, and supply it to the people at rates based upon the cost of generation, transmission, and distribution, our country can move forward into an era of progress and prosperity the like of which mankind has never known.

Mr. KERR. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word.

Mr. Chairman, I feel like I ought to say something about this matter before the House. Buggs Island Dam is about completed. That great electric-power plant which, when completed, will be able to serve a large portion of the State of Virginia as well as a large portion of the State of North Carolina. I have been very much interested in the construction of this great dam. These two States contribute a large sum of money to the administration of the affairs of this Government. North Carolina pays

approximately \$1,131,615,738 and Virginia pays about \$738,411,436 into the Treasury of this Nation. Buggs Island Dam is the only great public enterprise that has even been proposed in these two States. This dam is on the great Roanoke River that flows through most of Virginia and through all of eastern North Carolina. When completed, it will be able to develop 204,000 kilowatts of electric power and protect 150,000 acres of the finest farmland in the world; think of that for a minute to see what it means to the industry of the great States of Virginia and North Carolina.

I want to say just a word or two about this. I am advocating the adoption of the amendment offered by the gentleman from Arkansas [Mr. NORRELL]. This power project of course will develop power and the Government should be able to retain it and transmit it wherever needed by the Government, such as at Langley Field. That is not the question that is raised here. This power will be generated within 100 miles of Langley Field, all the power they need, and they want to put transmission lines down there and use that power for the benefit of the United States Government. That question should not enter into it.

This bill also relates to plans for the construction of transmission lines for the accommodation of three of the largest cities in eastern North Carolina. Two of them are entirely in my district, and one half of one of them is in my district. The other half is in the district of the gentleman from the Fourth District, who has risen here to oppose the proposed amendment. The amendment offered by the gentleman from Arkansas also provides that the great Buggs Island facility shall have transmission features so that they can accommodate three of the outstanding cities in eastern North Carolina. Kinston is one of them, Wilson is another, and the third is Rocky Mount. As the gentleman from the fourth district said, one-half of that into Rocky Mount goes to his district. These are industrial cities, they are thriving cities, and they need this power. The Government proposes in this bill to siphon enough power into those cities through these transmission lines to accommodate the people who live there and contribute to their welfare.

I hope very much the House will support the amendment offered by the gentleman from Arkansas, because we need this power. There is no reason in the world, when the power company proposes to build it there, why we should not have it. It does not interfere with either one of the other gentlemen who are opposing this, but it does mean a great deal to the Second Congressional District and the three great cities I represent in that district. I am asking this House to support the amendment offered by the gentleman from Arkansas [Mr. NORRELL] and let my constituents have that power that they need so much and that they can acquire so soon.

Mr. SMITH of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the pro forma amendment.

Mr. Chairman, we are dealing here with a bill which appropriates \$500,000,000 of the taxpayers' money. That is a lot of money and we are doing it in right smart of a hurry. I have had this theory about these bills this year, that in this time when everybody is being asked repeatedly by the administration to tighten their belts, that it might be a good idea for the Government to set an example and cut down or defer a lot of these unnecessary expenditures of which the proposal now before us is one of the outstanding ones. This proposition narrows itself down to this: Whether we are going to permit the taking over of private industry and the power lines in the transmission field by the Government, or whether we are going to maintain the policy that we started out with, namely, that the REA would distribute the power, but when it came to transmission of the power we would do it as far as feasible by existing lines. This proposal would build, at a cost of \$7,000,000, a line duplicating an existing line owned by a private power company. The gentleman from Washington, I think, made a very fair statement of what the actual fact is about this controversy, and that is that what is being sought to be done by this bill is to give the Southeastern Power Administration a blackjack with which to hit the private power company over the head and force them to make a contract such as the Southeastern Power Administration wants.

Mr. DONDERO. Mr. Chairman, a point of order. I make the point of order that the Committee is not in order.

The CHAIRMAN. The point of order is sustained, the Committee will be in order.

Mr. SMITH of Virginia. Well, Mr. Chairman, we are just disposing of a half billion dollars today, so I guess it is not very important.

The fact is that I read these hearings and this thing boils down, no matter what the negotiations have been in the past, to this situation—that there is an existing transmission line ready, willing, and able to transmit this power; there has been a dispute about the terms, and the private power company has submitted these propositions: That in order to settle all the controversies, they will sign the most favorable contract that the Government wants of any contract that the Government has signed in any State in the Union. Do you want anything better than that? They say to use any contract, such as in Oklahoma or Montana, Texas and several others, take the most favorable contract to the Government and the private company will sign it. When the Government would not do that, then the power company came back with this proposition, and they say to the Southeastern Power Administration, "If you will not agree to that, here is what we will do. We will submit this whole proposition to arbitration. And who will we take for the arbitrator? We will pick another Government agency, namely, the Federal Power Commission, and whatever they say is a fair term under this contract, we will agree to abide by it."

Is there any excuse for not accepting that, other than the excuse that the Government wants to gobble up and monopolize the transmission of power and take control of it all over the Nation? That brings us to a very important and vital question. Now, I hold no brief for any power company. I have voted for every REA appropriation that ever came along. I am strong for it, and I will always be strong for it. But that brings us right straight back to this vital question of whether we are going to continue to keep private industry going so that you will have somebody to pay these taxes that we are voting for every day or whether you are going to have a Government monopoly in this field. It is up to the Members of the Congress to decide that question and that is all that is involved in this thing because when these people come in and say, "We will let a Government agency, the Federal Power Commission, determine this question, and we will abide by any contract that they say we should," and when the Southeastern Power Administration turns that down, what other conclusion can you reach?

Mr. JACKSON of Washington. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SMITH of Virginia. I yield.

Mr. JACKSON of Washington. I know the gentleman wants to be fair, but I think it ought to be made clear that the Virginia Power & Light Co. has not made an offer to the Southeastern Power Administration to enter into a contract at the lowest rate now obtained by the Government. That offer was made this morning, but it has never been made to the Southeast Power Co.

Mr. SMITH of Virginia. I understand it has been. I have seen correspondence in which they say they are willing to do that.

Mr. JACKSON of Washington. The whole matter could be settled, then, right now if that is the case. If the gentleman will put that letter in the RECORD, we can settle this right now. I want to be fair. We do not want to blackjack this company. If the gentleman has that letter, I wish he would place it in the RECORD, but there is no evidence of that before the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. SMITH] has expired.

Mr. SMITH of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for two additional minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection? There was no objection.

Mr. SMITH of Virginia. It is my very distinct understanding—I think that it was in a letter to the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. GARY], in which the power company said that they were willing to submit this thing to the Power Commission or take the Montana contract or the Oklahoma contract.

Mr. JACKSON of Washington. Oh, that is quite different. I know you want to be fair, but the statement was made this morning by the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. GARY] that they would be willing now to accept the very cheapest rate that has been entered into on a wheeling

basis with the Government, but that proposition has never been made formally by the Virginia Power & Light Co.

Mr. SMITH of Virginia. What do you want them to do?

Mr. JACKSON of Washington. If that is the case, and they can make an offer, we can settle the whole thing right now.

Mr. GARY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SMITH of Virginia. I yield.

Mr. GARY. I said that the company has offered to accept the most favorable major contract now in force in the United States, for wheeling and firming Government power. The president of the company made that statement yesterday afternoon at 5 o'clock.

Mr. SMITH of Virginia. Therefore, Mr. Chairman, there is no question but that this amendment ought to be adopted and this item ought to be thrown out of the bill.

Mr. BARDEN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SMITH of Virginia. I yield.

Mr. BARDEN. In view of the fact that Congress laid down the policy that these transmission lines were not to be built by the Government except when absolute necessity required it in order to distribute the power, is it not strange to you that even though the Buggs Island production plant will not be available until 1952, here they are here, in 1951, before they even have any power to distribute, wanting these millions of dollars to build lines?

Mr. SMITH of Virginia. I am sorry to say it, but I am afraid that the conclusion is inescapable that the Federal Government is trying to reach out and build these transmission lines and take over as a government, the transmission of electric power.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Virginia has expired.

Mr. KIRWAN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I do not like to take the time of the Congress this afternoon, but when we say that the committee is building transmission lines, the committee is for eliminating a lot of the lines asked for in the budget. I told you that the Virginia Power & Light Co. charges the United States Government more today, every day, than they do in California or Ohio. That is going on today. That is the record. The committee did not necessarily want these transmission lines, but the Virginia Power & Light Co. would agree to give power only from 12 o'clock at midnight until 6 in the morning, at the off-peak time. We were not for this transmission line. It was only when we were forced to keep United States Government activity going. It will take 2 years to build the wind tunnel at Langley Field so the power will not be necessary until 2 years from now. It will be 2 years before we will finish Buggs Island. Two years before they will have this wind tunnel completed, and it will take that much time for the line to be completed. Its a big construction job to build such a line.

We knew what we were doing when we voted for this in committee. If the Virginia Light & Power Co. had done what was done in the six Southwestern States, and in California, Montana, and other States, if the Virginia people had even come in half fair, this transmission line would not be before the Congress today.

Mr. FURCOLO. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. KIRWAN. I yield.

Mr. FURCOLO. Corroborating what the chairman of the subcommittee just said, I think it is important to know that on page 2 of the committee report at the bottom of the page is the statement:

The Savannah River Basin program which proposed approval of 15 transmission lines has been denied entirely by the committee.

I think there can be no question. From the facts in the hearings and from the report of the committee, there is an attitude of the Members on both sides to deny any transmission line unless it was absolutely essential. And adequate evidence has been submitted to prove that they are absolutely essential. But there can be no difference of opinion on the fact that the committee itself on both sides was agreed in principle. Is that correct?

Mr. KIRWAN. That is correct.

Mr. JACKSON of Washington. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. KIRWAN. I yield.

Mr. JACKSON of Washington. I think it is important in this debate that the Members understand what this is all about. This matter has been pending for 2 years, and we are getting offers and propositions right up to the day of this debate, as late as yesterday, as to what they would give the Government by way of a fair rate. If anyone will examine the record of negotiations in this particular instance it will be very revealing and very enlightening. If it is a question of blackjacking, it is the case of the power company trying to blackjack Uncle Sam.

Mr. KIRWAN. At 5 o'clock last evening the gentleman from Virginia said the power company notified him instead of notifying the Interior Department—they are the contracting agency—not the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. GARY] and not the Congress. Why did they not notify the Department of the Interior? That Department is the bargaining agent, yet here the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. GARY] said that he is set up by the Virginia Power & Light Co. to be the bargaining agent. But the Flood Control Act of 1944 said the Interior Department should be the responsible agency, the bargaining agent in such cases.

Mr. COOLEY. I certainly did not understand the gentleman from Virginia to say he was the bargaining agent.

Mr. KIRWAN. He said they called him up at 5 o'clock last night. They did not call the Interior Department.

Mr. COOLEY. But he did not say he was the bargaining agent.

I would like to ask: Did the gentleman and his committee know that in the town of Goldsboro, or very near it, the Carolina Power & Light Co. will have

within 12 months a billion kilowatt-hours of firm electricity available? And yet you propose to build a line there.

Mr. KIRWAN. Yes. We propose to build the line, but I do not mean that I knew about that.

Mr. COOLEY. That shows the gentleman is woefully lacking in information.

Mr. KIRWAN. The thing about it is that the hearings were open to all who wanted to testify.

Mr. COOLEY. And what interest on earth has been indicated by anybody in this great development?

Mr. KIRWAN. The REA came in there.

Mr. COOLEY. The REA?

Mr. KIRWAN. Yes.

Mr. COOLEY. They did not speak for Rocky Mount, Goldsboro, Wilson, or Winston.

Mr. KIRWAN. They were speaking for themselves.

Mr. COOLEY. If your engineers had made a survey of the territory and determined that there was an inadequacy in the power available how could they have overlooked the fact that here was a reputable company which will soon have available 1,000,000,000 kilowatt-hours of firm power?

Mr. KIRWAN. Why did not the gentleman come and tell the committee that when it was having its hearings?

Mr. COOLEY. I had no opportunity or invitation to come.

Mr. KIRWAN. They were open hearings—open to all who asked to testify.

Mr. COOLEY. I would have been down there had I had any inkling that they were even thinking of such a ridiculous thing as building these lines there.

Mr. HOFFMAN of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word.

Now, Mr. Chairman, some of us have not been here all the time; perhaps some of us have not listened as carefully as we should, perhaps some of us are dumber than we ought to be, but the situation, as I get the idea, is the case of some private power company somewhere down South charging a little bit more, maybe a great deal more, I do not know, and I do not care—but they are charging more for electric current than some bureaucrat down here in Washington thinks they should; therefore, the Government is going ahead to build these lines which are not actually needed. Now, I ask the gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. COOLEY] is that what they are getting at?

Mr. COOLEY. Certainly that would be indicated by the statements that have just been made.

Mr. HOFFMAN of Michigan. Yes; and when there are restrictions on the material they will use. Permit me to say to my Republican friends over here, and some of those on my right, that if certain gentlemen on my right are genuinely thinking along the lines of economy I do not want to oppose them. I do not know any man in this House who is more able, more loyal to the people of the country, who is more patriotic than the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. RANKIN]. I do not know what sort of

contract he has for rental over here. I live in the same building on the same floor. Now, he may have an entirely different contract than I do. He said that he paid the telephone company more for his telephone service than he paid the electric light company for his lights. I might have added "than I pay them for light and gas." But I do not pay them anything for either. Both are included in my rent. I do not know whether that fits in with his situation or not.

May I ask the gentleman from New York [Mr. TABER] what the parliamentary situation is here? There are a couple of amendments pending. What is the effect of the amendments?

Mr. TABER. The first amendment was offered by the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. GARY] to strike out the whole paragraph and all money for power lines.

Mr. HOFFMAN of Michigan. How much?

Mr. TABER. Three million four hundred thousand dollars. The gentleman from Arkansas [Mr. NORRELL] offered an amendment to give them \$128,000 to build lines into towns that the gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. COOLEY] has just described. The Gary amendment would strike out the whole item.

Mr. HOFFMAN of Michigan. What does the gentleman think about that?

Mr. TABER. Well, frankly, I have never been in favor of the Government building power lines where private industry could do it. It is rather apparent that private industry can do it.

Mr. HOFFMAN of Michigan. That is the way I feel. Let us adopt the amendment. I thank the gentleman.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Arkansas [Mr. NORRELL].

The amendment was rejected.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. GARY].

The question was taken; and on a division (demanded by Mr. JACKSON of Washington) there were—ayes 135, noes 72.

So the amendment was agreed to.

Mr. BROWN of Georgia. Mr. Chairman, as I stated yesterday, I am against the Federal Government's running parallel lines to destroy private enterprise or take their customers away from them, but on the other hand, when the Government builds its own dams and makes electricity available, the Government has a right to deliver its power to an arm of the Government, especially a defense plant such as Langley Field.

The Government has acted to provide its own facilities for transmitting power from its Buggs Island power plant to its Langley Laboratory. Opponents of this action claim that the Government's lines will parallel or duplicate existing privately owned facilities. The claim is unfounded, and I wonder if it is made in an attempt to confuse and mislead.

The Government's line will run from Buggs Island eastward across Virginia to Suffolk; from Suffolk it will run northeast to Langley Field. It must carry

a load of 150,000 kilowatts in order to serve the needs of the Langley Laboratory.

The only existing east-west transmission facility anywhere nearby is a Virginia Electric & Power Co. line which starts in the vicinity of Roanoke Rapids in North Carolina. It crosses an area of North Carolina some 15 miles south of the route of the Government's line, then enters Virginia and terminates at Suffolk. By company accounting, it is capable of carrying only 60,000 kilowatts. Even this limited ability to transmit power is meaningless. Long before the movement of Buggs Island power to Langley Laboratory was ever considered, the line was well occupied with the transmission of VEPCO power to the company's customers. As a practical consideration in the movement of Buggs Island power to Langley Field, the line does not even exist.

To oppose the Government's line because of this remote, limited, and completely occupied facility is like opposing the construction of an urgently needed four-lane highway because there is already in existence a narrow, crowded country road wandering somewhere in the general region.

The company line has no relationship to the disposal of Buggs Island power. Even if it were a line of adequate capacity, unoccupied with the transmission of company power, it would still have no bearing on the disposal of Buggs Island power. Neither this line nor any other VEPCO line is available to the Government for this purpose. Despite the Government's best efforts, the company has refused to make its facilities available for the transmission of Buggs Island power at a reasonable cost to the Government.

The company has a purpose in refusing to make its facilities available to the Government for reasonable compensation. It is indicated by the haste with which it is proceeding with a line to the Buggs Island project from Chase City, a town to the north. Expecting to succeed with its issue of parallel lines and duplicating facilities, the company hopes to keep the Government bottled up at the Buggs Island power plant until power generation begins. Then it believes that the Government will settle on the company's terms, rather than to waste the power.

The only answer to this is to authorize the Federal transmission lines required to move the power away from the project to the agencies for whom the law gives a preference entitlement.

Some of the opponents of the program of transmission line construction proposed by the Southeastern Power Administration would deny to that agency the funds it requires for administration, power marketing, and system maintenance. They seek the life of the agency itself in an effort to destroy the Government's ability to market Federal power in the whole Southeast. I am glad the Georgia Power Co. of my State does not subscribe to this view.

Southeastern's area of power-marketing responsibility is of tremendous size. It covers 10 States. Within it are 3

projects at which power is being generated, 6 projects under construction from which power will begin to flow in 1952, 15 projects authorized for construction, and more than 40 projects approved for development. There are in the area more than four hundred public bodies and cooperatives to whom the law gives preference in the purchase of power. There are numerous Federal agencies, including many establishments of the Department of Defense. There are 13 private power companies with whose systems it is desirable to integrate the Government's operations under suitable agreements.

There are now but 30 people on the Southeastern Power Administration payroll. This handful of people has made only a beginning on the formidable body of work to be done before power sales can be properly handled. Study and consultation with the Corps of Engineers has been started to determine the generating capabilities of the power plants under various conditions. The quantities and kinds of power to be expected from the plants, and how their integrated operation may be accomplished for greater power benefits, is being investigated. Other work with the corps has been started for determining what allocations of project costs shall be made to power, so that rates may be set. Relationships with other electric systems, both public and private, have been established. Negotiations have been conducted on agreements for both interconnection and the use of excess capacity in existing transmission facilities. The preference agencies have been notified of their entitlements under the law, a detailed inventory of their power requirements has been started, and negotiations for the sale of power are proceeding with a large number of them. Expressions of interest in securing power for their establishments have been received from the Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, the Department of the Air Force, and a number of independent agencies concerned with the national defense. Arrangements to meet their requirements are being made. Existing contracts are being administered and power revenues are being collected and accounted for.

It is with the funds requested for administration, power marketing and system maintenance—activities which are collectively called operations and maintenance—that this work will be carried on during the coming fiscal year. It must be carried on if the investment the Government has made in these projects is to be protected. The need for an acceleration of the work cannot be too greatly emphasized. Southeastern was given a late start and has been handicapped from the outset by having to begin much fundamental work which should already have been completed. The handicap must be overcome as soon as possible. Engineering investigation, rate work, market analysis, contract negotiation—these and many other tasks must be pushed along more rapidly than ever. Southeastern is not only hard pressed to catch up with the situation it found when the agency was created; the

situation itself has continued to advance by leaps and bounds. Under the recently imposed requirements of the defense effort the Southeast is today reaching a new high of activity, and the defense effort has itself placed upon Southeastern a further element of urgency. Where there were two Federal power plants in operation at the time Southeastern was created a year ago, there are now three. Another project has moved into the authorized category. Two projects in the authorized category have been classified as defense projects and their schedules of power generation are subject to acceleration. By the end of 1954 Southeastern will have more than 1,000,000 kilowatts of installed generating capacity on the market. A conservative forecast of revenues for fiscal year 1952 anticipates receipts totaling more than \$4,000,000.

Work on the agency's basic program is performed by people paid with operation and maintenance funds:

1951: 34 people.....	\$150,000
1952: 60 people.....	300,000

They are the people required to do the involved and complicated work of investigation, calculation, study, and negotiation whether or not the agency performs construction.

Construction work is performed by people paid out of funds appropriated specifically for construction:

1951: 107 people.....	\$1,850,000
1952: 212 people.....	4,000,000

These people design the facilities to be constructed; prepare the specifications, review bids, receive, account for and spend the construction money; inspect and supervise the progress of construction work.

The agency's basic work of market survey and analysis, rate fixing, contract negotiation, and so forth, goes on whether or not there is construction of electrical facilities by the Government. Construction and operations-maintenance are two separate activities, with two separate appropriations, employing entirely different people.

The Clerk read as follows:

CONTINUING FUND, SOUTHEASTERN POWER ADMINISTRATION

All receipts from the transmission and sale of electric power and energy under the provisions of section 5 of the Flood Control Act of December 22, 1944 (16 U. S. C. 825s), generated or purchased in the southeastern power area, shall be covered into the Treasury of the United States as miscellaneous receipts, except that the Treasury shall set up and maintain from such receipts a continuing fund of \$50,000, and said fund shall be placed to the credit of the Secretary, and shall be subject to check by him to defray emergency expenses necessary to insure continuity of electric service and continuous operation of Government facilities in said area.

Mr. TACKETT. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. TACKETT: Strike out the period on line 18, page 3, following the word "area" and insert the following language: "Provided, further, That all receipts from the transmission and sale of electric power and energy under the provisions

of section 5 of the Flood Control Act of December 22, 1944 (16 U. S. C. 825a), generated or purchased by the Southwestern Power Administration, shall be covered into the Treasury of the United States as miscellaneous receipts, except that the Treasury shall set up and maintain from such receipts a continuing fund of \$250,000, and said fund shall be placed to the credit of the Secretary, and shall be subject to check by him to defray emergency expenses necessary to insure continuity of electric service and continuous operation of Government facilities in said area, and that no funds from such receipts herein appropriated or previously authorized or appropriated shall be subject to check by the Secretary for the purchase of power or lease of transmission facilities, except under these limitations relating to emergency conditions."

Mr. TRIMBLE. Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order against the amendment on the ground that it is legislation on an appropriation bill and that the language used changes the purpose of the legislation to be considered.

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman from Arkansas desire to be heard on the point of order?

Mr. TACKETT. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I contend, Mr. Chairman, that this is a limitation upon legislation and that it is germane to the provisions of the bill, because the Southwestern Power Administration and the Southeastern Power Administration are both authorized under section 5 of the Flood Control Act of December 22, 1944, and that this amendment places the Southwestern Power Administration and other such agencies under the Department of the Interior under the same provisions and entitlement so far as the continuing fund is concerned. It is certainly germane, Mr. Chairman, for the simple reason that both such agencies are set up under the Flood Control Act of 1944, and this is a limitation upon the legislation that is provided by this section of the proposal now before the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman from Iowa [Mr. JENSEN] desire to be heard on the point of order?

Mr. JENSEN. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I would like to talk on the point of order and say that this \$300,000 continuing fund was originally adopted by the Committees on Appropriations of the House and the Senate for the sole purpose of repair work and to purchase emergency power for a short time so that there would be a continuation of power. Due to the fact that the Committee on Appropriations originally adopted this item and put it in an appropriation bill, by the same token I contend it can be taken out of an appropriation bill, or limited as the gentleman from Arkansas is now attempting to do.

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman from New York [Mr. TABER] desire to be heard on the point of order?

Mr. TABER. Yes, Mr. Chairman. This is a germane amendment to the language that already appears in the legislation. While this may be legislation, the other is legislation.

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. McCORMACK] desire to be heard on the point of order?

Mr. McCORMACK. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I desire to be heard on the point of order for the purpose of making a contribution for consideration. It seems to me that this violates a fundamental rule. Under the guise of a limitation or a negative proposal you cannot impose additional affirmative duties or powers or responsibilities. The amendment of the gentleman is affirmative in nature, and a limitation cannot be utilized for that purpose.

Mr. TACKETT. Mr. Chairman, if I may make one additional observation, I would agree with the majority leader except for one thing. I contend that the legislation of which he speaks in a former appropriation bill passed by the Congress in 1950 was not permanent legislation. Therefore, this amendment would be in order to restrict legislation that was not of a permanent nature.

The CHAIRMAN (Mr. MILLS). The Chair is ready to rule.

The gentleman from Arkansas [Mr. TACKETT] has offered an amendment on page 3, line 18, to a paragraph of the bill which has to do with the continuing fund of the Southeastern Power Administration. The gentleman from Arkansas [Mr. TRIMBLE] makes a point of order against the amendment. The Chair has had an opportunity to read and analyze the amendment offered by the gentleman from Arkansas, which has to do with the generation or purchase of electric power by another agency than the Southeastern Power Administration, the Southwestern Power Administration. The amendment contains language that is clearly legislation.

In answer to the suggestion of the gentleman from New York, even though legislation may appear in an appropriation bill, that language cannot be amended by other language which adds legislation. Briefly, a proposition in an appropriation bill proposing to change existing law, but permitted to remain, may be perfected by germane amendments, but such amendments may not add legislation, and it is the opinion of the Chair that the amendment offered by the gentleman from Arkansas proposes to add legislation not authorized by law.

Therefore, the Chair sustains the point of order made by the gentleman from Arkansas [Mr. TRIMBLE].

Mr. TACKETT. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. TACKETT: On page 3, line 10, after the comma, strike out the words "generated or purchased in the southeastern power" and the word "area" and the comma of line 11, and strike out the last word of line 17, "in," and all of line 18.

Mr. JACKSON of Washington. Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order against the amendment offered by the gentleman from Arkansas on the ground that it is not germane to the matter now under consideration and that it is legislation on an appropriation bill; and that it changes the scope and purpose of the bill.

Mr. RAYBURN. Mr. Chairman, may I be heard on the point of order?

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will be glad to hear the gentleman from Texas, the Speaker of the House.

Mr. RAYBURN. I simply desire to make this statement, that if the other amendment was subject to a point of order for the reasons given by the Chair, this one certainly stands on the same footing.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will be glad to hear the gentleman from Arkansas on the point of order.

Mr. TACKETT. Mr. Chairman, I cannot see how the amendment I offer can be found to be other than a restriction on legislation of an appropriation bill. The pertinent portion of the provision is short. It reads:

All receipts from the transmission and sale of electric power and energy under the provisions of section 5 of the Flood Control Act of December 22, 1944 * * * shall be covered into the Treasury of the United States.

The only wording that is being changed by this amendment is to limit legislation of the appropriation for the simple reason that the words "generated or purchased in the southeastern power area" are sought to be stricken out.

Section 5 of the Flood Control Act covers all agencies of the Department of the Interior. Therefore, this amendment would merely restrict the language of this provision so as to provide that it would affect alike all the agencies doing business under section 5 of the Flood Control Act of 1944. If there is such a thing as being able to restrict an appropriation bill I cannot see why the amendment which I have offered is not admissible, since it restricts the appropriation bill.

The CHAIRMAN. Has the gentleman completed his statement?

Mr. TACKETT. Mr. Chairman, may I ask the gentleman to withhold the point of order so that I may be heard for a period of 5 minutes?

Mr. KIRWAN. Mr. Chairman, we cannot withhold the point of order.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Ohio has refused to withhold the point of order.

Mr. TABER. Mr. Chairman, may I be heard?

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from New York may proceed.

Mr. TABER. Mr. Chairman, the amendment offered by the gentleman from Arkansas, as I understand it, strikes out in line 10 the words "generated or purchased in the southeastern power area." The word "area" appears in line 11. And in lines 17 and 18 words "in said area." How it can be improper or be construed as creating legislation to strike out words is beyond me. It seems to me that any Member has the right to offer an amendment to strike out the whole or any part of the language, and this amendment is entirely in the nature of striking out specific words which appear in the paragraph.

Mr. JACKSON of Washington. Mr. Chairman, may I be heard very briefly on this question?

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman may proceed.

Mr. JACKSON of Washington. On page 3, starting on line 7 the bill provides:

All receipts from the transmission and sale of electric power and energy under the provisions of section 5 of the Flood Control Act * * * and so on "shall be covered into the Treasury of the United States."

What we have here is a situation where the amendment would have the effect of widening the scope and purpose of the bill. At the present time it is limited to the southeastern power area, but if the amendment is adopted, then the provision would be applicable throughout the country. Cannon's Precedents, under Germaneness, volume 8, pages 2917 and 2921 states in part:

But if the effect of the striking out of such language so affects the scope and import of the text as to present a different subject from the one under consideration it is not germane.

So, Mr. Chairman, it would seem under the Precedents that the effect of the gentleman's amendment would be that it is not germane because it widens the scope and purpose of the bill.

Mr. TACKETT. Mr. Chairman, may I be heard, to make but one further observation?

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair is pleased to hear the gentleman.

Mr. TACKETT. Mr. Chairman, my amendment does nothing except to strike a portion of legislation in the appropriation bill. It does that and nothing more, it is restrictive in nature and in its scope and therefore it is admissible. There is no question about the germaneness. No one has raised the question of it being germane. Therefore, the amendment is in order.

Mr. JACKSON of Washington. Mr. Chairman, my point of order is based on two grounds, one as to its germaneness, and second, that it is legislation on an appropriation bill.

Mr. McCORMACK. Mr. Chairman, may I be heard on the point of order?

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Massachusetts may proceed.

Mr. McCORMACK. The main language in this provision, as I see it, is in "the Southeastern Power area." The provisions are limited to one area. The striking out of language by this amendment extends it to other areas. There have been many rulings to the effect that even if an amendment is related to the bill or to the provision of a bill which is confined to one subject it is not in order to offer an amendment which would widen the scope and purpose of the bill. We have such a precedent in the old Territories decision where a bill which was reported out of committee, having for its purpose the admission of one Territory to the Union, could not be amended by an amendment to the bill to admit two Territories to the Union. It was held in the old Territories decision that such an amendment was not germane and would be subject to a point of order.

If the bill is reported out to admit two territories, then an amendment to admit a third one would be in order. But this is confined to one subject.

It seems to me that in addition to the other reasons, the line of rulings to which I have called attention would apply to the point of order raised by the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. KIRWAN].

The CHAIRMAN (Mr. MILLS). The Chair is ready to rule.

The gentleman from Arkansas [Mr. TACKETT] offered an amendment on page 3 to certain language in lines 10 and 11 and 17 and 18 of the paragraph of the bill "Continuing fund, Southeastern Power Administration." The amendment offered by the gentleman from Arkansas [Mr. TACKETT] would, as pointed out by the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. McCORMACK] in his able discussion of the point, enlarge the scope of the language contained on page 3 of the bill.

Cannon's Procedure in the House, on page 12, in the last paragraph on the page, reads:

While an amendment proposing to strike out cannot ordinarily be ruled out of order as not germane, if the effect of striking out the language so effects the scope and import of the text as to present a subject different from that under consideration, it is not germane.

The amendment offered by the gentleman from Arkansas [Mr. TACKETT] clearly enlarges the scope of the language contained on page 3 beginning in line 7.

The gentleman from Washington [Mr. JACKSON] makes a point of order against the amendment on the ground that it is legislation and is not germane. The Chair is constrained to sustain the point of order made by the gentleman from Washington on the grounds which the Chair has stated.

The point of order is sustained.

The Clerk will read.

The Clerk read as follows:

CONSTRUCTION, SOUTHWESTERN POWER ADMINISTRATION

For construction and acquisition of transmission lines, substations, and appurtenant facilities, and for administrative expenses connected therewith, in carrying out the provisions of section 5 of the Flood Control Act of 1944 (16 U. S. C. 825a), as applied to the southwestern power area, to remain available until expended, \$3,925,000, of which not to exceed \$600,000 is for liquidation of obligations incurred pursuant to authority previously granted.

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. HARRIS: Page 4, line 1, after the word "expanded" and the comma, strike out "\$3,925,000" and insert "\$3,375,000."

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, this amendment is an effort to reduce in some small way the burden and load of the taxpayer. It does not handicap or adversely affect the program or service of the Southwestern Power Administration.

This amendment conforms to the principle stated by members of the subcommittee, including the distinguished chairman, the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. KIRWAN], a few minutes ago. It was stated that the committee did not approve any funds for the agencies except when the need was specifically shown. I propose in this bill to reduce the appro-

priation by \$550,000. That is all. You might say, "Why would you want to reduce this bill by \$550,000?"

If there has been any one promise made to the taxpayers of this country, it is the reduction of unnecessary expenditures in our Federal budget. If there ever was a time when Federal expenditures unrelated to our national defense should be reduced to the bone, it is now. At the beginning of this year, when the budget for the next fiscal year was presented, emphasis on unnecessary expenditures was made.

Here is an opportunity to do something about reducing nonessential expenditures and without interfering with any part of our program that could by any stretch of the imagination or contention be considered a part of the national defense program. This amendment proposes to reduce the amount made available for the Southwestern Power Administration by \$550,000 from that proposed in the bill.

The budget request for the next fiscal year was \$4,100,000 for construction. The committee bill reports \$3,925,000. The committee reduced the budget request by \$175,000 by eliminating the proposed purchase of the Denison-Payne transmission line. However, Mr. Chairman, this is no reduction, because provision is made in the bill for the transfer of the line without exchange of funds.

I do appreciate the effort of the committee to reduce the over-all appropriation of the Interior Department bill for the next fiscal year. I want to commend the committee, because I know they have had a difficult task. Even though substantial reduction in the over-all bill has been made from that appropriated last year, many of us believe there can be other reductions made without seriously affecting services considered to be necessary in this emergency.

Mr. Chairman, there are two items that this reduction would specifically refer to. The bill carries with it in this appropriation \$500,000 to replenish a miscellaneous construction fund. There has been no definite need shown for this item. It is true that heretofore when our budgetary situation appeared to be less critical the Congress appropriated a similar fund for the agency. During the current year that fund has largely been spent to meet the cost of two short transmission lines deemed necessary.

Now it is proposed in this bill to merely replenish this fund. It is a blanket authority of funds made available in this amount for the Southwestern Power Administration to construct transmission lines at any place at any time they deem it necessary.

Now, if the committee is correct in what it said a moment ago they will accept this amendment, because they said a moment ago that they were going on the principle that no item for construction would be permitted by the committee unless there was a specific need shown. That is what I am trying to do.

I will be glad to yield to my colleague from Arkansas, a member of the committee.

Mr. NORRELL. I cannot speak for the committee, but I do not believe that

the item should be allowed. I feel that the gentleman's amendment ought to be adopted.

Mr. HARRIS. I thank the gentleman, and I believe the Members of this House should accept this amendment if we are ever going to prove to the people of this country that we are going to do something about reducing the tax burden.

In the hearings, on page 131, Mr. Douglas G. Wright, the Administrator of the Southwestern Power Administration said with reference to the miscellaneous construction program which the committee heretofore granted and the Congress appropriated, that—

The committee had some misgivings, and I remember discussions with the committee concerning the specific use of those funds.

The agency had been given \$1,000,000 for this miscellaneous construction fund. Mr. Wright said they have until this current year never used a dollar of that appropriation. They found it necessary, it seems, to use approximately \$500,000 and are now asking this amount to replenish the fund. They want, so Mr. Wright says, this miscellaneous construction fund "back to the level it previously held, and requires an appropriation of approximately \$500,000."

If there was a specific need justifying this appropriation for the construction or extension of any line, then the Congress would have opportunity to consider the need or desirability of the expenditure.

If there ever was, Mr. Chairman, a budget year, when appropriations should be restricted to specific and urgent needs, this is the year. Furthermore this agency asks for an additional \$100,000 for plans and specifications for future programs. As it is with all agencies who wish to get funds from the Public Treasury, they attempt to justify this planning for defense needs. They were given \$50,000. They are now back here asking for just twice that much.

This amendment reduces the amount identical to that which was appropriated in last year's appropriation. To me this seems to be fair. It seems to be justified, and if we mean what we say when we talk about reducing expenditures, this reduction should be made.

Many of us in this House are familiar with the controversies which have existed over the Southwestern Power Administration since it was created by an Executive order within the Department of Interior, for the purpose of marketing power from flood-control power dams in the Southwest. We are familiar with the fact that the Southwestern Power Administration proposed its super-colossal program to invade the entire Southwest and completely destroy private power in that area and the operation of free enterprise in the electric power industry.

We recall in 1946 the Congress was asked to authorize such an extensive construction program, but the Congress refused. Since then, controversy over this agency and its operation has raged back and forth. When they came to the Congress and showed specifically the lines necessary to connect these dams

in the marketing of the power under the Flood Control Act, appropriations on those specific projects were made.

This amendment is in keeping with that principle and it saves over one-half million dollars in our budget. This does not enter into the controversy as to the usurpation of authority given this agency, but it merely reduces this amount of money and carries out the pledge to the taxpayers that we are going to reduce these expenditures wherever we can.

We have before us for this next fiscal year a budget of \$71,600,000,000. We have been requested to impose another \$16,000,000,000 tax burden on the taxpayers of this country. I know this reduction is a very small amount, but there will be other proposed reductions, not only in this bill but other bills as they come along. A lot of these reductions, wherever they can be made, will reduce this tax burden in the over-all program.

The people of this country do not mind paying taxes and providing funds for the national defense. They are highly conscious of the continuing expansions by the planners and the wasting of money through expenditures by nondefense agencies.

Therefore, this one item becomes important, and together with the many others will help to do something about this tremendous burden. I hope this amendment is adopted.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas [Mr. RAYBURN], the Speaker of the House.

Mr. RAYBURN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, this is part of the same old fight. When the first appropriation was up with reference to the Southwestern Power Administration I said some things to this House and told them what I thought would happen. It has happened exactly that way. I said that in the making of appropriations for the Southwestern Power Administration we who were interested in it, who lived in it, did not belong to either class of the two that are prevalent in some sections of the country; we did not belong to the crowd that thinks there should be no public power, nor did we belong to the other crowd that does not think there should be any private power. Working together they could perform a great service to the people of this country.

I also said at that time that we did not intend to use any money to go out and confiscate anybody's property, that where a utility company had a line and they would carry our power at a reasonable rate no lines would be paralleled and none have been paralleled.

After that the Texas Power & Light Co., that I had a little brush with in about 1935 on the Utility Holding Company Act, and again in the campaign of 1936—sometimes people do not think one-party States have politics, but if you live there you find out—and the Southwestern Power Administration made a contract that has been confirmed and has been carried on for several years. The Southwestern Power Administration says that the Texas Power & Light Co. has kept every part of its contract. The

Texas Power & Light Co. says that the Southwestern Power Administration has kept every part of its contract.

The Texas Power & Light Co., a great utility, was criticized rather severely for making this contract. It was criticized in Oklahoma, but since then both of the power companies in Oklahoma, the Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co. and the Public Service Co. of Oklahoma, have come in and made a similar contract.

This leaves out only the Arkansas Power & Light Co. that is still against the Southwestern Power Administration. It has refused to make a contract with the Southwestern Power Administration because that contract has been offered to them on similar terms. They are still archaic enough to think they can kill public power. These other more enlightened companies are willing to deal fairly and justly with this Government set-up and they are getting along in fine fashion.

This is a demonstration in the United States of America where private enterprise and Government can get along together, both of them wanting to be fair and just, and making contracts and living up to them. Some people still want to kill these contracts, some people still want to cripple the Southwestern Power Administration. The amendment offered by the gentleman from Arkansas [Mr. TACKETT], of course, would have crippled and would have probably destroyed the Southwestern Power Administration which in turn would have destroyed this contract. The amendment offered by the gentleman from Arkansas [Mr. HARRIS] is a crippling amendment and should not be adopted because we are getting along down in that section of the country. Let me repeat that both sides, being fair, we have been able to make this demonstration.

I do trust that this crippling amendment will not be adopted by the Committee. Let us go along in an even fashion like we have been and serve the great Southwest as these power companies and the Southwestern Power Administration have been doing in the past.

Mr. SHORT. Mr. Chairman, I offer a substitute amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Substitute amendment offered by Mr. SHORT: On page 4, line 1, strike out "\$3,925,000" and insert in lieu thereof "\$988,750" and on page 4, line 3, strike out the period and insert in lieu thereof the following: "Provided, That this appropriation shall not be expended for the construction of facilities designated as comprising the western Missouri project."

Mr. SHORT. Mr. Chairman, surely all of us want more power and cheaper power. I voted for the original passage of REA. I have consistently and repeatedly voted for continuing appropriations for rural electrification. This is not a partisan matter.

I would like to remind Members that in the Eightieth Congress that was controlled by the Republicans we voted \$100,000,000 more for rural electrification than was asked for by the President and his Director of the Budget, although they had on hand and on tap many funds unexpended. We were asked in

the Eightieth Congress to vote \$300,000,000 for REA, and we voted \$400,000,000.

I think the Speaker is absolutely right when he says we should have both public and private power in this country. Of course, the Government owns the navigable streams. The original intention of REA was to develop hydroelectric power and distribute it in the rural regions of our country which could not or would not be supplied by private companies. But it was never the intention of the Congress when we passed the REA to go out and build steam plants to retail this power developed at the taxpayers expense not only to individuals but even to great industries and corporations.

I have no objection to the building of these dams, but I do object to the Southwestern Power Administration, the REA, or any other Government agency going into any State or congressional district or locality of this Nation and constructing parallel and duplicating lines. I will have to challenge the statement that the Speaker made. The lines that are proposed in this western Missouri project will parallel and duplicate existing lines that adequately supply the needs of all the people in that region.

Mr. RAYBURN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SHORT. Gladly.

Mr. RAYBURN. I stated what had happened in the Southwest, and it happened exactly like I said. But, if the time comes when the people who own the lines will not transmit electricity to preferred customers or will not carry the Government power at a reasonable rate, then that would be another story. I do not know exactly what the situation is in the section of the country from which the gentleman comes.

Mr. SHORT. I think perhaps I know my district—I like to think I do—as well as any Member of this House knows his, and if there had been any need for this proposed project, certainly I would have heard about it. Never have I had one single individual or corporation or firm ask me to extend this line. I am not out to liquidate REA. I do not want to see REA swallowed by the SPA. I think they are two different propositions. I am not out to liquidate SPA but I do not want to see SPA come into my district and liquidate the Empire District Electric Co. which was established years ago and operated by honest and able men, that has furnished all the domestic needs that we have requirements for at this moment. We do not have any Langley fields or shipbuilding yards or munition plants or giant defense industries down there that are demanding additional electricity. We are now furnished by this private company at a reasonable rate all that is required and needed, and they are offering good service. I do not think we have had a black-out but three times in the past 10 years, and that was due to an act of God when lightning struck.

The Empire District quickly repaired any damage done within a few minutes, which is much better, I think, than any Federal bureaucracy could do.

Mr. Chairman, the Empire District Electric Co. at Joplin, Mo., with its

steam plant at Riverton, Kans., and its hydroelectric plant at Ozark Beach, Mo., on Lake Taneycomo, has given us excellent service. The people who own this plant are not millionaires. There are hundreds and even several thousand stockholders, some of whom are widows and orphans. These good people have invested their life's savings in this enterprise, and we do not want to see it liquidated. Every good, decent American should be entitled to a just return on his honest investment on a legal and legitimate enterprise.

Yet there are some among us who would want to follow the disastrous course of Britain by penalizing thrift, industry, and economy.

As I said yesterday, Great Britain has nationalized her banks, her coal, her electric power, her railroads, her communications and transmission system—and now in a moderate way she has nationalized steel. I have no quarrel with them because it is a remnant of human liberty to remain unimproved.

If Britain wants state socialism, she is welcome to it, though it has proved a dismal failure—but I do not think the American taxpayers should foot the bill for her noble experiments in state socialism. If Russia wants communism, she is entitled to it, but we want none of it here. Sometimes I think I should be a Communist because I have nothing and I am willing to share it with everybody.

O Mr. Chairman, how long must we suffer before we learn a little? It is as necessary for us to fight our enemies on the home front as it is on the foreign battlefield.

Mr. DONDERO. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SHORT. I yield to the gentleman from Michigan.

Mr. DONDERO. Exactly what the gentleman was saying was the principle involved in the North Carolina-Virginia contest which we disposed of here about an hour ago.

Mr. SHORT. Absolutely. We did justice to North Carolina and Virginia today. All I am asking you today is to do justice to Missouri.

Is it not strange that I, a Member of this House, should come here and ask you not to spend the taxpayers' money in my own district? We do not need it, it is unnecessary, and you will absolutely liquidate private enterprise in that region. God help us to help our own. The Empire District employs thousands of people, pays hundreds of thousands of dollars in taxes, and we want to keep our country American.

Mr. TACKETT. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word.

Mr. Chairman, I likewise believe in public power and private power. I have never insisted upon anything to the contrary. The only purpose of the amendments I have introduced has been to try to prohibit the Southwestern Power Administration from doing exactly what Congress has told it that it could not do.

The Southwestern Power Administration came before this Congress and asked for money with which to build steam-generating plants and a web of trans-

mission lines, and Congress told it emphatically, "No; you cannot have the money for that purpose."

Remember, the Southwestern Power Administration is an agency for the purpose of marketing electricity produced at multiple-purpose dams owned by the Government. That Administration came back to Congress and asked for the same power-generation moneys, and Congress said "No." Then what did it do? The Southwestern Power Administration went over here and got hold of the executive manager of the National Rural Electric Cooperative Associations and came forth with a scheme to circumvent Congress.

Incidentally, I should like to add here that I have never yet voted against an REA appropriation or anything that would be beneficial to the REA's. I was a member of the Arkansas State Legislature in 1936, when the REA was authorized to do business in the State of Arkansas through legislative action, and I actively assisted the promotion of the program. The SPA plan called for several rural electric co-ops joining together, borrowing money from the Federal Government through the National Rural Electrification Administration, and then building steam-power units and transmission lines for the sole use and benefit of the SPA.

You remember, the Southwestern Power Administration can own transmission lines because it is a marketing agency of electricity. Therefore, the contract between the Southwestern Power Administration and the super co-op provides that from the day those lines are constructed in the name of REA the Southwestern Power Administration shall have an option to purchase them, or they can use these lines for a period of 40 years by merely paying necessary rentals to repay the cost of constructing and operating the lines.

The Congress has never given the Southwestern Power Administration authority to own a steam-power unit. Therefore, the contract provides that the fee simple title to these generating plants shall remain in the name of the super co-ops, but they are to be used solely for the benefit of and even to be paid for by the Southwestern Power Administration. Every speck of the electricity is to be sold to the Southwestern Power Administration. The Southwestern Power Administration determines the amount of electricity that is to be produced. Incidentally, they are going to produce about five times as much as those co-ops down there can use. You know what the balance of the power is going to be used for. It is to put private enterprise out of business.

Is this Congress going to tell the Southwestern Power Administration, "You cannot have our sanction to build steam power plants and transmission lines, but you can go through the back-door method and get from this Congress exactly what we refused to give you"? That is all in the world my amendments have proposed to do. This is just to make Congress declare straight-forward decisions rather than allow the back-door method of circumventing Congress

and then being in the position of telling our people, "No, we did not give them money to do it. They just figured out a scheme, and they have done it anyway against our protest." Surely Congress is not afraid to vote for or against these generating and transmission facilities.

The continuing fund is being used to obtain the use of the very facilities this Congress has refused them. I merely wish to curb and restrict the use of such funds to the expressed intentions of the purposes therefor when the funds were granted.

There are four systems of operation for the electric-power business: One is by private industry, which is the stock company, and the REA co-op. Another is locally-owned public-power plants. The third is multiple-purpose and hydroelectric dams owned by the Federal Government. The fourth is the only vicious one. That is where the Government produces the electricity and then rather than selling it wholesale to the REA co-ops, public bodies, locally owned public-power projects and private power companies, they go out and market it in competition with private enterprise and the Rural Electric co-ops and the locally-owned public-power agency. That is the only one which is vicious and the only one that I have ever protested. I do not believe that a monopoly of a necessity should be operated by the Federal Government.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Arkansas has expired.

Mr. TRIMBLE. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the pro forma amendment.

Mr. Chairman, of course I feel a little bit timid to rise to speak against three of my colleagues from Arkansas, and my neighbor, the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. SHORT].

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. TRIMBLE. I yield.

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman may have two additional minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Arkansas?

There was no objection.

Mr. HARRIS. I should like to say that I appreciate the gentleman yielding, that I have the greatest respect for our beloved Speaker of anybody in this Congress.

Mr. RAYBURN. May I say to the gentleman that that respect is mutual.

Mr. HARRIS. I appreciate that. I want him to know that in offering this amendment it is not the intention of trampling on anybody's toes and it is not the intention to do anything which would in any way interfere with the needed requirements of the Southwestern Power Administration, nor is there any intention of becoming involved in the great controversy which might exist between the private and public power advocates with reference to the operation of the Southwestern Power Administration. This is merely, I would like to say to our dear beloved Speaker, an attempt

to try to reduce an appropriation bill where there was no specific justification shown in the hearings by the Administrator; and it does not at all hinder or handicap or cripple anything that Mr. Douglas Wright said to this committee when he came before it as to any specific line anywhere. I hope our distinguished Speaker will accept that as being a sincere and honest statement.

Mr. RAYBURN. I certainly accept any statement made by the gentleman from Arkansas as being sincere and honest. I do not think there is a finer man or more honest man in the House of Representatives. But after all he says and after considering what Douglas Wright said, and so forth, the committee in its wisdom did recommend this provision.

Mr. TRIMBLE. Mr. Chairman, as a rule I do not take up much of the time of the committee, and I shall not take a great deal of it now. But if this agency, the Southwestern Power Administration, which is a marketing agency for the hydroelectric power, the Government power generated at the dams in our section, is hamstrung or killed, the Members will be cutting the throat of the REA movement in Arkansas.

Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. TRIMBLE. I yield.

Mr. ALBERT. I would like to add, also, it would kill the REA movement in Oklahoma.

Mr. TRIMBLE. I thank the gentleman from Oklahoma.

Mr. Chairman, I have been interested in the REA movement from its inception. I know what a struggle we had with the local private companies to get a rate which would permit us to serve enough customers to pay the interest and loan and at the same time serve the rural people of my section. We fought the rate down from 18 mills to 5.6. I would not be so nervous about this amendment or at the apparent attitude here to hamstringing the Southwestern Power Administration if there were not already pending before the Public Service Commission of the State of Arkansas a petition by local power companies asking to raise the rates of the REA co-ops. If you kill this appropriation, if you kill this marketing agency, I am just as certain as I am standing here that more than 10,000 rural people in the district which I represent, who are not now served, will not get electric service. I shall not stand here and see it killed without protesting both vocally and with my vote.

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. TRIMBLE. I yield.

Mr. HARRIS. I appreciate what the gentleman has said about REA, and certainly his feeling toward REA is no different from mine. Can the gentleman construe the amendment I have offered, reducing the appropriation by \$500,000, where no specific need is shown at all for REA or anybody else, as trying to cut the throat of REA? I am simply trying to reduce an appropriation where there is no specific need shown; not to do anything that might hinder any project

where there is specific need shown for it. That is what the record shows, and I am trying to do that by this amendment.

Mr. TRIMBLE. Of course, the committee has studied this carefully. They have listened to all the evidence and it is their conviction that this amount is necessary for the orderly processes of the agency that markets Federal power in our section.

Mr. RAYBURN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. TRIMBLE. I yield.

Mr. RAYBURN. Further than that, the substitute offered by the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. SHORT] not only reduces it \$500,000, but it cuts out all of the \$3,925,000 except \$925,000. How they are going to operate here, there, or anywhere without any part of this appropriation is just a little more than I can understand. The gentleman offers as a part of his amendment language saying that none of this could be used in this section. That is a horse of another color. If he does not want any of this money used to build transmission lines in his district that may be all right, but why should he want to cut out more than three-quarters of the appropriation for this Southwestern Power Administration?

Mr. SHORT. Because of this. Here are existing transmission lines in Oklahoma, Arkansas, and Missouri. The Southwestern Power Administration proposes to build right on top of it this line as shown in this diagram. I say that with the tremendous debt we are now carrying, with the corresponding taxes we are paying, with the acute shortage of critical and strategic materials, like copper and aluminum, this is no time to embark on such a vicious scheme.

Mr. RAYBURN. How old is that chart which the gentleman has in his hand?

Mr. SHORT. This is up to date.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Arkansas [Mr. TRIMBLE] has expired.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman may proceed for two additional minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

Mr. TRIMBLE. Let me say that our people in northwest Arkansas, those people who are being served by REA and those who are not able to secure services by reason of inability to get certain contracts are also paying taxes.

Mr. POAGE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. TRIMBLE. I yield.

Mr. POAGE. The power company in my city is now asking for increase in rates. There is no competition in my town. The REA cannot serve a city of 100,000 population. Just outside of the city the REA does offer competition and uses power from the Southwestern Power Authority along with other power, much of it bought from the Texas Power & Light Co. There is no request for an increase in rates outside the city limits. Why do you suppose that happens?

Mr. TRIMBLE. Simply because when you take competition out of any in-

dustry you have just the situation that you have mentioned. So if you adopt this amendment and hamstringing the Southwestern Power Administration you are dooming REA co-ops in Arkansas to noncompetition, to one source of supply, and that is always dangerous in any business.

Mr. RAYBURN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. TRIMBLE. I yield.

Mr. RAYBURN. I desire to say in reply to the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. SHORT] that under the contract made between the Southwestern Power Administration and these power companies they do not intend to parallel a single line that is in existence. But under that contract when a new line is proposed the power company goes out and makes the survey and determines whether it will be economical for them and beneficial to them to build the line to carry the power. If they decide that it is not beneficial to them then they ask Mr. Douglas Wright of the Southwestern Power Administration to build that line. Now, that is the low-down and the truth on this matter.

There will not be a line built paralleling anybody; there is no provision for it in this; there is no scheme for such a thing; and the only time the Southwestern Power Administration will build a line is when the private company says: "You build that line; we do not want to."

Mr. SHORT. Now the Southwestern Power Administration has already negotiated contracts with companies in both Texas and Oklahoma.

Mr. RAYBURN. Exactly.

Mr. SHORT. And in another instance they wanted to negotiate a contract and tried to furnish power at a better rate but they could not get a contract.

Mr. RAYBURN. Let me say that if the Texas Power & Light Co. could do it economically, or the two Oklahoma companies, they would be right down there ready and trying to negotiate that contract. I know that.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word.

Mr. Chairman, I believe I am reliably informed as to a very important point I would like to make. I made some investigation in regard to it. My understanding is that not one dime of this money, not one penny, is for new construction, but that it is to build that which has already been started. There are no new starts whatsoever. That is the information I have, and, if it be correct, certainly we would be doing grave injustice, it seems to me, to decrease the amount the committee has allowed, for we would find ourselves in the position of having some transmission lines that have been started and stopping them right in the middle of the construction, which would be a great waste of public funds. I think we had better be careful on this amendment and check that point. I suggest that you give that consideration.

Mr. Chairman, as to these private utility companies, quite often they make

mistakes on their calculations. Some little time ago I led the fight, because it involved my home district, for funds to build a steam generating plant at Anadarko, Okla., for the Western Electric REA, costing some \$12,500,000. I believe it is about 25 percent completed at this time. At that time the private power representatives down in my area said that if you put in the plant, you put us out of business. I told them there was no effort on my part to put them out of business and in my judgment it would not have that effect. I agree with our beloved Speaker on his position in this matter. I said to them: "There is no effort on our part to put you out of business." "But," they said, "you will put us out of business if you build this plant." Well, we got the Government loan, and the plant is being built. Since that time those same gentlemen are now building one of the biggest private generating plants between the Mississippi River and the Rocky Mountains right in that same area, and here is a picture of their plant to be built and here is an article in the paper in which they say:

PUBLIC SERVICE CO. TO BUILD BIG POWER STATION—LARGEST SINGLE STEAM ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT WILL BE BUILT NORTH OF ANADARKO

One of the largest single steam generating units between the Mississippi River and the Rocky Mountains will be installed in the new Southwestern power station located on the Washita River between Chickasha and Clinton, Okla., by the Public Service Co. of Oklahoma, R. K. Lane, president, announced this week.

After we won the victory against private power company opposition and after we started building the plant for REA they come along by their actions and say: "We were in error about that and we are going to put up the biggest plant we ever had." Obviously it must be a good financial investment or they would not build it. So they have evidently come to the conclusion that there is a dearth of electricity; that we need more and more electricity and that there is plenty of room both for Government and for private power. Now they come along and corroborate the theory I had at that time and refute their own.

Mr. POAGE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MORRIS. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. POAGE. Is that duplication?

Mr. MORRIS. No; it is an addition.

Mr. POAGE. We have been told that it is a duplication when the public puts in facilities to provide the needed plants and transmission lines. No one has suggested that it might be duplication if a private company puts in facilities in the area where there is public power. We have been led to believe that there is no duplication when a private company builds a plant after a Government-financed agency has provided adequate power. That it is not duplication according to the arguments just made. Is that not what we have heard all afternoon?

Mr. MORRIS. That is something of what we have heard all afternoon, but it is not duplication, I may say to the gentleman from Texas, it is an addition, and that addition is absolutely essential and necessary to the well being of this Nation. Right now, Mr. Chairman, it seems to me to be a mighty poor time to be slowing down the development of electric power because of the international situations that exist. We not only need it, from the domestic standpoint, even if there were no bad international situations existing, even though there were no war nor rumors of war, we would still need it. We certainly need it under present circumstances.

Mr. POAGE. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last two words.

Mr. Chairman, the gentleman has just discussed the question of rates and the question of duplication. There has been considerable discussion of the matter of duplication. What those of us who would like to see the Southwestern Power Administration continued in its present operation would like to do is avoid any unnecessary duplications. We believe we have established a program in Texas that results in a minimum of needless duplications. Throughout those areas in which it has been possible to establish the Texas Power & Light type of contract there is none of the type of duplication to which Members from other areas have referred. Under that contract, as the Speaker of the House has so well pointed out, the power company assumes both the obligation and the opportunity to provide the transmission of power if it cares to do so. If it does not care to build new transmission lines as needed, then and only then is there any construction of publicly owned lines by the Southwestern Power Administration.

I submit that in the State of Texas, which is a rather fair-sized State, the Southwestern Power Administration, since it entered into the contract with the Texas Power & Light Co., has been required to build a minimum of lines. I challenge any Member of this House to point to any excessive mileage of construction in the State of Texas by the Southwestern Power Administration since the contract with the Texas Power & Light Co. And yet under this contract where the public and the private agencies work together, it is possible to retain the advantage of competition in rates.

Is it not passing strange that in those two States in which the private power companies have entered into that kind of contract the Southwestern Power Administration has found it unnecessary to enter into a large construction program and the private companies are distributing the power? That has been taking place in Texas for some time and it is beginning to take place in Oklahoma. The two States in the Southwestern Power Administration area where the private power companies have refused to enter into such a contract are faced with the proposition of somebody's having to build some more lines because

they do not have enough lines to carry the current.

The question now is, Are you going to give the private power companies in those States a monopoly or are you going to give the people of those States an opportunity to have a competitive situation that will bring them a lower rate? I do not think I need argue the case. I think it might be sufficient to call attention to just one interesting fact, that all afternoon you have not heard one man come on this floor from either Texas or from Oklahoma, where we have a fair contract with the power companies, and where there is a minimum of duplication, and criticize the Southwestern Power Administration. On the other hand, all of the criticism has come from those States where there is no such contract between the power company and the Southwestern Power Administration, and they are the very States where you are getting duplication. If you want to stop duplication and if you want to give the people the cheapest power with the minimum of investment on everybody's part, then let us give the Southwestern Power Administration an opportunity to go ahead.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Texas has expired.

Mr. HOFFMAN of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the pro forma amendment.

Mr. Chairman, it is always very interesting to hear the gentleman from Mississippi and the gentleman from Texas complain about the bureaucrats as they do when they charge they are persecuting and robbing the cotton farmers. The bureaucrats are all bad and so are the Government agencies when they interfere with the cotton boys, or, I might add, with the growers, handlers, or processors of tobacco or peanuts. But suddenly here the bureaucrats are all right when they wish to build dams, power plants, or put a few corporations out of business. No wonder the gentlemen from Virginia and another Southern State yell when the stockholders of some of these companies are being squeezed by the bureaucrats. The Federal men, the agencies they run, can do this, that, and the other at far less cost than the fellow who has actually been doing it on his own account and at a profit for a long, long time—or can they? In fact, after listening to those gentlemen, I have been almost convinced this afternoon, but I will have to think it over tonight before I finally reach the conclusion that the Washington agencies here know more about everything and can do everything better than can those who operate at a reasonable profit and pay the taxes which make the agencies run. We may need more electricity if we follow along in the line of the present administration. Some folks may have to sit up nights reading those casualty lists before we get through it—yes; we may, if Acheson has his way.

But what I was wondering about was what the gentleman from Missouri was trying to tell us about these power lines and whether the administrators agreed with the opposition here. Can the gentleman advise us about that?

Mr. SHORT. Yes. The Administrator, I think, is the one who has talked to the committee.

I do not think the people want it, and, if the gentleman would yield, I would like to read from a letter.

Mr. HOFFMAN of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent for one additional minute.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Michigan?

There was no objection.

Mr. HOFFMAN of Michigan. I yield to the gentleman from Missouri.

Mr. SHORT. On August 18, 1950, D. C. McKee, president of the Empire District Electric Co., wrote to Mr. Douglas Wright, Administrator, Southwestern Power Administration, and in his letter he said:

Now that the contract has been made between the Administration and the electric utilities in Oklahoma, this company desires, as soon as practicable, to consummate a similar contract with the Government.

Then Mr. Wright, in answer to Mr. McKee, among other things, said in his letter:

We believe the Oklahoma contract is going to work and this administration proposes to do everything within its power to secure its success. When the contract has demonstrated beyond any doubt that it is a workable arrangement, and that it would be in the best interest of the Government to extend it to other areas in the Southwest, it would then seem only reasonable that we would be interested in undertaking negotiations with you.

Mr. HOFFMAN of Michigan. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. SHORT. Mr. Chairman, after talking to our beloved Speaker and my good friend the gentleman from Arkansas, and having no desire to scuttle the SPA because I do not want to liquidate the company in my district, I ask unanimous consent to withdraw my substitute amendment and offer the second part of it, on page 4, line 3, to strike out the period and insert in lieu thereof the following: "Provided, That this appropriation shall not be expended for the construction of facilities designated as comprising the western Missouri project."

I would offer that second part of my substitute amendment as an amendment to the amendment offered by the gentleman from Arkansas [Mr. HARRIS].

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Missouri?

There was no objection.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair might state that the gentleman from Missouri should offer his amendment after the amendment offered by the gentleman from Arkansas is disposed of. It would be better that way. The amendment offered by the gentleman from Arkansas has reference to the figures on line 1, page 4, and the gentleman from Missouri offers an amendment of a different sort.

Mr. SHORT. Then, if I may be permitted to offer it at the proper time, I would like to do so.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will recognize the gentleman from Missouri in due course.

The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Arkansas [Mr. HARRIS].

The question was taken; and on a division (demanded by Mr. JACKSON of Washington) there were—ayes 132, noes 89.

Mr. JACKSON of Washington. Mr. Chairman, I demand tellers.

Tellers were ordered; and the Chairman appointed as tellers Mr. JACKSON of Washington and Mr. HARRIS.

The Committee again divided; and the tellers reported that there were—ayes 149, noes 87.

So the amendment was agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. SHORT].

Mr. SHORT. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. SHORT: On page 4, line 3, strike out the period and insert in lieu thereof "Provided, That this appropriation shall not be expended for the construction of facilities designated as comprising the western Missouri project."

Mr. KIRWAN. Mr. Chairman, I accept the amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the amendment is agreed to.

There was no objection.

Mr. TACKETT. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. TACKETT: Page 4, line 3, after the word "granted", strike out the period, insert a semicolon and the following: "And no additional funds from any other source shall be expended for these purposes."

Mr. JACKSON of Washington. Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order against the amendment offered by the gentleman from Arkansas [Mr. TACKETT] on the ground the amendment is not germane and that it is legislation on an appropriation bill. I make the further point of order, Mr. Chairman, that it goes beyond the scope of the bill as presented at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman from Arkansas [Mr. TACKETT] desire to be heard on the point of order?

Mr. TACKETT. No. If the amendment offered by the gentleman from Missouri was germane this one is certainly germane.

Mr. JACKSON of Washington. Mr. Chairman, I would like to be heard further. The effect of the gentleman's amendment is to prohibit the use of additional funds from any other source. It goes beyond the scope of the bill, therefore comes within the rule announced by the Chair a short time ago in connection with a similar amendment, a point of order to which was sustained by the Chair on the ground that while the amendment might be germane the rule on germaneness does not apply where it goes beyond the scope of the bill.

Mr. TACKETT. Mr. Chairman, may I be heard further?

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will hear the gentleman.

Mr. TACKETT. Mr. Chairman, the provision that I seek to amend provides for the construction and acquisition of transmission lines, substations, and pertinent facilities, and provides for them by appropriation made here. The Southwestern Power Administration is appropriated a certain amount of money to be used for this purpose.

My amendment merely limits that agency to the exact amount this Congress gives them. In other words, my amendment would prohibit the Southwestern Power Administration from getting money from some other source and hiding it from this Congress. The amendment, therefore, is a limitation to be sure that the Southwestern Power Administration uses only the money that this Congress gives them. It certainly is germane and it certainly should be acceptable to the Congress, because it does exactly what Congress should want. We want every one of the departments of this Government to spend only the money that the Congress allows them to spend and that is all my amendment seeks to accomplish.

The CHAIRMAN (Mr. MILLS). The Chair is prepared to rule.

The gentleman from Arkansas [Mr. TACKETT] offers an amendment to line 3, page 4, of the bill. The provision of the bill sought to be amended has to do with construction by the Southwestern Power Administration. The bill before the House provides an appropriation of a specific amount of money for this purpose. The amendment offered by the gentleman from Arkansas [Mr. TACKETT] has reference to funds from sources other than those contained in the bill before the committee; therefore it goes beyond the scope and the purposes of the bill presently before the committee.

The gentleman from Washington [Mr. JACKSON] makes a point of order against the amendment. The Chair sustains the point of order.

The Clerk read as follows:

TRANSFER OF CERTAIN FACILITIES, DENISON DAM PROJECT

The Secretary of the Army is hereby authorized to transfer to the Secretary of the Interior under arrangements satisfactory to said Secretaries, without exchange of funds, all right, title, and interest, including rights-of-way, of the Department of the Army in and to the Denison-Payne 132-kilovolt transmission line.

Mr. TABER. Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order against the language appearing in the bill beginning line 20, page 4, over to line 2, page 5, on the ground that it is legislation in an appropriation bill.

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman from Washington [Mr. JACKSON] desire to be heard on the point of order?

Mr. JACKSON of Washington. Mr. Chairman, I concede the point of order.

The CHAIRMAN. The point of order is sustained.

The Clerk read as follows:

BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION
CONSTRUCTION

For construction and acquisition of transmission lines, substations, and appurtenant facilities, as authorized by law, to remain available until expended, \$67,500,000, of which not to exceed \$21,000,000 is for liquidation of obligations incurred pursuant to authority previously granted.

Mr. FORD. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. Ford: On page 5, line 16, strike out "\$67,500,000" and insert "\$62,000,000."

Mr. FORD. Mr. Chairman, the budget request for construction of Bonneville Power Administration was \$69,500,000 of which \$21,000,000 was for liquidation of previously authorized contract authority, thus leaving \$48,500,000 for new obligations. The committee reduced it by \$2,000,000. This amendment seeks a further reduction of \$5,500,000 which would bring the total reduction to \$7,750,000.

The budget request for this item would provide 2,227 employees for this agency at an average salary of \$4,026. In the current year 2,196 employees are provided for this agency and in 1950 only an average of 1,605 employees were permitted for this agency.

It will be argued that this new construction activity is for national defense purposes, which allegation I must admit is not entirely denied. However, it must be noted that every agency of the Government this year seeks to wave the wand of national defense over their budget requests in order to scare off some of us who believe in economy in the operation of the Federal Government. We, as Members of this body, cannot accept this premise in every case if we expect to come anywhere near close to achieving the necessary objectives of economy. We desire to maintain a strong economy through economy in the operation of the Federal Government. In fact, it might probably be said that everything in our entire economy is related to and makes a contribution to national defense in one form or another. Consequently we must take and choose those items that are urgent and which will contribute in the immediate future to the direct defense effort.

I would like to make this point. I know that those who will argue in opposition to this amendment will point out that this particular agency has a direct relationship to the aluminum industry and its productivity. It so happens that I am a member of the Subcommittee on Civil Functions and we are presently having hearings on a number of projects in reference to this area where the Army Corps of Engineers is going to build projects. I can assure you that in many instances the elastic is rather stretchable when you start talking about aluminum, its need and relationship to the national defense. If you will turn to page 172 of the hearings before this particular subcommittee you will find a question put to Dr. Raver, who is the Administrator of this agency. In his testimony that fol-

lowed that question Dr. Raver admitted that only 40 percent of the power output of the Bonneville Power Administration was going into aluminum production. He did not contend that anything over 40 percent of the production was going into aluminum production. He said vaguely there may be some other related national defense efforts in that particular area.

In addition, you know and I know very well that there is a great shortage of many, many critical materials, including copper. If you will turn to page 173 of the hearings you will find a statement by Dr. Raver in answer to a question by the gentleman from Washington [Mr. JACKSON]. Dr. Raver said:

We are slipping behind in some very serious spots. We have just been trying to get one of the manufacturers of steel for steel towers on schedule. He is unable to get his supply of steel.

I think that is a rather prevalent condition in the Nation today and a situation which we are only going to aggravate—I repeat, aggravate—by going too fast in the construction of some of these projects which take a lot of steel, a lot of copper, and a lot of other products that are in great demand at this time.

Mr. DONDERO. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FORD. I yield to the gentleman from Michigan.

Mr. DONDERO. Was there any evidence before the gentleman's committee that the reduction of the \$5,000,000 would in any way stop or hinder the normal construction at Bonneville?

Mr. FORD. I am not a member of the Subcommittee on Interior Department Appropriations. I did state that I am a member of the Civil Functions Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, which subcommittee has jurisdiction over a number of projects that are being built in this same area. As a result, I do have some knowledge of the problems in the area.

Mr. HOLMES. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FORD. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.

Mr. HOLMES. Has the gentleman had an opportunity to discuss with the Bonneville authorities the importance of that organization in relation to the transmission of power to the Hanford Engineering Works?

Mr. FORD. I admit to the gentleman I have not talked to the Bonneville Power Administration authorities. However, as I said previously, I am somewhat familiar with the power problems in the Northwest.

Mr. HOLMES. May I add that the gentleman must realize that the Hanford Engineering Works, in the central part of the State of Washington, is undergoing a program of expansion, and that it has the highest priority upon the use of what available electric energy we have and likewise needs a tremendous amount of facilities for the transmission of that energy.

Mr. FORD. The members of the committee should realize that all of the money in this item is not going for the construction of transmission lines. A

good bit of this money is going for the usual department operations. For example, I turn to page 154 of the committee hearings and find that in this request there is an item of \$1,482,746, for what? Travel. I urge the adoption of my amendment.

Mr. JACKSON of Washington. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment, and ask unanimous consent to revise and extend my remarks.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Washington?

There was no objection.

Mr. JACKSON of Washington. Mr. Chairman, the committee has tried to do a prudent job in making cuts wherever possible. I think an examination of the over-all budget submitted by the Department of the Interior will reveal a cut of about 7 percent, which is the largest cut that has been made so far in the regular appropriation bills that have been brought to the floor of the House.

We have made a cut of over \$2,000,000 in the Bonneville power appropriation. I think the committee, or a least a majority of it, feels that that was a fair cut under all the circumstances.

The Bonneville Power Administration is engaged in building a transmission grid system to connect up with the new dams that are being constructed in the Pacific Northwest area.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. JACKSON of Washington. I yield to the gentleman from Montana.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Is it not a fact that in addition to producing something like 40 percent of the country's aluminum, which is in very short supply at the present time, you also find a great deal of Bonneville's energy going to the Hanford and Richmond atomic energy plants?

Mr. JACKSON of Washington. The gentleman is absolutely correct. To be very frank I was amazed, to put it mildly, by the statement of my good friend, the gentleman from Michigan, when he said that only 40 percent of the entire power marketed by Bonneville is going for the production of aluminum. If the gentleman can name any other area in the United States where such a huge amount is going for a direct defense activity, that exceeds that which is being used in the Pacific Northwest, I would like to know where the area is.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Is it not also true that the only place where there is a possibility in the very immediate future of getting vitally needed aluminum production is within the Bonneville area in the Pacific Northwest?

Mr. JACKSON of Washington. My friend is exactly right. Over half of the aluminum produced in the United States is produced in the Pacific Northwest. We need aluminum to produce the planes. We have a shortage of it now. There is a 50 percent cut-back in the civilian use of aluminum.

It is ridiculous to assume that we ought to cut back on the very vital power facilities needed to produce more alu-

minum. During the past 12 months authority has been given to produce an additional 500,000 pounds of aluminum.

Mr. HOLMES. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. JACKSON of Washington. I yield.

Mr. HOLMES. And that is to try to comply or to help comply with the request of Mr. Charles Wilson, head of our national-defense mobilization, to expand the program 62 percent.

Mr. JACKSON of Washington. That is exactly right. The only place they can go to get the power for aluminum is in the Pacific Northwest and one or two other places. I made the comment yesterday of the importance of power in the atomic-energy program. Being a member of the Atomic Energy Committee, I can state categorically to the House that when we have to move in and move in a hurry on a new project there is always a No. 1 bottleneck, and that bottleneck is power. We are short of power in the Pacific Northwest. Last summer they had an outage at Hanford which threatened the Hanford Engineering Works because there is a shortage of power in the area. Now they are proposing to cut this appropriation \$5,000,000. Here is an agency, if you please, which last year brought to the Treasury in the form of earnings, according to the hearings at page 172, if the Members are interested to look at the record, \$12,000,000 profit. Every one of the items, included under the Bonneville Power Administration, is repayable to Uncle Sam with interest. This is a project which is vital to the security of the country. The committee has tried to make a reasonable reduction and there is no point now in trying to wreck a construction schedule so vital to national defense.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Washington has expired.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman may proceed for five additional minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Montana?

There was no objection.

Mr. HORAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. JACKSON of Washington. I yield.

Mr. HORAN. The point against the Bonneville appropriation has been based largely upon the use of critical materials. I think the point has been pretty well established that the Bonneville system is an instrumentality in creating critical materials and metals for the use of the country. I think it pretty well cancels out that argument.

Mr. JACKSON of Washington. Yes, and I think, too, if you will refer to page 172 of the hearings with reference to the statement by our good friend, the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Ford], in pointing out that 40 percent of the power is going to aluminum production, if you will read on Dr. Raver also stated that that did not include other national defense industries in that area. The

Boeing plant in Seattle, where they are making important military aircraft to carry atomic bombs, if necessary, has over 20,000 employees. There are a thousand and one other defense industries in other parts of the United States which will be vitally affected by the curtailment of this construction program. If you cut this item today, all you are doing is delaying the transmission of power from the new dams. Over half of the funds included for construction are in Oregon, to complete a power grid system. There was not a single private power company which opposed any of the items contained in this appropriation. The hearings will bear that out. It is an indication of the fine work that Dr. Raver is trying to do.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. JACKSON of Washington. I yield.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I want to join the gentleman from Washington and my Republican colleagues from the Bonneville area in the Northwest in testifying to what the gentleman has said, that there is a very good working relationship between all the private utilities in the Northwest and the Bonneville Power Administration. I think we are extremely fortunate in having such a man as Dr. Raver as the administrator of that agency. I would like to point out also that the Bonneville Power Administration has entered into contracts with various private utilities, that in addition to aluminum, the great copper mines in Butte and western Montana must also be considered, because at the present time we are suffering from a great deficiency in copper and we are supplying the power to those mines in the Northwest to speed up the production of that vital material.

Mr. JACKSON of Washington. I appreciate the gentleman's statement. I hope the House will use good judgment in seeing that this important agency which has the job of marketing the power—not building dams, but marketing the power—is not handicapped. It is nothing short of foolishness to assume that you can properly cut back the grid-transmission program that is so essential to the development of the power resources in the area. This Nation needs more power. In the Pacific Northwest we have 40 percent of all the potential hydroelectric power in America. If we had followed a backward policy in not going forward with this program the Government might have found itself in a very difficult situation in 1940 and 1941. Prior to 1940 there was not an ounce of aluminum produced in the State of Washington. By the end of the war over half of it was produced there.

I want to make this further observation: If you are interested in economy you will be interested in seeing to it that aluminum is produced in those areas where it can be produced at the lowest possible cost. We cut the price of aluminum almost in two in the Pacific Northwest, which saved untold millions to Uncle Sam during World War II. It will save millions more if we can only get the additional power that is needed

in the area. The only thing that is holding back the aluminum expansion program today is the lack of power. Over half of the power that is marketed in the Pacific Northwest comes from Bonneville-generated power. In addition to that, 40 percent of that generation is going directly to aluminum plants for national defense. Now an attempt is made to cut the program that is so vital to the security of the Nation as a whole.

Mr. POULSON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. JACKSON of Washington. I yield?

Mr. POULSON. You spoke about the development of power for aluminum plants, but I happen to know that right up there in the Bonneville area they are going out and putting parallel lines up into La Grande and Baker, where they have adequate power, and where there are no aluminum plants. They are absolutely going out there to run these particular private power companies out of business. That is what they can do with this \$5,000,000.

Mr. JACKSON of Washington. I do not agree with the gentleman.

Mr. POULSON. I have lived there, and I know.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Washington [Mr. JACKSON] has expired.

Mr. JACKSON of Washington. I ask unanimous consent to proceed for an additional minute, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

Mr. JACKSON of Washington. I do not know who the gentleman from California is speaking for, but it is a very strange situation that if that is the case why the private power companies did not come in and oppose these lines.

Mr. POULSON. Well, there was no use.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. JACKSON of Washington. I yield.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I think the gentleman has given the answer to the gentleman from California [Mr. POULSON] because the relationship between the private companies and the Bonneville Power Administration is extremely pleasant, and the best of any part of the country. Would the gentleman tell the House just how far ahead Bonneville is in its repayment schedule on the construction of such projects as Grand Coulee and the Bonneville Dam itself.

Mr. JACKSON of Washington. They are running away ahead of schedule. They have a surplus. After allowing for amortization on the capital investment and after allowing for interest, there is an additional surplus which at the present time indicates that those projects will be paid out in less than the time required by law, which is 40 or 50 years. They have done a real job, an economical job in administering this program; it is one of the best-administered agencies in the Government, in my opinion.

Mr. MACK of Washington. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word.

Mr. Chairman, again, and again, and again on this floor we have heard the Members plead for the building up of the Air Corps on the basis that it was America's first line of defense. Three times this Congress enacted a 70-group air force, once over the veto of the President of the United States. We are all in favor of building airplanes, and to build airplanes we must have aluminum. Forty percent of the aluminum of the United States is produced in four of the aluminum plants of the Pacific Northwest, and every one of those plants secure their power from the Bonneville Administration. We can produce aluminum with coal, or oil, or gas, but it is going to be a much more expensive production than with hydroelectricity. The gentleman from Michigan who proposes this amendment admitted that 40 percent of the power of the Pacific Northwest is now being employed in the production of aluminum. Another large percentage of that power is being employed in the operation of the atomic bomb plant in eastern Washington which is constantly being expanded; other quantities of this power is being employed in the pulp mills of the Pacific Northwest which in wartime produce materials which are used in the making of explosives and in the lumber and private industries which are also essential in the mobilization effort.

This expenditure is absolutely necessary for the building of these feeder lines throughout the Pacific Northwest to feed the multitude of plants which are engaged in industrial production. One of the lines included in this bill will extend from near Wenatchee, Wash., the home town of the gentleman from Washington, [Mr. HORAN], down across the mountains into Olympia and Shelton, Wash., and feed the great shipyards in the city of Bremerton where they are building war vessels. Other lines will go across the Columbia River into Vancouver, Wash., where two of the largest wartime shipyards of the United States operated during the last war.

If we do not build these lines, if we do not supply these aluminum plants with the necessary electricity, then surely, as the gentleman from Washington, [Mr. JACKSON], said, we are going to have to pay a considerably higher price for our aluminum, for it must be produced by power and energy created by coal, oil, or gas. There is little coal and no oil, or gas in the entire Pacific Northwest. If we use oil we must bring it all the way from near Los Angeles, 1,500 miles, to generate the power. That is not necessary. I plead with you and I urge you in the interest of national defense not to cut this appropriation for the Bonneville Power Administration.

Mr. TOLLEFSON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MACK of Washington. I yield.

Mr. TOLLEFSON. The gentleman has mentioned the aluminum industry, the airplane industry, lumber, and several others; and other than those you have mentioned, is it not a fact there are a number of small industries which are presently contributing to the national-defense program who are confronted

with the fact of securing adequate power in order to meet the requirements?

Mr. MACK of Washington. That is exactly true. American industry of the Pacific Northwest is dependent upon power.

Mr. POULSON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MACK of Washington. I yield.

Mr. POULSON. It is true; I agree with you 100 percent as far as aluminum production is concerned. But right up there in Baker County and Union County, which was where I was born and raised, and still go up there every summer, the PUB is going in there, and they are trying to go in there and run out those little private power companies. If they need that power why do they not take it over there where they have the aluminum factories and where they need it? Why do they want to run out private enterprise?

Mr. JACKSON of Washington. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MACK of Washington. I yield.

Mr. JACKSON of Washington. I was interested in my friend's comment about socialism. The gentleman from California ought to attend the chamber of commerce meeting sometime in any city in Oregon or Washington and let them discuss power. If there is anything connected with socialism, I would like to know about it. They are all for the program. The private utilities are behind the power program. There has been no objection whatever to the effort we are making. The truth about the matter is that power has brought more new private enterprise to the Pacific Northwest than anything that has happened since the white man moved into that great area.

Mr. MACK of Washington. I confirm the statement just made by the gentleman from Washington and I want you to know that all of the public and private power people are united in their desire to develop the Columbia River and all of its resources.

Mr. POULSON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, they can talk all they want to about the chambers of commerce, but I have attended some meetings up there in Oregon myself and I know what is going on in that particular area. The Bonneville Power Administration is up there to run out, for instance, a company in the Baker, Oreg., area. They are spending most of their time up there doing that one thing, plus dabbling in politics. That is what they are spending this extra \$5,000,000 for. They desire to go into these interior points, these out-of-the-way places, that do not need the power like you claim they need it here, and drive the local companies out of business. The result is that the aluminum factories are without sufficient power.

Mr. Chairman, I think this is the time to start cutting. They can find a way to save money. I am in favor of this \$5,000,000 reduction.

Mr. WOOD of Idaho. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I speak particularly with regard to the extension of the Bonneville power lines from La Grande to Baker, Oreg. Whatever the merit of some of the other transmission lines may be, there is no merit in this particular one, the over-all cost of which is said to be something over \$2,000,000. The lines of the Idaho Power Co. are fully adequate.

I called the Bonneville Power Administration in Washington here and asked them if they need this line. The answer was they do not need it right now but they will need it in 1965. I expect to be dead and gone by that time, and from the general appearance of the Members of this House I imagine none of you are going to see that line in use when they need it.

Mr. Chairman, I shall support the pending amendment.

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, the pending amendment, in fact, does not represent any real savings in this appropriation bill. We are just deceiving ourselves and deceiving the people of the country who read about this action because the funds appropriated in this section, which the amendment would reduce, are for construction, in other words plant investment. A plant investment, a resource which returns a good profit to the Government, cannot be considered as an expenditure or as non-essential spending. It is simply capital investment for the future. In fact, the adoption of this amendment very easily, in my opinion, could result in a waste of Government funds, for this reason: The Bonneville Power Administration is operating a very large institution. Two dams are now under construction. Plans are going along in advance for the development of this project for the benefit of the people of the United States. When a dam is completed it is absolutely necessary to have transmission lines available for the transmission of the power produced at the dam to the manufacturing plants, or the dam itself does not return any revenue. Now, if we cut off this money which will be applied in the construction of lines, we throw the timetable out of balance. It is quite likely that the dams would be completed ahead of time in this case, and then the dams would lie idle until transmission lines were eventually constructed. I do not think that that is sound economy; I do not think it is economy at all. I think we are just fooling about this thing. Let us make genuine economy cuts and not cuts of this nature.

Mr. HORAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.

Mr. HORAN. Does not the gentleman agree that if we throw the construction timetable out of joint, so to say, that we may have to enter into force contracts later on to build them in a hurry, and build them much more expensively?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Yes; I think the gentleman from Washington makes an

important point there. So far as I am concerned, if the program advanced by the Bonneville Power Administration is moved upward or downward at the discretion of the Congress, it is quite all right, but the idea of taking out one part of the program or reducing it and leaving the rest of it intact, or otherwise juggling the plan, I think is not only foolishness, but it is not economy in any way. These lines are going to be built, let us not be deceived about that. It is not a matter of saving any money, because the project must be completed for the benefit of the country. We need the power; the country needs the power to be developed out there on the Columbia River. There is no question about that. That question has been resolved a long time ago. So far as the idea of socialism is concerned, as has been mentioned on the floor here not long ago, the Government of the United States is in the business of producing hydroelectric power on the Columbia River, and the investments are tremendous. Whether we like it or not, we are in the business, and so long as we are in it, let us make the business pay. It returns millions and millions of dollars into the Federal Treasury. If we do not complete the system, the revenues cannot come in.

Mr. TOLLEFSON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.

Mr. TOLLEFSON. The gentleman from California expressed some concern over the interests of the private power people in the Pacific Northwest. Can the gentleman from Oregon tell us whether he knows of any private power concern in the Northwest that is opposed to this program?

Mr. ELLSWORTH. No; I have not heard a word from any private power people in the Pacific Northwest for several years opposing the completion of the power program and the development of the Columbia River. We all know in the Pacific Northwest that the development of electric power on the Columbia River must take place if we are going to have military security in this country. We have to have the capacity to carry on the aluminum and the atomic energy production, and so on, in that area. So, I submit to you, Mr. Chairman, that this is not an economy amendment and will not and cannot possibly by any stretch of the imagination save \$5,000,000. It just sounds like it, but it is not so.

The Bonneville Power Administration 1952 fiscal year program is probably the most important program that they have presented from the standpoint of the over-all economic well-being of the entire Pacific Northwest, because it is planned to alleviate power shortages that may be, in the coming 2 years, the most severe ever faced by the region and, what is more important at this time, because it is based on a sound contribution to the national defense. In the latter connection, there is nothing in the program except that required to meet the needs of the national defense or essential civilian requirements. The full power requirements of the region have not been met for many years. This has been

particularly true of southwest Oregon, to which the benefits of Federal power have been generally denied and are only now in prospect, with completion of facilities for which money is requested in 1952. It is only a very few years since the citizens of the district I represent were up in arms over the inadequate power supply. This situation has been alleviated to some extent in the Fourth Oregon District, but the need for power has grown tremendously.

Such strategic metals as aluminum, magnesium, and phosphorus are in the headlines as being critical materials from the standpoint of national defense, and much planning has been done in order to supply their power requirements. I must point out that the industry in my district is equally important to the national defense program. Lumber, for instance, can be considered as almost equally essential, along with wood-waste plants, plywood plants, and others.

The population of the United States over the past 10 years has increased by approximately 14 percent. The average increase in population in my district has increased many times this over the same period, and the need for power has increased in proportion. Let me cite a few figures: Linn County in my district has increased 76 percent; Lane County, 81 percent; Douglas County, 110 percent; Josephine County, 61 percent; Jackson County, 60 percent; Curry County, 39 percent; Coos County, 28 percent. The need of these people for power is no less than in other parts of the Pacific Northwest but, as I stated previously, the benefits of Federal power have not extended to these areas. It is now planned to provide for this power extension.

At the present time there is a 115,000-volt line extending from Albany substation through Eugene to the Mapleton substation. This facility not only serves parts of this general area directly, but also provides an interconnection with the Mountain States Power Co. in order to provide a more balanced service to the district. However, this is only a beginning. There is a 115,000-volt transmission line now under construction from Mapleton to Coos Bay to Gold Beach. This is the extreme coastal area which is badly in need of additional power and which will be provided by these lines and associated substations as soon as completed. Of equal importance, in fact even greater importance, are the large transmission lines either planned or under construction which carry the power from the generating plants to the Fourth District. These are 230,000-volt lines, which are part of the main grid system of the Pacific Northwest.

To mention a few of these lines, funds are requested in the 1952 fiscal year program of the Bonneville Power Administration for a line from McNary Dam through Big Eddy to Detroit Dam and on down to the J. P. Alvey substation near Eugene. This is a major line that will transmit Grand Coulee power to the load center at J. P. Alvey substation, from which lines are under construction

to Eugene substation, to Springfield, and to other points in the general area. This line must be completed on time if adequate power service is to be expected in this area. A second line is under construction from the vicinity of Maupin to Detroit Dam, and funds are requested in the 1952 fiscal year program to extend this line from Maupin to McNary. The lines that carry power from Grand Coulee Dam and that will carry power from McNary Dam into the general Portland area are also extremely important inasmuch as they support the 115-kilovolt system over which flows much of the power that now comes into southwestern Oregon. Another line that I should mention is that known as the Southwest Oregon Service, which will eventually be a loop extending from Maupin, Oreg., south to Klamath Falls, then west to Medford and north to Roseburg, and the J. P. Alvey substation which will complete a major grid loop and add immeasurably to the reliability of service to southwest Oregon.

These lines are all most important to Oregon, and to the southwest part of Oregon particularly.

Loads are growing extremely rapidly in southwest Oregon, and particularly in my district. In December 1950 the load in southwest Oregon was 96,000 kilowatts. The Bonneville people estimate that by December 1954, when all of these facilities that I have mentioned are in operation, the load will be 241,000 kilowatts—an increase of 250 percent. This load must be served and I most earnestly hope that nothing will happen to interfere with the rapid progress of the program as planned.

The people in my area have been served generally by private power companies—the Mountain States Power Co. and the California-Oregon Power Co.—to the very best of the abilities of these companies to serve them. They have increased power supplies and transmission facilities, but even these efforts have not resulted in adequate power service in this area. It must be supported by the Federal system working in conjunction with the distributors in the area. It is most important that the power systems existing in this area be integrated with the Federal system because in that way additional firm power becomes available, not only in this area but throughout the entire region.

New power supplies will start becoming available from Detroit Dam and from McNary Dam in 1953. A large part of the power to become available from these dams will be needed in southwest Oregon. We in southwest Oregon are most anxious to do our part in the present national emergency, and we are using the limited resources available to us to forward this effort to the greatest degree possible. Our contribution will be even greater when adequate power supply is available to us, and the appropriations herewith requested by the Bonneville Power Administration will serve this end.

We need the proposed transmission lines, and many more besides. We likewise need more power supply, more proj-

ects, that will develop the vast hydroelectric potential that exists in the Columbia Basin which is our main energy base. The potential to serve the region, to serve the Nation as a whole, and to serve the national defense should be developed as rapidly as possible so that potential loads which should now be served can at least be in prospect for the future when adequate power supply can be made available. At the present time there is a far too great proportion of important industrial load, as well as utility load, that is served on a so-called interruptible basis because the over-all power program has not progressed at the pace that was needed. Even with the most accelerated program of power project construction, we will still be faced with the specter of shut-down industries, unemployment, and generally dislocated economy if a poor water year should occur in the region. The planned program for additional power projects can forever put this difficulty behind us because, if sufficient power projects are in operation to provide for the entire basic needs of the region, then we need not fear the period when low water develops. I sincerely hope that this program will be permitted to go forward on this basis.

Mr. KIRWAN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word.

Mr. Chairman, I am glad to see the Members from the respective districts come down in the well and give the information as to what is going on in their districts. But I want to tell you this: We are not going through any economy wave on the floor of the House today. This committee sat through 6 weeks listening to both sides and trying to come in with a fair answer. I am satisfied, before this year goes out, that you will spend maybe \$25,000,000 more in the Northwest. So, do not cut it \$5,000,000, because it will show us up in the next few months that the House did not know what we were talking about. Where are they going to get the aluminum compared with the millions of dollars that you are going to spend? In going along with this war effort you are being called on to spend billions. Where do you think we are going to spend it, and where do you think we are going to produce the things that are needed? A lot of it in the Northwest. Yet we want to cut this appropriation \$5,000,000. How foolish we are going to be shown to be in a few months. They will be coming in here, probably before this bill goes through the Senate, and raising appropriations over in the Senate, for the Northwest and all over this Nation. They will do it for many items in this particular department, in the Bureau of Mines, the Geological Survey, the Parks, or whatever it may be. This Department of the Interior is the closest of all departments, except the military departments, to national defense. You watch from now on how the supplements will be coming in carrying appropriations of more money for national defense. It will be through this Interior Department that they will carry on much of the work.

Mr. STOCKMAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. KIRWAN. I yield to the gentleman from Oregon.

Mr. STOCKMAN. May I ask the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Interior Department appropriations how much money is in the entire Interior Department appropriations bill?

Mr. KIRWAN. There is only \$520,000,000 in this whole bill.

Mr. STOCKMAN. Will the gentleman advise me how that amount compares with the money we are spending in Europe and the rest of the world?

Mr. KIRWAN. We are spending billions over there. Let me say further to the gentleman from Oregon that at least \$300,000,000 of the \$520,000,000 that is in this bill is coming directly back to the Treasury of the United States. So all we are doing in this bill is spending \$220,000,000 on the greatest country in the world, the United States, and that is being mostly invested in conserving valuable resources.

Mr. STOCKMAN. Will not the gentleman agree with me that if we were to cut out the entire amount in the Interior Department appropriation bill it would not be a drop in the bucket in comparison to what we are spending in Europe and other parts of the world?

Mr. KIRWAN. It would not be a drop in the bucket compared to what we are spending not only in Europe but also what we are spending in this country for foolish things. What this bill calls for is the protection of the forests, the soil, the streams, the mines, the aluminum. Everything in this bill is really for national defense.

Mr. STOCKMAN. If we were to save the entire \$520,000,000, that is, make a so-called saving, it still would not be a drop in the bucket in comparison to the large amounts we are spending on other countries in the world?

Mr. KIRWAN. It would not be a drop in the bucket to what we are spending on the rest of the world.

Mr. JACKSON of Washington. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. KIRWAN. I yield.

Mr. JACKSON of Washington. I think the gentleman has helped to clarify the issue here considerably by his statement as to the amount of money that is recoverable. Following through on that line, I should like to refer the Members of the House to page 172 of the appropriation hearings, in connection with the Bonneville Power Administration:

Mr. NORRELL. After you paid the cost of operation and the interest last year, you paid in \$12,000,000 on the cost of construction; is that right?

Dr. RAVER. That is right.

The total of that surplus to June 30—that is, for all of our period of operation from the beginning, when we did have a big investment with very little business, down to the present time, when we are using our investment just as fast as we can—the total net which has been made available to the United States Government for whatever purpose the Treasury wants to use it, but for bookkeeping purposes we use this \$54,644,061 net for retirement of debt on our books.

This is a sound business enterprise and it is a good investment not only for the development of the resources of the

country but for the security of the Nation as a whole.

Mr. KIRWAN. I am not down here defending anything in Ohio. I have said every year since I have been chairman of the committee handling this bill that all that is in this bill for Ohio is the wick on the Perry Monument on Lake Erie. So you will not find me here saying, "This is in my district, or it is in the State of Ohio." There is not a quarter in this bill for the State of Ohio. From being on this committee for 10 years, I know pretty well that every dollar that is appropriated by the Congress for any activity of the Interior Department is essential for the national defense. No bill which may come to the House for your consideration, except for military agencies and atomic energy, will be as essential to the national defense as this bill. So, gentlemen, do what you wish with it. It is your country the same as it is mine, and I again tell you that, from this day on, not a month will pass when there will not be a supplemental appropriation bill. They will ask for money not only to put back in what you are cutting out of this bill, but for more money, too, to keep this Government going.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. KIRWAN. I yield.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure to listen to the distinguished gentleman, the chairman of this great subcommittee, giving an all-American speech on an all-American bill. But getting back to what the gentleman from Washington has said about \$54,000,000 being brought into the Treasury of the United States by Bonneville, it might be well to bring out at this time that that revenue comes from two dams only, the Cooley Dam and Bonneville Dam itself. The third dam which will come in and which will have a Bonneville account will, of course, be the Hungry Horse. We are just getting started in the Northwest. We need this power, not for ourselves so much, although it helps us, that is true, but for the security and defense of the United States. I was delighted to hear the gentleman from Oregon bring out that fact, and to hear the gentleman's corroboration of it that this was just a drop in the bucket, and that we are spending billions of dollars for Europe, but we are afraid to spend a few million dollars in the development of our own country for the benefit of our own people.

Mr. KIRWAN. I am grateful for the gentleman's statement.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Ohio has expired.

Mr. TABER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to call the attention of the House to just what the situation seems to be in connection with this amendment. There is a cut proposed here of \$5,500,000. That will leave \$62,000,000. The amount allowed last year was \$40,950,000. They will still have just as much new money which is not subject to contract authorization previously allowed as they had for the current year.

What is the situation out there? You know, the more you crowd things in an ill-considered way the more you run the cost of things up. What are they doing right now? If you would turn to page 173 of their own hearings you would find this:

Mr. JACKSON. Are you on schedule pretty much now, based on the appropriations you have received?

Answer by Dr. Raver:

No, sir. We are slipping behind in some very serious spots. We have just been trying to get one of the manufacturers of steel for steel towers on schedule. He is unable to get his supply of steel at this moment; and, if he does not get on schedule and get at least the foundation steel for us for this line so that it can be installed this summer before the snows begin to come into the mountain passes, we may be a year late in making the hook-up with Hungry Horse Dam.

That is the situation you are in now. They are trying to crowd the thing so hard that they are building up the cost and the thing is being delayed. You are going to get more and more of that because the demand is going to be absolute for this steel for munitions, ammunition, and for everything in the nature of transportation for the Army and Navy. This cut will still leave them just as much new money as they had last year, and it will still leave the \$21,000,000 to pay on the contract authorization which was allowed last year. Those folks who are anxious to build up the Northwest should have a little reason as they approach these things and not try to go helter-skelter into everything in such a way that it builds the costs of everything up and gets nowhere so far as the projects that they want are concerned.

I hope you will support this amendment and have an orderly procedure.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from New York has expired.

Mr. ANGELL. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word, and ask unanimous consent to revise and extend my remarks.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Oregon?

There was no objection.

Mr. ANGELL. Mr. Chairman, as the older Members know, the Bonneville project itself is in my congressional district. I am quite familiar with its operation by reason of that fact.

As a matter of fact, the appropriation for this year is not as much as it was last year. A great many people are confused by reason of the fact that last year we had \$20,000,000 in contract authorization, which has been eliminated this year, I am advised, and I think the report so shows.

Last year we had \$40,950,000, and, in addition, contract authorization of \$20,000,000, which made a total of \$60,950,000; but this year, without the contract authorization, and having to pay \$20,000,000 on contract authorization for the last year, you will note that the appropriation is not excessive.

As most of you know, the Hanford project for the construction of the atomic bomb is in this area. It uses a large block of the Bonneville power.

During the last war we produced aluminum which went into the construction of airplanes for approximately one-third of those that were produced throughout the United States. Without the aluminum which was produced in that area we would have had great difficulty in carrying on our operations in the prosecution of the war and in rearmament, as we pretend we are now doing. So this appropriation, which the committee, after careful screening, has brought to the attention of the House, in my judgment, is fair. It is a reduction over last year. I think it would be a great mistake if we were to attempt to reduce by some five and one-half million more the amount which the committee itself has authorized.

I hope that all of you who are interested in the development of the industries of our country, in the prosecution of the war, and in providing hydroelectric power, which as you know is in short supply throughout the Nation, will not vote for this amendment.

Mr. MARSHALL. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word.

Mr. Chairman, if I were politically astute I would not take the floor here today, because I know, as well as the rest of the Members of this House know, that any time we cut a dollar off of any bill it is the popular thing back home.

Also, I am not politically astute because I know personally that I will probably never get any support from any of the northwestern part of the United States for many of the things which I believe in. There are probably few States in the Union that have fewer programs in the Department of the Interior than the State of Minnesota. Therefore, I cannot be accused of being selfish for my district or the constituents in my district.

My constituents, like myself, are interested in America. This program of the Department of the Interior, everywhere all through this land, is one of the most important programs for the welfare of this Nation of any program that comes before us. The lands of Minnesota have been denuded of forests. Our minerals have been wasted because we did not have an active Department of the Interior. We need all the production we can get of some of these strategic materials.

I do not know whether Bonneville Dam is going to provide one more ounce of aluminum or not, but taking into consideration the situation in which this Nation finds itself today, we cannot afford to take chances of crippling the production of any of these materials, including aluminum.

I hope the Members of this House will seriously consider any thoughts that they have of being penny-wise and pound-foolish in eliminating needed appropriations for the Department of the Interior.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Ford].

The question was taken; and on a division (demanded by Mr. JACKSON of Washington) there were—ayes 89, noes 82.

Mr. JACKSON of Washington. Mr. Chairman, I demand tellers.

Tellers were ordered; and the Chair appointed as tellers Mr. JACKSON of Washington and Mr. FORD.

The Committee again divided; and the tellers reported that there were—ayes 110, noes 91.

So the amendment was agreed to.

The clerk read as follows:

ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS

Appropriations of the Bonneville Power Administration shall be available to carry out all the duties imposed upon the Administrator pursuant to law, including not to exceed \$40,000 for services as authorized by section 15 of the act of August 2, 1946 (5 U. S. C. 55a), including such services at rates not to exceed \$100 per diem for individuals; purchase of not to exceed 16 passenger motor vehicles of which 12 shall be for replacement only; and purchase (not to exceed 2) of aircraft. Appropriations made herein to the Bonneville Power Administration shall be available in one fund, except that the appropriation herein made for operation and maintenance shall be available only for the service of the current fiscal year.

Not to exceed 12 percent of the appropriation for construction herein made for the Bonneville Power Administration shall be available for construction work by force account or on a hired-labor basis, except in case of emergencies, local in character, so declared by the Bonneville Power Administrator.

Mr. REES of Kansas. Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order against the language appearing in the bill beginning with line 24, page 5, and continuing through to line 12, page 6, on the ground it is legislation on an appropriation bill.

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman from Washington [Mr. JACKSON] desire to be heard on the point of order?

Mr. JACKSON of Washington. Mr. Chairman, all of the language contained in the point of order raised by the gentleman from Kansas is authorized by law under the Bonneville Project Act and other acts and amendments to the original Bonneville Project Act and may be found in Sixteenth United States Code, section 825. For example, there is contained in the area covered by the gentleman's point of order the authority with reference to the purchase of automobiles. This is contained in general authorizing legislation that is applicable to all departments of Government.

The CHAIRMAN. Will the gentleman from Kansas be more specific with reference to the language that he deems to be legislation on an appropriation bill?

Mr. REES of Kansas. Mr. Chairman, the language in line 4, beginning with the word "including" and ending with the word "individuals" in line 5 is certainly without authorization and for that reason the entire paragraph, in my judgment, is legislation on an appropriation bill and not authorized.

Mr. JACKSON of Washington. Mr. Chairman, in response to the gentleman's contention at that point, may I say that Public Law 600 of the Seventy-ninth Congress specifically authorizes the Department to do this very thing.

The CHAIRMAN. It authorizes the department to pay at the rate of \$100 per diem?

Mr. JACKSON of Washington. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Will the gentleman from Washington explain to the Chair the reason for carrying it in the appropriation bill itself, if it is authorized?

Mr. JACKSON of Washington. Unless the Committee on Appropriations each year authorizes a specific amount, they have no authority to spend any money for this purpose. In other words, existing law gives the department the authority to pay per diem expenses to individuals but the amount as to what should be paid is left to the discretion of the Committee on Appropriations, and the committee from time to time has changed the amount. I will be glad to read from Fifth United States Code, section 55a, as follows:

The head of any department, when authorized in an appropriation or other act, may procure the temporary (not in excess of 1 year) or intermittent services of experts or consultants or organizations thereof.

I think that section clearly leaves it to Congress, and Congress has to act each year for the simple reason that the authority to make the payment is limited to a maximum of 1 year.

Mr. REES of Kansas. Mr. Chairman, may I add this further? It would occur to me then it is an attempt by law to change the Rules of the House and that certainly cannot be done. So, we still have legislation on an appropriation bill.

The CHAIRMAN. For the information of the gentleman from Kansas the Chair will read from the United States Code, title 5, on page 79, section 35a:

Temporary employment of experts or consultants; rate of compensation:

The head of any department, when authorized in an appropriation or other act, may procure the temporary (not in excess of 1 year) or intermittent services of experts or consultants or organizations thereof, including stenographic reporting services, by contract and in such cases such service shall be without regard to the civil service and classification laws (but as to agencies subject to sections * * * at rates not in excess of the per diem equivalent of the highest rate payable under said sections, unless other rates are specifically provided in the appropriation or other law) and except in the case of stenographic reporting services by organizations without regard to section 5 of title 41.

Mr. TABER. Might I be allowed to make a suggestion, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will be pleased to hear the gentleman from New York.

Mr. TABER. It is the duty of the legislative committees to bring in legislation that will fix the rate of compensation. A limitation by a Committee on Appropriations can be made restricting the amount below the statutory amount. But when you come by a statute to authorize the Committee on Appropriations to bring in legislation, it is utterly void, because the rules of the House provide that the Committee on Appropriations shall not bring in legislation. This not being a limitation or anything of that kind, it is clearly legislation and not in order on this bill.

Mr. JACKSON of Washington. If the Chair will permit me to speak further, of

course the answer to the statement of the gentleman from New York is that the argument does not apply when the Committee on Appropriations has been authorized by another basic law, and that law itself contemplates the very possibility which has arisen here, namely, that from time to time rates would have to be fixed each year as to the amount that should be paid on a per diem basis. The argument the gentleman from New York has advanced has no application in this instance because specific authorizing legislation has covered this part of it.

The CHAIRMAN. As the Chair understands, there is no per diem ceiling fixed in the provision to which the Chair has alluded. The gentleman from New York mentions a ceiling, and then the authority of the committee to place a limitation under that ceiling. Does the gentleman from New York know of some ceiling provided in law for per diem pay?

Mr. TABER. I do not, but there is legislation to fix the rate of pay, and the authority contained in the legislation would not give the Committee on Appropriations jurisdiction because the jurisdiction of the committee is governed by the rules of the House. You cannot change the rules of the House by legislation.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from New York is correct that you cannot change the rules of the House by legislation, but the language referred to by the Chair seems to authorize beyond any doubt the per diem payment by this service to individuals. There does not appear to be any ceiling fixed upon what the payment per day may be. So it appears to the Chair that the language contained in the bill in line 4 through "individuals" in line 5 on page 6 is actually in the form of a limitation. Therefore, the Chair overrules the point of order made by the gentleman from Kansas.

Mr. REES of Kansas. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. REES of Kansas: On page 5, line 24, strike out all language down to and including line 12 on page 6.

Mr. REES of Kansas. Mr. Chairman, this amendment seeks to strike out the paragraph in this bill that appropriates an extra \$40,000 to be used to pay certain appointees as much as \$100 per day. I listened very carefully to the statement of the chairman of this great subcommittee. I appreciate his view when he suggests that the expenditure of hundreds of thousands of dollars as against millions it seems comparatively small. I am now talking of a figure that may also seem comparatively small to some of you, but is \$40,000. The item is not small. Furthermore, I do not think its expenditure is justified.

Furthermore, I call your attention to the fact that this is not the only item of this kind in this bill. There are more right in this bill. I think you are going to find similar provisions in other bills. This comes about because an act was approved 2 or 3 years ago that said in substance, persons outside civil service may be hired on per diem basis at salaries

at a not higher rate than those receiving highest salaries under classified service. This is about \$43 or \$44 per day. It also provides, and here is where you break the ceiling, the Appropriations Committee could approve payments of as much as \$100 per day. Of course, all expenses are in addition thereto. I remind you these appointees are not required to qualify under civil service. They are clear outside of jurisdiction of civil service. The Civil Service Committee of the House did approve legislation permitting employment of a limited number of persons above ceilings but made definite requirements that had to be met by such persons.

Mr. Chairman, there is certainly nothing in this bill that says one word about the qualifications or requirements with respect to those who may be paid as much as \$100 per day. Here is what the bill provides with respect to this particular item:

Appropriations of the Bonneville Power Administration shall be available to carry out all the duties imposed by law, including not to exceed \$40,000 for services as authorized by section 15 of the act of August 2, 1946 (5 U. S. C. 55a) including such services at rates not to exceed \$100 per diem for individuals.

Nothing there about the kind or qualifications of the individuals. Nothing about how long they may work. Just that they are to be paid not more than \$100. Now look at the report. There is nothing at all in the report of this great committee supposed to describe the contents of the bill. The same thing applies to other sections in this bill, in other bureaus where you seek to pay a few extra people at the rate of \$100 per day.

There is nothing in the bill or in the report to say how they are to qualify for those jobs. Read the hearings, if you will, and point out to me where anyone testified before your great committee telling you of the need for these individuals and for this extra \$40,000, or telling what the qualifications of the individuals would be. What requirements would be met in order to qualify for receiving \$100 per day? About the only testimony you will find is that they may need some engineers for part-time service. Of course, they can get them now on a per diem basis at the rate of \$16,000 per year. The difference is that in the latter group they would have to meet certain qualifications provided by law.

Here you propose to pay \$100 a day and do it without even qualifying the individuals for this job.

As I said you do this thing again in other parts of this bill. This is only a start. Turn to page 12. There you agree to pay \$100 to some additional people in the Bureau of Indian Affairs.

Turn to page 19 and you will find they are doing the same thing again, except there is more of it. There you propose \$60,000 for additional individuals at \$100 per day.

After the camel gets his nose under the tent, of course he crawls on in. Here you are going to hire extra individuals in this great agency of ours across the board for \$100 a day without even indi-

cating their requirements or any qualifications. I feel quite sure this great department of government does not expect to employ additional attorneys. I am informed there are more than 200 lawyers in this agency at the present time. Here you propose to pay \$100 a day, which on the basis of 6 days a week amounts to \$600 a week. My amendment provides that little extra clause in it that you must not go above the highest amount paid under civil service, which is between \$43 and \$45 a day. I think this is fair. I do not think either the committee or the Bureau has made a case to support the payment of \$100 to the extra individuals. If this extra employment is really needed, we should know in what particular places their services are required, what professional or other qualifications will be required, and why they should not be required to comply with civil service qualifications. Requirements are set up for less important jobs. Why not do it here?

You would not give a man a 14 rating or a 12 rating, unless you showed that he is qualified. You do not qualify the people at all under this bill—not a bit of it.

Mr. NORRELL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. REES of Kansas. I yield to the distinguished gentleman from Arkansas.

Mr. NORRELL. Did I understand the gentleman to say that there had been no hearings on this subject at all?

Mr. REES of Kansas. No definite information on this particular item in the Bonneville Dam. You might find it on some others, but not on this one except in generalities.

Mr. NORRELL. If the gentleman will turn to page 1756 of the hearings he will find the testimony on the administrative provisions.

Mr. REES of Kansas. I am talking about the Bonneville Dam now. They are the ones you are going to have to qualify. The hearings do not indicate standards of qualification.

Mr. NORRELL. There were hearings on the change of language to give them the \$100 a day.

Mr. REES of Kansas. Oh, yes; the law provides it, all right, but you do not qualify these people. That is what I am talking about. You do not say what the qualifications are—not at all.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Kansas has expired.

Mr. KIRWAN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I hope the members of the committee will not feel that I am coming into the well of the House to address them, thinking I am an expert on these problems. Because I know I am not. We had this in the committee last year and before. The witnesses told the committee why they needed these men. Let me put this situation to the gentleman from Kansas.

Suppose you went to an engineering school and finished your course of study. Suppose you were the tops in your class and were voted the most likely to succeed and that you have something that the Government wants. Suppose your

fee is \$100 a day. You are not going to go out and go on the Government payroll for \$25 or \$50 a day, but you have the brains and the ability that they want. That has been explained to me at least five times when I asked that question of the Administrator of Bonneville, and we have had it in the hearings year after year until I thought the Congress was sick of listening to it. The testimony is there telling you why this is necessary and Dr. Raver explained it, I think, through three straight years. He explained that somebody had some ability that they—his regular employees—did not have, and he is an engineer himself. That is why they hired these men at \$100 a day. How will you know a year in advance if you want him, or who you may want until some particular case comes up for action?

That is why he hires them and that is why we have to have this provision.

Mr. REES of Kansas. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. KIRWAN. I yield.

Mr. REES of Kansas. You have \$40,000 in this particular item for the Bonneville Dam, is that correct?

Mr. KIRWAN. That is correct.

Mr. REES of Kansas. That is one agency. How many do you expect to employ?

Mr. KIRWAN. He may not use one of them.

Mr. REES of Kansas. But when you came to the amount of \$40,000 in your hearings, would it not have been well to have some kind of record that we could have based that on?

Mr. KIRWAN. Yes; they had that in detail in 3 years of hearings where Dr. Raver explained why he wanted that money. It has been in the record for years. He might not use a penny of it, but with the war crisis going on, overnight he might want a half a dozen engineers. Is he going to come back to Congress and get a supplemental to get the privilege to hire these men?

Mr. REES of Kansas. Another thing with reference to this agency: That agency can go out and make contracts in addition to this thing, and hire people at whatever they want to.

Mr. KIRWAN. Yes; up to \$100 a day.

Mr. REES of Kansas. That is another thing. You hire engineers at these high prices. That is something else we will get into later on, but it seems to me where you can be allowed to make these contracts you are just throwing it wide open.

Mr. KIRWAN. No. They have attorneys down there to draw the contracts on all these things.

Mr. REES of Kansas. And spend thousands and thousands of dollars in another spot.

Mr. FOGARTY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. KIRWAN. I yield.

Mr. FOGARTY. The same thing pertained in the bill we just passed here last week. The gentleman from Kansas [Mr. REES] offered the same amendment in the Mediation and Conciliation Service, where the House cut the daily rate from \$75 to \$50 a day. For this purpose the

Mediation and Conciliation had \$50,000 last year and did not spend a dime. It was returned to the Treasury. But it was there for that specific purpose, that when they got up against an emergency and needed qualified men, they could get men who could be depended upon. I am not a lawyer, and I do not think the gentleman is, but the lawyers have told me that when they are in court and they want technical experts to testify in the medical field or in the engineering field they sometimes pay them not only \$100 but \$200 a day. That is not exorbitant.

Mr. KIRWAN. Yes. If anyone ever sat on a jury in any courtroom in the United States and saw an expert come in there, whether it was for a corporation or what it was for, you would know that it cost from \$500 to \$1,000.

Mr. REES of Kansas. I called attention a while ago to the fact that you do not qualify any experts under this bill at all.

Mr. KIRWAN. No. We do not know what kind of an expert he will want. If he wants to go out and hire someone when occasion demands it, he has got a short time only to do it. But as the gentleman from Rhode Island [Mr. FOGARTY] said, they had permission to hire specialists in the bill last year, and they did not use a dime of it. There was no necessity to use it. No case came up. So they turned it back to the Treasury. But if they needed it, it was there. They are not spending the money simply because it is in the bill.

Mr. REES of Kansas. But do we not have a right to be protected and know that these people are qualified?

Mr. KIRWAN. Can you get any better protection than that? They did not spend the money. Is there any better protection than honesty?

Mr. REES of Kansas. No; of course not.

Mr. KIRWAN. The gentleman from Rhode Island said they did not spend one dime, and that is the greatest protection in the world.

Mr. REES of Kansas. I appreciate honesty, but let us qualify it.

Mr. KIRWAN. They are not spending this money where it is not needed.

Mr. JACKSON of Washington. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word.

Mr. Chairman, I love my good friend, the gentleman from Kansas [Mr. REES] and I have served with him many times on committees, but I think he is misinformed about the record of the hearings. First, he said the committee did not give much consideration to this matter. If he will look at page 1756, part 2 of the hearings, he will see that the committee went into this matter very thoroughly. The gentleman from Arkansas [Mr. NORRELL] gave very careful consideration to it. Starting on page 1758 the gentleman will find a detailed justification of the \$100 per diem item, which the gentleman now seeks to strike out along with other language.

Mr. NORRELL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. JACKSON of Washington. I yield.

Mr. NORRELL. This is one item that we went into very thoroughly, and the reason we took the action we did was to place the technicians hired on a special basis, on the same basis as the Corps of Army Engineers, for instance.

Mr. JACKSON of Washington. The gentleman is correct. It is a standard provision that applies to other items in the appropriation bill, where the services of outstanding professional people are required.

Mr. ROONEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. JACKSON of Washington. I yield.

Mr. ROONEY. Is it not a fact that about 70 percent of the money used for this purpose is to hire accountants to disclose rate structures for the benefit of the private utility companies?

Mr. JACKSON of Washington. I understand that a substantial part of it is used for the purpose of financial audit by a firm of private accountants such as Arthur Anderson Co., of Chicago. Not only that, but in the Pacific Northwest they are building some of the biggest transmission grid lines that have ever been built, and they must hire, from time to time, men from private engineering consulting firms, from the universities, and eminent electrical engineers who have specific specialized knowledge in this field.

Not only that, but Bonneville Power makes available their engineers to the private utilities to work out very difficult engineering problems. Just the other day, last week in fact, the Bonneville Power Administration laid a cable in the San Juan Islands, State of Washington, the longest cable that has ever been laid under water for the amount of power that will be carried by that cable. It required the hiring of professional people by private engineering companies to make sure that an efficient job was done.

When you are building dams like Grand Coulee, the largest dam in the world, the Bonneville Power Administration and the Bureau of Reclamation would be condemned by the Congress of the United States if they did not hire competent engineers to do the job of designing the dam and transmission facilities. If it is prudent for private power qualified, professional assistance, it follows that it is equally prudent for the Federal Government to do so. If, however, the Government had not been careful and a line broke down and they had a request in here for some funds to take care of the loss then Congress would ask: "Why did they not go out and get a good man from private industry who knew something about the job that had to be done?" It seems to me we went into this very carefully under the able questioning of the gentleman from Arkansas [Mr. NORRELL]. This is the same standard provision that applies in the case of the Army engineers.

I hope that under all the circumstances the Committee will vote the amendment down.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Kansas.

The question was taken; and on a division (demanded by Mr. REES of Kansas) there were—ayes 57, noes 59.

So the amendment was rejected.

Mr. KIRWAN. Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise.

The motion was agreed to.

Accordingly the Committee rose, and the Speaker having resumed the chair, Mr. MILLS, chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H. R. 3790) making appropriations for the Department of the Interior for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1952, and for other purposes, had come to no resolution thereon.

VERMONT AGRICULTURAL COLLEGE

Mr. POAGE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent for the immediate consideration of the bill (S. 271) to authorize the transfer to the Vermont Agricultural College of certain lands in Addison County, Vt., for agricultural purposes.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Texas?

There was no objection.

The Clerk read the bill, as follows:

Be it enacted, etc., That the Secretary of Agriculture is authorized and directed to transfer and convey to the Vermont Agricultural College, a State-owned corporation, upon acceptance by said agricultural college, without cost, the real property comprising 942.42 acres, more or less, of the United States Morgan Horse Farm located in Addison County, town of Weybridge, Vt., and such of the personal property of this station as may be agreed upon, in writing, by the Secretary of Agriculture and the dean of the Vermont Agricultural College. Such real and personal property and research records shall be transferred upon the express condition that they shall be used by the Vermont Agricultural College for the benefit of agriculture for such period as may be agreed upon by the Secretary and the said college at the time of transfer. Deeds to the property conveyed pursuant to this act shall contain a reservation to the United States of all gas, oil, coal, and other minerals and all fissionable materials as may be found in such lands and the right to the use of the lands for extracting and removing same.

The authority herein contained shall expire on June 30, 1951, unless, prior to such expiration date, the dean of the Vermont Agricultural College shall have notified the Secretary of Agriculture of the acceptance of the lands and other property of the station under the terms of this act.

Mr. POAGE. Mr. Speaker, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. POAGE: Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the following:

"That the Secretary of Agriculture is authorized and directed to transfer and convey to the Vermont Agricultural College, a State-owned corporation, upon acceptance by said agricultural college, without cost, the real property comprising nine hundred forty-two and forty-two one-hundredths acres, more or less, of the United States Morgan Horse Farm located in Addison County, town of Weybridge, Vt., and such of the personal property of this station as may be agreed

upon, in writing, by the Secretary of Agriculture and the dean of the Vermont Agricultural College. Such real and personal property and research records shall be transferred upon the express condition that they shall be used by the Vermont Agricultural College for the benefit of agriculture for such period as may be agreed upon by the Secretary, and the said college at the time of transfer. Deeds to the property conveyed pursuant to this act shall contain (1) a provision providing that the property shall revert to the United States if the property is used for any purpose other than for the benefit of agriculture, and (2) a reservation to the United States of all gas, oil, coal, and other minerals and fissionable materials as may be found in such lands and the right to use the lands for extracting and removing same.

"The authority herein contained shall expire on June 30, 1951, unless, prior to such expiration date, the dean of the Vermont Agricultural College shall have notified the Secretary of Agriculture of the acceptance of the lands and other property of the station under the terms of this act."

The amendment was agreed to.

The bill was ordered to be read a third time, was read the third time, and passed.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

Mr. LANE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on the Judiciary may have until midnight tonight to file a report on the bill, H. R. 3692.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Massachusetts?

There was no objection.

VIEWS OF ERLE COCKE, JR., NATIONAL COMMANDER OF THE AMERICAN LEGION

Mr. VAN ZANDT. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for 1 minute and to revise and extend my remarks.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Pennsylvania?

There was no objection.

Mr. VAN ZANDT. Mr. Speaker, if there is any segment of our population in a position to speak for the American people, it is those men and women who followed the Stars and Stripes through two world wars, many of whom are again serving their country in the so-called police action in Korea.

These veterans represent a true cross-section of the American people for they are from all walks in life, various religious faiths and racial origins, as well as being Democrats and Republicans.

These veterans are organized into several great veteran organizations that have a combined membership of nearly 9,000,000 citizens.

In Tampa, Fla., on April 23, Erle Cocke, Jr., national commander of the American Legion, reflected the views of millions of American citizens when he said:

Military decisions must govern the methods and tactics of defeating the enemy. This is no job for swivel chair politicians or striped-pants diplomats. This is a job for soldiers.

Today here in Washington Commander in Chief Charles C. Ralls, of the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States, reinforced the words of the national Legion commander when he demanded the replacement of Secretary of State Dean Acheson with a successor who can command the genuine support of both Democrats and Republicans as a necessary prelude to the reestablishment of a bipartisan policy.

In asking President Truman to dismiss Dean Acheson, Commander in Chief Ralls said:

The current conflict of opinions between Congress and the State Department and Acheson's manifest inability to win the support of the American people have produced a degree of disunity that strikes at the very foundation of our hopes for victory over the Communist menace to world peace.

Commander Ralls continued by saying:

Soviet Russia has always employed the divide and conquer technique to destroy its enemies. As long as we remain divided on our foreign principles and objectives, we are guilty of giving aid and comfort to our Communist enemies—

He said.

The national leader of the VFW declared that millions of Americans have clearly indicated their lack of confidence in Secretary Acheson and he said this attitude will continue to handcuff the Nation's effort to combat aggression on all fronts as long as Mr. Acheson remains head of our State Department.

Mr. Speaker, the statements by the national commanders of the American Legion and the Veterans of Foreign Wars are not emotional outbursts resulting from the Truman-MacArthur controversy. Their statements are based on actions taken at their national conventions, assembled last year, when they condemned the policies of the Department of State which they declared were endangering the very existence of our beloved country.

Mr. Speaker, I agree with these two great veteran leaders that Dean Acheson should be removed immediately. In the minds of millions of Americans he is a symbol of disunity. Recent polls of public opinion reveal the undeniable fact that a great percentage of the American people have lost faith in Dean Acheson. Therefore, as long as he remains in office, the American people can expect nothing but bitter controversies, political dissensions, and continued confusion in our efforts to meet the challenge of world communism.

Dean Acheson did not turn his back on Alger Hiss—it is the time for the American people to turn their backs on Dean Acheson—the symbol of disunity.

TREATMENT OF POWERS OF APPOINTMENT FOR ESTATE AND GIFT TAX PURPOSES

Mr. LYLE, from the Committee on Rules, reported the following privileged resolution (H. Res. 206, Rept. No. 374), which was referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed:

Resolved, That immediately upon the adoption of this resolution it shall be in order to move that the House resolve itself

into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H. R. 2084) relating to the treatment of powers of appointment for estate and gift tax purposes. That after general debate, which shall be confined to the bill and continue not to exceed 2 hours, to be equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on Ways and Means, the bill shall be considered as having been read for amendment. No amendment shall be in order to said bill except amendments offered by the direction of the Committee on Ways and Means, and said amendments shall be in order, any rule of the House to the contrary notwithstanding. At the conclusion of the consideration of the bill for amendment, the Committee shall rise and report the bill to the House with such amendments as may have been adopted, and the previous question shall be considered as ordered on the bill and amendments thereto to final passage without intervening motion except one motion to recommit.

DISPLACED PERSONS ACT OF 1948

Mr. MITCHELL, from the Committee on Rules, reported the following privileged resolution (H. Res. 207, Rept. No. 375), which was referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed:

Resolved, That immediately upon the adoption of this resolution it shall be in order to move that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H. R. 3576) to amend the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, as amended. That after general debate which shall be confined to the bill and continue not to exceed 1 hour, to be equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on the Judiciary, the bill shall be read for amendment under the 5-minute rule. At the conclusion of the consideration of the bill for amendment, the Committee shall rise and report the bill to the House with such amendments as may have been adopted and the previous question shall be considered as ordered on the bill and amendments thereto to final passage without intervening motion except one motion to recommit.

AGRICULTURAL WORKERS FROM FOREIGN COUNTRIES

Mr. MCCARTHY (at the request of Mr. MITCHELL) was given permission to file minority views on H. R. 3283.

The SPEAKER. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. CRAWFORD] is recognized for 30 minutes.

CONTROL OF MARGINS ON COMMODITY EXCHANGES

Mr. CRAWFORD. Mr. Speaker, some time ago on the House floor, an exchange took place in which an attempt was made to fix party responsibility for the defeat of a provision in the original draft of the Defense Production Act which would have given the President the authority to fix margin requirements for trading on the commodity exchanges.

During that discussion, familiar charges were repeated about speculation on the commodity exchanges and the conclusion was drawn that this speculation was a factor in increasing commodity prices and the cost of living.

Without saying whether Democrats or Republicans were responsible for the defeat of the effort to increase the Government's authority over the commodity ex-

changes, I want to say that I supported the amendment to the Defense Production Act for deletion of the commodity exchange provision. I did so after considered judgment and I would do so again under similar circumstances.

Bear in mind please, that the proposal we are talking about was not a proposal to put the commodity exchanges out of business because of the speculation which takes place on them. Nobody, so far as I know, has said that the commodity exchanges should be closed. On the contrary, even the Department of Agriculture, which has been the principal proponent for control of margins for futures trading on the exchanges, agrees that the exchanges serve a useful purpose. This is attested by many statements from Department officials. The question comes down to the advisability of giving the Government more power over the exchanges, including giving the Government the authority to raise margins, or lower margins, on the theory that speculation does have a vital influence upon commodity prices.

Chief Justice Taft, in delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court in the case of the *United States v. The New York Coffee and Sugar Exchange, Inc.* (263 U. S. 611) said:

The usefulness and legality of sales for future delivery, and of furnishing an exchange where under well-defined limitations and the rules the business can be carried on, have been fully recognized by this court. . . . Those who have studied the economic effect of such exchanges for contracts for future deliveries generally agree that they stabilize prices in the long run instead of promoting their fluctuation.

Like William Howard Taft, I maintain that the rise or fall of commodity prices, for any but very brief periods, simply reflects market conditions. In a free market, prices cannot but reflect supply and demand. The exchanges simply mirror these prices.

What then is the function of the commodity exchanges? They serve two primary purposes:

First. They show accurately what prices are from hour to hour and day to day.

Second. They serve as insurance for the elements of an industry which does not wish to speculate, but which wish to make their profits out of the services they perform.

The advantage of a place where anyone interested can readily obtain accurate and up-to-date information on commodity prices should not have to be spelled out.

If there is any question about the importance of this function of the exchanges, I refer you only to the recent experience on the cotton exchanges. The general ceiling price regulation, issued on January 26, resulted in the closing of the cotton exchanges until March 8. The cotton exchanges opened on March 8 following the issuance by OPS of specific price ceilings on upland cotton and a supplementary regulation which fixed ceilings for futures trading.

During the period from January 26 to March 8 the entire cotton trade was paralyzed. The general price ceiling

was such that no one knew what the price of cotton was supposed to be. The producers of cotton could not sell their cotton; merchants could not quote prices to mills, nor mills to their purchasers. The holders of contracts on the exchanges could not fulfill their contracts. Everything was at a standstill until the exchanges opened.

The exchanges now are doing their best to function but, as the cotton industry informed OPS, it is difficult for any industry to function in a Government strait-jacket. I am of the opinion that price ceilings on raw cotton and some other agricultural commodities will prove unworkable and eventually will be lifted. Meanwhile, the ceilings will have failed in their primary purpose of preventing inflation and much damage will have resulted to the industries affected.

It, however, is not my purpose today to discuss price ceilings on agricultural commodities. I intend to confine myself primarily to the proposal recently talked about on the House floor—the proposal to give the Government the authority to fix margins for trading on the exchanges, and to explain the reasons for my attitude.

As I have stated, the recent experience with the cotton exchanges has demonstrated the purpose which the exchanges serve as the authentic source of price information. Before leaving this point I would like also to state what happened in World War I. The cotton exchanges closed after war began and remained closed for several months. During this period, prices of cotton varied widely over the Cotton Belt. They even varied from locality to locality. With the exchanges closed, nobody knew what prices were.

Now let me return to the second of the primary purposes of a commodity market—to serve as insurance for the elements of the industry which does not wish to speculate.

Let me illustrate how this insurance works. It is called hedging. For example, a grain merchant buys wheat from producers and sells an equivalent amount of wheat in the futures market. When he sells the wheat he bought from farmers, he buys back his futures contract, thus closing out the transaction.

If the wheat he bought declines in price before he sells it, he loses on this transaction, but he gains an equivalent amount on his futures transactions.

Such an operation, simply stated, is hedging. The merchant referred to is protecting himself, through the medium of the market, from speculative risks in the market.

Since the merchant is protected, he can borrow from 80 to 85 percent of the value of his wheat from the banks at a comparatively low rate of interest. Similarly, the millers of flour protect themselves on their wheat stocks through hedging and consequently can finance their operations at a comparatively low cost. Other elements in the industry, including the producers, avail themselves of the insurance afforded by the exchanges.

Someone may say, however, as they have said many times in the past: "We

do not wish to interfere with legitimate hedging. We want the legitimate operator to be protected. The villain we are after is the speculator."

That sounds good. It has the virtue of all flat and simple statements. Let us explore this matter somewhat further and see if we can drive out speculation and protect the man who simply wishes to hedge and protect himself.

How does a commodity market operate? How does it afford the operator who wishes to hedge the protection he wants and which we wish to give him?

If a market is to afford this protection, someone must be available to buy and to sell whenever cotton, or grain, or any other commodity which is offered on an exchange. If a cotton merchant, for example, wishes to sell a futures contract, someone must be ready to buy it. If he wishes to buy a futures contract, someone must be ready to sell it.

If we drive out speculation, we are likely to destroy the commodity markets. The speculation in these markets enables the hedging operator to buy when he wishes to buy, or sell when he wishes. If there is no speculation in the market, hedging—which everyone wants to protect—would be impossible. Two persons, one wishing to sell and one wishing to buy, are necessary for a transaction on the futures exchanges. There is not enough so-called legitimate hedging on the futures exchanges for a commodity market to furnish price insurance for hedgers. Speculation in the market means that at almost all times there are buyers and sellers in the market and that a transaction will be consummated in a matter of minutes.

We may sit in moral judgment on speculation on the exchanges, but I would like to point out that the element of speculation is present in almost every business transaction. If the Members of this House will reflect a moment, I am certain they can recollect some business transactions which they have entered into which were speculative. Almost every purchase of real estate, or any other investment, has a speculative character. I do not have to belabor this point. It is obvious.

I might also point out that many speculative exchange transactions are in reality investments and are long term in nature. If a man with money to invest thinks the price of wheat is going up, I see no reason why he should not buy wheat, either on the futures exchanges, or wheat from farmers. But that simply is a personal expression of opinion. I am not attempting to defend speculation as such on the exchanges. I am simply trying to point out the function which the speculation has in exchange operations, and that if we want the exchanges to exist there must be speculation.

The late Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, one of the country's great jurists, said:

Speculation is the self-adjustment of society to the probable. . . . Its value is well known as a means of avoiding or mitigating catastrophes, equalizing prices, and providing for periods of want.

This, of course, does not dispose of the proposal that the Government be given power to regulate margins on the exchanges. The Government argues that it does not wish to stop speculation but to control it. There is no more effective instrument of control than the control of margins. If margins are increased substantially, the volume of trading, including speculation—and hedging—in a commodity, naturally will decline.

The whole question comes down as to which is to be the judge of the margin required for a futures transaction, the exchange or the Government?

Frankly, I am inclined to think that the exchange knows more about its own business than the Government. The Government's case is that speculation has been a sizable factor in the recent increase in commodity prices. I have seen no proof of this contention.

If we grant that speculation on the commodity exchanges is a big reason for the rise in farm prices, how do we account for the increase in other commodities not traded in on the exchanges?

Since Korea, farm prices have advanced about 21 percent, but the price of industrial raw materials—few of which are traded in on the exchanges—have advanced about 50 percent. Tin, which is not traded in on the exchanges, has risen about 138 percent; lead nearly 50 percent; aluminum 78 percent; chemicals about 27 percent; and textiles 32 percent. None of these are traded in on the exchanges.

If we single out exchange speculation as a major factor in price rises, how do we account for the far greater price increases in products not traded in on the exchanges?

Everyone knows, of course, that the rise in prices since Korea has been due to factors in no way connected with trading on the commodity exchanges. The exchanges simply reflect these conditions, just as the price for any commodity reflects the supply and demand for the commodity in the absence of a controlled market.

The effort made to connect price increases in food products with speculation on the exchanges also conveniently ignores some other factors.

For example, a great hullabaloo has been made about the price increases in cotton, to which I shall refer again later. But you are not told that the cotton in a shirt now selling for \$3.50 to \$4 probably did not bring the farmer more than 30 cents.

Nor do we hear that the corn in a can retailing for 19 or 20 cents brought less than 2½ cents to the producer.

Onions which were selling in stores in November 1950 for 5.7 cents a pound had been sold by farmers for a little over 1 cent.

The wheat in a loaf of bread which sells for 15 or 16 cents brings farmers only about 2½ cents.

Does speculation on the exchanges account for these spreads? I am not assailing the disparity between the price of the agricultural commodity and the finished product. Many factors account for this spread. I am simply reminding

those who are aroused over food prices that they must look elsewhere than speculation for their scapegoat.

The Department of Agriculture has been the leader of those who have sought to extend controls over the commodity exchanges. Last year, while Congress was considering the Defense Production Act, the Department issued a number of statements connecting farm-price increases with speculation on the exchanges. But the Secretary of Agriculture, Charles F. Brannan, on February 9 issued a statement defending farm prices. He said:

A number of recent public statements have created the impression that agricultural commodity prices are unreasonably or disproportionately high in relation to prices of other consumer goods or to wages or to the farmer's costs. This impression is not warranted by the facts.

The Secretary also said:

Food is a better bargain for the average person today than in the prewar period.

I would like to quote another portion of the Secretary's statement:

Prices of many manufactured items tend to rise because market supplies are being lowered in order to permit increased production of military goods. Most agricultural commodities, on the other hand, are available in record and near-record amounts, but demand is increasing as consumer incomes increase.

These considerations emphasize the importance of abundant production in the job of keeping prices of agricultural commodities at reasonable levels. On the other hand, it should not be taken for granted that agricultural production can be increased enough to meet all of the rising demands.

There is not one word in the statement about speculation on the commodity exchanges. As I stated, last year, when the Defense Production Act was being considered, the Department of Agriculture issued many statements which indicated that speculation was shooting farm prices upward. Some of these statements were misleading. For example, the Department compared the margins required for trading on the stock exchanges with the margins on the commodity exchanges. The inference was that high margins had not hurt the stock exchanges and would not harm the commodity exchanges.

The statement completely ignored the fundamental difference between the stock exchanges and the commodity exchanges. The stock exchanges do not furnish insurance for those who trade on them. You cannot hedge on a stock exchange.

Several months later we find the Department defending farm prices and in the statement by the Secretary there is not one word about speculation on the commodity exchanges.

Surely, if the Secretary really felt that speculation was a substantial factor in causing farm prices to rise, he would have again assailed gambling, and would have stated that if the additional authority sought over the exchanges had been granted, farm prices would have been lower.

Since the Korean war began, the price of cotton has advanced about 40 percent,

or substantially more than the prices of most other farm commodities. But speculative interest in cotton has been substantially less through the period of price advances than it was in 1949. Speculative interest on the New York Cotton Exchange during July 1950 was approximately 12 percent less than it was during October 1949. Speculative interest in cotton on the New York exchange has continued to decline during the period of cotton price advances. Now, with price ceilings on raw cotton the speculative interest in the market is negligible—yet spot cotton prices remain at the ceiling price.

Everyone familiar with cotton knows that the reasons for the rise in cotton prices is not speculation but has been due primarily to an extremely short crop in 1950, a crop less than 10,000,000 bales as compared to ordinary production of from 13,000,000 to 15,000,000 bales. An added factor, of course, has been the inflationary forces let loose by Korea and abetted by the monetary policy of the administration. Our currency is inflated and our dollar is worth less and less. But this fact, as plain as an elephant in a circus day parade, is ignored and we hear prevarications that would lead one to believe that if only speculation on the commodity exchanges could be curbed all would be well. This attitude is ridiculous.

Almost all agricultural commodities traded in on the futures exchanges now are at parity levels, and are under price ceilings, or are close to parity levels.

The volume of speculative trading in the commodities which have reached price ceilings have followed the pattern established in cotton and has fallen sharply. But there have been no significant price declines in these commodities.

Even with the hysteria which attended the fighting in Korea and which resulted in the passage of the Defense Production Act, the Congress refused to approve the administration's proposal to include the authority to control margins for futures trading in the act.

The House rejected the proposal by a roll-call vote, 198 to 194. The Senate Banking and Currency Committee turned down the proposal in committee and it never came to a vote on the Senate floor. The proposal was rejected in spite of almost frantic attempts to include it in the law and despite the furore about prices which made it extremely difficult to legislate wisely and well.

During the discussion of this question last year it was made plain that the proposal to give the Government authority to regulate margins for futures trading is not new. The administration has recommended it on several previous occasions. The President recommended such action in 1947. The Joint Committee on the Economic Report of the Eightieth Congress considered the matter thoroughly and refused to approve the plan.

Later in the same Congress, a bill, S. 1881, again proposed to give additional authority over the exchanges to the Secretary of Agriculture, including the authority to control margins.

This also was rejected after hearings by the Senate Agriculture Committee. Since that time many bills have been introduced in Congress proposing an extension of authority over the futures exchanges. The Senate and House Committees on Agriculture have studied these bills and have failed to report a single one favorably.

It is significant that the only committee, the House Committee on Banking and Currency, which has reported favorably a bill to give the Government the power to control the margins for futures trading, had held no hearings on the matter when it did so. Later, after the committee had an opportunity to examine the question, a move was made to reconsider the vote. The vote on this move, as I recall, was 12 to 12. In other words, the Committee on Banking and Currency failed by only one vote to rescind approval of the exchange section.

The proposal to control the margins for trading on the exchanges has been put forward during periods of rising prices and during periods of declining prices. If prices are declining, the argument is made that speculation is responsible; if prices are advancing, the argument is made that speculation on the exchanges is responsible.

What is the real reason for this stubborn insistence that the Government needs more power over the commodity exchanges—power above and beyond the ample authority over the exchanges which it already has? The real reason is the desire for an extension of Federal authority. This extension, unless it is absolutely necessary, is something which all of us should oppose.

The commodity exchanges are an integral part of the free-market system. If we give the Government additional authority over their operations, make no mistake about it, the power will be used to hamper the operation of the exchanges. Margins will be raised to high levels. Speculators will be driven out of the market. Hedging will be interfered with. The exchanges, eventually, could be forced out of business.

The exchanges, in my opinion, have done a good job of self-regulation. The margins required for trading are sufficient to protect the integrity of a contract on the exchanges. That is the real purpose for margins and there is no question of their adequacy in this respect. Nor is there evidence that the exchanges have not managed their own affairs in an orderly and sound way. Margins are raised as prices increase. If the exchanges are running their affairs satisfactorily—as they are—why should the Government step in? The disappearance of the exchanges will be another long step toward the destruction of the free economy.

The international situation has brought developments that make some controls necessary. All the more reasons to reject unnecessary controls.

Even though the exchanges today are in the strait-jacket of price controls, some people are not satisfied. If price controls should be lifted, they still want to maintain controls. So again the pro-

gram to extend control over the futures markets is put forward and it is accompanied by the fanfare of propaganda—speculation, gambling, high prices. This propaganda has misled some Members of this House. They repeat the inflammatory statements, never stopping to look at the facts, or to examine the real motives behind the propaganda.

I say to you that we should be more vigilant than ever. To repeat, some controls are forced upon us by circumstances. This is all the more reason to fight as vigorously as we know how against unnecessary controls.

The plan to give the Government the power to control the margins used for futures trading on the commodity exchanges falls into the questionable and unnecessary category.

I am against such a proposal and will continue to be against it unless circumstances—which I do not foresee—make it advisable.

IOWA DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION

Mr. JENSEN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address the House for 1 minute.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Iowa? There was no objection.

Mr. JENSEN. Mr. Speaker, in conjunction with an article emanating from the Iowa Development Commission which will be found in the Appendix of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, I am glad to say that 98 percent of the farms in Iowa are electrified. That condition has come about because of the fine cooperation which has existed for many years between the REA, the private utilities, and the municipal power plants. I am very proud of the fact that this fine showing has been made by the people of Iowa. It should be a model for other States to follow.

The SPEAKER. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mrs. ROGERS] is recognized for 5 minutes.

PROSTHETIC APPLIANCES

Mrs. ROGERS of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, I rise to tell the House that the Speaker has very graciously granted the opportunity to the gentleman from New Mexico [Mr. DEMPSEY] and myself to have the National Advisory Committee on Prosthetic Appliances on Thursday, the 10th of May, at 10 o'clock, in the caucus room, show what has been done in the way of the development of prosthetic appliances and their use by our veterans. It is a very remarkable performance.

Those who saw the men last year and the year before and the year before that will realize what strides have been made in the last 3 years. I was at Walter Reed Hospital this morning and I saw what is being done in the sinoplastic work at Forest Glen. Men have been given artificial arms, and those arms were attached to muscles in the shoulder, the chest, and the muscles in the arms. The men operate their hands in that way. It does away with the ropes that were being used. These appliances

are extremely advanced, and the men like these artificial arms very much.

Mr. CANFIELD. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mrs. ROGERS of Massachusetts. I yield to the gentleman from New Jersey who is so interested in the veterans.

Mr. CANFIELD. I am glad to hear the Members of the House are going to have this opportunity to witness firsthand the remarkable strides made by the one laboratory in all this world engaged in this type of research. I happened to be out at Forest Glen this afternoon and saw this great development with my own eyes. I was greatly impressed. I want to be there on the 10th when they come down here with their boys and their appliances. If I am not mistaken, more boys have lost their arms, their legs, and their hands through frostbite and hand-to-hand conflict in Korea than in World War II during the same period of time.

Mrs. ROGERS of Massachusetts. The gentleman is correct.

Mr. CANFIELD. This is an extraordinary challenge, and I am glad to hear of this opportunity.

Mrs. ROGERS of Massachusetts. I hope the gentleman will speak to other Members about it. I know we do not always receive in our offices notices that are sent out.

I should like to take this opportunity to thank the House and the Senate for passing a bill I introduced some years ago providing that \$1,000,000 be spent every year in prosthetic appliance research under the direction of the Veterans' Administration. It has been very successful and it has meant a great deal to these men. It gives them a chance to have more like their own legs and arms. A great deal has been done also in connection with appliances for the legs.

The Walter Reed appropriation comes out of Army funds. I am very grateful to the Army this year, the Secretary of the Army and the Under Secretary of the Army, General Alexander, for keeping that prosthetic laboratory open at Forest Glen. There was some talk of closing, which would have been a tragedy. What has been accomplished is amazing.

Mr. CANFIELD. How the Members will be impressed by the spirit of these boys. They appreciate so much all that has been done for them.

Mrs. ROGERS of Massachusetts. The spirit of the boys, yes. Also those boys have undoubtedly suffered a lot in nervous strain and physical pain and strain in having these sinoplastic appliances made useful for them.

May I commend also the officers who have been working day after day and day after day with the greatest enthusiasm, because they were giving something not only to the veterans of this country but to the civilians as well, but civilians will be asked to purchase aids. It has been a very great service that has been performed.

I should like at this time to pay a great tribute to Col. Robert Allen, who was here one time in our Press Gallery, and still is.

He is now a commentator on the air and in the newspapers. He gave his arm for us. He served as combat intelligence man for Gen. George Patton. He lost his arm and was taken prisoner by the Germans. He was in the hospital after he was hurt and out of the hospital, I think, in 24 hours, a remarkable thing for a man to accomplish, wounded as he was. He has been the spearhead for this movement in getting better arms and legs for the veterans, hearing and visual aids. It has been a very great thing, and I know the world will be grateful to this man. Sinoplastic prosthesis was started first, I think, in Russia, or Germany and we have come along and perfected it. I would like to point out that the artificial arms and legs and other prosthesis developed by the VA and the Army will be made available to civilians also. Our colleague the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. KELLEY] and I are members of the advisory committee to the VA on prosthesis of which Col. Robert L. Allen is chairman.

The SPEAKER. The time of the gentlewoman from Massachusetts has expired.

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

Mr. GARY asked and was given permission to extend his remarks and include a portion of his weekly radio broadcast to his constituents.

Mr. PRICE asked and was given permission to extend his remarks in three instances and include extraneous matter.

Mr. JONES of Alabama asked and was given permission to extend his remarks.

Mr. ASPINALL asked and was given permission to extend his remarks and include an editorial.

Mr. HAYS of Ohio asked and was given permission to extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.

Mr. MITCHELL asked and was given permission to extend his remarks and include an editorial.

Mr. DORN asked and was given permission to extend his remarks and include a resolution adopted by the Veterans of Foreign Wars.

Mr. FEIGHAN (at the request of Mr. LANE) was given permission to extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.

Mrs. ROGERS of Massachusetts asked and was given permission to extend her remarks and include an editorial from Life magazine of last week and an editorial from the Washington Post.

Mr. MORANO asked and was given permission to extend his remarks and include a speech by Hon. Clare Boothe Luce.

Mr. AYRES asked and was given permission to extend his remarks and include a letter from General Hershey.

Mr. FURCOLO asked and was given permission to extend his remarks and include an editorial.

Mr. PHILBIN asked and was given permission to extend his remarks in two instances.

Mr. VAN ZANDT asked and was given permission to extend his remarks in two instances.

Mr. GROSS asked and was given permission to extend his remarks and include a letter from a constituent.

Mr. LECOMPTE asked and was given permission to extend his remarks and include portion of a letter from Dr. Samuel Stevens.

Mr. BOW asked and was given permission to extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.

Mr. BOYKIN asked and was given permission to extend his remarks and include a statement by Edward J. Foley, Jr.

Mr. CARNAHAN asked and was given permission to extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.

Mr. FLOOD asked and was given permission to extend his remarks and include an article.

Mr. SHELLEY (at the request of Mr. HAVENNER) was given permission to extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.

Mr. JENSEN asked and was given permission to extend his remarks and include an article from the Iowa Development Commission.

Mr. HILLINGS asked and was given permission to extend his remarks in two instances and to include an editorial and other extraneous matter.

LEAVE OF ABSENCE

By unanimous consent, leave of absence was granted as follows:

To Mr. FINE (at the request of Mr. McCormack), for the remainder of the week, on account of official business.

To Mrs. HARDEN, for April 24 to May 3, on account of official business.

To Mr. BURTON (at the request of Mr. FUGATE), for 1 day, on account of official business.

To Mr. ROOSEVELT (at the request of Mr. GREEN), for Tuesday, April 24, on account of illness.

To Mr. ANFUSO (at the request of Mr. McGrath), for April 24, 25 and 26, on account of official committee business.

ENROLLED JOINT RESOLUTION SIGNED

Mr. STANLEY, from the committee on House Administration, reported that that committee had examined and found truly enrolled a joint resolution of the House of the following title, which was thereupon signed by the Speaker:

H. J. Res. 238. Joint Resolution making an emergency appropriation for the fiscal year 1951, and for other purposes.

ADJOURNMENT

Mr. PHILBIN. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House do now adjourn.

The motion was agreed to; accordingly (at 5 o'clock and 41 minutes p. m.) the House adjourned until tomorrow, Wednesday, April 25, 1951, at 12 o'clock noon.

EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

Under clause 2 of rule XXIV, executive communications were taken from the Speaker's table and referred as follows:

399. A letter from the Archivist of the United States, transmitting a report on records proposed for disposal and lists or schedules covering records proposed for disposal by certain Government agencies; to the Committee on House Administration.

400. A letter from the Attorney General, transmitting copies of orders of the Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service suspending deportation as well as a list of the persons involved, pursuant to the act of Congress approved July 1, 1948 (Public Law 863), as amended; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

401. A letter from the Attorney General, transmitting copies of orders of the Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service granting the application for permanent residence filed by the subjects of such orders, pursuant to section 4 of the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, as amended; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

402. A letter from the Acting Assistant Secretary of the Interior, transmitting copies of laws enacted by the Eleventh Guam Congress and the First Guam Legislature, pursuant to section 19 of Public Law 630, Eighty-first Congress, to the Organic Act for Guam; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

REPORTS OF COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 2 of rule XIII, reports of committees were delivered to the Clerk for printing and reference to the proper calendar, as follows:

Mr. RIBICOFF: Committee on Foreign Affairs. House Joint Resolution 223. Joint resolution to give the Department of Commerce the authority to extend certain charters of vessels to citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, and for other purposes; with amendment (Rept. No. 343). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.

Mr. CHATHAM: Committee on Foreign Affairs. House Resolution 204. Resolution appointing Members of the House of Representatives to attend and participate in the Australian Commonwealth Jubilee Celebration to be held in Canberra, Australia, during May 1951; without amendment (Rept. No. 372). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.

Mr. CARNAHAN: Committee on Foreign Affairs. H. R. 3791. A bill to furnish emergency food relief assistance to India; without amendment (Rept. No. 373). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.

Mr. LYLE: Committee on Rules. House Resolution 206. Resolution providing for the consideration of H. R. 2084, a bill relating to the treatment of powers of appointment for estate- and gift-tax purposes; without amendment (Rept. No. 374). Referred to the House Calendar.

Mr. MITCHELL: Committee on Rules. House Resolution 207. Resolution providing for the consideration of H. R. 3576, a bill to amend the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, as amended; without amendment (Rept. No. 375). Referred to the House Calendar.

Mr. LANE: Committee on the Judiciary. H. R. 3692. A bill to facilitate the financing of defense contracts by banks and other financing institutions, to amend the Assignment of Claims Act of 1940, and for other purposes; without amendment (Rept. No. 376). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.

REPORTS OF COMMITTEES ON PRIVATE BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 2 of rule XIII, reports of committees were delivered to the Clerk for printing and reference to the proper calendar, as follows:

Mr. BYRNE of New York: Committee on the Judiciary. S. 300. An act for the relief of Lloyd F. Stewart; without amendment

(Rept. No. 344). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House.

Mr. BYRNE of New York: Committee on the Judiciary. S. 451. An act for the relief of James McGillic and Blossom McGillic; without amendment (Rept. No. 345). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House.

Mr. BYRNE of New York: Committee on the Judiciary. S. 464. An act for the relief of Willard Cheek and Louise Cheek; without amendment (Rept. No. 346). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House.

Mr. BYRNE of New York: Committee on the Judiciary. S. 568. An act for the relief of George W. Purdy; without amendment (Rept. No. 347). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House.

Mr. BYRNE of New York: Committee on the Judiciary. S. 613. An act for the relief of Ernestine Bacon Jacobs; without amendment (Rept. No. 348). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House.

Mr. BYRNE of New York: Committee on the Judiciary. S. 768. An act conferring jurisdiction on the Court of Claims of the United States to hear, determine, and render judgment on the claims of G. T. Elliott, Inc., and M. F. Quinn; without amendment (Rept. No. 349). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House.

Mr. FRAZIER: Committee on the Judiciary. H. R. 658. A bill for the relief of Harold W. Britton; with amendment (Rept. No. 350). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House.

Mr. KEATING: Committee on the Judiciary. H. R. 1443. A bill for the relief of Paul Matelli; without amendment (Rept. No. 351). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House.

Mr. JONAS: Committee on the Judiciary. H. R. 1593. A bill for the relief of Charles E. Maulden; with amendment (Rept. No. 352). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House.

Mr. KEATING: Committee on the Judiciary. H. R. 1676. A bill for the relief of Elizabeth Sabow; with amendment (Rept. No. 353). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House.

Mr. JONAS: Committee on the Judiciary. H. R. 2107. A bill for the relief of Edward M. Chapman, Roland P. Davis, and the Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York; without amendment (Rept. No. 354). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House.

Mr. MACHROWICZ: Committee on the Judiciary. H. R. 2204. A bill for the relief of Lamar Calloway; with amendment (Rept. No. 355). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House.

Mr. BYRNE of New York: Committee on the Judiciary. H. R. 2207. A bill for the relief of Numa A. Winstead; without amendment (Rept. No. 356). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House.

Mr. BYRNE of New York: Committee on the Judiciary. H. R. 2913. A bill for the relief of Mrs. Evelyn Campbell; without amendment (Rept. No. 357). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House.

Mr. JONAS: Committee on the Judiciary. H. R. 3217. A bill for the relief of the Peerless Casualty Co. and of Charles E. Nelson and Irwin I. Main; without amendment (Rept. No. 358). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House.

Mr. BYRNE of New York: Committee on the Judiciary. H. R. 3229. A bill for the relief of Mrs. Albert W. Lack; with amendment (Rept. No. 359). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House.

Mr. MACHROWICZ: Committee on the Judiciary. H. R. 3562. A bill for the relief of sundry former students of the Air Reserve Officers' Training Corps; without amendment (Rept. No. 360). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House.

Mr. BYRNE of New York: Committee on the Judiciary. H. R. 3651. A bill conferring jurisdiction upon the United States District

Court for the District of New Mexico to hear, determine, and render judgment upon the claim of Adolphus M. Holman; without amendment (Rept. No. 361). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House.

Mr. BYRNE of New York: Committee on the Judiciary. H. R. 3653. A bill for the relief of Angelina Marsiglia; without amendment (Rept. No. 362). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House.

Mr. BYRNE of New York: Committee on the Judiciary. H. R. 3706. A bill for the relief of John K. Jackson; without amendment (Rept. No. 363). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House.

Mr. WALTER: Committee on the Judiciary. S. 77. An act for the relief of Mircea Grossu and his family; without amendment (Rept. No. 364). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House.

Mr. WALTER: Committee on the Judiciary. S. 119. An act for the relief of Joseph Girardi; without amendment (Rept. No. 365). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House.

Mr. WALTER: Committee on the Judiciary. S. 165. An act for the relief of Robert Johanna Sorensen; without amendment (Rept. No. 366). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House.

Mr. WALTER: Committee on the Judiciary. S. 166. An act for the relief of Lars Daniel Sorensen; without amendment (Rept. No. 367). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House.

Mr. WALTER: Committee on the Judiciary. S. 822. An act for the relief of Mrs. Robert M. Sternberg; without amendment (Rept. No. 368). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House.

Mr. WALTER: Committee on the Judiciary. S. 824. An act for the relief of Gertrud Lomnitz; without amendment (Rept. No. 369). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House.

Mr. WALTER: Committee on the Judiciary. Senate Concurrent Resolution 9. Concurrent resolution favoring the suspension of deportation of certain aliens; with amendment (Rept. No. 370). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House.

Mr. WALTER: Committee on the Judiciary. Senate Concurrent Resolution 10. Concurrent resolution favoring the suspension of deportation of certain aliens; with amendment (Rept. No. 371). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House.

PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 3 of rule XXII, public bills and resolutions were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. CELLER:

H. R. 3828. A bill to assist Federal prisoners in their rehabilitation; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. DEWART:

H. R. 3829. A bill authorizing the exchange of certain Indian lands; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

By Mr. HART:

H. R. 3830. A bill to authorize the construction and equipment of a geomagnetic station for the Department of Commerce; to the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries.

By Mr. KEOGH:

H. R. 3831. A bill to amend the fifth paragraph of section 311 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

H. R. 3832. A bill to amend section 3178 of the Internal Revenue Code; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. MARTIN of Massachusetts:

H. R. 3833. A bill to amend the Immigration Act of 1924, as amended, to remove the age limitations with respect to nonquota and preference quota status for unmarried sons

and daughters of United States citizens and alien residents; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H. R. 3834. A bill to provide for the establishment of a veterans' hospital in or near Fall River, Mass.; to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs.

By Mr. MITCHELL:

H. R. 3835. A bill to simplify and consolidate the laws relating to the receipt of compensation from dual employments under the United States, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

H. R. 3836. A bill to establish the Federal Agency for Handicapped, to define its duties, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Education and Labor.

By Mr. NORRELL:

H. R. 3837. A bill to amend Public Laws Nos. 815 and 874 of the Eighty-first Congress; to the Committee on Education and Labor.

By Mr. POTTER:

H. J. Res. 242. Joint resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution to provide that a special national election may be held upon a two-thirds vote of each House of Congress; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

MEMORIALS

Under clause 3 of rule XXII, memorials were presented and referred as follows:

By Mr. PRICE: Memorial of the Sixty-seventh General Assembly of the State of Illinois, resolving that the Federal Communications Commission be urged to take such steps as may be necessary to grant licenses to three unassigned television channels allocated to the city of Chicago; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By the SPEAKER: Memorial of the Legislature of the State of California, relative to Gen. Douglas MacArthur; to the Committee on Armed Services.

Also, memorial of the Legislature of the State of California, relative to the use of Federal gasoline tax money; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

Also, memorial of the Legislature of the State of Illinois, recommending that legislation be enacted amending pertinent sections of the Federal Social Security Act; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

Also, memorial of the Legislature of the State of New York, relative to the reinstatement by the Civil Aeronautics Authority of its flight rules governing La Guardia Field and Idlewild Airport; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

PRIVATE BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 1 of rule XXII, private bills and resolutions were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. DEWART:

H. R. 3838. A bill authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to issue a patent in fee to Joseph Pickett; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

H. R. 3839. A bill authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to issue a patent in fee to Sylvania Cooper Jahncke; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

H. R. 3840. A bill authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to issue a patent in fee to Laura A. Craig; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

By Mr. HELLER:

H. R. 3841. A bill for the relief of Francesco Romano; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

PETITIONS, ETC.

Under clause 1 of rule XXII, petitions and papers were laid on the Clerk's desk and referred as follows:

253. By Mr. MACHROWICZ: Petition of the Common Council of the City of Hamtramck,

Mich., recommending the abolishment of the Federal Tax Policy Committee; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

254. By Mr. SMITH of Wisconsin: Resolution of the Board of Supervisors of Milwaukee County to the effect that the Milwaukee district office of the Office of Price Stabilization should be reclassified to an A status; to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

SENATE

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 25, 1951

(Legislative day of Tuesday, April 17, 1951)

The Senate met at 12 o'clock meridian, on the expiration of the recess.

His Excellency, Norman J. O. Makin, Ambassador from the Commonwealth of Australia to the United States, offered the following prayer:

God, our father, the father of all mankind, Thou art the God that doest wonders. Thou art our refuge and strength, and we turn to Thee. In these days so tense and fraught with tremendous consequences for good or evil, we seek Thy guidance. Our God, we would remember the prophet who sought Thy voice, but who did not find it in the earthquake or the whirlwind. In all the confusions around us, may we turn to Thee and see the majesty of Thy power. In the face of common dangers, preserve us from evil intent or moral decay.

May we be resolute and united, conscious of our high calling in the affairs of the nations. May we be free from arrogance or hatred. Grant us wisdom and understanding in dealing with all men, with our friends and our enemies. With all radiance and power may we make these things self-evident, so that the world shall know that this is the way by which men are made free—that it is the truth alone that shall make men free.

Almighty God, we humbly beseech Thee to vouchsafe Thy blessing upon the President, the Vice President, and the people of this Nation. Prosper all wise deliberation in this Legislature, and bless every Member of this Senate in his individual and corporate responsibilities, to the advancement of Thy glory and the true welfare of the people of the United States of America.

In Thine infinite wisdom, bind the nations in the bonds of one accord. Grant that all men everywhere may turn to Thee and be moved by divine compassion. Preserve brave men and assuage their suffering. Grant us the blessings of peace with honor, and finally bring us all to the joys of Thine eternal kingdom. Through Jesus Christ our Lord. Amen.

THE JOURNAL

On request of Mr. McFARLAND, and by unanimous consent, the reading of the Journal of the proceedings of Tuesday, April 24, 1951, was dispensed with.

MESSAGES FROM THE PRESIDENT— APPROVAL OF BILLS

Messages in writing from the President of the United States were commu-

nicated to the Senate by Mr. Miller, one of his secretaries, and he announced that the President had approved and signed the following acts:

On April 24, 1951:

S. 60. An act for the relief of Cilka Elizabeth Ingrova; and

S. 379. An act to authorize relief of authorized certifying officers of terminated war agencies in liquidation by the Department of Labor.

On April 25, 1951:

S. 82. An act to provide reimbursement of expenses incurred in connection with the burial of those who served in the military forces of the Commonwealth of the Philippines while such forces were in the Armed Forces of the United States pursuant to the military order of the President of the United States, dated July 26, 1941.

LEAVES OF ABSENCE

On his own request, and by unanimous consent, Mr. CAIN was excused from attendance on sessions of the Senate Thursday and Friday of this week.

On request of Mr. HOLLAND, and by unanimous consent, he and Mr. SMATHERS were excused from attendance on the sessions of the Senate for the remainder of the week, to make a formal visit to the Florida Legislature, now in biennial session, with reference to both Federal and State matters.

COMMITTEE MEETINGS DURING SENATE SESSION

On request of Mr. O'MAHONEY (for Mr. CHAVEZ), and by unanimous consent, the subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee having before it the Labor and Federal Security appropriation bill was authorized to sit during the session of the Senate today.

On request of Mr. KILGORE, and by unanimous consent, the subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee having before it the Treasury and Post Office appropriation bill was authorized to sit during the session of the Senate this afternoon.

TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE BUSINESS

Mr. McFARLAND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senators be permitted to present petitions and memorials, submit reports, introduce bills and joint resolutions, and transact other routine business, without debate, and without speeches.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered.

PROPOSED SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATION, LEGISLATIVE BRANCH (S. DOC. NO. 28)

The VICE PRESIDENT laid before the Senate a communication from the President of the United States, transmitting a proposed supplemental appropriation, in the amount of \$75,000, for the legislative branch, fiscal year 1952, in the form of an amendment to the budget for said fiscal year, which, with the accompanying paper, was referred to the Committee on Appropriations and ordered to be printed.

DEAN ACHESON—RESOLUTION OF LLOYD SPETZ POST, NO. 1, AMERICAN LEGION, BISMARCK, N. DAK.

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. President, I present for appropriate reference and ask unani-

mous consent to have printed in the RECORD a resolution adopted by Lloyd Spetz Post, No. 1, the American Legion, of Bismarck, N. Dak., with which I am fully in accord and I commend them for the action they have taken. It relates to the proposed resignation or impeachment of Dean Acheson, Secretary of State.

There being no objection, the resolution was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations and ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Whereas the great majority of all patriotic citizens of the United States were shocked and astounded by the action of the President of the United States in relieving General MacArthur of his command; and

Whereas we deem such action of the President both unjustifiable and of grievous and dangerous consequences to the United States of America and to the world; and

Whereas this act has every appearance of further appeasement of the evil forces of communism now rampant in a divided world; and

Whereas it appears that the President has been unduly influenced in this, as well as other matters, by the Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, and that greater concern has been shown for the reactions of communism than for maintaining the highest standards of Americanism that have always and always should prevail in our great Nation; and

Whereas we deem that the best interests of the Nation demand that Dean Acheson, as Secretary of State, either resign or be impeached, the American people having lost all confidence in him long ago and it appearing that he and the State Department are out of touch and out of harmony with the thinking of our people, and that the feeling of many of the people of our country is that his actions have the appearance of the actions of a Judas: Now, therefore, in meeting duly assembled, the Lloyd Spetz Post, No. 1, of the American Legion of Bismarck, N. Dak., does hereby resolve that it is the sense of the meeting that Dean Acheson, as Secretary of State, must be retired from the Government for the good of the Nation, and that it is further the sense of this meeting that the Congress of the United States should immediately demand of the President of the United States that Dean Acheson, as Secretary of State, resign or that he be subjected to impeachment by the Congress; be it

Resolved, That it is the sense of this meeting that it is imperative that the Congress assert its leadership in this grave hour to safeguard the vital interests of the Nation and take whatever steps may be necessary to avert and prevent grave and serious errors of policy in the future that have prevailed in the recent past; be it further

Resolved, That a copy of this resolution be sent to the President of the United States, to Dean Acheson, Secretary of State, and to the entire congressional delegation of the State of North Dakota.

REPORT OF A COMMITTEE

The following report of a committee was submitted:

By Mr. PASTORE, from the Committee on the District of Columbia:

S. 945. A bill to amend the District of Columbia Teachers' Salary Act of 1947; with an amendment (Rept. No. 296).

PRINTING OF COMPILATION OF SOCIAL- SECURITY LAWS (S. DOC. NO. 27)

Mr. HAYDEN. Mr. President, from the Committee on Rules and Administration, I report favorably, without amendment, Senate Resolution 125, and I ask unanimous consent for its immediate consideration.